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Foreword
Twenty-two years have passed since the adoption in May 1992 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. The Convention broke new ground in the progressive develop-
ment of international law. It introduced the principle that biodiversity is a “common 
concern of humankind”; it restated the concept of “sustainable development” of bio-
logical resources, which a month later was to be proclaimed in general terms by 
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration. It provided a legal framework for the protection and 
sustainable use of biodiversity as a global common good to be tapped in the general 
interest of humanity. In other respects the Convention on Biological Diversity 
remained attached to the traditional “Westphalian” model of international law as a 
legal order created by States and meant to govern relations between sovereign States. 
It explicitly embraced the principle that States have the sovereign right over their natu-
ral resources (Preamble, Articles 3 and 15), thus endorsing the entrenched idea that 
States are allowed to “privatize” parts of the physical space of the planet under the 
mantle of “territorial sovereignty.” This idea runs counter to the cosmopolitan model of 
“common heritage” of biological resources, which was earlier foreshadowed in the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1983 Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources. This “realistic” solution respectful of State sovereignty has been the key to 
the success of the Convention and to its almost universal support, as witnessed by its 
194 contracting Parties at the time of this writing. At the same time, the State-oriented 
approach adopted by the Convention is counterbalanced by the introduction of two 
innovative principles: that of “facilitated access” to bio-genetic resources for environ-
mentally sustainable development, and that of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits” 
arising from research and commercial exploitation of such resources. These two prin-
ciples have a potential for progressive development of international law. First, State 
sovereignty is recast in a “modern” perspective – not any longer as absolute territorial 
power and jus excludendi alios, but as a form of public authority to be exercised in a 
manner that is functional to the goals of sustainable utilization of the common good 
of biodiversity. Second, the introduction of fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
entails the recognition of an entitlement under international law to an equitable 
remuneration of the providers of bio-genetic resources, thus departing from the previ-
ous regime of freedom for everyone to access and exploit genetic material with no 
obligation whatsoever to return some of the benefits accruing from its exploitation.
Facilitated access and benefit-sharing have important implications in terms of eco-
nomic incentives to invest in the identification and sustainable use of bio-genetic 
resources and in terms of growing expectations of financial reward for source coun-
tries rich in biodiversity. At the same time, the concrete implementation of the two 
principles raises complex issues. An appropriate legislative and institutional setting is 
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needed in order to operationalize the two principles at the national level so as to avoid 
not only the risk of free riding, but also the opposite risk of the “anti-common”, that is 
the presence of so many layers of decision – national, regional, local, communal – as 
to make access to and management of biological resources unreasonably cumbersome 
and uneconomical. This presents a real challenge when we consider that the 
Convention on Biological Diversity has included indigenous and local communities 
among the title-holders of traditional knowledge which is relevant to the identifica-
tion and utilization of genetic resources and which makes them indispensable partici-
pants in the decision-making process. At the same time, the principle of equity 
underlying the strategic concept of benefit-sharing needs to be clarified in terms of 
international standards, rather than left to the pure private-law bargaining between 
business actors and local titleholders.
It is in view of addressing these complex issues that the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity embarked in the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-sharing. The Protocol was adopted in October 2010 at the tenth meeting of 
the Parties to the Convention and will enter into force ninety days after the date of 
deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification or accession. With 29 ratifications so far, 
almost entirely by developing countries, the Protocol has still some way to go to meet 
its goal of providing a widely internationally accepted legal framework for governing 
access and benefit-sharing in the field of biodiversity resources. 
With this publication, Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck have pro-
duced an outstanding contribution to the elucidation of the issues that will dominate, 
and in fact are already dominating, the agenda for the implementation of the Protocol. 
Their earlier work The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, 
published by the same team of authors as editors in 2013, was the first bold attempt at 
bringing together academics and policy-makers to enhance the collective understand-
ing of the far-reaching implications of the Protocol in the many areas of international 
law, including environmental law, human rights, international economic law and the 
law of the sea. With this Commentary, which appears just a year after the earlier work, 
the authors have made two central contributions to the field of biodiversity law. They 
have provided an invaluable contribution to the understanding of the innovative pro-
visions of the Protocol and of the challenges they pose for their effective implementa-
tion. At the same time, they have placed their textual analysis in the broader context of 
international law and of its dynamic evolution with regard to the development of soli-
darity obligations, the environmental dimension of human rights, the role of equity, 
and the emerging status of indigenous peoples and local traditional communities as 
title-holders of biodiversity-related knowledge. It is to be hoped that this book will 
contribute not only to operationalize the principle of access and benefit-sharing in 
national law and commercial practices, but also to place the sometimes competing 
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concepts of intellectual property rights and sovereign rights in the modern perspective 
of biodiversity as a “common concern of humanity” and of the common good of sus-
tainable development.  
Francesco Francioni
European University Institute
Florence
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Introduction
The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing1 (ABS) is an international 
agreement that concerns environmental sustainability,2 other sustainable 
development issues3 and justice.4 It aims at sharing the benefits arising from 
the utilization of genetic resources and of the traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities in a fair 
and equitable way, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies. By doing so, the Protocol aims at 
contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use 
of its components. 
1 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, 
29 October 2010, not yet in force), in CBD Decision 10/1, “Access to genetic resources and the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization” (20 January 2011) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (hereinafter, Nagoya Protocol or the Protocol).
2 E.g., Nagoya Protocol 7th preambular paragraph (which reads: ‘Acknowledging the potential 
role of access and benefit-sharing to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity . . . and environmental sustainability”, emphasis added) and 14th pream-
bular paragraph (which reads: ‘Recognizing the importance of genetic resources to . . . biodi-
versity conservation and the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change’). See discussion 
in this commentary on Article 1, section 4.
3 E.g., Nagoya Protocol 5th preambular paragraph (which reads: ‘Recognizing the important 
contribution to sustainable development made by technology transfer and cooperation to 
build research and innovation capacities for adding value to genetic resources in developing 
countries’) and 7th preambular paragraph (which reads: ‘Acknowledging the potential role 
of access and benefit-sharing to contribute to . . . poverty eradication . . . thereby contributing 
to achieving the Millennium Development Goals’) (emphasis added). For a discussion, see 
Conclusions to this commentary, section 2.
4 For a discussion predating the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, Bram De Jonge, “What Is 
Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24 
(2011): 127; Philippe Cullet, “Environmental Justice in the Use, Knowledge and Exploitation 
of Genetic Resources,” in Environmental Law and Justice in Context, ed. Jonas Ebbesson and 
Phoebe N. Okowa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 371; and Peter-Tobias 
Stoll, “Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Underlying Concepts and the Idea 
of Justice,” in Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law: Solutions for Access 
and Benefit Sharing, ed. Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter (London: Earthscan, 2009), 3. 
For a discussion after the conclusion of the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol, see also 
Peter-Tobias Stoll, “ABS, Justice, Pools and the Nagoya Protocol,” in Common Pools of Genetic 
Resources Equity and Innovation in International Biodiversity Law, ed. Evanson C. Kamau and 
Gerd Winter (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 305.
2 introduction
The Nagoya Protocol was adopted under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).5 Similarly to the CBD, it provides a flexible framework for 
accommodating developed and developing countries’ concerns and capacities6 
and for encouraging partnerships between national and local authorities, indig-
enous and local communities, and the private sector.7 The Protocol expands 
upon the text of the Convention by detailing obligations in relation to benefit-
sharing and access to genetic resources8 and traditional knowledge associated 
with such resources.9 It contributes to developing significantly the concept of 
benefit-sharing10 under international law. In addition, the Protocol seeks to 
strike an innovative balance between the economic and non-economic values 
5 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993) 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD).
6 Désirée McGraw, “The CBD – Key Characteristics and Implications for Development,” 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 11 (2002): 17.
7 Lee Kimball, “Institutional Linkages between the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and Other International Conventions,” Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 6 (1997): 239.
8 The literature on the CBD provisions on genetic resources is extensive: Daniel 
Robinson, Confronting Biopiracy: Challenges, Cases and International Debates (London: 
Earthscan, 2010); Suneetha M. Subramanian and Balakrishna Pisupati, Learning from 
the Practitioners: Benefit Sharing Perspectives from Enterprising Communities (Nairobi: 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP)/United Nations University (UNU), 2009); Charles 
McManis, Biodiversity and the Law (London: Earthscan, 2007); Morten W. Tvedt and 
Tomme Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
Commitment in the CBD (Gland: IUCN, 2007); Natalie Stoianoff, ed, Accessing Biological 
Resources: Complying with the Convention on Biological Diversity (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004); and Walter V. Reid et al., Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic 
Resources for Sustainable Development (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 1993).
9 Anja Meyer, “International Environmental Law and Human Rights: Towards the Explicit 
Recognition of Traditional Knowledge,” Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 10 (2001): 37; Kamau and Winter, eds., Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and the Law, op. cit.; Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder and Roger Chennells, 
eds, Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing: Lessons from the San-Hoodia Case 
(New York: Springer, 2009); Sarah A. Laird, ed, Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: 
Equitable Partnerships in Practice (London: Earthscan, 2002); Suneetha M. Subramanian 
and Balakrishna Pisupati, Traditional Knowledge in Policy and Practice: Approaches to 
Development and Human Well-Being (Tokyo: UNU, 2010); and Manuel Ruiz and Ronnie 
Vernooy, eds, The Custodians of Biodiversity: Sharing Access to and Benefits of Genetic 
Resources (London: Earthscan, 2012).
10 This concept has indeed been subject to evolving interpretation by the CBD Parties 
as a tool for inter-State cooperation as well as for partnership between States, indige-
nous and local communities, and the private sector: Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani, 
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of biodiversity, more tightly linking the third objective of the CBD (benefit-
sharing) with its first and second objectives – conservation and sustainable 
use.11 It thus contains provisions related to environmental management, inter-
national cooperation and human rights, while addressing a fairly complex sub-
ject matter that affects a range of research and commercial activities.
By way of introduction, the following sections will first trace the origins of 
the international debate on access and benefit-sharing (ABS) related to genetic 
resources, highlighting the evolution of the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing in inter-State relations under the international biodiversity 
regime. The key features of the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol that have a 
bearing on its interpretation will then be outlined. Attention will then turn to 
the novelty of including traditional knowledge in an international regime on 
ABS, which highlights the intra-State dimension of benefit-sharing. This leads 
to a preliminary identification of legal questions arising from the inclusion 
of indigenous peoples and local communities among the beneficiaries of the 
Nagoya Protocol. On this basis, the introduction will then explain the objective, 
approach and methods of the present commentary, as well as its limitations.
1 The International Debate on Access and Benefit-sharing 
Modern bio-sciences have led to the rapid growth of scientific research on the 
genetic base of life, on the relevance of genes for the biological and chemical 
make-up of cells and organisms, and on interactions between the genetic and 
bio-chemical make-up of organisms and their natural environment. Genes and 
naturally occurring bio-chemicals play significant and growing roles in differ-
ent economic sectors and are considered as the basis for meeting important 
societal challenges in diverse areas such as agricultural research and food secu-
rity, the development of medicines, cosmetics or bio-based sources of renewable 
energy, or adaptation to climate change, to name but a few.12 Although the 
“The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Communities’ Livelihoods,” 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 19 (2010): 150. 
11 See commentary on Article 1, section 4, Article 5, section 6, Article 8, section 2, Article 9, 
section 2, Article 10, section 4, Article 12, section 5, Article 21, section 3, Article 22, 
section 3, and Article 23, section 3, discussing the promotion of coherent interpretation 
and integrative implementation of the CBD objectives under the Nagoya Protocol. 
12 TEEB, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of 
Nature: A Synthesis of the Approach, Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB (Nairobi: 
UNEP, 2010), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.teebweb.org/>. 
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commercial value of genetic resources is still the object of dispute,13 the value 
of products derived from genetic resources worldwide was estimated in 1999 
between USD 500–800 billion.14 According to more recent estimates, compa-
nies relying on genetic resources for their research and development include 
pharmaceutical and food companies earning more than USD 50 billion annu-
ally, with combined industry and government expenditures in research and 
development in the pharmaceutical sector totaling USD 68 billion in 2010.15 In 
the field of medicine alone, terrestrial plants and microorganisms have been 
important natural sources used in the development of new medicines: approx-
imately 75 percent of the top 20 hospital drugs and approximately 20 percent 
of the top 100 most widely prescribed drugs are derived from natural sources.16 
Bioprospecting17 is often a transnational activity:18 it involves situations 
where genetic resources are acquired in one State but are used in another State. 
The role of international law is thus that of addressing the trans-jurisdictional 
aspects of regulating in one country access to genetic resources by users based 
in other countries, and rewarding States holding genetic resources for their con-
tribution to the development of products that are eventually commercialized 
13 Sebastian Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal, “Global Governance of Genetic Resources: 
Background and Analytical Framework,” in Global Governance of Genetic Resources: 
Access and Benefit Sharing After the Nagoya Protocol, ed. Sebastian Oberthür and Kristin 
Rosendal (London: Routledge, 2013), 1, 3.
14 Kerry Ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-Sharing (London: Earthscan, 1999), cited by Oberthür and Rosendal, 
“Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Background and Analytical Framework,” 
op. cit., 3.
15 Sarah A. Laird and Rachel P. Wynberg, “Bioscience at a Crossroads: Implementing 
the Nagoya Protocol in a Time of Scientific, Technological and Industry Change,” CBD 
Factsheet (2012), accessed 1 February 2014, <www.cbd.int/abs/policy-brief/default.
shtml/>. 
16 Amy E. Wright, “Biological Diversity Equals Chemical Diversity – The Search for Better 
Medicines” US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Ocean Explorer, 
accessed 13 December 2013, <http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/02sab/back 
ground/biodiversity/biodiversity.html>. See also Daniel A. Dias, Sylvia Urban and Ute 
Roessner, “A Historical Overview of Natural Products in Drug Discovery,” Metabolites 2 
(2012): 313. 
17 ‘Bioprospecting’ is understood as ‘the search for plant and animal species from which 
medicinal drugs and other commercially valuable compounds can be obtained.’ See 
Oxford Dictionary, accessed 6 March 2014, <www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/bioprospecting>.
18 Christine Godt, “Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties in User Countries,” in Kamau and 
Winter, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law, op. cit., 419, 420–421.
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by actors in other countries.19 The debate on international law and ABS has 
thus not been concerned with the purely domestic uses of genetic resources. 
Rather, international law has been considered necessary to foster international 
cooperation for the protection of the sovereign entitlement of one State to 
derive benefits from the use of its genetic resources once these resources are 
brought outside of its jurisdiction.20 In addition, international law is needed to 
ensure the realization of the international community’s objective of ensuring 
fairness in transnational ABS transactions ‘in recognition of the need to reduce 
enormous global asymmetries’ among developed and developing States,21 
as explained below. As often ABS transactions concern private individuals/ 
entities, international law is also needed to guide the development of domestic 
legislation and interaction of different countries’ domestic legal frameworks 
creating rights and duties for individuals/entities within their jurisdiction in 
sharing and receiving benefits from access to genetic resources. This should 
ultimately ensure the implementation of fair and equitable private-law con-
tractual arrangements that are to be negotiated between the individuals, pri-
vate entities, indigenous and local communities, institutions or governments 
in each individual ABS transaction.22 To that end, the role of international 
law in relation to ABS is that of setting a multilateral framework coordinat-
ing domestic measures governing contractual ABS transactions,23 and foster-
ing international cooperation, thereby operating “across the public-private 
divide.”24 
The CBD was pioneering in introducing the concepts of ABS for genetic 
resources in international environmental law in early recognition of the 
above-described scientific and technological developments and legal chal-
lenges. Until its negotiation and entry into force, an arguable25 application 
19 Cullet, “Environmental Justice in the Use, Knowledge and Exploitation of Genetic 
Resources,” op. cit., 372.
20 Stoll, “ABS, Justice, Pools,” op. cit., 309.
21 Braulio Dias, “Preface,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 1.
22 Tomme Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” in The 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and 
Implementation Challenges, ed. Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 451, 457.
23 Sebastian Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal, “Conclusions,” in Oberthür and Rosendal, 
Global Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 231, 237–239.
24 Ibid.
25 This understanding of common heritage should be compared with the common heri-
tage regime, as provided for in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 
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of the concept of common heritage of mankind over biological resources had 
resulted in an almost free flow of genetic resources across boundaries.26 Access 
to genetic resources in nature (in situ)27 was considered free and uncondi-
tional, and the results of research on such resources were expected to benefit 
future generations. The CBD marked a paradigm shift vis-à-vis bioprospecting 
by recognizing national sovereignty over genetic resources.28 In other words, 
the CBD subjected access to genetic resources to the prior informed consent 
(PIC) of the State providing the resource.29 Furthermore, the CBD made it an 
objective for the international community
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources 
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account 
all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding.30 
This fundamental shift in principles can be explained in the light of the asym-
metries between States providing and using genetic resources, exacerbated by 
the intellectual property system, as well as by growing expectations concern-
ing the commercial value of biodiversity. These moral and economic reasons 
will be discussed below in turn.
10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS), Article 140(2) 
which subjects resources that cannot be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of 
States to an international managing and regulating institution with a view to provid-
ing benefits arising from the utilization of such resources to all States even if they are 
unable to participate in the actual process of extraction: see Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle 
and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 128–130 and 197. 
26 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 1. 
27 CBD Article 2 defines ‘in situ conditions’ as ‘conditions where genetic resources exist 
within ecosystems and natural habitats, and in the case of domesticated or cultivated 
species, in the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties.’
28 See Lyle Glowka, Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin and Hugh Synge. A Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (Gland: IUCN, 1994), 76; and Elsa Tsioumani, “International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Legal and Policy Questions from 
Adoption to Implementation,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law 15 (2004): 
119, 122–124.
29 CBD Article 15(5). See commentary on Article 6, Section 3.
30 CBD Article 1.
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1.1 Asymmetries and the Ethical Rationale for ABS
There are several asymmetries among States in relation to genetic resources. 
First of all, genetic variability is not distributed equally among States. Australia, 
Brazil, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, 
India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, the United States of America and Venezuela host 
more than 70% of the world’s biodiversity and are therefore considered mega-
diverse.31 Among these mega-diverse countries, tropical developing countries 
have formed a political grouping, the Like-minded Mega-diverse Countries, 
as their impressive richness in terrestrial genetic resources is not matched by 
the technological capacities to research and develop genetic resources held 
by them.32 This asymmetry in technological capacities also implies unequal 
access to information on the scientific and technological value, and the com-
mercial potential of genetic resources among developed and developing 
countries,33 as well as unequal access to resources and knowledge (including 
legal knowledge and legal assistance) needed to negotiate ABS transactions.34 
All these elements translate into unequal bargaining powers between States.35 
Against this background, a historical asymmetry should be highlighted. 
Colonialism fostered the collection and appropriation of cultural and natu-
ral heritage into museums, zoological and botanical gardens and other ex situ 
31 The UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre identified these countries as mega-
diverse in 2000; and megadiversity is determined on the basis of the ‘total number of spe-
cies in a country and the degree of endemism at the species level and at higher taxonomic 
levels:’ see “State of the Environment Report (Biodiversity Theme Report),” Australia, 
2001, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.environment.gov.au/node/21579>.
32 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Background and 
Analytical Framework,” op. cit., 1.
33 Stoll, “ABS, Justice, Pools,” op. cit., 309; and Stoll, “Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing,” op. cit., 12.
34 Joji Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization: Background and Analysis (The Berne 
Declaration, Bread for the World, Ecoropa, Tebtebba and Third World Network, 2013), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.evb.ch/cm_data/Nagoya_Protocol_complete_final.
pdf>, 5. On the North-South asymmetries and other conflicting objectives behind the 
ABS provisions of the CBD, see generally De Jonge, “What Is Fair and Equitable Benefit-
Sharing?”, op. cit.; and Bram De Jonge and Niels Louwaars, “The Diversity of Principles 
Underlying the Concept of Benefit Sharing,” in Kamau and Winter, Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and the Law, op. cit., 38.
35 Stoll, “ABS, Justice, Pools”, op. cit., 309; and Stoll, “Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
sharing,” op. cit., 12.
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collections in colonizing countries.36 This asymmetry has more recently 
been compounded by the application of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
to improved germplasm.37 On the basis of the concept of the common heri-
tage of mankind, developing countries provided their genetic resources freely, 
while the products incorporating them were protected by IPRs and their use 
was therefore restricted. Even after adoption of the CBD, which established the 
principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources, IPR holders are able 
to enforce their rights through private law in developed countries, whereas 
developing countries’ claims based on their national sovereignty encounter 
significant barriers in foreign jurisdictions where the IPR holders are based. 
This asymmetry is likely to worsen in the face of the growth and increasing 
dominance of multinational corporations in the biotech sector.38
The latter asymmetry is complicated by a well-studied and still unresolved 
tension between international law on IPRs and on biodiversity.39 While pat-
enting based on the use of genetic resources is allowed under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS),40 subject to meeting patentability criteria, these do 
not require evidence of PIC from the country providing genetic resources or 
of benefit-sharing.41 There is thus nothing in the TRIPS Agreement to provide 
support for the CBD principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources. 
Although it can be argued that access to resources in violation of the CBD 
principles of PIC and benefit-sharing may not be legitimate, in the absence of 
national legislation implementing such principles particularly in user coun-
tries, private companies may obtain private rights on products derived from 
genetic resources from other countries without having to adhere to the CBD 
principles. It has thus been argued, in very broad terms, that unless the TRIPS 
Agreement is amended and the patent system ensures respect for the CBD 
36 Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol, op. cit., 2. CBD Article 2 defines ‘ex situ conservation’ as ‘the 
conservation of components of biological diversity outside of their natural habitats.’
37 Michel Petit et al., Why Governments Can’t Make Policy: The Case of Plant Genetic Resources 
in the International Arena (Lima: International Potato Center, 2001), 10 and 19.
38 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 241.
39 Paul Oldham, Stephen Hall and Oscar Forero, “Biological Diversity in the Patent System,” 
PLoS ONE 8 (2013): e78737.
40 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 
1 January 1995), Annex 1C in WTO Secretariat, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 321.
41 See UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development (London: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002), 84.
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principles also in the intellectual property field, implementation and enforce-
ability of such principles will be lacking.42 The situation is further complicated 
by the (mis)application of intellectual property rights over natural compounds, 
which can hardly be considered inventions.43 
An amendment of the TRIPS Agreement44 incorporating a requirement 
to disclose in IPR applications the origin of the genetic resources used in an 
invention, as well as evidence of PIC and benefit-sharing45 would arguably 
make the IPR system a mechanism to enforce the ABS provisions of the CBD 
by linking to the WTO binding dispute settlement system.46 Such proposals, 
however, have been very controversial, and it remains to be seen whether 
negotiations under the WTO will achieve any progress in that regard.47 As the 
impasse on this issue at the WTO continues at the time of writing,48 it should 
42 Ibid. Detailed analysis of the technically complex linkages between the intellectual prop-
erty system and the CBD falls beyond the scope of this commentary. See, e.g., Martha 
Chouchena-Rojas et al., Disclosure Requirements: Ensuring Mutual Supportiveness between 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement and the CBD (Gland and Geneva: Center for International 
Environmental Law et al., 2005), accessed 30 November 2013, <https://portals.iucn.org/
library/node/8766>. 
43 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
44 The original proposal, submitted by a group of developing countries led by India and 
Brazil, was eventually supported by a coalition of 110 WTO members by 2008, when a 
strategic alliance was made with the EU and Switzerland calling for a procedural decision 
to negotiate in parallel the biodiversity amendment and an extension of protected geo-
graphical indications, another issue under discussion in the TRIPS Council: “Article 27.3b, 
Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity,” WTO, accessed on 30 October 2013, <www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm>.
45 In the policy and academic debates, this is referred to as ‘disclosure requirement.’ 
Chouchena-Rojas et al., Disclosure Requirements, op. cit.; and Evanson C. Kamau, 
“Disclosure Requirements – A Critical Appraisal,” in Kamau and Winter, Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and the Law, op. cit., 399.
46 For a technical discussion of proposals to enhance the relationship between the intel-
lectual property system and the CBD, including disclosure requirements, as well as the 
legal and policy issues such proposals raise for the patent system, see “Technical Study on 
Disclosure Requirements in Patent Systems Related to Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge submitted by the WIPO Secretariat” (15 December 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/7/INF/17.
47 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing”, op. cit., 168–169.
48 See the post-Nagoya Protocol version of the proposal: WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, 
“Draft Decision to Enhance Mutual Supportiveness between the TRIPS Agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity” (19 April 2011) WTO DOC TN/C/W/59; and dis-
cussion in Riccardo Pavoni, “The Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” in Morgera, Buck and 
Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 185, 
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be noted that many countries have also been calling for disclosure require-
ments and mechanisms49 to be addressed in the framework of negotiations 
held under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on IPRs and 
genetic resources.50 Discussions on IPRs in both the WIPO and WTO context 
provided a critical background to the negotiations of the Protocol.
1.2  An Incentive-based Approach to Biodiversity Conservation and the 
Economic Rationale for ABS
ABS is expected to generate economic benefits for biodiversity conservation 
in States that share the genetic resources over which they hold sovereign 
rights with other CBD Parties. To a significant extent, it has been argued that 
ABS is ‘assumed’ to create strong incentives for biodiversity conservation 
‘quasi-automatically’.51 In parallel, ABS seeks to enhance access for researchers 
and companies to quality samples of genetic resources, based on predictable 
access decisions at reasonably low transaction costs. This is expected to create 
new opportunities for nature-based research and development and the cre-
ation of innovative goods and services that help to meet societal challenges. 
208–212. The TRIPS/CBD relationship was not on the agenda of the ninth WTO ministe-
rial conference in Bali, 3–7 December 2013. See Bali Ministerial Declaration (11 December 
2013) WTO Doc WT/MIN(13)/DEC. According to the report of the TRIPS Council, con-
sultations continued ‘on the earlier suggestion that the Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) be invited to brief the Council on the outcome of the tenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD . . . ’ See Annual Report (2013) of the 
Council for TRIPS (23 October 2013) WTO DOC IP/C/67. 
49 For a recent study on national practice on disclosure requirements, see Paul Oldham 
and Geoff Burton, “Defusing Disclosure in Patent Applications: A Positive Strategy to 
Strengthen Legal Certainty in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and Support WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore” (2010), accessed 
1 March 2014, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694899>.
50 The WIPO General Assembly established an Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore at its 
twenty-sixth session: WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning intellectual property 
and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore” (3 October 2000) WIPO Doc 
WO/GA/26/6. The mandate of the Committee was subsequently renewed, most recently 
in October 2013, see WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore (IGC)” (14 August 2013) WIPO Doc WO/GA/43/14. See discussion in commentary 
on Article 4, section 3.1.
51 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 244–5.
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More broadly, ABS is expected to strengthen the political and economic inter-
est in, and public awareness of the importance of, preserving genetic diversity 
in situ and in collections ex situ. As recognized in the preamble of the Nagoya 
Protocol,
public awareness about the economic value of ecosystems and biodiver-
sity and the fair and equitable sharing of this economic value with the 
custodians of biodiversity are key incentives for the conservation of bio-
logical diversity and the sustainable use of its components.52 
The primary contribution of ABS to conservation thus arguably rests with 
the idea that the utilization of genetic resources leads to the development of 
new products, and in doing so provides both an incentive and additional eco-
nomic benefits to support conservation efforts.53 These linkages should thus 
be understood54 against the background of increased international attention 
to the concepts of ecosystem services55 and the green economy,56 and the 
emerging importance of bio-based economies.57 The report ‘The Economics 
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ (TEEB), launched in 2010, argued that success-
ful environmental protection needs to be grounded in the explicit recognition, 
52 Nagoya Protocol 6th preambular recital.
53 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for suggesting this point.
54 The linkages between ABS and the complex (and often controversial) concepts men-
tioned in this section would deserve further academic analysis, which, however, falls 
beyond the scope of this commentary.
55 Ecosystem services are the benefits that people obtain from ecosystems: Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystem and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity Synthesis 
(Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2005), accessed 30 November 2013, <www 
.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.354.aspx.pdf>; and intergovernmental endorse-
ment of the concept of ecosystem services in UN General Assembly, “World Summit 
Outcome” (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, paragraph 12. See discussion in Elisa 
Morgera, “The 2005 UN World Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full 
Glass,” Italian Yearbook of International Law 15 (2006): 53, 61. 
56 Elisa Morgera and Annalisa Savaresi, “A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on the Green 
Economy,” Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 22 
(2013): 14.
57 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “The Application of 
Biotechnology to Industrial Sustainability” (Paris: OECD, 2001), accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/the-application-of-biotechnology-to-indus 
trial-sustainability_9789264195639-en>; and OECD, “Towards the Development of OECD 
Best Practices for Assessing the Sustainability of Bio-based Products” (Paris: OECD, 2010), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.oecd.org/sti/biotech/45598236.pdf>.
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efficient allocation, and fair distribution of the costs and benefits of conserva-
tion and sustainable use of natural resources,58 which is seen as an essential 
approach to ensure the mainstreaming of biodiversity concerns in all rel-
evant policy- and decision-making processes.59 In that sense ABS for genetic 
resources may arguably be seen as one of the front-runners for linking eco-
nomic activities more clearly to the services provided by healthy ecosystems.60 
A few words of caution should be added on the economic rationale for ABS 
as a tool for conservation and sustainable use. First, conservation and sus-
tainable use in principle are a precondition for the preservation of genetic 
resources until the time research and development can be conducted upon 
them. Second, directing benefits from research and development of genetic 
resources to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use is to a large extent 
in the discretion of the provider country, so it remains to be seen whether spe-
cific ABS deals will effectively contribute to the other two objectives of the 
CBD.61 Third, difficulties in enforcing implementing measures may also have a 
great bearing on the actual functioning of ABS as an incentive for conservation 
and sustainable use.62 Fourth, biodiversity-related economic instruments have 
so far produced ‘modest effects at best’63 and demand for genetic resources is 
58 TEEB, Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, op. cit., 6. See discussion in Elisa Morgera 
and Elsa Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention 
on Biological Diversity,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law 21 (2011): 3, 9–11.
59 CBD Decision 10/4, “Third edition of the Global Biodiversity Outlook: implications for 
the future implementation of the Convention” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/10/27, paragraph 5(a) and (e). Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow,” op. cit., 9–11.
60 CBD Secretariat, “Access and Benefit-sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across 
Sectors” CBD Technical Series No. 38. (Montreal: CBD Secretariat, 2008), 37.
61 We are grateful to Tomme Young for making this point. See discussion in this commentary 
on Article 1, section 4.
62 We are grateful to Tomme Young for making this point. See CBD Decision 10/44, “Incentive 
measures” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, paragraph 14.
63 Franziska Wolff, “The Nagoya Protocol and the Diffusion of Economic Instruments for 
Ecosystem Services in International Environmental Governance,” in Oberthür and 
Rosendal, Global Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 134, 135–139, 151 and 153 as 
part of a broader trend in incentive-based governance of biodiversity. See also Riccardo 
Pavoni, “Channeling Investment into Biodiversity Conservation: ABS and PES Schemes,” 
in Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection Incentives and 
Safeguards, ed. Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 206; and CBD and UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
(WCMC), “Global Biodiversity Outlook (Montreal and Cambridge: 2010 CBD and UNEP- 
WCMC), accessed 30 November 2013, <http://gbo3.cbd.int/> 19, where it is stated that 
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affected by free availability of pre-CBD (and arguably pre-Protocol)64 material 
ex situ.65
More fundamentally, the commodification of biodiversity arguably underly-
ing the discourse on ecosystem services has not gone unchallenged. Increasing 
attention is being paid to addressing ethical questions raised by market-based 
approaches to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.66 This principled 
debate is reflected in multilateral policy-making, as the concept of ecosystem 
services as developed within the CBD framework has arguably attempted to 
reconcile an economic approach67 with an increased focus on its contribution 
to poverty eradication68 and on the need for broader stakeholder engagement, 
particularly the vulnerable.69 These tensions clearly emerge also in the context 
‘There are few examples of the benefit arising from the commercial and other utilization 
of genetic resources being shared with the countries providing such resources.’
64 On pre-Protocol material, see this commentary on Article 3, Section 3.1.
65 Wolff, “Nagoya Protocol and the Diffusion,” op. cit., 151. Along the same lines, Stoll, “Access 
to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 4. Laird and Wynberg, “Bioscience at 
a Crossroads”, op. cit., at 2, note that ‘In higher tech industries like pharmaceuticals, agri-
culture and biotech, the need to access genetic resources is less than in previous years, 
through large-scale field collections, but interest persists; in lower tech industries con-
sumer demand for novel, and natural ingredients is often a central part of product iden-
tity and marketing.’
66 For example, see papers collected in the special issue of Transnational Environmental 
Law published in October 2013, in particular the contribution by Colin T. Reid, “Between 
Priceless and Worthless: Challenges in Using Market Mechanisms for Conserving 
Biodiversity,” Transnational Environmental Law 2 (2013): 217, where the author draws 
attention to the challenges of ‘defining the units that can be the subject of the economic 
or market devices,’ ‘ensuring that such mechanisms do deliver conservation gains and 
establishing appropriate governance arrangements’, as well as to ‘ethical concerns’ associ-
ated with the commodification of nature. Ibid., 218.
67 CBD Decision 5/6, “Ecosystem approach” (22 June 2000) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23; 
and CBD Decision 7/11, “Ecosystem approach” (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/7/21.
68 CBD COP Decision 10/6, “Integration of biodiversity into poverty eradication and devel-
opment” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27; and CBD Decision 11/22, 
“Biodiversity for poverty eradication and development” (5 December 2012) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35.
69 For instance, CBD Decision 10/4, “Third edition of the Global Biodiversity Outlook: 
Implications for the Future Implementation of the Convention” (20 January 2011) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, paragraphs 5(d) and (f), points to: enhancing the benefits 
from biodiversity to contribute to local livelihoods; empowering indigenous and local 
community; and ensuring their participation in decision-making processes to protect and 
encourage their customary sustainable use of biological resources. 
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of the Nagoya Protocol, as evidence of a positive interaction between benefit-
sharing and biodiversity conservation remains meager.70
1.3 The ABS Provisions of the CBD 
Against this background, fair and equitable benefit-sharing was at the heart 
of the political agreement at the time of adoption of the Convention: it was 
conceived both as an economic incentive for the developing world to con-
serve biodiversity, as well as a means to correct injustices.71 Benefit-sharing, 
as enshrined in the CBD, thus embodies an inter-State approach to achieve 
sustainable development and equity.72 In particular, it points to a bilateral rela-
tion between a country providing genetic resources and a country using them.
The legally binding language of CBD Article 15(7) points to an inter-State 
benefit-sharing obligation, that is not expressly linked to specific access activi-
ties and that is to be implemented through the adoption of domestic measures 
on benefit-sharing. Fair and equitable benefit-sharing, however, is not defined 
in the CBD other than by reference to the means for its realization. The lan-
guage of the third CBD objective seems to point to three such means, each 
underpinned by specific provisions in the Convention: appropriate access to 
genetic resources;73 appropriate transfer of relevant technologies,74 includ-
ing biotechnology;75 and appropriate funding.76 For each ABS transaction, 
the articulation and implementation of specific benefit-sharing obligations 
rest on the conclusion of mutually agreed terms (MAT), i.e. a private law con-
tract between individual providers and users upon access to specific genetic 
resources.77 Benefits to be shared on the basis of MAT are not only research and 
development results, but also the commercial or other benefits derived from 
the utilization of the genetic resources provided.78 
70 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 244–245, where it is argued that the 
assumption that ABS will ‘quasi-automatically’ create strong incentives for biodiversity 
conservation may be unrealistic.
71 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 153.
72 Ibid., 151–159. 
73 Addressed in CBD Article 15.
74 CBD Article 16.
75 CBD Article 19.
76 CBD Articles 20 and 21.
77 CBD Article 15(4) and (7).
78 CBD Article 15(6) reads: ‘Each Contracting Party shall endeavor to develop and carry out 
scientific research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with 
the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.’ 
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Accordingly, the CBD calls upon Parties to legislate (or adopt other domes-
tic measures) on ABS to develop a domestic system for requiring and granting 
PIC, coupled with the requirement to establish MAT, with a view to sharing 
benefits.79 PIC may be embodied in a public act (an authorization/permit 
issued by the national competent authority), while the details of the ABS trans-
action will then be worked out in MAT.80 The contract embodying MAT will 
set out any conditions for access and specific benefit-sharing obligations, in 
order to achieve the overarching benefit-sharing objective of the Convention 
in the context of specific ABS transactions.81 There may be instances, however, 
in which PIC may be issued as a private-law act (possibly, part and parcel of 
MAT), for instance when the power to grant access to genetic resources is del-
egated to non-State actors (such as research centers). In addition, there may 
be also instances in which MAT may be incorporated into PIC, if, for example, 
the latter includes standard contractual clauses as part of the conditions for 
granting a permit.82 It could also be the case that the establishment of MAT 
may precede the granting of PIC (i.e., national authorities may condition the 
granting of PIC to the successful conclusions of negotiations on MAT).83
The country providing genetic resources would normally be the ‘country 
of origin’, which is defined by the CBD as the country which possesses those 
79 CBD Article 15(4–5) and (7).
80 Claudio Chiarolla, “The Role of Private International Law under the Nagoya Protocol,” 
in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Perspective, op. cit., 423, 428, fn. 13, who explains that consequently, even where MAT will 
involve a private party/user and a national authority/State actor, when the latter concludes 
MAT it will act in its capacity as a private law party to the contract. See also Morten W. Tvedt, 
“Beyond Nagoya: Towards a Legally Functional System of Access and Benefit-Sharing,” in 
Oberthür and Rosendal, Global Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 158, 172.
81 On the objective of the Nagoya Protocol, see commentary on Article 1 (where there is no 
reference to MAT). For a discussion on MAT, see this commentary on Articles 5, section 5, 
Article 6, section 7, and Article 18, as well as Conclusions to this commentary, section 3. See 
also CBD Article 15(7), second sentence. As noted in this commentary on Article 5, there 
may also be two separate sets of MATs: one on access and one on benefit-sharing to be 
established at a later stage when the value of the genetic resources is better understood 
(or there may be a re-opener clause in the MAT established at the time of access, calling 
for renegotiations of benefit-sharing obligations if at a later stage when the value of the 
genetic resources is better understood).
82 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,”, op. cit., 172.
83 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 71; and Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 172.
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genetic resources in ‘in situ conditions.’84 So a Party is considered ‘country of 
origin’ wherever a specific genetic resource exists in ecosystems85 or natural 
habitats86 within its territory. This may appear fairly straightforward. However, 
practical challenges may arise in specific ABS transactions in the case two or 
more countries share the same genetic resources. Particular difficulty may 
also arise in relation to ‘domesticated or cultivated species’ – a term which 
includes genetic resources for food and agriculture (agricultural biodiversity). 
In such cases, continuous exchanges of genetic resources over long periods of 
time and interactions between the organisms and the environment leading to 
adaptation of varieties result in a situation where determining a country of 
origin is impractical.87 To address this situation, the CBD also defines as ‘coun-
try providing genetic resources’ the countries supplying genetic resources col-
lected from in situ or ex situ sources that may not have originated from that 
country.88 In this regard, the CBD further specifies that only provider coun-
tries that ‘acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention’ 
(that is, in accordance with CBD requirements on PIC and MAT) have a right to 
receive a share in the benefits arising from their utilization.89 On the other side 
of ABS transactions, there are ‘user countries.’ This term is not defined in the 
Convention, but has become a common expression used by CBD Parties and 
in ABS literature. Although it is generally understood that all countries can be 
both users and providers of genetic resources,90 during the negotiations of the 
Protocol certain (developed) countries saw themselves as predominantly user 
84 CBD Article 2, which also defines ‘in situ conditions’ as ‘conditions where genetic 
resources exist within ecosystems and natural habitats, and, in the case of domesticated 
or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive 
properties.’
85 A dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-
living environment interacting as functional unit: CBD Article 2.
86 The place where an organism or population naturally occurs: CBD Article 2.
87 Claudio Chiarolla, Sélim Louafi and Marie Schloen, “An Analysis of the Relationship 
between the Nagoya Protocol and Instruments Related to Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 83, 84.
88 CBD Article 2.
89 CBD Article 15(3). Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 14. See this commentary on 
Article 15, section 3.1.
90 CBD Decision 7/19, “Access and benefit-sharing as related to genetic resources (Article 
15)” (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, 16th preambular recital, which reads: 
‘Parties that are countries of origin of genetic resources may be both users and provid-
ers and . . . Parties that have acquired these genetic resources in accordance with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity may also be both users and providers.’ 
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countries, because of their highly developed research sector and biotechnol-
ogy industry and therefore high economic stakes in having access to genetic 
resources in other countries. The Like-Minded Mega-diverse Countries, on the 
other hand, together with other developing countries, saw themselves as pre-
dominantly provider countries. These terms remain relevant also in the con-
text of specific ABS transactions, where a Party will act as provider country and 
another as a user country in the bilateral exchange envisaged under the CBD.
2 From the CBD to the Nagoya Protocol via the Bonn Guidelines
CBD Parties were given significant leeway in devising their domestic ABS 
frameworks. Nevertheless, few have translated the relevant CBD provisions into 
national ABS legislation.91 In addition, most industrialized country Parties 
have been very hesitant to adopt measures supporting effective benefit-sharing 
by their researchers and companies towards provider countries.92 As a reac-
tion, conditions for access to genetic resources in some countries have become 
very restrictive.93 At the same time, researchers and companies have repeat-
edly been exposed to allegations of ‘biopiracy.’ Such allegations cover a diver-
sity of circumstances, ranging from the lack of steps to ensure PIC is granted 
or benefits are shared, to the violation of domestic ABS requirements and of 
contractual obligations under MAT,94 the granting of erroneous patents on 
inventions not fulfilling patentability criteria or the granting of patents on 
91 As of 2007, 39 countries had enacted legislation referring to ABS: CBD Secretariat, 
“Overview of recent developments at national and regional levels relating to access and 
benefit-sharing” (30 August 2007) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/4. By 2013, 57 CBD 
Parties have adopted measures to implement ABS provisions in the Convention: “ABS 
measures database,” CBD, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/abs/measures/>.
92 ‘Deficiencies in implementation of user country measures have equally or even more 
undermined effective governance of genetic resources:’ Oberthür and Rosendal, 
“Conclusions,” op. cit., 238. See also comments by Susette Biber-Klemm et al., “Governance 
Options for Ex Situ Collections in Academic Research,” in Oberthür and Rosendal, Global 
Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 213, 216.
93 The national ABS legislation of the Philippines has often been cited in this regard. See 
Aphrodite Smagadi, “National Measures on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing – The Case of the Philippines”, Law Environment and Development Journal 1 
(2005): 50, at 68.
94 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 427–8.
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inventions developed on the basis of genetic resources accessed in violation of 
provider countries’ sovereign rights.95 
Difficulties in developing national ABS frameworks have been due to the 
complexity of the subject matter and limited international guidance. The CBD 
in fact provides a set of basic principles on ABS, but gives very little guidance 
on how to address non-ideal ABS situations. In a hypothetical scenario of an 
ABS arrangement, a European research team working for the food industry, 
wishes to conduct research on a wild African plant with high nutritional value 
to further advance the development of a functional food. In this ideal case, 
both the African (provider country) and the European country in question 
(user country) have national legislation in place clearly setting out, among 
others, conditions for access, including the authority to grant PIC, modalities 
for the negotiation of specific benefit-sharing arrangements through the estab-
lishment of MAT, and a framework that supports the reporting and tracking 
of ABS-related obligations. The European research team contacts the provider 
country’s national authority in order to request a research permit (embody-
ing PIC). Following negotiations, where both sides are equally aware of their 
rights and obligations, MAT for fair and equitable benefit-sharing are estab-
lished, including for instance the participation of African researchers in the 
research team (non-monetary benefit-sharing) and a percentage of royalties in 
case of commercialization of a product based on the use of the plant provided 
(monetary benefit-sharing). The European team conducts its research, devel-
ops a highly successful functional food with immune system-boosting proper-
ties and acts in full compliance with MAT. Benefits flow back to the African 
country and are consistently used for the conservation and sustainable use of 
the plant in question, as well as to improve the livelihoods of local communi-
ties that have for many centuries used the said plant for its recovery properties 
and whose traditional knowledge provided useful leads to the research team. 96 
Very rarely, however, are real ABS cases that straightforward. In the example 
above, it could well be that none of the countries involved had national legisla-
tion in place; or that the provider country had not established the authority 
competent to grant PIC. Or that the users decided to proceed without request-
ing PIC or entering into MAT for benefit-sharing. Or that the access proceeded 
95 Tomme Young, “An Analysis of Claims of Unauthorised Access and Misappropriation of 
Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge,” in Covering ABS: Addressing 
the Need for Sectoral, Geographical, Legal, and International Integration in the ABS Regime: 
Papers and Studies of the ABS Project, ed. Tomme Young (Gland: IUCN, 2009), 97.
96 For an introduction to the role of traditional knowledge in the ABS discourse, see 
section 3 below.
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as required by the national legislation of the African country, but later, one 
member of the research team breached the MAT and continued doing research 
on the plant in another company without sharing benefits. To complicate mat-
ters further, we can picture a university researcher who requests PIC and enters 
into MAT for academic, non-commercial research on the African plant. He pub-
lishes the results of his research in a scientific journal without mentioning the 
country of origin of the samples, the limitations on the use, or the existence 
of a benefit-sharing agreement. Two years later, another scientist undertaking 
applied research in the food industry reads the article and acquires a sample 
of the African plant from a botanical garden in his country: the research on 
the plant sample leads to a highly successful (and maybe patented) product. 
Yet another complexity would arise if the researchers were only interested in 
the resin produced by a certain plant (a ‘derivative’)97 rather than its genetic 
resources. A whole additional level of complication arises then if the plant 
in question could be found in situ only in indigenous territories in a provider 
country, and had been traditionally used by an indigenous group that enjoys 
a high degree of autonomy from the State. The situation could, once again, be 
complicated by the fact that the same genetic resource could be found in vari-
ous indigenous territories located in different countries, and researchers’ inter-
est in these genetic resources has been sparked by the traditional knowledge of 
indigenous or local communities that have been customarily using the plant.
The first effort by the international community to provide more detailed 
guidance on ABS to support countries in addressing non-ideal ABS scenarios 
led to the development of the non-legally binding Bonn Guidelines98 in April 
2002. The Guidelines aim to guide governments in establishing legislative, 
administrative or policy measures on ABS. In particular, the Bonn Guidelines 
provide some guidance with regard to the types, timing and distribution 
of benefits, and mechanisms for benefit-sharing, in order to assist Parties 
and stakeholders in the development of MAT. Notably, the Bonn Guidelines 
provide a list of examples of monetary and non-monetary benefits,99 which is 
97 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.2.1.
98 “Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization” in CBD Decision 6/24, “Access and benefit- 
sharing as related to genetic resources” (27 May 2002) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, 
Annex (hereinafter, Bonn Guidelines).
99 See Bonn Guidelines, paragraphs 45–50, and Appendix II. See Lyle Glowka and 
Valérie Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing: Innovations 
in International Environmental Law,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 21, 25.
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reproduced almost verbatim in the Annex to the Nagoya Protocol. The Bonn 
Guidelines further acknowledge that specific benefit-sharing arrangements 
may vary depending upon the type of benefits, the specific conditions in the 
country and the stakeholders involved, and should thus be determined by the 
partners involved on a case-by-case basis.100 
All CBD Parties were expected to adopt measures related to both the pro-
vider and the user side of ABS transactions, including provisions clarifying 
each country’s sovereign rights over genetic resources, and the identification 
of access procedures and requirements; and addressing the responsibility of 
users under their jurisdiction who are utilizing genetic resources from other 
countries.101 Nevertheless, only a limited number of countries developed 
domestic ABS legislation after adoption of the Bonn Guidelines.102 
Only four months after the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines, in August 2002, 
heads of State and government attending the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) agreed to launch negotiations on an international 
regime on benefit-sharing.103 The WSSD mandate triggered the negotiations 
that eventually led to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. 
The Nagoya Protocol is the result of six years of intergovernmental 
negotiations,104 which mostly occurred in the context of an Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Working Group on ABS already established under the Convention, with 
input from the CBD Working Grup on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions.105 
The Working Group on ABS was assisted by expert, informal and regional con-
sultations106 and, in the final phases of the negotiations convened as an inter-
100 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 49.
101 Ibid., 3.
102 See note 91 above.
103 “Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” (September 
2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2 (hereinafter, Johannsburg Plan of 
Implemenation), paragraph 44(o). For a discussion of the mandate, see commentary on 
Article 1, section 2.
104 For a more detailed discussion of the negotiating process, see Thomas Greiber et al., An 
Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing (Gland: IUCN, 
2012), 18–24; Gurdial Singh Nijar and Gai Pei Fern, The Nagoya ABS Protocol: A Record of 
the Negotiations (Kuala Lumpur: CEBLAW, 2012), 3–29; and Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol, 
op. cit., 11–23. For an academic analysis of the negotiations, see Oberthür and Rosendal, 
Global Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., particularly chapters 3–7.
105 CBD Decision 7/19, Section D: ‘International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Benefit-Sharing’.
106 “Relevant Documentation from the Negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol,” CBD, accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/abs/pre-protocol/documentation/default.shtml>.
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regional negotiating group.107 The negotiations also benefited from inputs by 
non-governmental actors. In particular, representatives of indigenous peoples 
and local communities had been recognized specific opportunities to contrib-
ute to the negotiations since March 2006.108 Opportunities for multi-stake-
holder participation were extended in the final phases of the negotiations: the 
interregional negotiating group comprised, in addition to government dele-
gates, two representatives for indigenous and local communities, civil society, 
industry and public research, respectively.109
CBD Parties had set as a deadline for completing the negotiations ‘the ear-
liest possible time before’ the tenth meeting of the CBD Conference of the 
Parties (COP) scheduled in October 2010,110 but in autumn 2010 several key 
aspects of the Protocol remained outstanding. To increase political momentum 
CBD Parties treated as a package the adoption of the Protocol together with 
the adoption of the CBD Strategic Plan,111 and specific funding commitments, 
107 The Inter-governmental Group setting entailed a roundtable format, inspired by the 
‘Vienna setting’ used during the biosafety negotiations. It included five representatives 
for each UN region, and two representatives for indigenous and local communities, civil 
society, industry and public research, respectively. In what was termed a ‘Vienna plus’ 
setting, spokespersons and representatives could change freely, and discussions were 
open to the attendance of all Working Group participants: CBD Working Group on ABS, 
“Report of the first part of the ninth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group 
on Access and Benefit-sharing” (26 April 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3, para-
graphs 87–89.
108 CBD Decision 8/5 “Article 8(j) and related provisions”, section C “International regime 
on access and benefit-sharing: collaboration with the Ad Hoc Working Group on Access 
and Benefit-sharing and participation of indigenous and local communities” (15 June 
2006) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31, paragraph 7 invited chairpersons of negotiating 
meetings on the international ABS regime ‘to facilitate the effective participation of rep-
resentatives of indigenous and local communities and to consult them, as appropriate, on 
issues related to traditional knowledge, innovations and practices and associated genetic 
resources.’
109 See fn. 107 above.
110 CBD Decision 8/4 “Access and benefit-sharing” (15 June 2006) UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31, 
paragraph 8.
111 See G77/China proposal at the sixty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, high-
level meeting of the General Assembly as a contribution to the International Year of 
Biodiversity, 22 September 2010: “Secretary-General, at High-Level Meeting, Stresses 
Urgent Need to Reverse Alarming Rate of Biodiversity Loss,” UN General Assembly 
(22 September 2010), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/
ga10992.doc.htm>; and “Press Conference on Biodiversity by Minister for Environment 
of Brazil,” UN (22 September 2010), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.un.org/News/
briefings/docs//2010/100922_Brazil.doc.htm>. In the last phases of the CBD COP 10, the 
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including a decision on the implementation of the Convention’s Strategy for 
Resource Mobilization. Two days before the end of the meeting of the CBD 
COP 10, however, the most contentious issues in the ABS negotiations remained 
still unresolved. The Japanese environment minister, as president of the COP 
and thus with political responsibility for the overall success of the Conference, 
took the initiative to convene a closed meeting in conjunction with the COP 
ministerial segment, including (allegedly some) key negotiating groups.112 As 
a result, the COP Presidency tabled a comprehensive compromise proposal on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, which was found to be sufficiently representative 
of all of the groups’ priorities and was accompanied by substantive finance 
pledges for ABS by the Japanese government.113 The Nagoya Protocol was thus 
adopted by consensus on the basis of the Japanese compromise text, as part 
of a political package that also included adoption of a global strategic plan for 
biodiversity policy until 2020 and of guidance on the implementation of the 
CBD global strategy for resource mobilization.114 
Two implications of significance for any legal analysis of the Protocol should 
be drawn from the specific circumstances of its adoption. First, from a practi-
cal perspective, the Japanese COP Presidency’s politically successful strategy 
did not leave time for the rigorous language and legal consistency checks that 
normally take place at the end of a treaty negotiation, thereby inevitably cre-
ating several interpretative questions. Second, from a principled perspective, 
CBD Parties did not have a possibility to negotiate and reach agreement on all 
European Union proposed to also include the CBD budget in the package and, indeed, this 
is how these key outcomes of the COP were eventually adopted. See Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin (ENB), “Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: 18–29 October 2010,” Vol. 9 No. 544, 1 November 2010, 25.
112 Ibid., 26. See also Gurdial Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis (Kuala 
Lumpur: CEBLAW, 2011), 248–249 and fn. 9.
113 See ENB, “CBD COP 10 Highlights: Wednesday, 27 October 2010,” Vol. 9 No. 542, (2010), 
28 October 2010. See also the guidance circulated for the ministerial consultation [on file 
with authors]. The Japanese contribution for ABS has been included, together with funds 
from France, Norway, and Switzerland, in the Nagoya Implementation Fund, which is 
managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and operated by the CBD Secretariat: 
“GEF Establishes the Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund,” CBD (3 June 2011), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/press/2011/pr-2011-06-03-GEF-ImpFund-en.
pdf>. For a discussion of this approach to conclude the negotiations, see Morgera and 
Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 12–13.
114 CBD Decision 10/2, “The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27; and CBD 
Decision 10/3, “Strategy for resource mobilisation in support of the achievement of the 
Convention’s three objectives” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27.
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the details of the final text of the Protocol before adopting it as a whole by con-
sensus. In that regard, it should be emphasized that normally adoption by con-
sensus has a ‘powerful law-making effect.’115 As Boyle and Chinkin underscore, 
this way of securing widespread support for a legal text per se legitimizes and 
promotes consistent State practice even before the treaty enters into force.116 
The actual extent of law-making in the context of the adoption of the Protocol, 
however, may not be so clearly identified. Due to the unusual conclusion of 
its negotiations, some of its innovative provisions, for example Article 10 on a 
Global Multilateral Benefit-sharing Mechanism, were not actually negotiated 
by CBD Parties, but resulted from the Japanese compromise proposal. This fact 
possibly qualifies the law-making effect of the consensus, package-deal adop-
tion of the Nagoya Protocol.117 And in effect, some regional groups declared 
that the Protocol is ‘far from perfect.’118
It should be finally noted here that upon adopting the Nagoya Protocol, CBD 
Parties asserted that the ABS provisions of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines 
remain pillars of the ‘international ABS regime.’119 The CBD provisions will 
of course remain the only legally binding obligations for CBD Parties that do 
115 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 160. 
116 That is, ‘there is a marked tendency to legitimise implementation in practice of treaties 
adopted by consensus without waiting for widespread ratification or entry into force’: 
ibid., 260. 
117 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
118 During the closing plenary, a number of delegations including the African Group, the 
Central and Eastern European Group, Venezuela, and Bolivia made statements for the 
record to underscore their doubts about the new instrument’s quality: CBD COP, “Report 
of the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, paragraphs 98–102. Boyle 
and Chinkin caution that even consensus adoption will not be as significant as it may at 
first appear if accompanied by statements which ‘seriously qualify what has been agreed,’ 
or if consensus ‘simply papers over an agreement to disagree’: Boyle and Chinkin, Making 
of International Law, op. cit., 226.
119 CBD COP Decision 10/1, “Access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable shar-
ing of benefits arising from their utilization” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/10/27, 6th preambular paragraph, which reads: ‘Recognizing that the International 
Regime is constituted of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as complemen-
tary instruments, including the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture and the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.’
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not become Parties to the Nagoya Protocol, and for those CBD Parties that 
become Parties to the Nagoya Protocol before the latter enters into force. As 
to the Bonn Guidelines, it can be argued that they play a complementary role 
vis-à-vis the Nagoya Protocol: while the latter sets the procedural framework 
for ABS, the Guidelines can continue to provide guidance to Parties in rela-
tion, for instance, to the substantive criteria for the establishment of MAT.120 
Further legal analysis, however, is warranted to fully understand the extent and 
implications of the relationship between the Convention provisions on ABS, 
the Bonn Guidelines and the Nagoya Protocol, which is beyond the scope of 
this commentary.121 
Nonetheless, as opposed to its predecessors, the Nagoya Protocol provides 
for the first time legally binding rules on compliance in the context of ABS 
transactions, with a view to operationalizing the third objective of the CBD 
more effectively. Basically, the Protocol creates innovative international obli-
gations that link the performance of provider and user countries. Establishing 
such a link entails a dynamic web of diverse legal relationships: administrative 
decisions on access are set out in domestic permits (PIC), linking to contrac-
tual benefit-sharing agreements (MAT) with private parties, which are backed 
by an enabling framework of national laws in provider and user countries, as 
well as by international cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level. The 
effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol will thus ultimately rely on a 
plurality of legal orders122 in a particularly challenging – and in many respects 
unprecedented – way. 
3 Traditional Knowledge and ABS 
The Nagoya Protocol has spelt out, for the first time in legally binding pro-
visions, the benefit-sharing obligation arising from the use of the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous and local communities in research and development.123 
120 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), 198. This is discussed this commentary on Article 13, section 3, and 
Article 18, section 2.
121 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
122 Elisa Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-Judicial 
Enforcement of Global Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law,” 
European Journal of International Law 23 (2012): 743.
123 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(5) and 7. For a discussion prior to the conclusions of the nego-
tiations of the Protocol, see Gurdial Singh Nijar, “Incorporating Traditional Knowledge in 
an International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: Problems 
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In that regard, the Nagoya Protocol makes reference to a qualitatively different 
concept of benefit-sharing – namely, intra-State benefit-sharing as opposed 
to inter-State benefit-sharing discussed above. In other words, in the case of 
traditional knowledge, benefit-sharing makes reference to an internal, State-
to-community contribution to sustainable development, social justice and 
equity.124 
An intra-State notion of benefit-sharing was already present in the CBD, 
but the Convention only linked it to its first and second objectives (conserva-
tion and sustainable use), not to research and development in the context of 
ABS. CBD Article 8(j) in effect envisages the establishment of a relationship 
between the State and the local or indigenous community whose traditional 
knowledge is utilized for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.125 
Traditional knowledge is not defined in there, although it can be understood 
as the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local commu-
nities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biodiversity. And on the basis of CBD Article 10(c), traditional 
knowledge also refers to the customary use of biological resources in accor-
dance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conserva-
tion or sustainable use requirements. The reference to ‘traditional lifestyles’ 
has been interpreted by some commentators as excluding the knowledge 
of groups that descended from indigenous and local communities but have 
‘assimilated into mainstream, non-traditional economy and society.’126 A 
preferable reading, however, would rather be a more inclusive one, that is 
based on international human rights caselaw127 and takes into account the 
and Prospects,” European Journal of International Law 21 (2010): 457. For a discus-
sion following the conclusions of the negotiations of the Protocol, see Gurdial Singh 
Nijar, “Traditional Knowledge Systems, International Law and National Challenges: 
Marginalization or Emancipation?,” European Journal of International Law 24 (2013): 
1205.
124 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing”, op. cit., 150–151.
125 Ibid., 159–168.
126 See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 11; and Gregory F. Maggio, “Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities 
in International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity,” UCLA Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy 16 (1998): 179, 210. 
127 Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Case no. 12,338 
(28 November 2007) (hereinafter, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007); and African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. 
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placement of the provision on traditional knowledge in the context of in situ 
conservation under the CBD. Accordingly, the essential elements for under-
standing traditional knowledge are the link between indigenous and local 
communities and the land and biological resources that they traditionally 
occupy or use128 for livelihood purposes or for ensuring their distinctive cul-
tural practices, and the existence of customary rules about the preservation 
and protection of such traditional knowledge. 
Indeed, recent research has shown that biological and cultural diversity are 
deeply linked: in 35 regional biodiversity hotspots, which contain more than 
half of the world’s vascular plants and 43 percent of terrestrial vertebrate spe-
cies, are found 3,202 languages, nearly half of all languages spoken on Earth. 
Although the researchers cannot conclude why areas of endangered species 
concentration and endangered languages coexist, a possible explanation is 
that indigenous cultures, supported by their languages, create the conditions 
to maintain species and keep the ecosystems working.129 At the same time, 
the asymmetries already highlighted in the context of genetic resources are 
exacerbated in the case of traditional knowledge. Historically, colonization, 
mandatory assimilation, relocation policies, and globalization forces have 
resulted in the marginalization of indigenous peoples and local communi-
ties and the erosion of their cultures, governance and traditional knowledge 
systems.130 Furthermore, (ab)use of the IPR system has resulted in a series of 
famous biopiracy cases involving misappropriation of traditional knowledge.131
Kenya, Communication no. 276/2003 (25 November 2009) (hereinafter, Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya). Cf. also International Law Association, The Hague Conference 
Report, Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Law Association, 2010), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024>, 7–8. 
128 The latter term aims to cover nomadic communities, see for example Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya, 206–210, where the African Commission found that the Endorois 
nomadic pastoralists were granted the recognition of their rights of ownership and res-
titution of their ancestral land, as well as unrestricted access to sites they traditionally 
‘used’ for religious and cultural rites and for grazing their cattle.
129 See Larry J. Gorenflo et al., “Co-Occurrence of Linguistic and Biological Diversity in 
Biodiversity Hotspots and High Biodiversity Wilderness Areas,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 19 (2012): 8032. 
130 For a comprehensive account of the threats and challenges that indigenous peoples 
face and the response of the international community, see UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (New York: United 
Nations, 2009), accessed 6 March 2014, <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
SOWIP_web.pdf>.
131 Controversial patent cases involving traditional knowledge and genetic resources include 
the cases of turmeric, neem, ayahuasca and hoodia. Among the rich bibliography, see UK 
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CBD Article 8(j) requires Parties to ‘respect, preserve and maintain’ tra-
ditional knowledge, promote its wider application with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, and ‘encourage the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from its utilization of such knowledge, innova-
tions and practices.’132 CBD Article 8(j) further calls for benefit-sharing related 
to traditional knowledge as a recognition of and reward for the contribution 
of indigenous and local communities to the conservation of biodiversity133 
and – based on a combined reading with CBD Article 10(c)134 – to the sustain-
able use of biodiversity components. This is in consideration of the fact that 
traditional knowledge contributing to the conservation of biodiversity derives 
from the customary sustainable use of biodiversity components.135 Numerous 
decisions adopted by the CBD COP have detailed how benefit-sharing from 
traditional knowledge related to conservation and sustainable use should 
be operationalized, including through the use of environmental and socio- 
cultural impact assessments, the integration of traditional knowledge and com-
munity concerns in management plans and the legal recognition and active 
support of community-based management arrangements.136 In addition, CBD 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, op. cit., 73. The discussion on the tensions 
between IPRs and traditional knowledge is very complex, and basically rests on the fact 
that traditional knowledge does not satisfy easily the general requirements of new and 
innovative creation for patentability and copyright, and its protection cannot be limited 
to a specific time period, as is the case for IPRs: see e.g. Cullet, “Environmental Justice in 
the Use, Knowledge and Exploitation of Genetic Resources,” op. cit. 
132 The CBD preamble only stresses the ‘desirability’ of sharing equitably benefits arising 
from the use of traditional knowledge relevant to the conservation of biodiversity and 
the sustainable use of its components: CBD 12th preambular recital.
133 Doris Schroeder, “Justice and Benefit Sharing,” in Wynberg, Schroeder and Chennells, 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing, op. cit., 11 where benefit-sharing is con-
sidered a reward for the custodians of biodiversity.
134 CBD Article 10 reads as follows: ‘Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate: [. . .](c) Protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in 
accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or 
sustainable use requirements.’
135 See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 60.
136 Other mechanisms include the setting-up of benefit-sharing mechanisms when revenue 
generated through conservation and sustainable use activities is accrued by the State or 
outside investors, the provision of livelihood-based mitigation and compensatory meas-
ures, the use of other incentives such as payments for ecosystem services, as well as the 
re-investment of benefits in the protection of traditional knowledge and traditional sus-
tainable practices.
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COP decisions have indicated additional/alternative functions of benefit- 
sharing as a broader incentive to ensure the full and effective participa-
tion of indigenous and local communities in decision-making and adaptive 
management of biodiversity, and as compensation137 for the costs and nega-
tive impacts of biodiversity conservation or sustainable management activi-
ties on indigenous and local communities.138 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CBD did not expressly link the concepts 
of ABS and traditional knowledge,139 Article 8(j) has been significantly dis-
cussed in the context of ABS negotiations,140 on the basis of a combined read-
ing of CBD Articles 15 and 8(j). This interpretation beyond the letter of the 
Convention may be explained by the fact that on many occasions, genetic 
resources attract the interest of bioprospectors and gain value because of 
the traditional knowledge associated with them.141 In other words, it is tradi-
tional knowledge that sparks the utilization process or provides the lead to the 
potentially useful properties of a genetic resource.142 For instance in the case 
of the pharmaceutical sector, traditional knowledge was ‘found to increase the 
success ratio of bioprospecting by 400 percent.’143 It can thus be understood 
137 Benefit-sharing may also be linked to food security. See Bram De Jonge and Michiel 
Korthals, “Vicissitudes of Benefit Sharing of Crop Genetic Resources: Downstream and 
Upstream,” Developing World Bioethics 6 (2006): 144.
138 See primary legal materials cited in Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-
Sharing,” op. cit., 159–168.
139 Ibid., 155–156. See also Geoff Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ 
Countries: The Unlikely Lot,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 295, 316
140 Since the launch of the negotiations for an international ABS regime, the CBD Article 
8(j) Working Group has been addressing ABS as a permanent issue on its agenda. E.g., 
“Report of the fifth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Article 8(j) 
and related provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (13 November 2007) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/7; and “Report of the sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and related provisions of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity” (21 November 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2, Annex II.
141 The evolving interpretation of the CBD in relation to traditional knowledge is discussed 
in Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit.; and Morgera and 
Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit.
142 See CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), “Report of the sixth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/
COP/10/2, 36.
143 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Background and 
Analytical Framework,” op. cit., 3. Laird and Wynberg, “Bioscience at a Crossroads”, op. cit., 
at 1, note that ‘The cosmetic, botanicals, and food and beverage industries use traditional 
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that in these cases, genetic resources and traditional knowledge are seen as 
inseparable.144 
The Bonn Guidelines contributed to cement the link between traditional 
knowledge and ABS by noting that benefits should be shared fairly and equi-
tably with all those, including indigenous and local communities, who have 
been identified as having contributed to the management of the resource used 
in a scientific and/or commercial process.145 The express reference to indig-
enous and local communities as potential beneficiaries in the ABS process 
can be arguably read in conjunction with references, in the objectives of the 
Guidelines to poverty alleviation and realization of food security, health and 
cultural integrity.146
The Nagoya Protocol definitely crystallizes this understanding and breaks 
new ground by establishing a clear international obligation to share ben-
efits arising from the utilization of ‘traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources’.147 As opposed to genetic resources that are subject to 
national sovereignty,148 traditional knowledge belongs to the community/ies: 
knowledge associated with genetic resources in product development (as a guide towards 
finding useful species or to help determine safety and efficacy) and in marketing, but 
there appears to be a trend towards decreased use of traditional knowledge for higher 
pharmaceuticals and biotech industries increasingly focused on microorganisms.’
144 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital. See also this commentary on Article 8, Section 4.
145 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 48.
146 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 11.
147 The Bonn Guidelines use two expressions in relation to traditional knowledge: ‘associ-
ated traditional knowledge’ (paragraphs 9 and 37) and ‘traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources’ (paragraph 31). Both terms were considered during the 
negotiations of the Protocol, see: CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the meeting 
of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge Associated with 
Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
sharing” (15 July 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2; and “Revised draft Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (hereinafter, Cali Draft) in 
CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the first part of the ninth meeting” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/9/3, Annex I, draft articles 3(1) and 14(1). Negotiators eventually decided to use 
consistently the latter out of concern that the former could have led to broader interpre-
tations. It should be noted that the negotiations under WIPO are also considering both 
expressions, as discussed below in this commentary on Article 4, section 3.1.
148 Leaving aside for the moment the question of ‘genetic resources held by indigenous and 
local communities’: see this commentary on Article 5, section 3, and on Article 6, section 4.
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it is created in a cultural context, is local in nature and evolves continually.149 
Against this background, the regulation of traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources under the Protocol brings in a whole new dimension 
to the ABS context – that is, an internal dimension within the provider State. 
Questions related to who negotiates, receives or (re)distributes benefits on a 
sub-national level will have to be clarified between the provider State and the 
communities,150 taking into account relevant international law.151 As the vast 
majority of CBD Parties have not legislated on traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources, the relevant provisions of the Protocol will be par-
ticularly challenging to implement.152
It should be stressed that traditional knowledge in the Protocol is only 
that ‘associated with genetic resources’ – so a narrow, undefined notion that 
leaves several other aspects of traditional knowledge outside of the scope of 
the Protocol153 (such as knowledge related to traditional healthcare and build-
ing techniques, for instance). The notion of traditional knowledge under the 
Protocol is therefore narrower than that under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, where traditional knowledge refers more broadly to biological diver-
sity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The notion of traditional 
knowledge is even broader in the context of ongoing negotiations under WIPO 
on intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and tra-
ditional cultural expressions,154 where traditional knowledge is generally seen 
as the 
149 Gurdial Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing Country’s View on the Challenges of the 
Nagoya Protocol,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 247, 258; CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of 
the expert meeting on Traditional Knowledge” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, paragraph 33; 
and Jack K. Githae, “Potential of TK for Conventional Therapy – Prospects and Limits,” in 
Kamau and Winter, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law, op. cit., 77, 77–82.
150 We are grateful to Tomme Young for highlighting this point.
151 See discussion in section 4 below.
152 Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani, “Conclusions,” in Morgera, Buck and 
Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 507.
153 We are grateful to Tomme Young for highlighting this point.
154 The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: see fn. 50 above and commentary on Article 4, 
section 3.1.
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accumulated knowledge which at the same time provides indigenous 
peoples and local communities with a sense of identity. It is evolving and 
dynamic, holistic in its conception and is a strong component of the cul-
tural heritage of indigenous peoples and their communities.155 
That being said, the WIPO negotiations are also attempting to define ‘tradi-
tional knowledge associated with genetic resources’ or ‘associated traditional 
knowledge’, as the substantive knowledge of the properties and uses of genetic 
resources and their derivatives held by indigenous peoples and local commu-
nities.156 As will be discussed below, it remains to be seen whether the WIPO 
negotiations will conclude with an understanding of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources that is mutually supportive with that of the 
Protocol.157
4 Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities as Beneficiaries of the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol not only makes indigenous and local communities ben-
eficiaries when traditional knowledge is concerned, but also when genetic 
resources are held by these communities.158 Complex questions thus arise 
related to national sovereignty over genetic resources and the control that 
155 “TK Documentation Toolkit. A Consultation Draft,” WIPO (2012), accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/tk_toolkit_draft.pdf>, 21. 
Specific elements that are being considered for a definition of traditional knowledge in 
the textual negotiations under WIPO include: knowledge that is the ‘unique product’ or 
‘distinctively associated with’ indigenous peoples and local communities; knowledge that 
is developed within a traditional context and/or is passed on from generation to genera-
tion; knowledge that is part of the collective, ancestral, territorial, cultural, intellectual 
and material heritage of indigenous peoples and local communities; and that is collec-
tively generated, shared and preserved and is integrally linked with the cultural identi-
ties of indigenous peoples and local communities: WIPO General Assembly, “Matters 
concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC)” (12 August 2011) WIPO Doc WO/
GA/40/7.
156 WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning the IGC,” WO/GA/40/7.
157 “Draft Articles on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge” in WO/GA/40/7, Annex B, 
draft article 10: ‘consistency with general legal framework.’
158 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2). See commentary on Article 5, section 3, Article 6, 
section 4 and Article 7.
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indigenous peoples159 and local communities exercise over these resources 
located in their territories, which in their understanding are inextricably 
linked with their traditional knowledge.160
While the Protocol does not provide a clear answer to these questions, it 
still represents the culmination of a normative process under the CBD that has 
gradually explored the human rights-based dimensions161 of the international 
concern over biodiversity conservation.162 The text of the CBD carefully avoids 
the use of the term ‘right’ or cross-references to human rights instruments.163 
Nevertheless, the CBD has progressively emerged as the preferred interna-
tional environmental forum for indigenous peoples and local communities to 
express their interests and demands for the protection of their nature-related 
interests.164 
These developments, however, have not occurred without continued oppo-
sition from certain CBD Parties, and the relevant provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol are, as a result, heavily qualified. One notable instance is the use of 
the expression ‘indigenous and local communities,’ which is also used under 
the CBD, rather than the term ‘indigenous peoples,’ which refers to the subjects 
specifically protected by international human rights instruments.165 In this 
159 See Federico Lenzerini, “Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty 
of Indigenous Peoples,” Texas International Law Journal 42 (2006): 155, where the author 
argues that the scope of States’ sovereignty is subject to the influence of other competing 
values, which represent the foundations for asserting the existence of a ‘degree’ of indige-
nous sovereignty ‘parallel’ to that held by the State. Ibid., 156 and 186–187. Also see UNPFII, 
“Contribution to the International Expert Meeting on the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s International Regime on Access and Benefit-sharing and Indigenous Peoples’ 
Human Rights” (17–19 January 2007) UN Doc PFII/2007/WS.4/7, accessed 4 February 2014, 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/workshop_CBDABS_mahren_en.doc>.
160 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital.
161 Notably, the CBD programmes of work on Article 8(j) in CBD Decision 5/16, “Article 8(j) 
and related provisions” (22 June 2000) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, Annex; on pro-
tected areas, in CBD Decision 7/28, “Protected areas” (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/7/21, Annex; and on forest biodiversity, in CBD Decision 6/22, “Forest biological 
diversity” (27 May 2002) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20.
162 Elisa Morgera, “Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity to International Human Rights Law,” in Unity and Diversity of International 
Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ed. Dennis Alland et al. (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), 983.
163 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 626–28.
164 Meyer, “International Environmental Law and Human Rights,” op. cit., 41–42; Benjamin J. 
Richardson, “Indigenous Peoples, International Law and Sustainability,” Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 10 (2001): 1, 8.
165 Meyer, “International Environmental Law and Human Rights,” op. cit., 38.
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respect, it should be noted that since 2010 the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) has been calling on CBD Parties to adopt 
the more human rights-cognizant terminology ‘indigenous peoples and local 
communities.’166 This would have been in line with the terminology already 
adopted by the UN General Assembly,167 the UN Forum on Forests,168 and 
under the international climate change regime.169 The question was discussed 
most recently in 2012, but CBD Parties could not yet find consensus.170 
For the purposes of interpreting the several provisions of the Protocol that 
concern ‘indigenous and local communities’, the lack of a definition of both 
terms and their combined use raise questions as to the actual identification of 
the beneficiaries (and, arguably, of right-holders)171 under the Protocol. While 
there is no agreed definition of indigenous peoples in international law, the 
distinctive nature of their rights has been recognized.172 And the lack of an 
166 UNPFII, “Report on the ninth session” (19–30 April 2010) UN Doc E/2010/43–
E/C.19/2010/15; and “Report on the tenth session” (16–27 May 2011) UN Doc E/2011/43–
E/C.19/2011/14, paragraphs 26–27.
167 UN General Assembly, “Agriculture development and food security” (24 March 2011) UN 
Doc A/RES/65/178.
168 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 2006/49, “Outcome of the sixth ses-
sion of the United Nations Forum on Forests” (28 July 2006) UN Doc E/2006/INF/2/Add.1, 
paragraph 3.
169 In the context of safeguards for REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and for-
est degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks), see UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (hereinafter, UNFCCC) 
Decision 1/CP.16, “Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention” (15 March 2011) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/
Add.1, Appendix I.
170 CBD Parties postponed the issue for consideration until October 2014, following con-
sideration of ‘all its implications for the Convention on Biological Diversity and its 
Parties’: CBD Decision 11/14, “Article 8(j) and related provisions” (5 December 2012) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, Annex I, paragraph 2; and CBD Article 8(j) Working Group, 
“Recommendations from the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues” 
in “Report of the eighth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working 
Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity” 
(11 November 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/12/5, Annex, section 8/6.
171 Annalisa Savaresi, “The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya 
Protocol,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 53, 73–79.
172 See Human Rights Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development . Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, S. James Anaya” (5 August 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/9/9, paragraph 40, 
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international definition also corresponds to the right of indigenous peoples 
to self-identify in light of their broader right to self-determination.173 On the 
other hand, an international definition could act as a ‘limit to States’ discretion’ 
in identifying (and thereby possibly excluding certain groups from) relevant 
right holders. That is, States could enact a restrictive definition that would 
result in excluding certain groups from relevant international protection as 
implemented domestically.174 Relevant sections of this commentary will aim 
to draw the implications of the interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol in the 
light of the international law on human rights,175 as required by general inter-
national law.176
which reads: ‘The Declaration does not affirm or create special rights separate from the 
fundamental human rights that are deemed of universal application, but rather elabo-
rates upon these fundamental rights in the specific cultural, historical, social and eco-
nomic circumstances of indigenous peoples. These include the basic norms of equality 
and non-discrimination, as well as other generally applicable human rights in areas such 
as culture, health or property, which are recognized in other international instruments 
and are universally applicable.’ 
173 See UN Commission on Human Rights, “Discrimination against indigenous peoples. 
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its fourteenth session” 
(16 August 1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21, paragraphs 28–30.
174 International Law Association, The Hague Conference Report, op. cit., 6.
175 The rights of indigenous peoples have been considered ‘essential principles of interna-
tional law’: ICJ, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment (30 June 
2005), (hereinafter, Case Concerning East Timor), paragraph 29. See more generally on 
indigenous peoples’ rights: Elvira Pulitano, ed, Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN 
Declaration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); James S. Anaya, Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Benjamin J. 
Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative 
and Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
176 Namely, the general principle of pacta sunt servanda would require specific Parties to 
the Protocol to read the Protocol provisions with human rights implications in light of 
their specific obligations under applicable human rights treaties. Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980) 115 UNTS 331 
(VCLT), Article 31(3)(c). Mark E. Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Forty Years After,” Recueil des Cours 344 (2009): 1, 122–124. Note that the ‘case law of the 
International Court of Justice suggests that where possible it prefers an integrated concep-
tion of international law to a fragmented one:’ Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International 
Law, op. cit., 210–211.
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4.1 Internationally Recognized Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples
With regards to the human rights of indigenous peoples, a legally binding 
treaty (the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169)177 
and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)178 pro-
vide an obvious frame of reference. Perhaps due to the limited membership 
of the ILO Convention,179 however, the Nagoya Protocol only refers explicitly 
(in its preamble) to UNDRIP.180 In that regard, it should be noted that while 
formally UNDRIP is a non-legally binding instrument, several arguments can 
be put forward with regard to its actual legal force. It has been contended that 
the Declaration ‘reflects an important level of consensus at the global level 
about the content of indigenous peoples’ rights, [which] informs the gen-
eral obligation that States have under the UN Charter to respect and promote 
human rights.’181 It has also been underscored that some rights recognized in 
the Declaration, such as non-discrimination,182 cultural integrity and property 
‘constitute, or are becoming, part of customary international law or are gen-
eral principles of international law.’183 Furthermore, in as far as the Declaration 
177 International Labour Organisation Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (Geneva, 27 June 1989, in force 5 September 1991) ILO/
C169 (hereinafter, ILO Convention No. 169). 
178 UN General Assembly, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
(13 September 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (UNDRIP).
179 Note that the ILO Convention No. 169 counts only 22 Parties, namely: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, 
Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, and Venezuela: “Ratifications of C/169,” ILO, accessed 30 
November 2013, <www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:1130
0:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO>.
180 Nagoya Protocol 26th preambular recital.
181 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples” (14 August 2013) UN Doc A/68/317, paragraph 60.
182 Non-discrimination is seen as a general principle of international law by the African 
Commission on Human Rights (Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 196) and the ICJ (Case 
Concerning East Timor, 29), albeit the Court used the expression ‘essential principle’); as 
customary international law by International Law Association, The Hague Conference 
Report, op. cit., 45 and is even seen as a jus cogens norm. See Alessandro Fodella, 
“Indigenous Peoples, the Environment and International Jurisprudence,” in International 
Courts and the Development of International Law – Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves, 
ed. Nerina Boschiero et al. (The Hague: Asser Press, 2013), 349.
183 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples” A/68/317, paragraph 64.
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offers an interpretation of standards found in other, legally binding human 
rights treaties, it can be considered binding to the extent to which the States 
party to such treaties have agreed to such interpretation.184 Ultimately, it is a 
question of good faith for the States that have adhered to UNDRIP185 to live 
up to their commitments and the expectations they created, particularly as 
the Declaration is seen as incorporating ‘norms that indigenous peoples them-
selves have advanced.’186 
Beyond the significance of UNDRIP, several general, well-established inter-
national human rights have been recognized as specifically relevant for indig-
enous peoples, such as the right to non-discrimination, to the protection of 
their culture,187 and to freely dispose of their natural resources.188 Those sup-
porting the existence of international customary law on the overarching right 
to self-determination189 (in its internal dimension – that is, guaranteeing a cer-
tain degree of autonomy to the indigenous peoples concerned within States’ 
184 Ibid. On UNDRIP, see generally: Mauro Barelli, “The Role of Soft Law in the International 
Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 58 (2009): 957; Siegfried Wiessner, 
“Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 41 (2008): 1141; and Siegfried 
Wiessner, “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing 
Challenges,” European Journal of International Law 22 (2011): 121.
185 UNDRIP was adopted by a majority of 143 states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and 
Ukraine). Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have later endorsed 
the Declaration and expressed their own understanding on certain aspects of the text: 
“Indigenous Rights Declaration Endorsed by States,” UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
Indigenousrightsdeclarationendorsed.aspx>.
186 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
peoples” A/68/317, paragraph 66. See also Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples” A/HRC/9/9, paragraph 41.
187 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966, in 
force 23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’), Article 27.
188 ICCPR and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 
16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976), 993 UNTS 3, (‘ICESCR’) common Article 1(2). 
See also ICESCR Article 25; and ICCPR Article 47.
189 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, op. cit., 8–9. On continuous difficulties 
in fully understanding the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurie, “The Question of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: a Time for Reappraisal?” in 
Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International 
Law, ed. Duncan French (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 349.
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constitutional structures)190 argue in favor of an international obligation for 
every State to take into account the interests of indigenous peoples in main-
taining and managing their distinct culture and unique relationship with their 
land and biological resources also in the context of ABS,191 based on the effec-
tive participation192 of these peoples in relevant decisions and on benefit-shar-
ing.193 For those contesting the existence of customary international law on 
human rights, instead, the argument put forward is rather that different Parties 
to the Nagoya Protocol are to interpret and apply the Protocol in the light of 
their respective international treaty-based human rights obligations, depend-
ing on which key international treaties relevant for indigenous peoples they 
are party to.194 Based on either view, human rights are to work as a benchmark 
against which to measure the legitimacy of measures relating to the applica-
tion of modern science on traditional knowledge, and as a tool for balancing 
the freedom of scientific research against the rights to non-discrimination and 
to the sharing of the benefits of scientific advancements.195 The consideration 
that “benefit-sharing cannot be ‘decontextualized’ from the [human] rights 
190 James Summers, “The Internal and External Aspects of Self-determination Reconsidered” 
in French, Statehood and Self-Determination, op. cit., 229.
191 Francesco Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights : The 
International Legal Framework, Working Paper (Florence: European University Institute, 
2006), accessed 30 November 2013, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6070> 1.
192 See generally Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, James Anaya. Extractive industries and indigenous peoples” (1 July 
2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, paragraphs 19–25. Note that regardless of whether States 
have ratified specific international conventions, ‘there is currently a clearly recognized 
right to consultation’ based on developments within the Inter-American system on the 
property rights of indigenous peoples, other international instruments, and case-law of 
the highest domestic courts in the Americas.’ See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, 
Judgment, Case No. 12,465 (IACtHR, 27 June 2012) (hereinafter, Sarayaku v. Ecuador), 
paragraph 165.
193 Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights, op. cit., 20.
194 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 58; Hugh Thirlway, 
“The Sources of International Law,” in International Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 95, 104; International Law Association, The 
Hague Conference Report, op. cit., 43–52. In that regard, note that while the CBD has 193 
Parties, the ICCPR has 167 and the ICESCR 161. Also note that there is no regional human 
rights instrument in Asia, although see: “ASEAN Human Rights Declaration,” Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (2012), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.asean.org/news/
asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration>. 
195 Ibid., 2.
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that form its basis”196 thus appears to apply to all provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol that may concern indigenous peoples.
4.2 Internationally Recognized Rights of Local Communities
A related question that emerges in the context of the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol is that of the definition of local communities, and their concep-
tual and normative differentiation from indigenous peoples. Although CBD 
Parties have engaged in a discussion of the specific characteristics of local 
communities,197 the exercise did not lead to a clear understanding of the 
distinction. Indeed many of the key characteristics of local communities are 
commonly attributed also to indigenous peoples: self-identification; lifestyles 
linked to traditions associated with natural cycles; occupation of a definable 
territory; and customary and/or collective rights.198 The question is particu-
larly relevant for those CBD Parties that claim that they do not have indigenous 
peoples in their territories.199 There is no guidance, however, at present under 
the CBD as to whether the status and rights of local communities are to be 
understood as similar or even equivalent to those of indigenous peoples under 
international law.
196 Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights, op. cit., 20.
197 CBD Decision 10/43, “Multi-year programme of work on the implementation of Article 
8(j) and related provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (20 January 2011) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, paragraph 21; and CBD Decision 11/14, paragraphs 17–21.
198 CBD Article 8(j) Working Group, “Participatory mechanisms for indigenous and local 
communities in the work of the Convention. Draft recommendation submitted by the 
Chair” (3 November 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/7COP/12/L.3, paragraph19.
199 That is the case of many European countries, see Alejandro Lago Candeira and Luciana 
Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol from the Perspective 
of a Member State of the European Union: The Case of Spain,” in Morgera, Buck and 
Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 269, 
291); certain Asian countries (Benedict Kingsbury, “ ‘Indigenous Peoples” in International 
Law; A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy’ American Journal of 
International Law 92 (1998): 414; and African countries (Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing 
Country’s View,” op. cit., 258; and “African Model Legislation for the Protection of the 
Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of Access to 
Biological Resources” endorsed by the 68th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers 
in 1996, Organization of African Unity, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/
measures/abs/msr-abs-oau-en.pdf>, Article 1, where a local community is defined as: 
‘a human population in a distinct geographical area with ownership over its biological 
resources, innovations, practices, knowledge and technologies governed partially or com-
pletely by its own customs, traditions or laws’). 
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Against this background, there are at least three arguments that can be 
made in relation to the status of local communities under the Protocol in the 
light of international human rights law. First of all, local communities may be 
recognized, on a case-by-case basis, some of the collective rights that are typi-
cally bestowed upon indigenous peoples – that is, ‘when these communities 
share characteristics with indigenous peoples.’200 To make such a determina-
tion, attention is drawn to the ‘distinct social, cultural and economic group 
with a special relationship with its ancestral territory’ that justify the adoption 
of special measures to guarantee the full exercise of their rights, particularly 
with regards to their enjoyment of property rights, in order to safeguard their 
physical and cultural survival.201 
Second, local communities may in specific circumstances be regarded as 
minorities202 and, because of that, enjoy specific human rights protection. To 
be recognized as minorities, local communities cannot be simply characterized 
by ‘mere participation in a common social activity.’203 Rather, their common 
social activities should amount to a ‘particular lifestyle which is so inextricably 
linked to the identity of those who practice it that [to interfere with the exer-
cise of such common activity] would be to jeopardize the very essence of their 
identity.’204 The reference to ‘particular lifestyles’ does resonate quite distinctly 
with the CBD language in Article 8(j) on ‘traditional lifestyles.’ In particular, the 
development and maintenance of traditional knowledge by local communities 
200 Tribal peoples are expressly included in the scope of ILO Convention No. 169. For an in-
depth discussion of this argument, see Adriana Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in 
International Law, PhD thesis European University Institute, 2013, chapter 6.
201 Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007, 80–85. See also Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of the Moiwana vs. Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Case No. 11,821 (IACtHR, 15 June 2005) (hereinafter, 
Moiwana Community v. Suriname).
202 For an in-depth discussion of this argument, see Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in 
International Law, op. cit., chapter 6. On terminological questions related to indigenous 
peoples and minorities, see Federico Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights 
and the Controversy over Commercial Use of Their Traditional Knowledge,” in Cultural 
Human Rights, ed. Francesco Francioni and Martin Schenin (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2008), 119, 135, fn. 73.
203 See a contrario European Court of Human Rights, The Countryside Alliance and Others v. 
The United Kingdom, Applications no. 16072/06 and no. 27809/08 (ECtHR, 24 November 
2009), 44, where the Court rejected the argument that fox-hunters and communities 
that depended on foxhunting for their income may be regarded as a distinguished social 
group that deserves specific protection. Note, however, that this case was dismissed at the 
admissibility stage and was not considered by the Court on the merits.
204 Ibid.
40 introduction
is an ‘essential element of the collective identity’ of these communities, whose 
unlawful appropriation ‘may actually result in a serious threat to the integrity 
of the idiosyncratic identity of the [community] concerned.’205 Local commu-
nities holding traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources may 
therefore be considered ‘cultural minorities’ when their way of life is closely 
associated with their territory and the use of its resources,206 community’s 
customary laws regulate their relationship with the lands and resources,207 and 
traditional knowledge safeguards a community value upon which the ability of 
the group to maintain its culture depends.208 
Third, even where local communities may not be recognized as minori-
ties, they may still be protected by international human rights law when 
an ABS activity may affect their substantive social, economic and cultural 
human rights, on a case-by-case basis.209 In particular, the right to property 
can be interpreted in an extensive way to protect the rights of users of natural 
resources through customary tenure, including communal rights.210
As it has been argued that local communities are at present a category of 
right-holders of unclear status in international human rights law,211 the ques-
tion ultimately arises as to whether the Nagoya Protocol, in arguably applying 
205 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 199 (although referring to ‘indig-
enous groups’).
206 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27)” 
(4 August 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (hereinafter, General Comment No. 23), 
paragraph 3(2). See discussion in Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” 
op. cit., 135.
207 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 137.
208 General Comment No. 23, paragraphs 6(2) and 9; Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural 
Rights,” op. cit., 125.
209 This argument draws, by analogy, on current international normative developments 
on the free PIC of ‘forest-dependent communities’ in the context of the “Guidelines on 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent,” UN-REDD Programme (2013), accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid= 
8717&Itemid=5>, 11–12. We are grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for drawing our attention to 
this point and for an exchange of ideas on all the arguments outlined in this section. 
210 Olivier De Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to Land,” International Community Law 
Review 12 (2010): 303, 324–325 and 319: ‘There is no reason not to extend the recognition 
of communal rights beyond indigenous or traditional communities’ particularly where 
the management of common pool resources at the local level proves effective. Along 
these lines, he also points to the role of the right to food to justify protection of local com-
munities’ special relationship with land and resources traditionally used.
211 This is the main conclusion of Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in International Law, 
op. cit. 
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by analogy concepts that are traditionally referred to indigenous peoples also 
to local communities in the ABS context, entails an expansive interpretation of 
extant international human rights law. The question goes beyond the purposes 
of this study, but it is hoped that the findings of this commentary will provide 
useful departure points for such an in-depth investigation from a human rights 
viewpoint.
4.3  Human Rights-related Risks and Opportunities, Limitations and 
Innovations under the Protocol
As the Nagoya Protocol provides little indication as to how to address at the 
national level complex questions related to indigenous peoples and local com-
munities, it remains to be seen whether it will actually provide opportunities 
or risks for the effective protection and progressive realization of their rights 
related to traditional knowledge and genetic resources held by them. While 
Parties to the Protocol are expected to interpret and apply relevant Protocol 
obligations in good faith and in light of applicable international human rights 
obligations, they will certainly face several challenges. In particular, the issue 
of compliance with regard to access to, and use of traditional knowledge is 
an uncharted field in international law as well as in domestic law in many 
countries.212 
It should be further emphasized that international human rights law also 
sets limitations to indigenous peoples and local communities’ own laws and 
practices in the context of the Nagoya Protocol, and may thereby call for 
some balancing of internationally protected, but possibly conflicting, human 
rights. This could be the case of communities’ rules and practices related to 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources that are at variance with interna-
tional norms against discrimination, such as discrimination based on gender.213 
This complex214 case seems particularly relevant as in the Protocol preamble 
212 Notably in the Member States of the EU: see Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in 
the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 269, 290.
213 See also considerations related to a possible conflict between the protection of the rights 
on traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities and the protection of the 
right to health of the population discussed in commentary on Article 8, section 3.
214 The case is quite complex as it creates the risk of ‘disentrenching . . . longstanding 
identity-shaping system’; see Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples,” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, online edition), paragraph 61, referring to Human Rights Committee, 
Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977 (30 July 1981) UN Doc CCPR/
C/13/D/24/1977 and US Supreme Court, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, (15 May 1978) 436 
U.S. 49; and Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous 
42 introduction
Parties recognize the vital role that women play in the ABS context and affirm 
the need for women’s full participation at all levels of policy-making and 
implementation.215 
Overall, the Nagoya Protocol certainly provides abundant food for thought 
on possible tensions and synergies between international environment law 
and international human rights law. The present analysis will in particular 
focus on the extent to which the Nagoya Protocol may implicitly recognize 
procedural and substantive216 environmental rights217 of indigenous and local 
communities under the Protocol. Indigenous peoples and local communities’ 
rights to PIC and benefit-sharing in the ABS context should in fact be seen as 
intrinsically aimed at the protection of traditional knowledge and customary 
ownership contributing to the conservation of indigenous cultures, biodiver-
sity and the sustainable use of its components.218 
peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 70. We are grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for 
drawing our attention to this point.
215 Nagoya Protocol 11th preambular recital and Article 12(3)(b). Note, however, that this 
proposition is not free from challenges: ‘. . . subjecting pre-colonial societies to the social 
or gender equity critique tends to diminish the value of indigenous knowledge in gen-
eral to the extent that in most cases such knowledge has evolved within the strictures of 
the patriarchal order. It would seem paradoxical even for ecofeminists to praise women’s 
traditional ecological knowledge given that such knowledge has largely been acquired 
through the oppressive dictates of patriarchy. Consequently, even though feminists, criti-
cal theorists, and post-modernists might all advocate for the replacement of science with 
indigenous knowledge, it would be naive to assume they necessarily speak with one voice 
or from one perspective.’ Bosire Maragia, “The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the 
Quest for Sustainability in Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All That Is 
Needed?,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 18 (2006): 197, 210.
216 John Merrils, “Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects,” in 
Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, ed. Alan Boyle and Michael R. 
Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 25; and Dinah Shelton, “Human 
Rights and the Environment: Substantive Rights,” in Research Handbook on International 
Environmental Law, ed. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong and Panos Merkouris 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 265.
217 Environmental rights can be defined as ‘rights understood to be related to environmental 
protection:’ Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of 
human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustain-
able environment, John H. Knox” (24 December 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/22/43, paragraph 7. 
218 Or biocultural rights: see United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) “Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity” in UNESCO General Conference 
31 C/Resolution 25 (2 November 2001), Annex, paragraph 14; Federico Lenzerini and 
Maurizio Fraboni, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge: The Case of the Sateré-Mawé People,” in Biotechnology and International Law, 
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5 About This Commentary
This commentary explains each of the Protocol’s Articles in accordance 
with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provisions on 
interpretation.219 It focuses on a teleological and systematic interpretation220 
wherever a strict literal interpretation may prove problematic due to the 
peculiar way in which the final text of the Protocol had been arrived to.221 For 
the same reason, this commentary pays particular attention to the principle 
of effectiveness – that is, it engages in interpretations that contribute to give 
coherent meaning and ensure full effect of the treaty222 – and the principle 
of good faith. As to the latter, excessively strict literal interpretations will be 
avoided when they would allow a Party to obtain an unfair advantage, disre-
gard legitimate expectations, or exercise rights in a way that would be damag-
ing to another Party.223 
ed. Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), 201, 207. 
Note, however, that this proposition needs to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis: ‘The 
assumption that indigenous knowledge is essential to promoting sustainability tends to 
idolize pre-colonial societies which are credited for being good exemplars of sustainabil-
ity.’ See Maragia, “The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox,” op. cit., 210. This concern is 
already balanced in the text of the CBD Article 10(c), where reference is made to the ‘sus-
tainable’ customary use of biological resources by indigenous and local communities.
219 VCLT Articles 31–33. Although the VCLT is not close to universal ratification, it is generally 
regarded as an authoritative statement of customary law by States, as well as international 
and national courts: Anthony Aust, “Limping Treaties: Lessons from Multilateral Treaty-
Making,” Netherlands International Law Review 50 (2003): 243, 248–252. In particular, 
the VCLT provisions on treaty interpretation ‘have been applied in the case law of nearly 
all international tribunals and many national courts.’ See Boyle and Chinkin, Making of 
International Law, op. cit., 190–191. But see the cautionary commentary in Villiger, “1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 133. 
220 VCLT Article 31(1). See Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 
113–134. For this reason, the Protocol preambular provisions will be discussed in the con-
text of the proposed interpretation of the operative provisions of the Protocol, and not 
in a separate section commenting on the preamble per se. An appendix to this commen-
tary includes the full text of the Protocol’s preamble, with numbering suggested by the 
authors (as the preambular paragraphs of the Nagoya Protocols are unnumbered in the 
original text) to facilitate references, the Annex to the Protocol will similarly be discussed 
in the context of Article 5 in which the Annex is referred to.
221 See section 2 above.
222 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “The Law of Treaties,” in International Law, ed. Malcolm N. Shaw, 
6th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 810, 832–838.
223 Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 116–117.
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That being said, the wording of each of the Protocol operative provisions 
will be carefully analyzed with a view to determining the legal implications of 
qualified, conditional, vague or general formulations that leave ample room 
for interpretation and elaboration.224 This commentary will thus assess the 
relevance of open-textured provisions in creating ‘expectations concerning 
matters which must be taken into account in good faith in the interpretation 
and implementation of the treaty,’225 and in providing ‘predictability regard-
ing the parameters within which Parties are required to work towards the 
objectives of the [treaty]’226 collectively and individually. Where necessary, it 
will also be recalled that even obligations framed in heavily qualified terms 
impose legally binding obligations, albeit they leave a margin of discretion in 
the choice of means of implementation to State Parties.227 
The negotiating history of the Protocol228 will only be referred to where it 
appears indispensible, also with a view to clarifying linkages with relevant aca-
demic and policy debates.229 To that end, this commentary will in particular 
224 See discussion on treaties as soft law in Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, 
op. cit., 220–222.
225 Ibid., 222.
226 Ibid.
227 The High Court of Australia, in Commonwealth v. Tasmania [1983] HCA 21] held that not-
withstanding qualified language of the World Heritage Convention Articles 4 and 5, these 
articles impose a legally binding obligation that is ‘real’ and ‘substantive’ and could not be 
read as a mere statement of intention: it was expressed in the form of a command requir-
ing each Party to endeavor to bring about the matters dealt with - although there is an ele-
ment of discretion and value judgment on the part of the State to decide what measures 
are necessary and appropriate, the discretion only concerns the manner of performance 
not the issue of performance or not. The case is discussed by Anna Huggins, “Protecting 
World Heritage Sites from the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change: Obligations for States 
Parties to the World Heritage Convention,” Australian International Law Journal 14 (2007): 
121, 131–132. Similar qualifiers to those used in the World Heritage Convention Articles 4 
and 5 (‘as appropriate’ and ‘as far as possible’) can also be found frequently in the text of 
the Nagoya Protocol.
228 VCLT Article 32. The travaux préparatoires include ‘all documents relevant to the forth-
coming treaty and generated by the Parties during the treaty’s preparation up to its 
conclusion’: Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 26. In 
addition, the VCLT also allows taking into account the ‘political, social and cultural fac-
tors – the milieu – surrounding the treaty’s conclusion. Ibid., 126. See also Jan Klabbers, 
“International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in 
Treaty Interpretation?,” Netherlands International Law Review 50 (2003): 267.
229 Recourse to the preparatory work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion is 
limited as a supplementary means of interpretation: VCLT Article 32. 
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rely on the official documents produced by the CBD Secretariat, such as the 
expert groups’ meetings reports that explored some of the conceptual chal-
lenges arising from the Protocol negotiations,230 to discuss whether and to 
what extent arising issues have been eventually tackled in the Protocol. As key 
stages of the negotiations were held in informal settings for which no official 
records are available,231 this commentary will also rely on the reports of the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB).232
Another key aspect of this commentary is its emphasis on placing the 
Protocol in the context of other relevant international legal instruments233 
given its far-reaching implications in other areas of international law beyond 
environmental protection, notably human rights but also food and agriculture, 
health, oceans, development cooperation, trade and investment.234 Specific 
questions related to the relationship of the Protocol with other international 
agreements were in fact particularly significant during its negotiations.235 
Questions of systemic interpretation and mutual supportiveness will thus be 
raised throughout this commentary with a view to clarifying the Protocol’s rel-
evance for other areas of international law. That being said, it should be equally 
emphasized that this commentary has been mainly prepared from an interna-
tional environmental law viewpoint and does, therefore, not seek to answer all 
questions related to other areas of international law.
230 Note that as in other modern multilateral negotiations, most of the Protocol’s text did 
not rely on preparatory work laid down by legal experts before the intergovernmental 
negotiations, but rather was developed by the participants themselves in the course of 
the negotiations: Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 148.
231 See “Relevant Documentation from the Negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol,” CBD, 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/abs/pre-protocol/documentation/>.
232 The Earth Negotiations Bulletin is an independent, authoritative summary and analysis 
of multilateral environmental negotiations that is produced by the international think-
tank International Institute for Sustainable Development/Reporting Services and is often 
referred to in official UN websites. See Pamela S. Chasek and Lynn M. Wagner, “An Insider’s 
Guide to Multilateral Environmental Negotiations since the Earth Summit,” in The Roads 
from Rio: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations, 
ed. Pamela S. Chasek and Lynn M. Wagner (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1, 10.
233 VCLT Article 31(3)(c). Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 
122–124, note that the ‘case law of the International Court of Justice suggests that where 
possible it prefers an integrated conception of international law to a fragmented one’: 
Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 210–211.
234 In this respect, this commentary builds upon Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., Part I.
235 See this commentary on Articles 3–4.
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Furthermore, as the Nagoya Protocol “does not actually create an ABS 
regime, but calls for its creation through a myriad paths of ‘implementation’ and 
‘regime development’ ”, 236 this commentary will also point to areas that will 
likely require further clarification through implementation-related decisions 
taken collectively by the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol at the international 
level.237 Like other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), Parties 
will articulate their understanding of the Protocol obligations238 through the 
progressive development of international guidance and measures supporting 
the realization of its objective, under the institutional structure created by 
the Protocol.239 As such evidence of subsequent agreement between Parties 
regarding the interpretation of the Protocol or widespread practice in its 
application are not available at the time of writing, given that the Protocol has 
not entered into force,240 this commentary will rather take into account the 
outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations (ongoing at the time of writing) 
among CBD Parties that are preparing for the entry into force of the Nagoya 
Protocol.241 These negotiations have clearly confirmed that CBD Parties still 
need to find common understanding on some of the unprecedented or ambig-
uous provisions of the Protocol,242 and may provide some indication of the 
likely interpretation of the Protocol and some guidance for incipient practice 
at the national level. That being said, these sources will be treated with caution 
as the recommendations resulting from the current intergovernmental negoti-
ations among CBD Parties are still subject to approval by the Protocol’s govern-
ing body following entry into force.243 The role of domestic courts and other 
judicial mechanisms in the implementation of the Protocol in the context of 
specific ABS transactions is briefly addressed in the conclusions.
236 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 457 (emphasis in the original).
237 In this connection, occasionally this commentary identifies also open questions that 
could be addressed at the level of domestic ABS frameworks implementing the Nagoya 
Protocol: it does not, however, systematically seek to discuss all questions arising from 
national implementation.
238 Adapting from what Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 155, observe 
in the human rights context.
239 Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 151–154.
240 VCLT Article 31(3)(a–b): see Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” 
op. cit., 120–122.
241 In the context of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol (ICNP) 
established by the CBD COP in CBD Decision 10/1, Section 2. 
242 Elisa Morgera, “First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya 
Protocol: All about Compliance,” Environmental Policy and Law 41 (2011): 189.
243 See comments by Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 486
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Finally, this commentary has greatly benefitted from the views shared by 
certain negotiators of the Nagoya Protocol, experts from the United Nations 
bodies and non-governmental organizations that participated in the negotia-
tions and/or are pioneering the implementation of the Protocol, and academ-
ics who kindly agreed to peer-review two drafts of this commentary.244 As 
usual, the authors remain solely responsible for any error or omission. The law 
and policy developments discussed in this commentary are reflected as they 
were on 1 November 2013.
244 For a list of the peer reviewers, see Acknowledgements (supra). Specific acknowledge-
ments of individual peer-reviewers’ contribution to this commentary are also provided in 
footnotes in subsequent sections.
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Article 1. Objective
The objective of this Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the ben-
efits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appro-
priate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant 
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to tech-
nologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the conserva-
tion of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components
1 Overview 
The opening provision of the Nagoya Protocol clarifies that fair and equita-
ble sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources is the 
objective – the ‘essential goal’1 – of the Protocol. It further indicates three 
means for its realization – in primis, access to genetic resources, but also tech-
nology transfer and funding. 
Two notable features of Article 1 are the explicit link established between 
benefit-sharing and the other two objectives of the CBD – conservation and 
sustainable use; and the absence of any reference to traditional knowledge, 
which, however, is a key component of the regime created by the Protocol. The 
following sections will first introduce the reader to the relation between bene-
fit-sharing and access to genetic resources, highlighting key tensions between 
CBD Parties underlying the whole text of the Protocol. Second, the missing 
reference to traditional knowledge will be addressed. Then we will turn to 
the relevance of the connection between the Protocol’s objective and the first 
and second objectives of the CBD. Finally, the practical and legal functions of 
Article 1 will be illustrated, to equip the reader to understand references to the 
objective in other provisions of the Protocol.
1 David Jonas and Thomas Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative 
Methods.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2010): 565, 567.
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2 Objective and Means
The objective replicates verbatim the third objective of the CBD, which refers 
prominently to fair and equitable benefit-sharing in its Article 1 (Objectives)2 
and points to three means of sharing benefits, each underpinned by specific 
provisions of the Convention: appropriate access to genetic resources;3 appro-
priate transfer of relevant technologies,4 including biotechnology;5 and appro-
priate funding.6 Among these three means, the Nagoya Protocol emphasizes 
access, by referring to ‘access and benefit-sharing’ in its title and devoting two 
central provisions to it.7 Technology transfer and finance are addressed in suc-
cessive provisions of the Protocol.8 
The preamble confirms that the Protocol aims to implement the third 
objective of the CBD,9 by spelling out the steps for the operationalization of 
CBD Article 15 on access to genetic resources,10 with a view to further sup-
porting the effective implementation of the ABS provisions of the Convention.11 
2 CBD Article 1 reads: ‘The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with 
its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of 
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appro-
priate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources 
and to technologies, and by appropriate funding,’ emphasis added. Tvedt and Young, 
Beyond Access, op. cit., 5.
3 CBD Article 15. 
4 CBD Article 16.
5 CBD Article 19.
6 Addressed in CBD Articles 20 and 21. See generally, Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and 
Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 15. It should be noted that 
the text of Nagoya Protocol Article 1 does not include cross-references to these specific 
CBD Articles.
7 See this commentary on Articles 6 (Access to Genetic Resources) and 7 (Access to 
Traditional Knowledge).
8 See this commentary on Articles 23 and 25 respectively. The reference to ‘taking into 
account all rights . . . to technologies’ in Article 1 foreshadows legal issues related to intel-
lectual property rights on relevant technologies and their bearing on Parties’ ability to 
facilitate technology transfer. This question will be discussed more in detail in this com-
mentary on Article 23.
9 Nagoya Protocol 2nd preambular recital, which reiterates the relevant wording of CBD 
Article 1.
10 The latter is specifically recalled in Nagoya Protocol 4th preambular recital.
11 Nagoya Protocol 12th preambular recital.
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The preamble also points to providing legal certainty and promoting equity 
and fairness in negotiations between users and providers of genetic resources.12 
Fairness and equity are indeed two critical features of benefit-sharing 
in international biodiversity law, and part and parcel of the objective of the 
Protocol. Fairness can be understood as encapsulating both the need for legit-
imacy (the degree to which rules are made and applied in accordance with 
what the participants perceive as right process) and for equity or justice (the 
degree to which the rules satisfy the participants’ expectations of justifiable 
distribution of costs and benefits).13 In the latter sense, it introduces notions of 
reasonableness and a common ethic of the international community through 
consideration of a broader array of socio-economic factors and a committ-
ment in principle to a notion of fair allocation that aims to ‘narrow the gap 
between the haves and have-nots’.14
The preamble also serves to clarify that the Protocol is expected more broadly 
to contribute through fair and equitable benefit-sharing to the achievement 
of sustainable development.15 CBD Parties acknowledge the potential role of 
ABS to contribute not only to the other objectives of the CBD (conservation 
and sustainable use), but also to poverty eradication and environmental sus-
tainability more generally, thereby contributing to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals.16 In addition, reference is made to technology transfer 
and cooperation, as means of benefit-sharing, that can build research and 
12 Nagoya Protocol 9–10th preambular recitals.
13 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 7.
14 Ibid, 12–13 and 47–80.
15 Braulio Dias, “Preface,” op. cit., 1; and discussion in the Conclusions to this commentary, 
section 2.
16 Nagoya Protocol 7th preambular recital. The Millennium Development Goals were devel-
oped by the UN, following consultations among international agencies, as a set of inter-
connected and mutually reinforcing development goals, accompanied by targets and 
benchmarks based on the time-bound commitments contained in UN General Assembly, 
“United Nations Millennium Declaration” (8 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2. The 
Millennium Development Goals were then intergovernmentally approved at the 2005 UN 
Summit, “World Summit Outcome,” paragraph 17. The eight Millennium Development 
Goals are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary educa-
tion; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce the mortality rate of chil-
dren; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure 
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. See: 
“Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015,” UN, accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.
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innovation capacity for adding value to genetic resources in developing coun-
tries, as an important contribution to sustainable development.17 
Against this background, the relation between benefit-sharing as the objec-
tive of the Protocol and access to genetic resources is not as straightforward 
as the wording of Article 1 may imply. The preamble in a sibylline formula-
tion simply ‘acknowledges the linkage’ between the two without any further 
elaboration.18 While it may be intuitive that without access to genetic resources 
there could be no benefits to share, it has been argued that the obligations to 
ensure benefit-sharing and to facilitate access to genetic resources under the 
Convention do not have the same legal force.19 In fact, Article 1 represents the 
compromise20 between CBD Parties emphasizing benefit-sharing as the main 
objective of the Protocol21 and those Parties emphasizing access to genetic 
resources as an additional objective that should have been placed in the 
Nagoya Protocol on the same footing as benefit-sharing.22 Tensions over the 
17 Nagoya Protocol 5th preambular recital.
18 Nagoya Protocol 8th preambular recital.
19 See CBD Article 15(2), which requires Parties to ‘endeavor to create conditions to facilitate 
access . . . for environmentally sound uses’access’ and 15(7), which requires Parties to ‘take 
legislative, administrative or policy measures . . . with the aim of sharing in a fair and equi-
table way the . . . benefits arising from the commercial use and other utilization of genetic 
resources.’ See comments by Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” 
op. cit., 154.
20 ENB, “Summary of Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group 
on Access and Benefit-sharing: 10–16 July 2010,” Vol. 9 No. 527, 19 July 2010.
21 The current formulation emerged from the resumed ninth meeting of the CBD Working 
Group on ABS: “Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity” in “Report of the second part of the ninth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing” (28 July 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/10/5/Add.4, Annex (hereinafter, Montreal I Draft), on the basis of an initial formula-
tion in the Cali Draft, which was limited to declaring benefit-sharing the objective of the 
Protocol and making a link with the other two objectives of the CBD. In the Cali Draft, 
draft article 1 read: ‘The objective of this Protocol is to ensure the fair and equitable shar-
ing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, contributing to the 
conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components.’
22 Note the EU proposal to this end in CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the first part 
of the ninth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3, 19 ‘the facilitation of access to genetic 
resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization 
of genetic resources that were obtained after the entry into force of this Protocol, also 
contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its 
components.’
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appropriate framing of the objective of the Protocol had in fact emerged from 
the inception of its negotiating mandate. On the one hand, without mention-
ing access, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation called for: 
negotiat[ing] within the framework of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime 
to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits aris-
ing out of the utilization of genetic resources.23 
On the other hand, the mandate agreed upon by the CBD COP clearly men-
tioned both:
The COP . . . Decides to mandate the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group 
on Access and Benefit- sharing with the collaboration of the Ad Hoc 
Open ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related 
Provisions, ensuring the participation of indigenous and local com-
munities, non-governmental organizations, industry and scientific and 
academic institutions, as well as intergovernmental organizations, to elab-
orate and negotiate an international regime on access to genetic resources 
and benefit-sharing with the aim of adopting an instrument/instruments 
to effectively implement the provisions in Article 15 and Article 8(j) of 
the Convention and the three objectives of the Convention.24 
Overall, Article 1 confirms that fair and equitable benefit-sharing is the ulti-
mate objective of the implementing measures to be adopted by the Protocol 
Parties. However, the underlying tension in the relationship between the 
‘access’ and ‘benefit-sharing’ pillars of the Protocol is reflected in the vari-
ous compromises reached between those CBD Parties mostly characterizing 
themselves as user countries and those characterizing themselves as provider 
countries.25 It should be preliminarily noted that access, benefit-sharing and 
compliance are the three constitutive elements of the political deal behind the 
Protocol adoption – the so-called ‘ABC of ABS.’26 Ultimately, the actual balance 
struck between access and benefit-sharing is to be determined on the basis of 
23 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, paragraph 44(o).
24 CBD Decision 7/19, section D, paragraph 1, emphasis added.
25 CBD Decision 7/19, section D, 16th preambular recital. See Introduction to this commen-
tary, section 1.3.
26 CBD Friends of the Co-Chairs Meeting on access and benefit-sharing, “Paper on selected 
key issues submitted by the Co-Chairs” (26–29 January 2010), accessed 30 November 
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the more specific provisions contained in the Nagoya Protocol,27 which are to 
be interpreted in the light of the objective of realizing fairness and equity in 
benefit-sharing. 
3  Traditional Knowledge
Article 1 does not mention benefit-sharing in relation to traditional knowledge, 
in line with the Protocol’s own title (‘Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits from Their Utilization’). Nevertheless, as the 
CBD COP mandate for the Protocol negotiations clearly indicated, CBD Parties 
had come to an understanding that access and benefit-sharing would also 
apply to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, based on a 
combined reading of CBD Articles 15 and 8(j),28 notwithstanding the fact that 
the former does not mention traditional knowledge and the latter does not 
mention genetic resources.29 As the object and purpose of a treaty are also 
to be deduced from its preamble and other programmatic articles,30 atten-
tion should be drawn to several substantive provisions of the Protocol that 
are wholly or significantly devoted to traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources.31 It can therefore be asserted that benefit-sharing related 
to the use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources32 is 
part and parcel of the objective of the Protocol. This interpretation appears 
confirmed by the express provision on the Protocol scope, which extends to 
2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=ABS-FOCC-01>, paragraph 3. See also: ENB 9/527, 
“Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 14.
27 See in particular this commentary on Articles 5–6, 15 and 17–18.
28 As confirmed in Nagoya Protocol 21st preambular recital, which recalls the ‘relevance’ of 
CBD Article 8(j) ‘as it relates to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources,’ 
emphasis added. The Bonn Guidelines already foreshadowed this development, by stat-
ing: ‘These Guidelines may serve as inputs when developing and drafting legislative, 
administrative or policy measures on access and benefit-sharing with particular refer-
ence to provisions under Articles 8( j), 10(c), 15, 16 and 19 [of the CBD]; and contracts and 
other arrangements under mutually agreed terms for access and benefit-sharing’: Bonn 
Guidelines, paragraph 1, emphasis added.
29 As discussed in the Introduction to this commentary, sections 1.3 and 3. See also this com-
mentary on Article 7.
30 E.g. Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 196.
31 See commentary on Article 5, section 4 and Articles 7, 12 and 16. 
32 Unless otherwise specified, the rest of the commentary will always refer to ‘traditional 
knowledge’ as ‘associated with genetic resources.’
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traditional knowledge.33 The objective of sharing in a fair and equitable man-
ner benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge with indigenous and 
local communities needs thus to be taken into account in the interpretation of 
the whole Protocol. In this connection, the reference to ‘taking into account all 
rights over those resources’ points to the question of the indigenous peoples’ 
and local communities’ rights over genetic resources34 and also their rights 
related to traditional technologies.35 
4 Links with Conservation and Sustainable Use
The third objective of the CBD as the objective of the Protocol is not to be pur-
sued in isolation from the broader framework established by the CBD. Notably, 
the objective of the Nagoya Protocol is clearly and expressly linked to the other 
two objectives of the CBD, as it specifies that benefit-sharing is seen as a ‘con-
tribution’ to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of 
its components.36 This seeks to ensure a coherent interpretation and integra-
tive implementation of the CBD three objectives in the context of the Nagoya 
Protocol.37 It encapsulates the idea that ABS can function as a source of fund-
ing or incentive for, or otherwise contribute to, the achievement of the other 
two objectives of the Convention.38 This idea is more concretely pursued in 
several operational provisions.39
‘Sustainable use’ is defined by the CBD as ‘the use of components of biologi-
cal diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline 
33 See commentary on Article 3, sections 1–2.
34 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2). We are grateful to Krystyna Swiderska for draw-
ing our attention to this point, which will be discussed in detail in the commentary on 
Articles 5, section 3 and 6, section 4.
35 See commentary on Article 23. See also Ajit Bhalla, Dilmus James and Yvette Stevens, eds., 
Blending of New and Traditional Technologies: Case Studies (Geneva: ILO, 1984).
36 As already highlighted in the Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 48.
37 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 173.
38 Nagoya Protocol 7th preambular recital. See also the “Strategy for resource mobilisation 
in support of the achievement of the Convention’s three objectives for the period 2008–
2015” in CBD Decision 9/11, “Review of implementation of Articles 20 and 21” (9 October 
2008) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29, Annex, which includes a goal on enhancing imple-
mentation of ABS initiatives, considering them a tool for generating financial returns to 
support conservation and sustainable use initiatives in provider countries, Goal 7.
39 See commentary on Article 5, section 6, Article 8, section 2, Article 9, section 2, Article 10, 
section 4, Article 12, section 4, Article 21, section 3, Article 22, and Article 23, section 3.
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of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and 
aspirations of present and future generations.’40 There is, however, no defini-
tion of ‘conservation’ as such in the Convention but rather a clarification of 
the distinction between ex situ and in situ conservation as respectively ‘out-
side natural habitats’ and in genetic resources’ ‘natural surroundings’ or ‘in the 
surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties.’41 Thus, 
to better understand how the Nagoya Protocol is expected to contribute to 
conservation and sustainable use it is necessary to make reference to relevant 
provisions in the CBD, namely its Articles 8–10. On that basis, benefit-sharing 
under the Protocol can be expected to contribute to, inter alia, the selection 
and management of protected areas and species, the restoration of degraded 
ecosystems and the recovery of threatened species, the protection and pro-
motion of traditional knowledge, the creation of measures and/or facilities 
for ex situ conservation, the support towards sustainable customary use and 
remedial action by local communities.42 Notably, both CBD Articles 8 and 10 
also contain references to the central role of indigenous and local communi-
ties in contributing to conservation and sustainable use.43 A combined reading 
of Article 8(j) and 10(c) in particular leads to connecting the aim of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing with the use of traditional knowledge contributing 
to in situ conservation and also with communities’ sustainable traditional use 
of biological resources.44
It should also be noted that the Nagoya Protocol seeks to contribute to the 
first and second objectives of the CBD by calling upon Parties to promote and 
encourage research activities contributing to conservation and sustainable 
usd of biodiversity, particularly in developing countries.45 Furthermore, the 
40 CBD Article 2.
41 CBD Article 2.
42 But also: control of living modified organisms (LMOs) and invasive alien species, and 
cooperation between authorities and the private sector on sustainable use. For a discus-
sion on how inter-State benefit-sharing can reach indigenous and local communities, 
see Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 155–158. For a dis-
cussion of the potential contribution of ABS to development, see Reid et al., Biodiversity 
Prospecting, op. cit.; and Rachel Wynberg and Sarah A. Laird, “Bioprospecting, Access and 
Benefit Sharing: Revisiting the ‘Grand Bargain,’ ” in Wynberg, Schroeder and Chennells, 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing, op. cit., 69.
43 CBD Articles 8(j) and 10(c). We are grateful to Krystina Swiderska for drawing our atten-
tion to this point.
44 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing”, op. cit., 159.
45 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a), which expands on CBD Article 12: see this commentary on 
Article 8, section 2.
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Protocol foresees not only a contribution of ABS to biodiversity conservation, 
but also to environmental protection more broadly conceived. In fact, its pre-
amble notes the importance of genetic resources also for the mitigation of and 
adaptation to climate change.46
The importance of the Protocol’s support for a coherent implementation 
of the three CBD objectives47 should not be underestimated. With two new 
protocols and an ever-growing range of decisions adopted by the CBD COP, 
States’ obligations and commitments have expanded considerably under the 
Convention at the risk of substantive and procedural fragmentation. This has 
become particularly visible in the context of the Cartagena Protocol:48 in many 
respects, the biosafety regime has developed into an independent sub-process 
that has little, if any, link with the CBD. This development can be explained 
and arguably justified on the basis of the very specific and technical nature of 
the Cartagena Protocol’s subject matter.49 On the other hand, the negotiators 
of the Nagoya Protocol have specifically arranged for keeping the Protocol in 
close relation with the CBD, through substantive provisions that expressly link 
benefit-sharing to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of its components,50 as well as the institutional arrangement to hold meet-
ings of its Parties in conjunction with the meetings of CBD Parties.51
5 Legal and Practical Functions
According to general international law, Article 1 seeks to clarify the ‘object 
and purpose’ of the Protocol as the chief criterion for the interpretation of the 
whole treaty.52 As explained above, a correct understanding of the scope of the 
46 Nagoya Protocol 14th preambular recital. On the links between genetic resources and cli-
mate change, see e.g. FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(CGRFA), “Roadmap on climate change and genetic resources for food and agriculture” 
FAO Doc CGRFA-14/13/5 (2013); and “Selected processes and initiatives on climate change 
of relevance to genetic resources for food and agriculture” FAO Doc CGRFA-14/13/Inf.10 
(2013).
47 See this commentary on Articles 1, section 4; 5, section 6; 9, section 2 and 10, section 4.
48 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Montreal, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003) 
2226 UNTS 208.
49 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 38.
50 See fn. 39 above.
51 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(6): see this commentary on Article 26, section 3.
52 VCLT Article 31(1). See Jonas and Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty,” op. cit., 
577–582.
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Protocol necessarily requires reading Article 1 together with the Protocol’s pre-
amble and other programmatic provisions.
Where the meaning imparted by the text of a treaty itself is equivocal or 
inconclusive or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the 
text is desired, the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may shed some 
light.53 While the object and purpose cannot override the ordinary meaning 
of the text of a treaty, they can be interpreted as ‘modifiers’ of the ordinary 
meaning.54 Thus, the object and purpose of a treaty can facilitate its evolutive 
interpretation.55 In addition, the object and purpose of a treaty can be used 
as a means to reconcile divergences in the text of the Protocol in two or more 
of its authenticated languages, when no text has been agreed to prevail in case 
of divergence and the difference in meaning cannot be resolved by applying 
the other general rules on treaty interpretation, as long as the chosen meaning 
is that which best reconciles the texts.56
The interpretative relevance of the object and purpose of the treaty is par-
ticularly significant in the context of the often open-ended or heavily qualified 
language used in the Nagoya Protocol. In that regard, it is of the utmost impor-
tance that its object and purpose (i.e. ensuring the fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge among 
and within States, with a view to contributing to conservation and sustainable 
use) guide Parties in unilaterally implementing the Protocol where they are 
allowed a wide margin of discretion, and collectively57 in further developing 
certain provisions of the Protocol that require further negotiations.58 In both 
regards, the object and purpose of a treaty can serve to ‘maintain the balance 
of rights and obligations created by the treaty.’59 This is particularly – but not 
exclusively – the case in Protocol operative provisions that specifically refer 
to the ‘objective’ of the Protocol. For instance, the objective serves as a sub-
stantive limit to the Parties’ negotiating and legislative discretion in the devel-
opment and implementation of future ‘specialized ABS instruments,’ as well 
as a substantive limit to the interpretative discretion of Parties in achieving 
53 VCLT Article 33. See ICJ, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment 
(3 February 1994), paragraph 41.
54 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, op. cit., 190 and 192.
55 Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 246.
56 VCLT Article 33(4). See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, op. cit., 193.
57 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
58 See for example this commentary on Articles 10 and 30.
59 Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” op. cit., 118.
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mutual supportiveness between the Protocol and other relevant international 
instruments.60 In addition, it serves as an aim for transboundary cooperation.61
Furthermore, this Article is relevant in relation to the international obliga-
tions of States signatories to the Protocol. Signatories of an international treaty 
are obliged not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry 
into force, unless these States afterwards explicitly express their intention not 
to ratify it.62 This general rule appears particularly significant at the time of 
writing, as the Protocol is not yet in force,63 but a significant number of signa-
tories are developing domestic ABS frameworks and undertaking other activi-
ties, such as providing capacity building64 on ABS on the ground.65
60 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
61 See this commentary on Article 11. Interpretative questions arise however from the fact 
that the provision on transboundary cooperation in relation to genetic resources just 
refers to ‘with a view to implementing the Protocol’ – Nagoya Protocol Article 11(1) – 
whereas the provision on transboundary cooperation in relation to traditional knowl-
edge specifically refers to ‘implementing the objective of this Protocol’ – Nagoya Protocol 
Article 11(2), emphasis added – even if Nagoya Protocol Article 1 does not mention ‘tra-
ditional knowledge.’ For completeness’ sake, Nagoya Protocol Article 1 is also the object, 
among others, of awareness-raising obligations: Article 21(a). See this commentary on 
Article 21.
62 VCLT Article 18 reads: ‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have 
made its intention clear not to become a Party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its con-
sent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that 
such entry into force is not unduly delayed.’ It should be noted, however, that ‘the extent 
of [such an] interim obligation has never been conclusively defined’: Jonas and Saunders, 
“The Object and Purpose of a Treaty,” op. cit., 572–572 and more generally 594–608.
63 At the time of writing the Protocol had 26 ratifications and 92 signatures: see “Status 
of Signature, and Ratification, Accession, Approval and Acceptance,” CBD, accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/default.shtml>.
64 See this commentary on Article 22.
65 CBD Executive Secretary, “Progress report on the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
and related developments” (7 September 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/11 and ADD.1. 
© Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani, and Matthias Buck, 2015.
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Article 2. Use of Terms
The terms defined in Article 2 of the Convention shall apply to this Protocol. 
In addition, for the purposes of this Protocol: 
(a) “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention;
(b) “Convention” means the Convention on Biological Diversity; 
(c) “Utilization of genetic resources” means to conduct research and 
development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of 
genetic resources, including through the application of biotechnology 
as defined in Article 2 of the Convention.
(d) “Biotechnology” as defined in Article 2 of the Convention means any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organ-
isms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes 
for specific use.
(e) “Derivative” means a naturally occurring biochemical compound result-
ing from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic 
resources, even if it does not contain functional units of heredity.
1 Overview 
The most notable function of Article 2 is to introduce in international biodi-
versity law new definitions,1 some of which seek to delimit the scope of the 
Protocol2 and were negotiated as a package.3 The first key definition is ‘utiliza-
tion of genetic resources,’ and has implications for the subject-matter scope 
of the Protocol and several of its operative provisions.4 This is particularly 
1 VCLT Article 31(4); and comments by Villiger, “1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,” op. cit., 125. Among the additional definitions, the terms established in Article 2(a) 
and (b) simply allow using short references to the ‘Conference of the Parties’ and to the 
‘Convention’ rather than their full official name.
2 Nagoya Protocol Article 2(c–e). 
3 ENB, “Summary of the Interregional Negotiating Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing: 
18–21 September 2010,” unnumbered, 2–3, accessed 30 November 2013, <http://www.iisd 
.ca/biodiv/absing/brief/absing_briefe.html>.
4 It informs the potential scope of domestic access frameworks (Nagoya Protocol Article 6) 
as well as the scope of ‘user measures’ (see this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1) and 
related monitoring obligations of Parties (see this commentary on Article 17, section 2).
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significant in the absence of consistent State practice in defining/understand-
ing the concept of genetic resources domestically or internationally.5 The term 
‘utilization of genetic resources,’ also appears in the ABS provisions of the 
CBD6 to delimit the scope of potential benefits falling under the provisions of 
the Convention, but was left undefined. As defined in the Protocol, the term 
expands the interpretation of ‘genetic resources,’ which was defined in the CBD 
as ‘genetic material’ of actual or potential value (‘any material of plant, animal 
or other origin containing functional units of heredity’).7 The Protocol, instead, 
includes not only the genetic composition, but also the ‘biochemical composi-
tion’ of genetic resources,8 with the aim of including ‘derivatives’ – another 
key definition introduced by the Protocol. These two new definitions, there-
fore, aim to include in the Protocol’s scope not only genetic resources, but also 
material that does not contain ‘functional units of heredity’ (i.e. DNA),9 such 
as snake venoms, resins or alkaloids found in plants, or proteins. Inclusion of 
these definitions aimed to address one of the most challenging issues in the 
Protocol negotiations. But as will be discussed below, the way in which the 
terms are used (or not) in the Protocol raises interpretative doubts. 
In addition, Article 2 clarifies that the terms defined in the CBD are to apply 
also to the Nagoya Protocol.10 As a result, the definitions of CBD Article 2 
constitute an integral part of the Nagoya Protocol.11 Among these, the ones 
that are clearly relevant for the interpretation of the Protocol include: 
5 Morten W. Tvedt and Peter J. Schei, “The Term ‘Genetic Resources’: Flexible and Dynamic 
While Providing Legal Certainty?,” in Oberthür and Rosendal, Global Governance of 
Genetic Resources, op. cit., 18 and 25–27.
6 CBD Articles 1 and 15(7).
7 CBD Article 2, emphasis added. 
8 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 28. 
It should be noted that the term ‘biochemical composition of genetic resources’ is vague 
from a scientific viewpoint, and could either refer to the biochemical composition of the 
gene – i.e., which can be subject to human manipulation by using biotechnology (for 
instance, introducing synthetic gene segments to improve gene expression) or it could 
refer to the biochemical composition of the organism (i.e., derivatives as products of cel-
lular metabolism). For a scientific background, see Bruce Alberts et al., Molecular Biology 
of the Cell, 5th ed. (New York: Garland Science, 2012).
9 Biologically speaking, only DNA contains functional units of heredity (meaning genes), 
not RNA. RNA is thus included among derivatives in Figure 1, as it retains the information 
from functional units of heredity. We are extremely thankful to Francesca Morgera and 
Andrea D’Ambrogio for their inputs on scientific terminology addressed in this chapter. 
Any remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility.
10 As clarified in the first sentence of the chapeau to Nagoya Protocol Article 2.
11 This is significant because CBD Article 2 (Use of terms) only applies ‘for the purpose of 
[the] Convention.’
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biodiversity,12 biological resources,13 biotechnology,14 country of origin,15 
country providing genetic recourses,16 genetic resources,17 in situ conditions,18 
sustainable use19 and technology.20 
12 CBD Article 2 defines ‘biological diversity’ as ‘the variability among living organisms from 
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems.’ The term appears in the Nagoya Protocol in the 1st, 
6th, 7th,  11th, 14th, 22nd and 25th preambular recitals; as well as in Articles 1, 2(b), 4(1), 
8(a), 9, 10 and 22(5)(h); and in the Annex, 2(f) and (k). The term ‘biodiversity’ is used in 
the 6th and 11th preambular recitals; and in the Annex, 1(f).
13 CBD Article 2 defines ‘biological resources’ as including genetic resources, organisms or 
parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or 
potential use or value for humanity. The term appears in Article 2(e) of the Nagoya Protocol.
14 CBD Article 2 defines ‘biotechnology’ as ‘any technological application that uses biological 
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes 
for specific use.’ The term appears in the Nagoya Protocol in Articles 2(c–d) and in the 
Annex, 2(f). The adjective ‘biotechnological’ appears in Article 23 and in the Annex, 2(b).
15 CBD Article 2 defines ‘country of origin of genetic resources’ as ‘the country which pos-
sesses those genetic resources in in situ conditions.’ The term appears in Articles 5(1), 6(1) 
and 23 of the Nagoya Protocol.
16 CBD Article 2 defines ‘country providing genetic resources’ as ‘the country supplying 
genetic resources collected from in situ sources, including populations of both wild and 
domesticated species, or taken from ex situ sources, which may or may not have origi-
nated in that country.’ The term appears in the Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(1), 6(1), 23 and 
in the Annex, 2(b), (j) and (m). Note also that CBD Article 2 defines ‘genetic material’ as 
‘any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of 
heredity.’ The latter expression, however, is not used in the Protocol as such.
17 CBD Article 2 defines ‘genetic resources’ as ‘genetic material of actual or potential value.’ 
The term appears in the Nagoya Protocol 2nd, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 19th, and 
21st through 25th preambular recitals; in Articles 1, 2(c) and (e), 3, 4(4), 5(1–2) and (5), 
6(1–2) and (3)(b) and (f), 7, 8(b–c), 9, 10, 11(1–2), 12(1–2 and 4) and 12(3)(a) and (c); 13(1)
(a–b) and 13(4), 14(3)(c), 15(1), 16(1), 17(1)(a–b), (3) and (4)(f), 18(1), 21, 22(4)(d) and (5)
(j), 23 and in the Annex, (2)(b), (e), (f), (j) and (m).
18 CBD Article 2 defines ‘in situ conditions’ as ‘conditions where genetic resources exist 
within ecosystems and natural habitats, and in the case of domesticated or cultivated 
species, in the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties.’ The 
term appears in Article 11(1) of the Nagoya Protocol.
19 CBD Article 2 defines ‘sustainable use’ as ‘the use of components of biological diversity 
in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future 
generations.’ The term appears in the Nagoya Protocol in the 6th, 7th, 22nd and 25th pre-
ambular recitals; in Articles 1, 8(a), 9, 10, 22(5)(h) and in the Annex, 1(f) and 2(k). 
20 CBD Article 2 defines ‘technology’ as including biotechnology. The term appears in the 
Nagoya Protocol in the 5th preambular recital; in Articles 2(c–d), 22(5)(g) and 23, and in 
the Annex, at 2(f) and (g).
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It should be further noted that the Nagoya Protocol does not define ‘utiliza-
tion of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources,’ although the 
expression is used in its operative provisions.21 This gap is particularly note-
worthy as no other international treaty has referred to this concept or more 
generally to ‘traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.’22
The following sections will focus on explaining the definition of utilization 
of genetic resources, by breaking it down into its components, and linking it 
to the definition of derivatives. The implicit exclusion of biological resources23 
(as opposed to genetic resources) used as commodities in trade from the scope 
of the Protocol, and the lack of definition of utilization of traditional knowl-
edge will be also briefly discussed.
2 Utilization of Genetic Resources
The term first appeared, without being defined, in the CBD, both in its objec-
tives and in its provision devoted to access to genetic resources, when referring 
to benefit-sharing arising from the ‘utilization of genetic resources.’24 To fill 
this gap, the Nagoya Protocol negotiators initially considered a list of activities 
falling under the term ‘utilization’,25 but eventually decided in favor of a gen-
eral definition that could allow for covering rapidly developing technologies 
and uses, potentially unknown at the time of negotiation.26 In particular, the 
21 E.g. Nagoya Protocol Articles 3, 5(5), 10, 12 (2–4), 16(1) and 18(1). The term appears also in 
the preamble and in the Annex to the Protocol.
22 Tvedt and Schei, “The Term ‘Genetic Resources,’ ” op. cit., 24–25. See also Introduction to 
this commentary, section 3.
23 CBD Article 2.
24 CBD Articles 1 and 15(7).
25 See non-exhaustive list of activities in the CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the 
meeting of the Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Concepts, Terms, Working 
Definitions and Sectoral Approaches” (12 December 2008) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/2, paragraphs 7–8, including: genetic modification, biosynthesis, breeding 
and selection, propagation and cultivation of genetic resources in the form received, 
conservation, characterisation and evaluation, and production of compounds naturally 
occurring in genetic material. The final text of Article 2 includes only one specific activity, 
namely the application of biotechnology.
26 See Peter J. Schei and Morten W. Tvedt, The Concept of “Genetic Resources” in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and How It Relates to a Functional International Regime 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing (Lysaker: Fridthof Nansen Institute, 2010), circulated in the 
ABS negotiations as UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/1. 
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Protocol hinges the definition on the intent27 underlying ‘utilization of genetic 
resources’ (by reference to ‘research and development’), as well as the material 
on which the conduct focuses (‘on the genetic and/or biochemical composi-
tion of genetic resources’).
2.1 The Intent
The terms ‘research’ and ‘development’ are not defined in the Nagoya Protocol 
or in the CBD.28 Based on their ordinary meaning,29 ‘research’ means the 
investigation or experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation 
of facts.30 In the context of the Protocol and when it is used in combination 
with ‘development,’ it refers to the two closely related processes intended to 
create new products and new forms of old products through technological 
innovation.31 This may include all types of systematic work on the genetic or 
biochemical composition of genetic resources aimed to discover potentially 
interesting properties and to devise practical applications of such discoveries. 
In practice, different sectors (e.g., agriculture, cosmetics and pharmaceuti-
cals) have different approaches to research and development.32 For the purposes 
of the Protocol, however, it does not matter where research and development 
take place – in the provider country or in another jurisdiction – and by whom 
it is carried out – by a public or private individual or entity. Arguably, while 
the Protocol applies to all types of research, whether it is characterized as 
27 Based on legislative experience in Australia: see Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries,” op. cit., 301–302.
28 CBD Articles 17(7) and 25(2).
29 VCLT Article 31(1) states that ‘the ordinary meaning [is] to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
30 ‘Research’ in Oxford Dictionaries Online, accessed 10 October 2013, <http://oxforddictio 
naries.com/definition/english/research>: ‘A search or investigation undertaken to dis-
cover facts and reach new conclusions by the critical study of a subject or by a course of 
scientific inquiry.’
31 ‘Research and Development’ in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, accessed 10 October 
2013, <www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/499010/research-and-development>: ‘two 
intimately related processes by which new products and new forms of old products are 
brought into being through technological innovation.’
32 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/2, paragraph 17; CBD Secretariat, “Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice: 
Trends in Partnerships Across Sectors,” CBD Technical Series No. 38 (Montreal: CBD 
Secretariat, 2008); Institute for European Environmental Policy, “Study to analyse legal 
and economic aspects of implementing the Nagoya Protocol on ABS in the European 
Union” (2010), accessed 30 October 2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiver-
sity/international/abs/pdf/ABS%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf>, Annex 3
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‘fundamental’ research without commercial objective or whether it explicitly 
aims at developing commercial products,33 it draws a distinction between 
research carried out for commercial purposes and research for non-com-
mercial purposes to which special considerations apply.34 The Protocol itself 
acknowledges, however, that difficulties arise in practice in determining the 
presence of the commercial intent in specific research activities at a specific 
point in time,35 particularly when a commercial purpose may arise at succes-
sive stages of research, either because the original researcher changed his/
her intent36 or where another researcher with commercial purposes uses the 
results of non-commercial research.37
2.2 The Material
Utilization relates to ‘the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources’. This formulation was the result of a long-standing debate among 
CBD Parties and ABS stakeholders on the exact understanding of the term 
‘genetic resources’ under the Convention. This debate revolved around whether 
33 Ibid., paragraphs 17 and 43–45. See also CBD Group of Legal and Technical Experts on 
Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches, “Concepts, terms, working 
definitions and sectoral approaches relating to the international regime on access and 
benefit-sharing, Submission from the International Workshop on the topic of ‘access and 
benefit-sharing in non-commercial biodiversity research’ ” (29 November 2008) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/ABS/GTLE/1/INF/2, paragraph 5. 
34 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). See this commentary on Article 8, section 2.
35 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a) underscores the need to address a change of intent in the 
context of non-commercial research.
36 This could be the case where access to a plant was sought for non-commercial purposes 
by a university team of researchers from a user country in accordance with the national 
legislation of the provider country, but later one member of the research team continues 
doing research on the plant in another company leading to a highly successful (and maybe 
patented) product: Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani, “Introduction,” in 
Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Perspective, op. cit., 1, 5.
37 This could be the following case: a university researcher requests prior informed consent 
and enters into mutually agreed terms for academic, non-commercial research on a plant. 
He publishes the results of his research in a scientific journal without mentioning the 
country of origin of the samples, the limitations on the use, or the existence of a benefit-
sharing agreement. Two years later, another scientist undertaking applied research in the 
food industry reads the article and acquires a sample of the African plant from a botanical 
garden in his country: the research on the plant sample leads to a highly successful (and 
maybe patented) product. Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Introduction,” op. cit., 6.
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the term referred only to material containing functional units of heredity (i.e. 
DNA) or more broadly gene expressions such as RNA, proteins and enzymes 
(which do not contain functional units of heredity per se, but retain informa-
tion from them) and any naturally occurring biochemical compounds result-
ing from cellular metabolism (i.e., resins, essential oils, and fragrances).38 The 
latter does not contain functional units of heredity or information from them,39 
and therefore can only be synthesized if the compounds are extracted directly 
from the organism. 
While the reference to ‘biochemical composition of genetic resources’ in 
Article 2(c) does not clarify the material that is the object of utilization self-
evidently, the combined reading of this provision with the other new defini-
tions provided in the Protocol, in particular that of derivatives (explained 
below), leads to the conclusion that all of the above is covered by the Protocol.40
2.2.1 Derivatives
Derivative is a term used in the CBD in relation to the definition of ‘biotechnology’41 
and in the Bonn Guidelines as an item to be potentially addressed in relation to 
benefit-sharing as part of the information required for obtaining PIC42 and 
when establishing MAT.43 Neither instrument, however, define the term. 
During the negotiations of the Protocol, there was no common understanding 
of what the term ‘derivative’ (i.e., material not containing functional units of 
heredity) may include. It could refer to the results of cellular metabolism.44 It 
could further be understood as information on genetic resources. But it could 
also refer to any result of human activity utilizing a genetic resource, such as 
a chemical compound extracted from an organism and purified by human 
activity, gene segments isolated by human manipulation of genetic material, 
synthetic gene segments produced by human manipulation or a synthetic 
38 See Singh Nijar and Pei Fern, Nagoya ABS Protocol, op. cit., 113–114.
39 See Figure 1.
40 This is the only interpretation that would give effect to the entirety of Article 2 (on the 
effectiveness principle for treaty interpretation, see Introduction to this commentary, sec-
tion 5). See also Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries,” 
op. cit., 302–303.
41 CBD Article 2.
42 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 36(l).
43 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 44(i). 
44 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/2, paragraphs 9–10, refers to ‘organism’s metabolism’ in that regard.
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analogue of a gene segment inspired by a natural gene.45 Developing coun-
tries sought to include specific reference to derivatives within the Protocol 
general provisions, arguing that this is where the actual or potential value of 
genetic resources lies primarily as the main interest of modern biosciences.46 
Accordingly, failure to specifically mention derivatives in the Protocol would 
have significantly narrowed the scope for benefit-sharing and would not have 
served the ultimate fulfillment of neither the Protocol’s nor the CBD objectives. 
Some industrialized countries, in contrast, argued that the CBD only refers to 
‘genetic resources’ (genetic material containing functional units of heredity).47 
Behind this argument were concerns about legal and economic costs arising 
from an international ABS instrument that would introduce the need for PIC 
and benefit-sharing requirements to a broad spectrum of industrial activities. 
These countries thus rather preferred to leave it to MAT to clarify how deriva-
tives are understood on a case-by-case basis by the individual parties to a spe-
cific ABS transaction and set out specific benefit-sharing modalities in that 
contractual context.48 
As this divergence of views continued, the compromise reached was to elim-
inate all references to the term ‘derivative’ in the operational provisions of the 
Protocol with the understanding that the term ‘utilization of genetic resources’ 
(or its alternative forms – e.g., ‘utilized’, ‘use’, ‘used’) would include the notion of 
derivatives.49 This led to the puzzling inclusion of the term ‘derivatives’ only in 
45 Drawing from CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2, paragraphs 9–10.
46 Matthias Buck and Claire Hamilton, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Benefit-sharing Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity,” Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 20 
(2011): 47, 56. 
47 Making reference to CBD Article 15. Note however that not all developed countries shared 
this view. The 2005 Australian legislation, for instance, defined access as the taking of 
a biological resource for the purpose of research and development on its genetic and 
biochemical compounds. See EPBC Regulations 2000 Part 8A.03, accessed 14 February 
2014, <www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2005L03473>. We are grateful to Geoff Burton for 
drawing our attention to this. 
48 ENB 9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 6.
49 Ibid., 16. See also Ryo Kohsaka, The Negotiating History of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS: 
Perspective from Japan (2012), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.ipaj.org/english_jour 
nal/pdf/9-1_Kohsaka.pdf>, 61. The compromise was developed at the meeting of the 
Interregional Negotiating Group on Access and Benefit-sharing in September 2010 and 
then again by the Japanese COP Presidency during CBD COP 10. See CBD Working Group 
on ABS, “Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity” in 
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the Protocol provision on ‘definitions’, although the term as such is not referred 
to anywhere else in the Protocol. Its relevance, however, to the interpretation 
of ‘utilization of genetic resources’ (or its alternative forms) throughout the 
Protocol operative text can be argued on two grounds. First, there is an indirect 
link between ‘utilization’ and ‘derivatives’ via an explicit reference to ‘includ-
ing through the application of biotechnology’ in the definition of ‘utilization.’ 
That is, the definition of ‘biotechnology’ in the Protocol – which uses the word-
ing of the CBD50 – refers to ‘any technological application that uses . . . deriva-
tives [of living organisms] to make or modify products or processes for specific 
use.’ Therefore, utilization implicitly refers also to research and development 
through the application of biotechnology on derivatives. In this connection, it 
should be emphasized that the CBD notion of biotechnology is broader than 
‘modern biotechnology’ that is exclusively understood as genetic engineering,51 
and therefore allows the Protocol to cover a series of biological technologies 
involving materials not containing functional units of heredity.52 Second, the 
definition of ‘utilization’ makes reference to the ‘biochemical composition of 
“Report of the meeting of the Interregional Negotiating Group,” (21 September 2010) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/ING/1, Annex (hereinafter, Montreal II draft), draft article 
2(c); and ENB, “Summary of the Interregional Negotiating Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing: 18–21 September 2010”, 2–3. This terminology is deployed in Nagoya Protocol 
Article 5(1): benefits arising from the ‘utilization of genetic resources;’ Article 6(1): access 
to genetic resources ‘for their utilization;’ Article 15(1): ‘genetic resources utilized;’ and 
Article 17(1): ‘utilization of genetic resources’. The compromise also included: referring 
to ‘subsequent applications and commercialization’ not in the definition of ‘utilization’ 
but in Article 5; and providing for the issuance of a permit ‘at the time of access’ (Nagoya 
Protocol Article 6.3(e)). See Buck and Hamilton, “The Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 56.
50 The definition of ‘biotechnology’ in Nagoya Protocol Article 2(d) is a verbatim repro-
duction of the definition of the term in CBD Article 2. Thus, its inclusion in the Nagoya 
Protocol is not strictly necessary, since CBD definitions also apply to the Nagoya Protocol. 
Its inclusion in Article 2 can only be explained by the fact that it creates an explicit, 
albeit indirect, link between ‘derivatives’ and ‘utilization of genetic resources.’ Beyond its 
implicit relevance whenever ‘utilization of genetic resources’ appears in other operational 
provisions of the Protocol, the term ‘biotechnology’ appears only once in the Protocol 
text, in the Annex listing examples of monetary and non-monetary benefits which Parties 
may consider for inclusion in MAT (see Nagoya Protocol Article 5(4) and this commentary 
on Article 5, section 6).
51 That is, as opposed to the restrictive understanding of biotechnology under the Biosafety 
Protocol. We are thankful to Riccardo Pavoni for drawing our attention to this point. 
52 See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” UNEP/
CBD/WG-ABS/7/2, paragraph 19.
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genetic resources’53 which arguably relates to the reference to ‘biochemical 
compounds’ in the definition of ‘derivatives’, as it is only the latter that pro-
vides the necessary elements to circumscribe this otherwise vague concept.54 
The operational value of the definition of ‘derivatives’ for the Protocol, there-
fore, is to further clarify the definition of ‘utilization of genetic resources’: it 
serves to articulate that naturally occurring biochemical compounds resulting 
from genetic expression or cellular metabolism, and not containing DNA, can be 
the focus of utilization for the purposes of research and development. 
While this interpretation of the role of the definition of derivatives in the 
Protocol appears as the only one to give effect to the entirety of Article 2, the 
unfortunate drafting may raise doubts in interpreters and as a consequence 
lead to variations in national legislation implementing the Protocol.55 When 
developing domestic ABS frameworks, national legislators would be well 
advised to establish that they apply not only to genetic resources collected in 
situ in their territory but also to compounds extracted or resulting from such 
resources. Guidance from the Protocol’s governing body56 would be beneficial 
in that regard.
International guidance could also address the case of ‘isolated derivatives’ – 
i.e. derivatives acquired and utilized without physical access to genetic 
resources, such as those already extracted and isolated from their natural envi-
ronment and available ex situ – which are arguably covered by the definition 
of ‘utilization of genetic resources’ and thus by the Protocol.57 For example: 
53 Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 250.
54 See fn. 8 above on the vagueness of the notion from a scientific perspective. Note also that 
the WIPO negotiating text includes a bracketed definition of derivatives that reiterates 
the wording of Nagoya Protocol Article 2(e): WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concern-
ing the IGC” WO/GA/43/14, Annex A, paragraph 2.
55 See divergence of views between the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union (EU) as to the need for explicit inclusion of derivatives in proposed EU 
regulation implementing the Nagoya Protocol in the EU in “Amendments adopted by 
the European Parliament on 12 September 2013 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union (COM(2012)0576 – 
C7-0322/2012 – 2012/0278(COD),” accessed 30 November 2013, <www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0373&language=EN&ring=A7-2013- 
0263>, amendments 38, 39 and 43.
56 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
57 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 250; see also Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 67. This implies that the definition of ‘utilization’ may lead to 
situations where there can be benefit-sharing without access in situ (see this commentary 
on Article 5, section 2). Indeed, at least in the case of the EU, it appears that most com-
mercial users of genetic resources source new material from ex situ collections, including 
69use of terms
a plant produces a resin. Such resin is collected, its biochemical compounds 
are extracted and isolated in the laboratory of the local university. A foreign 
researcher obtains access only to the isolated biochemical compounds but not 
to the resin, nor to the plant that produced the resin. As domestic ABS frame-
works may cover isolated derivatives differently in provider and user countries, 
such discrepancy may eventually play out in the cooperation between specific 
provider and user countries in the context of the compliance provisions of the 
Protocol.58 
Finally, an issue that is not explicitly addressed by the Protocol and remains 
to be clarified relates to bioinformatics, i.e. the application of computer sci-
ence and information technology to the field of biology, molecular biology in 
particular. By applying information technology, mankind can further expand 
and develop the understanding of biological processes. In practice, bioinfor-
matics is a way of realizing the value in the genetic material without the need 
for access to the biological sources where it was originally found.59 Thus, it 
remains unclear whether the definition of ‘utilization’ covers, and thus the 
Protocol may apply to, exchanges of information concerning derivatives (but 
no longer exchanges of derivatives as such). However, on the basis of the defi-
nition of ‘derivative,’ it has been observed that ‘functional’ could refer both to 
the genetic structure per se and to the information encapsulated in the DNA 
sequence that can be screened and transferred electronically and become 
from collections in countries of origin. See European Commission, Impact Assessment 
(Part I) accompanying the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on access to genetic 
resources and benefit-sharing, SWD(2012) 292 final (4 October 2012), 15. In addition, 
Schei and Tvedt argue that the interpretation of the definition of ‘genetic resources’ and 
their uses needs to be dynamic as regards new technologies, in order to meet the overall 
objectives of the benefit-sharing objective and obligation in the CBD. See Schei and Tvedt, 
Concept of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 17.
58 See this commentary on Article 15. Practical questions related to ensuring benefit-shar-
ing and enforceability are expected to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, see Singh 
Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 254. In particular, triggering of the 
Protocol’s compliance provisions would be facilitated by national legislation in both 
user and provider countries providing for documentation requirements or standards to 
identify the source or origin of the isolated derivative in question, and thus a clear chain 
of information connecting the genetic resource to the compound used in research and 
development and requiring due diligence by researchers in that regard. See Buck and 
Hamilton, “The Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 53. Impossibility to trace the country of origin 
and obtain PIC would lead to a situation specifically foreseen by the Protocol as a con-
sideration for the possible creation of a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism: see this 
commentary on Article 10, section 2.2.
59 See Schei and Tvedt, Concept of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 15.
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functional in a new, digital form.”60 In that light, it has been argued that ‘the 
biological origin rather than the biological form [of the information] matters’ 
for falling under the definition of utilization of genetic resources.61 Another 
argument could be made on the basis of the definition of ‘utilization of genetic 
resources,’ as research and development on the genetic and/or biochemical 
‘composition’ could be interpreted to include the information this composition 
is transcribed to. In effect, the definitions of the Protocol appear capable to be 
interpreted dynamically in the light of relevant technological developments,62 
with a view to including any new technique that ‘in fact realizes the value of 
functional units of heredity’63 and avoiding that the Protocol become obso-
lete in a few years’ time. That being said, such broad interpretation may cre-
ate challenges for the architecture of the Protocol, which has been conceived 
without specific consideration of bioinformatics. 
While guidance by the Protocol’s governing body on this issue will be 
needed, the issue has already arisen in the context of the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA):64 in 2013, 
Secretary Shakeel Bhatti highlighted the ‘increasing trend for the informa-
tion and knowledge content of genetic material to be extracted, processed 
and exchanged in its own right, detached from the physical exchange of the 
plant genetic material’ and called on Parties to widen the focus of the ITPGRFA 
provisions with the potential to address the non-material values of genetic 
resources.65
60 Tvedt and Schei, “The Term ‘Genetic Resources,’ ” op. cit., 20–21.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 21.
63 Ibid., 29. On the question, see also Joseph Henry Vogel et al., “The Economics of 
Information, Studiously Ignored in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Benefit Sharing,” Law, Environment and Development Journal 7 (2011): 52.
64 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 
3 November 2001, in force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303.
65 See Report of the Secretary of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources on 
Food and Agriculture, Appendix I in the Report of the Fifth Session of the Governing 
Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources on Food and Agriculture, 
(2013) FAO Doc IT/GB-5/13/Report, 4–5. 
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FIGURE 1 Figure developed by Francesca Morgera on the basis of Bruce Alberts et al., 
Molecular Biology of the Cell, 4th ed (New York: Garland Science; 2002).
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2.2.2 Commodities in Trade
Since the beginning of the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol, questions have 
arisen about whether it would affect international trade in commodities (agri-
cultural and forest products, cut flowers, herbal teas, etc.).66 This was based 
on some CBD Parties’ understanding that ABS could also apply to biological 
resources (as opposed to genetic resources), an understanding which was 
reflected in certain pieces of national legislation.67 The rationale behind this 
expansive approach is to prevent a loophole: that access to biological resources 
for consumptive uses can lead to the use of their genetic or biochemical com-
position for research and development purposes, without respecting the 
Protocol requirements on PIC and benefit-sharing at the time of access to the 
resources (i.e., when they entered international trade).68 Other CBD Parties, 
particularly from the industrialized world, were concerned about an exces-
sively broad approach subjecting international trade in commodities to ABS 
rules and its potential (ab)use by some Parties with a view to establishing non-
tariff barriers to trade.69 
As emerged shortly after the conclusion of the Nagoya Protocol, the use of 
imported commodities for research and development purposes is not just a 
matter of academic speculation. In May 2010, Nestlé, the world’s largest food 
company, faced allegations of biopiracy after it applied for five patents involv-
ing medicinal uses of two plants found and commonly used in South Africa, 
rooibos and honeybush, and commonly traded internationally as herbal teas, 
66 In response, some Parties submitted proposals of operational text at the seventh meet-
ing of the Working Group on ABS that explicitly excluded ‘commodities in trade’ from 
the scope of the regime: see CBD, “Compilation of submissions by Parties, governments, 
international organisations, indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders 
in respect of the main components of the international regime on access and benefit- 
sharing listed in Decision IX/12, Annex I” (2 February 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/INF/1, paragraphs 24 and 43. 
67 See for example Costa Rica’s Biodiversity Law No. 7788, 1998, analysed in Jorge Cabrera 
Medaglia, “The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 331, 343–347. See 
also Australia, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations, No. 
181, 2000, where ‘access to biological resources’ means ‘the taking of biological resources 
of native species for research and development on any genetic resources, or biochemical 
compounds, comprising or contained in the biological resources . . .’
68 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/2, paragraph 6.
69 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 197–199.
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without having negotiated the relevant permit with the South African govern-
ment. Two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) alleged that the patent 
applications were in violation of the South African Biodiversity Act, which 
implements the CBD provisions on ABS in South Africa. According to it, a 
company needs a permit from the South African government to do research 
with commercial intent on, or patent the use of, genetic resources occurring 
in South Africa. Such a permit can only be obtained if a benefit-sharing agree-
ment has been negotiated.70 Nestlé maintained that any biopiracy claims are 
baseless since it neither sourced the plants in South Africa nor did research 
on them there. Rooibos and honeybush extracts and material were provided 
by South African suppliers to two Nestlé research facilities in Switzerland and 
France, which used them for basic research on active ingredients.71 The com-
pany added that the patents were filed to protect research results, but there 
was no plan for their commercial use. The controversy illustrates the need 
for additional clarity with regard to the use for research of plants exported as 
commodities, to address the change of intent and the time when the benefit-
sharing obligation arises.72 
While the final text of the Protocol does not include any explicit reference 
to commodities,73 Parties are nonetheless broadly required to take measures, 
under the compliance provisions of the Protocol, to avoid the circumvention of 
the general provisions on PIC and benefit-sharing that could potentially arise 
in the context of the international commodity trade. In view of the Protocol’s 
objective and based on an effectiveness-driven interpretation, these provi-
sions74 should be interpreted as implying that Parties prevent genetic material 
and biochemical compounds originated from biological resources imported 
as commodities from being subjected to research and development without 
70 “Rooibos robbery: Nestlé accused of biopirating South African genetic resources,” Berne 
Declaration (27 May 2010), accessed 30 November 2013 <www.evb.ch/en/f25001910.
html>.
71 “Lessons from the ‘rooibos robbery,’ ” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Bridges vol. 14 no. 4 (10 December 2010), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/98765/>.
72 Ibid.
73 An explicit exclusion was considered during the negotiations but was eventually aban-
doned: CBD Working Group on ABS, “Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity” in “Report of the Third Part of the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing” (17 October 2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.5, Annex (hereinafter, Nagoya Draft), draft article 3(d).
74 See this commentary on Article 15.
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seeking PIC and establishing MAT according to the domestic ABS framework 
of the Party where the ‘commodity’ was acquired.
3 Utilization of Traditional Knowledge
In the absence of an explicit definition, utilization of traditional knowledge 
needs to be understood by combining different elements of the Protocol. It 
can be interpreted along similar lines to the definition of ‘utilization of genetic 
resources.’ In other words, as traditional knowledge under the Protocol would 
serve as lead information for the utilization of genetic resources,75 it can be 
understood as hinging on the same intent (research and development) as in 
the case of genetic resources. In addition, this lacuna in the Protocol should be 
seen as part of a general approach to avoiding definitions or specifications for 
several other expressions used in relation to traditional knowledge. Therefore, 
the interpretation of utilization of traditional knowledge needs to allow for 
flexibility at the national and sub-national level, given the wide range of con-
texts within which any traditional knowledge-related concepts and provisions 
apply in practice.76 Furthermore, as any other traditional knowledge-related 
term or provision in the Protocol ‘utilization of traditional knowledge’ needs to 
be understood in light of relevant international human rights law,77 as well as 
taking into account indigenous and local communities’ customary laws, proto-
cols and procedures.78
75 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), “Report of the sixth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2, 
36. See discussion in the Introduction to this commentary, section 3.
76 See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on traditional knowledge,” 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, paragraph 10.
77 See discussion in Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
78 In light of the cross-cutting provision of Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1): see this commen-
tary on Article 12, section 2.
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Article 3. Scope
This Protocol shall apply to genetic resources within the scope of Article 15 
of the Convention and to the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
resources. This Protocol shall also apply to traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources within the scope of the Convention and to the ben-
efits arising from the utilization of such knowledge.
1 Overview
This short provision1 aims to clarify the ambit of application of the Protocol: 
it, however, only addresses its subject-matter scope and it does so in a rather 
obscure manner. Several other scope-related issues, notably the temporal and 
spatial scope of the Protocol, were heavily debated during the negotiations but 
were eventually not explicitly addressed in its final text. 
Article 3 at least implicitly clarifies that2 the Protocol applies not only to 
access to and benefit-sharing from the utilization of genetic resources, but also 
to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. And the Article 
appears to draw a distinction between the scope of application related to 
genetic resources and to traditional knowledge.
The following sections will discuss the ambiguity in the delineation of 
the subject-matter scope of the Protocol and analyze outstanding questions 
related to its temporal and spatial scope. It should also be noted that other 
Articles in the Protocol contribute to defining its scope.3
1 The text reproduces the final compromise proposal of the Japanese COP10 Presidency, which 
closely follows the text of draft article 3 in the Cali Draft. The only modification was the 
insertion of an explicit reference to the ‘scope of Article 15’ of the Convention in relation to 
genetic resources. 
2 As opposed to what can be inferred from the title of the Protocol and its Article 1: see this 
commentary on Article 1, section 3.
3 See, e.g., this commentary on Articles 2, 4 and 8.
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2 Subject-matter Scope
Article 3 appears to distinguish between the scope of the Protocol in relation 
to genetic resources, which is delimited by a specific reference to Article 15 
of the Convention, and the scope in relation to traditional knowledge, which 
refers to the general scope of Convention. 
With regards to traditional knowledge, however, it is difficult to under-
stand what the Nagoya Protocol intends by making a general reference to 
the Convention, as its text is silent on ‘traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources’.4 With regards to genetic resources, the specific reference to 
CBD Article 15 is equally puzzling, as that Article does not address questions 
related to subject-matter scope, but simply reaffirms Parties’ rights to regulate 
access to genetic resources under their national jurisdiction through national 
law.5 The only possible explanation for the obscure drafting of Article 3 can 
be traced back to the negotiators’ intention to de-link the spatial scope of the 
Nagoya Protocol in relation to genetic resources from the CBD provision on 
jurisdictional scope. The latter states that the Convention applies to processes 
and activities under Parties’ jurisdiction or control also in areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.6 Basically, the Protocol drafters’ main concern 
was to implicitly exclude bioprospecting activities on marine genetic resources 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction from the scope of the Protocol, as dis-
cussed below. 
As the overall usefulness of Article 3 of the Protocol is questionable, it will 
fall on the Protocol’s governing body7 to clarify any questions on subject- 
matter scope that may arise in the future.
2.1 Human Genetic Resources
Although the text of the Convention is silent about human genetic resources, 
CBD Parties adopted Decision 2/11 stating that human genetic resources are 
not included within the framework of the Convention.8 Negotiators debated 
4 As explained in the Introduction in this commentary, section 3, there is no explicit link 
between traditional knowledge and genetic resources in the text of the Convention.
5 CBD Article 15(1) reads: ‘Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural 
resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national gov-
ernments and is subject to national legislation.’
6 CBD Article 4(b). See also Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 57.
7 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
8 See CBD Decision 2/11, “Access to genetic resources” (30 November 1995) UN Doc UNEP/
CBD/COP/2/19, paragraph 2.
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whether to explicitly exclude human genetic resources from the Protocol’s 
scope,9 but eventually decided against such an explicit reference. However, 
CBD Parties, when adopting the Protocol, recalled Decision 2/11 and restated 
that human genetic resources are not included within the framework of the 
Protocol, noting that this decision was without prejudice to further consider-
ation of the issue by its governing body.10 
3 Outstanding Questions
The Protocol is silent on questions related to temporal and spatial scope, 
although these were heavily debated in the negotiations. Other questions 
addressed in that context related to the relationship between the Protocol 
and other international treaties and processes,11 that will be discussed in 
the sections of this commentary concerning Articles 4 (Relationship with 
International Agreements and Instruments) and 8 (Special Circumstances). 
The following sub-sections will focus on outstanding questions related to the 
temporal and spatial scope.
3.1 Temporal Scope
As regards temporal scope,12 the Protocol clearly applies to genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge associated with such resources utilized after the 
entry into force of the Protocol for a Party. Negotiators, however, had discussed 
whether the Protocol should address more complex questions related to 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge acquired after the entry into force 
of the Convention but before the entry into force of the Protocol. The argu-
ment was put forward by developing countries. They argued that the interna-
tional obligation to share benefits and obtain informed consent prior to access 
pre-existed the Protocol, as it was already included under the Convention.13 
9 See Montreal I Draft, draft article 3.
10 CBD Decision 10/1, paragraph 5.
11 See references to the ITPGRFA and to human pathogens in Montreal I Draft, draft article 3.
12 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 14, note some of the uncertainties that already 
existed regarding the temporal coverage of CBD Article 15.
13 See submissions by Namibia on behalf of the African Group to the CBD Working Group 
on ABS, “Collation of operative text submitted by Parties, governments, international 
organisations, indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders in respect of 
the main components of the international regime on access and benefit-sharing listed in 
Decision IX/12, Annex I” (28 January 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/4, paragraphs 
11–12.
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They further argued that the benefit-sharing obligation in CBD Article 15(7) is 
independent from the creation of national ABS frameworks and the establish-
ment of MAT.14 They thus proposed that the benefit-sharing obligation of the 
Protocol apply to new and continuing uses of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge acquired after the entry into force of the Convention (but before the 
Protocol’s entry into force), under ‘modified procedures for benefit-sharing’ to 
be developed by the Protocol’s governing body.15 This, it was argued, would not 
constitute a retroactive application of the Protocol since the focus would be on 
new facts.16 The underlying rationale of the proposal was to expand the range 
of situations in which the benefit-sharing obligations of the Protocol would 
apply, and to address possible loopholes related to ex situ collections already 
existing in developed countries’ genebanks. The proposal encountered firm 
opposition from most developed countries, who wished instead to explicitly 
exclude ‘genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources acquired prior to the entry into force of the Protocol.’17 A compro-
mise proposal was then put forward by Norway and the African Group to at 
least create an obligation for States to encourage individual users to take all 
14 ENB 9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 5. 
An argument can be made that, because Article 15(7) is clearly worded, unconditional 
and framed in unequivocally legally binding terms, it could be self-executing. This point 
remains contentious: see Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 2 and fn. 9.
15 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the first part of the ninth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/9/3, paragraph 119; and Montreal I Draft, draft article 3.
16 See Singh Nijar and Pei Fern, Nagoya ABS Protocol, op. cit., 26; and Evanson C. Kamau, 
Bevis Fedder and Gerd Winter, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Benefit Sharing: What Is New and What Are the Implications for Provider and User 
Countries and the Scientific Community?,” Law, Environment and Development Journal 
6 (2010): 246, 255, where the authors argue that ‘Clearly, this means that any genetic 
resource or traditional knowledge accessed before [entry into force of the Protocol] can-
not retroactively be made subject to PIC requirements. Likewise, any benefits obtained 
before that date cannot retroactively be subjected to a benefit-sharing obligation. 
However, it can be argued that the generation of benefits after that date is a new act in 
terms of Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, or that the holding of the genetic resource 
or traditional knowledge is a situation which has not ceased to exist.’ See also Berne 
Declaration and Natural Justice, Access or Utilization – What Triggers User Obligations? A 
Comment on the Draft Proposal of the European Commission on the Implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (Cape Town and Zurich: Berne Declaration 
and Natural Justice, 2013), accessed 1 November 2013, <http://naturaljustice.org/wp- 
content/uploads/pdf/Submission-EU-ABS-Regulation.pdf>, 6–8.
17 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the second part of the ninth meeting,” UNEP/
CBD/COP/10/5/ADD.4, paragraph 133; and Montreal I Draft, draft article 3.
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reasonable measures to enter into benefit-sharing arrangements with a coun-
try of origin for new and continuous utilization of genetic resources acquired 
before the entry into force of the Protocol.18 None of these proposals, however, 
made it in the final text of the Nagoya Protocol.
As a result, issues related to temporal scope are not specifically addressed by 
the text of the Protocol.19 Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that 
while the Protocol does not apply to genetic resources acquired prior to the 
entry into force of the CBD, it does not prevent Parties from requiring, in their 
domestic ABS frameworks, benefit-sharing arising from new and continuing 
uses of genetic resources acquired after the entry into force of the Convention 
but before the entry into force of the Protocol.20 Equally, the text of the Protocol 
does not exclude that Parties may require benefit-sharing arising from new and 
continuing uses of traditional knowledge acquired prior to the entry into force 
of the Protocol.21 Others, instead, exclude both possibilities, arguing that the 
main operational provisions of the Protocol refer to genetic resources provided 
by a Party to the Protocol on the basis of its domestic ABS framework.22
It may be tentatively concluded that the Protocol does not apply to genetic 
resources acquired prior to the entry into force of the Convention,23 but 
it remains debatable whether benefit-sharing obligations arise under the 
Protocol for new or continuing uses of genetic resources acquired in the interim 
period between the entry into force of the CBD and that of the Protocol. As 
the Protocol is silent on these complex questions, it appears that an interpreta-
tive decision or guidance reached by the Protocol Parties collectively through 
18 See Montreal I Draft, draft article 3, second last paragraph. A similar proposal on tradi-
tional knowledge in draft article 9(5) of the Cali Draft was also deleted in the final com-
promise proposal. CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the second part of the ninth 
meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/ADD.4, paragraph 133.
19 VCLT Article 28 reads: ‘Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a Party in relation to any act or fact which took 
place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the 
treaty with respect to that Party.’
20 Greiber et al, Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 72–73.
21 Ibid., 90.
22 Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 57, making reference to Nagoya Protocol 
Articles 5–6 and 15.
23 The Protocol reference to ‘genetic resources within the scope of Article 15 of the 
Convention’ presupposes the existence of a Party to the Convention, i.e., that the 
Convention has entered into force. That being said, the possibility cannot be excluded 
that this discussion may be reopened in the context of Nagoya Protocol Article 10: see 
below in this section.
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the Protocol’s governing body24 on how to address new and continuing uses 
would be desirable. This is particularly critical as practical and legal problems 
could arise if different Parties were to base their domestic ABS frameworks on 
different understandings of the temporal scope.25 To name but a few of such 
problems, pre-Nagoya Protocol decisions on PIC and MAT may not conform 
with the Protocol requirements; no internationally recognized certificate 
of compliance would exist; or users may have already obtained intellectual 
property rights on material and innovations developed on the basis of genetic 
resources acquired in good faith before the entry into force of the Protocol. The 
status of ex situ collections pre-dating the entry into force of the Protocol may 
be also addressed by the Protocol’s governing body in this context. These dis-
cussions could also be (and actually have already been)26 entertained in rela-
tion to a possible global benefit-sharing mechanism under the Protocol.27 The 
absence of a collective solution on the temporal scope could possibly lead to 
a situation in which the Protocol’s compliance procedures and mechanisms28 
would be used to consider whether lack of implementing measures in a user 
Party taking a restrictive approach to the question of the temporal scope, that 
does not support the benefit-sharing claims of a provider Party taking a broader 
approach to the temporal scope with regard to new uses of material accessed 
before the Protocol’s entry into force, would constitute non-compliance.
24 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a).
25 For example, the draft EU regulation for implementing the Nagoya Protocol in the EU 
would explicitly apply to genetic resources accessed after the entry into force of the 
Nagoya Protocol for the Union, with the term ‘access’ defined as ‘the acquisition of genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources in a Party to the 
Nagoya Protocol’ (emphasis added): European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union, COM(2012) 
576 final, (hereinafter, EU draft regulation), draft article 2.1.
26 “Draft decision for the consideration of the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol,” in ICNP, “Report of the sec-
ond meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from Their Utilization,” (26 July 2012), UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex, sec-
tion 2/3, where specific reference is made to issues related to ex situ conservation. See 
also ENB, “Summary of the Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 
2–6 July 2012,” Vol. 9 No. 579, 9 July 2012, 10.
27 See this commentary on Article 10, section 2.2.
28 See this commentary on Article 30.
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3.2 Spatial Scope
The negotiators also considered whether the Protocol should only apply 
to genetic resources over which Parties exercise sovereign rights, and thus 
whether to include or exclude explicitly from its scope genetic resources from 
beyond areas of national jurisdiction. The latter include genetic resources 
located in marine areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the high 
seas29 and the Area)30 or the Antarctic Treaty Area.31 
With regard to marine genetic resources located beyond national juris-
diction, the reference to CBD Article 15 in the Protocol arguably serves to 
emphasize genetic resources over which States exercise sovereign rights and 
implicitly indicate the negotiators’ intention to de-link the spatial scope of the 
Nagoya Protocol from CBD Article 4(b). This would suggest that bioprospect-
ing for genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction does not fall 
under the scope of the Nagoya Protocol.32 Whether this is indeed the case, 
29 UNCLOS Part VII.
30 The Area is ‘the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction’ (UNCLOS Article 1(1)(1)). UNCLOS Part XI and Agreement relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New 
York, 28 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996) 1836 UNTS 3.
31 See references to excluding or specifically inducing in the scope ‘genetic resources located 
in the Antarctic Treaty Area, which is the area south of latitude 60º South,’ ‘genetic 
resources beyond national jurisdictions’ and ‘genetic resources from marine areas beyond 
national jurisdiction’ in Montreal I Draft, draft article 3, which foresaw (in case of inclu-
sion in the scope) a mandate for the Protocol’s governing body to adopt modified proce-
dures for benefit-sharing for genetic resources. For a discussion of this specific issue, see 
CBD Working Group on ABS, “Study on the relationship between an international regime 
on access and benefit-sharing and other international instruments and forums that 
govern the use of genetic resources. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Note by the Executive Secretary” 
(3 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/Part3; Patrizia Vigni, “Antarctic 
Bioprospecting: Is It Compatible with the Value of Antarctica as a Natural Reserve?,” 
in Francioni and Scovazzi, Biotechnology and International Law, op. cit., 111; Morten W. 
Tvedt, “Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica,” Polar Record 47 (2011): 46; and 
Dagmar Lohan and Sam Johnston, The International Regime for Bioprospecting. Existing 
Policies and Emerging Issues for Antarctica (Tokyo: United Nations University Institute of 
Advanced Studies, 2003).
32 In favour of this interpretation: Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 57; Veit 
Koester, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: Ratification by the EU and Its Member States and 
Implementation Challenges (Paris, France: IDDRI, 2012), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/STUDY0312_VK_nagoya%20abs.
pdf>, 16–17; Charlotte Salpin, “The Law of the Sea: A before and an after Nagoya?” in 
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however, remains debatable,33 as ultimately the Protocol (and the CBD pro-
vision referred to in this context) are silent on this complex question and a 
clear determination on this issue is needed at the multilateral level. It cannot 
thus be excluded that the Nagoya Protocol’s governing body may consider the 
matter explicitly in the future. This may well be the case depending on prog-
ress or lack thereof in ongoing discussions34 on marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction under the UN General Assembly.35 It should in 
fact be emphasized that at the time of writing, discussions under the General 
Assembly have not reached the stage of formal intergovernmental negotia-
tions on that matter.36 An interpretative decision or guidance by the Protocol’s 
Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Perspective, op. cit., 149, 177; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 73.
33 Sebastian Oberthür and Justyna Pozarowska, “The Impact of the Nagoya Protocol on the 
Evolving Institutional Complex of ABS Governance,” in Oberthür and Rosendal, Global 
Governance of Genetic Resources, op. cit., 178, 188, conclude that the ‘the situation of the 
geographical scope of the Nagoya Protocol remains ambiguous and it should in any event 
be difficult to oppose the notion of mutual supportiveness.’ On mutual supportiveness 
between the Protocol and a future instrument on marine genetic resources in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, see this commentary on Article 4, section 3.3.
34 UN General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea” (2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/24, 
paragraph 73. 
35 For a discussion of the possible interactions between the UN General Assembly and the 
Nagoya Protocol, see Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 179–182.
36 In the context of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues 
relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction, under the authority of the UN General Assembly. At its 
fourth meeting in 2011 the Working Group concluded that ‘A process be initiated, by the 
General Assembly, with a view to ensuring that the legal framework for the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction effec-
tively addresses those issues by identifying gaps and ways forward, including through the 
implementation of existing instruments and the possible development of a multilateral 
agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’: UN General 
Assembly, “Letter dated 30 June 2011 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly” (30 June 2011) UN 
Doc A/66/119, Annex, paragraph 1(a). At its sixth meeting in 2013, the Working Group 
decided ‘to establish a process within the Working Group to prepare for a decision by 
the General Assembly before the end of its sixty-ninth session on marine biodiversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, including by taking a decision on the development 
of an international instrument under UNCLOS.’ UN General Assembly, “Letter dated 
23 September 2013 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group to the President of the General Assembly,” (23 September 2013) UN Doc A/68/399, 
Annex, paragraph 9. 
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governing body37 may thus become necessary, particularly if the discussions 
under the General Assembly do not make significant progress by the time the 
Nagoya Protocol comes into force. In that regard, it may also be possible that 
Parties may decide to address some of this and the other above-mentioned 
questions in the context of the possible multilateral benefit-sharing mecha-
nism under Article 10.38
37 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
38 As a situation where it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC for the use of genetic 
resources: see this commentary on Article 10, section 2.2. Note that for those arguing that 
marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction fall outside the scope of the Nagoya 
Protocol, consideration of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion in the context of a possible multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism would require 
renegotiating the scope of the Protocol: Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 177–179. The 
question has been put on the agenda of the first meeting of the Parties to the Protocol: 
see “Draft Decision for the consideration of the first meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol,” in ICNP, “Report 
of the second meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation,” (26 July 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, 
Annex, Recommendation 2/3. 
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Article 4. Relationship with International 
Agreements and Instruments
1. The provisions of this Protocol shall not affect the rights and obliga-
tions of any Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause 
a serious damage or threat to biological diversity. This paragraph is not 
intended to create a hierarchy between this Protocol and other inter-
national instruments.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent the Parties from developing and 
implementing other relevant international agreements, including 
other specialized access and benefit-sharing agreements, provided 
that they are supportive of and do not run counter to the objectives of 
the Convention and this Protocol.
3. This Protocol shall be implemented in a mutually supportive manner 
with other international instruments relevant to this Protocol. Due 
regard should be paid to useful and relevant ongoing work or practices 
under such international instruments and relevant international orga-
nizations, provided that they are supportive of and do not run counter 
to the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol.
4. This Protocol is the instrument for the implementation of the access 
and benefit-sharing provisions of the Convention. Where a specialized 
international access and benefit-sharing instrument applies that is 
consistent with, and does not run counter to the objectives of the 
Convention and this Protocol, this Protocol does not apply for the 
Party or Parties to the specialized instrument in respect of the specific 
genetic resource covered by and for the purpose of the specialized 
instrument.
1 Overview
Article 4 is a complex provision seeking to clarify the relationship of the 
Protocol with existing and future international agreements.1 First, it encapsu-
1 From a political science perspective, this has been seen as ‘an attempt to reinforce the cen-
tral position of the international biodiversity regime in global ABS governance’ by seeking 
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lates the implied compromise reached by CBD Parties that the Nagoya Protocol 
will not serve as a comprehensive framework,2 in the global governance of ABS 
transactions. As it will be argued below, it indicates (although not very clearly) 
that the Protocol will address ABS issues when and to the extent to which 
these are not addressed by other international ABS instruments. It will not 
subsume previous ABS agreements or subordinate to the Protocol rules future 
ABS agreements.3 Vis-à-vis these instruments, the Protocol thus establishes a 
residual regime.
Nonetheless, this provision aims to limit the discretion of Protocol Parties 
in negotiating new international instruments, by reference to mutual support-
iveness with the objective of the CBD and the Protocol.4 In that connection, it 
is significant that the question of the relationship of the Protocol with other 
international instruments is addressed in the operative part of the Protocol, 
rather than in its preamble. This placement would make Article 4 a ‘substan-
tive standard of conduct incumbent upon State Parties,’ rather than just an aid 
to contextual interpretation.5 The provision’s convoluted language, however, 
complicates interpretation and may well prevent the Article from realizing 
to clarify the division of labour among different international processes and providing guid-
ance for future developments in other institutions, and has been considered to have had 
some success in that direction (in the context of the General Assembly Working Group on 
Marine Biodiversity, the Antarctic Treaty System, the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
WIPO): Oberthür and Pozarowska, “Impact of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 179, 187–189, 231, 
240 and 243.
2 Note the proposed preambular language that did not make it into the final text of the Protocol 
‘noting that this Protocol will be the comprehensive protocol on access and benefit-sharing 
and that WIPO should use this Protocol as a basis for its ongoing work’, emphasis added, CBD 
Working Group on ABS, “Report of the third part of the ninth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing” (17 October 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/10/5/Add.5, 8.
3 This is also reflected in the CBD COP decision adopting the final text of the Nagoya Protocol 
(CBD Decision 10/1, 6th preambular recital, where CBD Parties recognized ‘that the 
International Regime is constituted of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Nagoya 
Protocol . . . , as well as complementary instruments, including the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the Bonn Guidelines . . . ,’ emphasis 
added).
4 The role of the Protocol as a regime that applies by default (when and to the extent to which 
other international ABS instruments do not apply) also explains the provisions on ‘special 
considerations’ in Article 8. See this commentary on Article 8.
5 Riccardo Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: 
A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?,” European Journal of 
International Law 21 (2010): 649, 658.
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its aim. Article 4 in part combines language from the CBD,6 with language on 
mutual supportiveness that was borrowed (in a slightly different formulation) 
from other multilateral environmental agreements.7 
The sections below aim to suggest a coherent and effective interpretation of 
this Article by differentiating between its bearing on the relationship between 
the Protocol and other existing agreements, future international agreements, 
and more specifically other (existing and future) international agreements or 
instruments specialized in ABS. The negotiating history is particularly signifi-
cant to understand which existing and future international instruments were 
identified by the Protocol negotiators as directly relevant for the interpretation 
or implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.8 
2 Relationship with Existing Agreements 
Article 4(1) focuses on the relationship of the Protocol with existing interna-
tional agreements. The provision attempts to clarify the relationship between 
the Protocol and other international treaties (not necessarily environmental 
ones)9 in existence at the time of its adoption (or possibly at the time of its 
entry into force). In doing so, Article 4 relies on the text of CBD Article 22(1) 
verbatim.10 Furthermore, it adds that the provision is ‘not intended to create a 
hierarchy between this Protocol and other international instruments’.11
6 CBD Article 22(1), which reads ‘The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international 
agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a seri-
ous damage or threat to biological diversity.’ This accords with VCLT Article 30(2), which 
reads: ‘When a treaty specifies that is subject to, or that it is not to be considered incom-
patible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.’
7 Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness,” op. cit., 205–206.
8 See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Study on the relationship between an international 
regime on access and benefit-sharing and other international instruments and forums 
that govern the use of genetic resources” (3 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/
INF/3/Part.1.
9 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 109.
10 See fn. 6 above. 
11 The same language can be found in the preamble of the Rotterdam Convention on the 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade (Rotterdam, 10 September 1998, in force 24 February 2004) 2244 
UNTS 337 (‘Rotterdam PIC Convention’) and ITPGRFA. Note that instead the Cartagena 
Protocol preamble refers to ‘not [being] intended to subordinate this Protocol to 
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The overall meaning of Article 4(1) is, however, quite unclear. The wording 
borrowed from the CBD is that of a reverse conflict clause. It has been inter-
preted as giving ‘conditional priority’ to CBD Parties’ obligations arising from 
other treaties existing at the time of the conclusion of the CBD over their 
obligations arising from the Convention, but only in the absence of a ‘serious 
damage or threat’ to biodiversity.12 In the presence of such damage or threat, 
conversely, the CBD would oblige its Parties to give their obligations under the 
Convention precedence over their obligations from other international agree-
ments. But the Protocol Article 4(1) then adds that the reverse conflict clause 
is not intended to create a hierarchy among international instruments. The 
additional wording presumably limits to a case-by-case application the condi-
tional priority assigned to the Protocol by the beginning of Article 4(1). Since 
priority – rather than ‘hierarchical’ superiority – should be assigned to other 
international agreements, in the absence of a serious damage or threat to bio-
diversity, Article 4(1) expresses the intention to preclude an interpretation of 
the Protocol that would lead to a modification of Protocol Parties’ obligations 
under other existing international agreements 13 relevant for ABS. 
In doing so, Article 4(1) seems to reflect the wide margin of discretion also 
afforded by the CBD reverse conflict clause to CBD Parties. It equally implies 
a duty for Parties (collectively) to be constantly alert to, and promptly iden-
tify, any ‘serious damage or threat’ to biodiversity that may materialize from 
other international regimes.14 In that connection, the normative activity of the 
CBD governing body is highly significant in periodically crystallizing consen-
sus in the identification of serious threats to biodiversity, thereby triggering 
the prevalence of the CBD over other obligations arising from existing interna-
tional agreements.15 A similar approach in the context of the Nagoya Protocol 
could thus be adopted, although it is difficult to identify in abstracto specific 
other international agreements’ (emphasis added) and discussion by Pavoni, “Mutual 
Supportiveness,” op. cit., 654. Note also proposals to include language on non-subordi-
nation in the Protocol that were not included in the final text: CBD Working Group on 
ABS, “Report of the first part of the ninth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3, 108 and ENB 
9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 4.
12 Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness,” op. cit., 655.
13 Similarly to what was suggested in interpreting comparable language in the Biosafety 
Protocol by Ruth Mackenzie et al., An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety (Gland: IUCN, 2003), 29.
14 Based on a similar interpretation of CBD Article 22, see discussion in Elisa Morgera, 
“Faraway, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law,” Climate Law 2 (2011): 85, 88.
15 Ibid., 91.
88 article 4
ABS-related activities that could cause a serious damage or threat to biodiver-
sity. Ultimately, the most effective interpretation of Article 4(1) is thus that 
Parties should avoid any ‘principled’ or a priori approach in assessing and 
addressing the relationship of the Nagoya Protocol with other existing inter-
national agreements, but rather focus on a pragmatic, case-by-case approach 
to mutual supportiveness – as confirmed by the first sentence in Article 4(3).
The concept of ‘mutual supportiveness’ – that is key to the whole of 
Article 4 – has a two-fold implication for the conduct of States.16 First, it 
requires, at the interpretative level, that States ‘disqualify’ solutions to tensions 
between competing regimes involving the subordination of one regime to the 
other. Second, at the law-making level, it requires that States exert good-faith 
efforts to negotiate and conclude instruments that clarify the relationship 
between competing regimes, particularly when interpretative reconciliation 
efforts have been exhausted.17 Article 4(1) thus seems to relate to the first 
dimension of mutual supportiveness. This is further clarified by the Protocol 
preamble, where Parties ‘recogniz[e] that international instruments related to 
[ABS] should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving the objectives 
of the Convention’.18 
In addition, Article 4(3) mandates Parties to implement the Protocol in a 
mutually supportive manner with other ‘relevant’ international instruments. 
It implicitly expects Parties to identify, monitor and take into account inter-
national instruments that may not necessarily focus on ABS, but directly or 
indirectly relate to it. It provides, however, no specific guidance as to how to 
resolve any conflict that may arise between the Protocol and other interna-
tional agreements, but rather reflects Parties’ ‘awareness of the potential for 
conflict and their aspiration that any such conflict be resolved in a manner 
that respects both instruments.’19
Article 4(3) further encourages20 ‘due regard . . . to useful and relevant ongo-
ing work or practices under such international instruments and relevant inter-
national organizations, provided that they are supportive of and do not run 
counter to the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol’ in implementing 
16 Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness,” op. cit., 650–651.
17 Ibid., particularly 661–669.
18 Nagoya Protocol 20th preambular recital.
19 As was noted in the context of the Biosafety Protocol: see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory 
Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 27.
20 Note the non-legally binding language of the second sentence of Nagoya Protocol Article 
4(3): ‘should.’
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the Protocol. The drafting is quite unusual and highly unclear.21 The impre-
cise expression ‘ongoing work and practices’22 could arguably include not only 
negotiations of treaties but also of soft-law instruments. It may also refer to 
negotiations of other (technical) documents or to the conduct of activities on 
the ground undertaken in the context of international agreements or under 
the auspices, or with the technical support, of intergovernmental institutions. 
It remains to be seen which specific ‘work and practices’ will be deemed ‘use-
ful and relevant’ to trigger this provision. At the time of the Protocol negotia-
tions, relevant international instrument(s) were being negotiated under the 
World Health Organization (WHO)23 and under WIPO,24 and relevant discus-
sions were held under the FAO’s Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (CGRFA).25 As these developments are inherently subject 
to evolution and other relevant work may be initiated in other intergovern-
mental contexts, a collective determination of ongoing work and practices 
for the purposes of Article 4(3) by the Parties may be necessary at regular 
intervals. The Protocol’s governing body is consequently to monitor ongoing 
intergovernmental26 developments on matters related to ABS, as long as they 
are ‘supportive of, and do not run counter to the objectives’ of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol. The Protocol’s governing body may then provide consensus 
guidance in this regard, if necessary, including in the context of its provision 
on assessment and review.27 
21 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 263; Singh Nijar and Pei Fern, 
Nagoya ABS Protocol, op. cit., 26; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 78–80.
22 The expression ‘ongoing work in other international forums relating to access and benefit- 
sharing’ can also be found in the Nagoya Protocol 18th preambular paragraph, which does 
not shed further light on the matter.
23 See Marie Wilke, “A Healthy Look at the Nagoya Protocol – Implications for Global Health 
Governance,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 123, 142–143; and section 4.2 below.
24 See section 3.1 below.
25 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship”, op. cit., 114–115.
26 Ongoing work and practices that involve State and non-State actors, or only non-State 
actors (i.e., transnational work and practices on ABS as opposed to intergovernmental 
ones) is not addressed by Nagoya Protocol Article 4(3), since this provision is limited to 
work or practices ‘under [international] instruments and relevant international organiza-
tions.’ Transnational work and practices may rather be considered as ‘codes of conduct, 
guidelines and best practices and/or standards: see this commentary on Article 20.
27 See this commentary on Article 31, as CBD Decision 10/1, paragraph 6 suggests with spe-
cific regard to the WIPO negotiations.
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2.1 Examples of Existing Agreements 
While existing international instruments specializing on ABS will be discussed 
below, at least five sets of existing international norms may be considered 
relevant for the purposes of Article 4(1) and (3). Parties, in their implemen-
tation of the Protocol at the domestic level, as well as in the context of the 
Protocol’s governing body or in other concerned multilateral fora, will have to 
ensure mutual supportiveness between the Protocol and: i) international law 
on human rights, ii) the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage,28 
iii) the law of the sea, iv) the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
v) international investment law. 
With regards to international human rights law, the Protocol preamble notes 
the relevance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.29 
While it may be debatable whether, as a formally non-legally binding instru-
ment, UNDRIP may be considered an ‘existing international agreement’ for the 
purposes of Article 4, it is certainly true that the Nagoya Protocol will have 
to be interpreted so as not to derogate from the obligations of Parties under 
their applicable international human rights agreements, many of which are 
reflected in UNDRIP.30 This relationship may be particularly relevant with 
regard to indigenous peoples and local communities.31 But international 
human rights law also applies to individuals as users and providers in rela-
tion to the notions of participation, access to information and access to jus-
tice under the Protocol.32 Specific instances where the relationship between 
the Protocol and international human rights law is particularly relevant will 
be discussed more specifically in this commentary in relation to the relevant 
operative provisions of the Protocol.33
The scope of the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage 
extends to ‘knowledge and practices concerning nature’,34 so also traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources.35 To that extent, the UNESCO 
28 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (Paris, 
17 October 2003, in force 20 April 2006) 2368 UNTS 35 (hereinafter, UNESCO Convention 
on Intangible Cultural Heritage).
29 Nagoya Protocol 26th preambular recital.
30 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.1.
31 On the relevance of indigenous peoples’ human rights for local communities, 
see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.2.
32 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 74.
33 See this commentary on Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 13, 17, 18 and 21. 
34 UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage, Article 2(2)(d).
35 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 129. The relevance of the UNESCO 
Convention for traditional knowledge associated with biodiversity more generally 
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Convention appears to qualify as a relevant existing agreement for the purposes 
of Article 4 of the Protocol. The Convention creates several obligations for its 
Parties that are of relevance to traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources, such as the obligation to develop inventories of traditional knowl-
edge present in its Parties’ territory with the ‘participation of communities,’36 
and a best-endeavor obligation to adopt domestic measures aimed at ‘ensur-
ing access to the intangible cultural heritage while respecting customary prac-
tices governing access to specific aspects of such heritage.’37 Parties both to 
the Protocol and to the UNESCO Convention will thus have to interpret and 
implement their respective obligations related to traditional knowledge asso-
ciated with genetic resources in a mutually supportive manner. In particular, 
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol will have to raise the bar significantly compared 
to the UNESCO Convention by ensuring PIC (or approval and involvement) is 
obtained from indigenous and local communities before access to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources is granted and by ensuring fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing, in light of the more specific standards included 
in the Protocol in that regard.38
With regard to the law of the sea,39 the Protocol will have to be imple-
mented in relation to ABS-related activities in marine areas ‘consistently with’ 
the rights and obligations arising from the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) or relevant customary law for those Parties to the Protocol that 
are not Parties to UNCLOS.40 In other words, the application of the Nagoya 
is currently discussed under the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) pursuant to the 
mandate on misappropriation of traditional knowledge in CBD Decision 11/14, section C, 
paragraph 2. See CBD Article 8(j) Working Group, “How Tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best 
contribute to work under the Convention and to the Nagoya Protocol. Revised note by 
the Executive Secretary” (23 September 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/8/4/Rev.2, para-
graphs 3 and 55; and “Study on How Tasks 7, 10 And 12 of the Revised Programme of 
Work on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions Could Best Contribute to Work under the 
Convention and the Nagoya Protocol” (12 September 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/8/
INF/5, paragraphs 13–14.
36 UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage Articles 11(b) and 12(1).
37 UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage Article 13(d)(ii), emphasis added. 
Article 13(d)(iii) also foresees the development of domestic measures aimed at establish-
ing documentation institutions for the intangible cultural heritage and facilitating access 
to them.
38 We are grateful to Federico Lenzerini for a very useful preliminary exchange of ideas on 
this question.
39 See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Study on the relationship between an international ABS 
regime, the Antarctic Treaty System and UNCLOS,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/PART3.
40 While the CBD has 193 Parties, UNCLOS has 166.
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Protocol will have to respect the general jurisdictional framework applicable 
to the oceans established by the law of the sea, which distinguishes between 
different areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. In doing so, however, 
Protocol Parties may face several uncertainties and challenges in implement-
ing the two instruments in a mutually supportive manner, as the law of the sea 
does not address explicitly questions related to genetic resources.41 In areas 
within national jurisdiction, even when it can be argued that existing provisions 
under the law of the sea and the Protocol may be interpreted in a mutually sup-
portive way, challenges may arise from the proceduralization and contractual-
ization of ABS transactions required by the Protocol and the UNCLOS consent 
regime for marine scientific research for commercial purposes,42 or from the 
application of the Protocol provisions concerning indigenous and local com-
munities, on whose rights and traditional knowledge UNCLOS is silent.43 Much 
more uncertainty and controversy surrounds the status and regime applicable 
to marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, as discussed 
below.44
With regard to WTO law, while possible conflicts were very prominent in 
the negotiations of the Protocol, in particular in relation to IPRs,45 the final 
compromise text carefully avoids any reference to this specific relationship.46 
In that respect, it has been noted that the Nagoya Protocol was a ‘golden oppor-
tunity [that] has been lost’ for shielding environmental measures taken in the 
common interest of humanity against essentially reciprocal trade obligations 
under the WTO.47 In fact, it is argued that while the Nagoya Protocol does not 
impose WTO-inconsistent obligations on its Parties, its neutral48 provisions 
vis-à-vis trade-related measures may allow Parties to pass national ABS legis-
41 An exhaustive analysis of these challenges exceeds the scope of this commentary. A pre-
liminary, but systematic analysis can be found in Salpin, “Law of the Sea”, op. cit.
42 Ibid., 161–163.
43 Ibid., 169. Although note that Articles 5(i) and 24(2)(b) of the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New York, 4 August 1995, in force 11 December 
2001) 2167 UNTS 3, may be relevant in relation to indigenous peoples and local communi-
ties. We are grateful to Adriana Bessa for drawing our attention to this point.
44 See section 4.3 below.
45 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.1.
46 For this reason, this commentary will address questions related to IPRs only to the extent 
necessary to better understand the sparse references in the Protocol. 
47 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 212.
48 Ibid.
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lation that may be considered at variance with WTO rules and possibly put 
those Parties on the losing side in a WTO law dispute, because they are unable 
to justify these measures on the basis of an authoritative mandate from the 
Protocol.49
Finally, international investment law may also be relevant. Although there 
have been no international decisions on a conflict between ABS norms and 
investment disciplines, it remains a possibility that an investment dispute-
resolution mechanism may be seized by users who can claim to act as foreign 
investors against provider-country Parties when domestic ABS provisions 
implementing the Nagoya Protocol in relation to access50 or benefit-sharing51 
may be alleged to conflict with the terms of bilateral investment treaties.52 
Each Party has thus to ensure that the Nagoya Protocol and applicable invest-
ment treaties are implemented in a mutually supportive way. Provider coun-
tries may be well advised to explicitly justify domestic ABS frameworks on the 
basis of the Protocol, as well as of applicable international human rights law 
in as far as indigenous and local communities are concerned,53 to reduce their 
investment-related litigation risk.54 On the other hand, it has been noted that 
the existence of ‘broad permissive commitments’ in the Protocol suffices to 
alert international investors to include risks arising from ABS regulation in 
their due diligence assessments.55 
3 Relationships with Future Agreements
Article 4(2) acknowledges the possibility that Protocol Parties may negoti-
ate new international agreements that may ‘relate’ to the Protocol, including 
49 Ibid., 204. Note that bilateral trade agreements could also address WTO law-related issues: 
see section 3 below.
50 See this commentary on Article 6.
51 Such as joint ventures: Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(i). See this commentary on Article 5, 
section 6.
52 Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 205. 
53 As investment tribunals are generally more reluctant to fully consider the implications of 
international environmental law for the disputes they are tasked to decide: Ibid., 215.
54 Ibid., 206.
55 As a highly specialized bioprospecting investor would find it difficult to argue that it was 
not (and could not have been) aware of relevant international environmental rules when 
arguing before an investment dispute settlement tribunal: ibid., 213. See discussion in this 
commentary on Article 6, Section 3.1.
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specialized ABS agreements but also other international instruments that 
only indirectly or partly concern ABS. But such possibility is conditioned upon 
ensuring that future international agreements ‘are supportive of and do not 
run counter to the objectives of the Convention and of the Protocol’. The sec-
ond (law-making) dimension of mutual supportiveness, therefore, comes into 
play when Article 4 refers to future international agreements. In light of the 
understanding of the principle of mutual supportiveness outlined above, it 
can be argued that Article 4(2) limits Parties’ international law-making discre-
tion by requiring that they exert good-faith efforts to negotiate and conclude 
new instruments with a view to clarifying the relationship with the Protocol 
and ensuring that the objectives of the CBD and the Protocol on achieving fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing among and within States56 are respected. That 
is, at the very least, Protocol Parties should seek to ensure not only that these 
objectives are not undermined, but also that their realization is contributed to, 
by future international agreements.57 
Besides its relevance for future specialized ABS agreements (discussed 
below), the provision is of particular relevance for the ongoing negotiations 
under WIPO, also discussed below. It may also become particularly relevant for 
bilateral agreements to be concluded between a provider and user country to 
address either ABS issues in general or the implementation of the Protocol in 
particular. 
Bilateral agreements may be particularly relevant in situations specifically 
foreseen by the Protocol, such as where transboundary cooperation may be 
necessary,58 but also focus on59 or deal with ABS in the context of broader 
bilateral trade and/or cooperation agreements.60 These agreements could cer-
tainly raise issues related to their mutual supportiveness with the Protocol, 
and Parties are therefore to exercise their negotiating discretion to ensure that 
56 See this commentary on Article 1.
57 Indeed, Nagoya Protocol Article 4(2) explicitly points the negative and positive side – 
‘supportive of and do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and [the] 
Protocol’. See Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 207.
58 See this commentary on Article 11. Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” 
op. cit., 496. 
59 Ibid., 496–8. Young refers in particular to bilateral negotiations initiated by traditionally 
user countries, such as the US and Japan. 
60 E.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Washington, DC, 12 April 2006; 
in force 1 February 2009), Article 18(1) and “US-Peru TPA, Understanding Regarding 
Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge,” US Government (2006), accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file 
719_9535.pdf>; Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Its Member States, of the One 
Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, [2012] OJ L354/3, Articles 272(2)–272(5).
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these agreements do not run counter to the CBD and Protocol objectives. This 
may prove particularly difficult in the case of free trade and/or investment 
agreements, whose lengthy text may include several non-ABS related clauses 
that may promote biodiversity-damaging activities.61 This also applies when 
bilateral agreements involve non-Parties to the Protocol, and can indeed pro-
vide a specific opportunity in which Parties can comply with their obligation 
to encourage non-Parties to adhere to the Protocol.62 In addition, international 
human rights law may also apply to these bilateral negotiations. Thus States 
are expected to ensure that they maintain adequate policy space to meet their 
international obligations relating to indigenous peoples,63 including when 
negotiating bilateral trade and investment agreements that may affect human 
rights applicable to ABS transactions.64 
3.1 WIPO Negotiations
Established in 2001, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) is 
a result of the influence of the CBD principles, as well as of developing coun-
tries’ concerns regarding the consequences of patents over genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, and injustices enshrined in the intellectual prop-
erty system.65 The IGC has been undertaking text-based negotiations towards 
an international legal instrument or instruments to ensure the effective pro-
tection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions through intellectual property rights ‘without prejudice to the work 
pursued in other fora.’66 Such fora include in particular the TRIPS Council, 
other WIPO committees and bodies such as the Working Group on the Patent 
61 Both the EU and the US have put in place environmental assessments of their bilateral 
trade negotiations with a view to identify possible negative impacts on the environment, 
but these and similar practices may require further refinement to better assess impacts on 
biodiversity and ABS-related issues. For a non-ABS related discussion, see Sikina Jinnah 
and Elisa Morgera, “Environmental Provisions in US and EU Free Trade Agreements: A 
Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda,” Review of European, Comparative and 
International Environmental Law 22 (2013): 324.
62 See this commentary on Article 24.
63 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
64 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises: note by the Secretary General” (6 August 2013) UN Doc A/68/279 (advanced 
version), paragraph 55(e).
65 WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning the IGC,” WO/GA/26/6. 
66 In accordance with the IGC mandate as most recently renewed by the 2013 WIPO General 
Assembly. See Decision on agenda item 35 of WIPO Assemblies 43rd (21st ordinary) 
session, 23 September–2 October 2013, “Matters concerning the IGC” WO/GA/43/14. 
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Cooperation Treaty,67 but also the CBD regarding the Nagoya Protocol negotia-
tions and now the deliberations preparing for the Protocol’s entry into force.68 
While the WIPO negotiations go well beyond the scope of the Protocol,69 as 
they also concern traditional cultural expressions and are not linked to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the utilization of genetic 
resources, any future international instrument(s) on genetic resources and 
on traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources in the context of 
intellectual property will be implemented at a certain stage of the research and 
development chain (i.e. commercialization or pre-commercialization), that is 
also regulated by the Nagoya Protocol.
At the time of writing, the negotiations under WIPO are still ongoing.70 The 
Protocol’s negotiating history appears to include the WIPO IGC negotiations 
among the ‘ongoing work’ expected to be kept under review under Article 4(3).71 
Should the WIPO negotiations be completed successfully, the resulting interna-
tional instrument(s) will be ‘relevant’ to the Protocol pursuant to Article 4(3). 
This would be particularly true with regard to the intersection between ABS 
and intellectual property rights, especially in view of the fact that the Nagoya 
Protocol shies away from imposing IPR-related benefit-sharing 72 or a require-
ment of mandatory disclosure of the origin or source of genetic resources 
used in a product at the time of filing a patent application73 – issues which 
are currently under negotiation in the WIPO IGC framework. The scope and 
67 See for instance the Swiss proposal for amending the WIPO International Patent 
Cooperation Union Working Group on reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
“Declaration of the source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in patent appli-
cations. Proposals submitted by Switzerland,” (7 March 2007) WIPO Doc PCT/R/WG/9/5.
68 See for instance inclusion of references to the Nagoya Protocol in the WIPO IGC draft 
negotiating texts regarding the definitions, disclosure requirement and defensive protec-
tion of traditional knowledge: WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning the IGC,” 
WO/GA/43/14, Annex A, 2. 
69 See Introduction to this commentary, section 3. See also CBD Working Group on ABS, 
“Study on the relationship between an international regime on access and benefit-sharing 
and other international instruments and forums that govern the use of genetic resources. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO); the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO); and the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)” 
(3 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/PART2.
70 See WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning the IGC,” WO/GA/43/14.
71 CBD Decision X/1, paragraph 6.
72 Pavoni, “The Nagoya Protocol and WTO,” op. cit., 202.
73 Which had been considered through a combination of provisions during the negotia-
tions: Cali Draft, draft article 13(1)(a), 13(1)(a)(iv) and 13(3) – see comments by Pavoni, 
“Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 203–204, and this commentary on Article 17.
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specific provisions of a future WIPO instrument may thus result in strengthen-
ing (or weakening, depending on the outcome of the negotiations) the link-
ages between the two instruments, as well as the Protocol’s objective. Overall, 
the effect of Article 4(2) and 4(4) for the Parties that are involved in the WIPO 
negotiations is that they ‘are bound not to develop and implement agreements 
that would be at variance with the CBD and Protocol objectives,’74 notably 
achieving fair and equitable benefit-sharing between and within States, with a 
view to contributing to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.
4 Relationship with Specialized ABS Instruments
As indicated above, Article 4(2) specifically foresees the conclusion of future 
specialized ABS agreements. The provision thereby implies that CBD Parties 
expect that more specific international instruments will be developed to deal 
with certain sectors of genetic resources.75 It thus clarifies that the Protocol is 
not expected to be a comprehensive instrument, but rather applies by default 
where more specific international agreements have not been adopted to ensure 
the implementation of the ABS provisions of the Convention. Interpreting 
Article 4(2) in the light of the principle of mutual supportiveness,76 Parties are 
subject to an international obligation to negotiate such specialized ABS instru-
ments in a manner that proactively supports the realization of the objectives 
of the Convention and the Protocol, or at least avoids running counter to these 
objectives. 
The adoption of instruments in compliance with Article 4(2) is then char-
acterized by Article 4(4) as a condition for specialized ABS instruments to pre-
vail as lex specialis over the Protocol for those Parties that are Party to both 
instruments, as well as in respect of the specific genetic resources covered by 
and for the purpose of the specialized instrument. Thus, if a specialized ABS 
74 Pavoni, “The Nagoya Protocol and WTO,” op. cit., 207.
75 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Access and benefit-sharing arrangements existing in spe-
cific sectors” (11 January 2008) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/6/INF/4/REV1.
76 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Makane M. Mbengue, “A Propos du Principe Soutien 
Mutuel: les Relations entre le Protocol de Cartagena et les Accords de l’OMC,” Revue 
Générale de Droit International Public 4 (2007): 829; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 
and Makane M. Mbengue, “A ‘Footnote as a Principle.’ Mutual Supportiveness and Its 
Relevance in an Era of Fragmentation,” in Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber 
Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed. Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2011), 1615; and Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness,” op. cit.
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agreement is deemed inconsistent with the objectives of the CBD and the 
Protocol, Parties should not apply it.77
As to existing specialized ABS agreements that would come into play in 
implementing Article 4(4), the Protocol preamble points to the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,78 and the WHO 
International Health Regulations (2005),79 suggesting that, as of 2010, these 
meet the criteria of Article 4(4). As to the latter, it should be emphasized that 
shortly after the conclusion of the negotiations of the Protocol, the WHO com-
pleted the negotiations of a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework 
(PIP Framework), which can also be seen as a specialized ABS instrument.80 In 
addition, the negotiating history of Article 4 points to possible future special-
ized ABS instruments,81 such as a new international instrument or provisions 
on marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction; and pos-
sible new sectoral instruments to be developed under the FAO Commission 
on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA). The following sub-
sections will discuss each of the existing and potential future specialized ABS 
agreements in turn.
4.1 Genetic Resources Covered by the ITPGRFA 
The preamble to the Protocol acknowledges the ‘fundamental role’ of the 
ITPGRFA in relation to the interdependence of all countries with regard to 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, their special nature, and 
77 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 102.
78 Nagoya Protocol 16th and 19th preambular recitals. 
79 Nagoya Protocol 17th preambular recital. Revision of the WHO International Health 
Regulations (Geneva, 23 May 2005, in force 15 June 2007).
80 Note that the Nagoya Protocol refers to specialized ABS ‘agreements’ in Article 4(2), but 
‘instruments’ in Article 4(4). The WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework 
for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits (effective 24 
May 2011) WHO DOC WHA64.5, is a soft-law instrument and not a legally-binding treaty, 
although arguably its effects on the conduct of WHO Member States go well beyond those 
traditionally ascribed to soft-law instruments, as discussed below (see section 4.2 below). 
81 CBD COP, “Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing on the work of its sixth meeting” (31 January 2008) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/6, 
14–16; and Montreal I Draft draft article 3(c), which reads: ‘Genetic resources [contained 
in Annex I of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
provided they are used for the purposes of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture][under the Multilateral System of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, both current and as may be 
amended by the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture].’ (brackets in the original).
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importance for achieving food security worldwide and sustainable develop-
ment of agriculture in the context of poverty alleviation and climate change.82 
The preamble further recalls the Multilateral System of ABS established under 
the ITPGRFA ‘in harmony with the Convention.’83 For its part, the ITPGRFA 
was specifically negotiated to ensure harmony with the CBD,84 and its stated 
objective refers to ‘harmony with the CBD and its objectives.’85 It can thus be 
asserted that the ITPGRFA is an existing specialized international ABS instru-
ment ‘that has the same legal status of, and is consistent with, the CBD and 
its Nagoya Protocol.’86 Accordingly, Article 4(4) can be interpreted as a legal 
presumption of compatibility between the International Treaty, the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol, that may not be rebutted.87 
In view of the distinctive features of agricultural biodiversity,88 the Interna-
tional Treaty takes a markedly different approach to ABS than the Protocol, 
82 Nagoya Protocol 16th preambular recital. 
83 Nagoya Protocol 19th preambular recital.
84 FAO Conference Resolution 7/93 “Revision of the international undertaking on plant 
genetic resources,” (1993) requested intergovernmental negotiations on: the revision of 
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture to be 
in harmony with the CBD; the issue of access, on mutually agreed terms, to plant genetic 
resources, including ex situ collections not addressed by the CBD; and the realization of 
farmers’ rights.
85 ITPGRFA Article 1 reads: ‘1 The objectives of this Treaty are the conservation and sus-
tainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equita-
ble sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food security. 2 These objectives will 
be attained by closely linking this Treaty to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and to the Convention on Biological Diversity.’
86 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 105. See also CBD 
Working Group on ABS, “Study on the relationship between an international regime on 
access and benefit-sharing and other international instruments and forums that govern 
the use of genetic resources. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture and the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations” (3 March 2009) UN DOC 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/Part.1.
87 Ibid., 103. Note, however, that the ITPGRFA will have to be interpreted and applied in a 
mutually supportive manner with regard to the Nagoya Protocol provisions on indigenous 
and local communities’ PIC and benefit-sharing concerning traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources held by them, which may pose specific challenges as the International 
Treaty provisions on farmers’ rights are markedly different in approach and in level of 
detail than the relevant provisions of the Nagoya Protocol. For a discussion, Chiarolla, 
Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 110–114.
88 See also this commentary on Article 8, section 4.
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namely it is built on a multilateral – rather than prevalently bilateral – 
approach.89 The rationale is to some degree described in the preamble to 
the Treaty. First, agriculture in all countries depends largely on plant genetic 
resources that have originated elsewhere. Continued and unrestricted access 
to plant genetic resources, therefore, is indispensable for the crop improve-
ments that are necessary for sustainable agriculture and food security, in the 
face of genetic erosion, environmental changes, and future human needs. 
Furthermore, given the millennia of agricultural history, the geographical 
origins of plant genetic resources are often impossible to locate, and thus, 
identification of the country of origin is very difficult. Genebanks all over the 
world now have collections of all major crops, making the search for genetic 
resources in situ unnecessary.90
Against this background, the International Treaty has created a multilateral 
system aimed at facilitating access to, and exchange of, a specified list of crops91 
considered vital for food security and agricultural research, and at institution-
alizing the sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of these resources.92 
Benefits include non-monetary ones, such as exchange of information, access 
to and transfer of technology, capacity building and facilitated access to crops, 
recognized as a benefit in itself. Sharing of benefits arising from commercializa-
tion is done through standard payments by the users of material accessed from 
the multilateral system, according to the provisions of the standard Material 
Transfer Agreement (SMTA), adopted by the ITPGRFA Governing Body.93 
89 UN General Assembly, “Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food: Seed 
policies and the right to food: enhancing agrobiodiversity and encouraging innovation” 
(23 July 2009) UN Doc A/64/170, paragraphs 10 and 21–22. See also Michael Halewood 
et al., “Implementing ‘Mutually Supportive’ Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms 
under the Plant Treaty, Convention on Biological Diversity, and Nagoya Protocol,” Law 
Environment and Development Journal 9 (2013): 68, 71.
90 See David H. Cooper, “The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture,” Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 11 
(2002): 1, 4; Gerald K. Moore and Witold Tymowski, Explanatory Guide to the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Gland: IUCN, 2005), 2–6.
91 ITPGRFA Annex I.
92 ITPGRFA Articles 10–13. See Tsioumani, “International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture,” op. cit., 128.
93 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006, “On the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement” (16 June 2006). Users of material accessed from the Multilateral System must 
choose between two mandatory monetary benefit-sharing options: a default benefit-
sharing scheme, according to which the recipient will pay 1.1 percent of gross sales to 
the Treaty’s benefit-sharing fund in case of commercialization of new products incorpo-
rating material accessed from the MLS and if its availability to others is restricted; and 
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Such payments, together with voluntary donations, are directed to the Treaty’s 
benefit-sharing fund, which allocates funds under the direction of the ITPGRFA 
Governing Body, to particular activities designed to support farmers in devel-
oping countries in conserving crop diversity in their fields, and assist farmers 
and breeders globally in adapting crops to changing needs and demands. The 
benefit-sharing fund is thus mandated to prioritize projects that support not 
only the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity, but also 
the livelihoods of farmers and rural communities.94 
In this connection, the Protocol negotiators debated whether to specifically 
exclude the ITPGRFA Annex I resources from the scope of the Protocol,95 but 
eventually opted for a more general provision in the form of Article 4. As a 
specialized ABS agreement consistent with the objectives of the CBD and the 
Protocol as per Article 4(4), the provisions of the Treaty ‘will prevail over those 
of the Protocol with respect to [plant genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture] that are covered by the MLS and that are accessed for the purpose of 
research, breeding and training for food and agriculture.’96 In cases where the 
resources under the Treaty are used for other purposes (such as for chemical, 
pharmaceutical and/or non-food and non-feed industrial uses), the Nagoya 
Protocol will apply.97 With regard to agricultural research, however, and on 
the basis of the recognition of the specific features of agricultural biodiversity 
and the role and scope of the International Treaty in that regard, the Nagoya 
Protocol arguably does not preclude making available non-Annex I plant genetic 
resources under the same conditions provided for under the Multilateral 
an alternative formula whereby recipients pay 0.5 percent of gross sales on all PGRFA 
products of the species they accessed from the MLS, regardless of whether the products 
incorporate the material accessed and regardless of whether or not the new products 
are available without restriction. See “Standard Material Transfer Agreement,” ITPGRFA 
(16 June 2006), accessed 30 November 2013, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/agree 
ments/smta/SMTAe.pdf> (SMTA) Articles 6(7) and 6(11). 
94 See Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 124. 
95 Montreal II Draft, draft article 3(c).
96 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 103. See also 
Michael Halewood, Isabel Lopez Noriega and Sélim Louafi, “The Global Crop Commons 
and Access and Benefit-Sharing Laws: Examining the Limits of International Policy 
Support for the Collective Pooling and Management of Plant Genetic Resources,” in Crop 
Genetic Resources as a Global Commons. Challenges in International Law and Governance, 
ed. Michael Halewood, Isabel Lopez Noriega and Sélim Louafi (London: Routledge, 
2013), 1, 7.
97 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 109.
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System (MLS), i.e. using the SMTA,98 as long as this is specifically decided upon 
by the ITPGRFA Governing Body, which would take into consideration also 
the Nagoya Protocol’s provisions and requirements. This may be the case of 
plant genetic resources covered by the agreements between the international 
agricultural research centers of the Consultantive Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR Consortium) and the ITPGRFA Governing Body.99 
This may also be the case of materials voluntarily made available by ITPGRFA 
Parties under the conditions of the SMTA,100 as long as they are the countries of 
origin or have acquired the material in accordance with the CBD. Therefore, on 
the basis of a combined reading of Articles 4 and 8, the Protocol seems to allow 
for differentiated treatment of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
purposes both at the international level, using the multilateral ABS framework 
of the ITPGRFA, and at the national level, on the basis of national legislation.101 
4.2 Genetic Resources with Pathogenic Properties
Some genetic resources have pathogenic properties, i.e. they may cause disease 
to other organisms. The same genetic resources are used for medical research 
98 Ibid., 106–9. See also CBD Working Group on ABS, “Study on the relationship with the 
ITPGRFA,” UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/7/INF.3/Part I, paragraphs 2.2.2–3 and 3.3.15.
99 The issue of the use of the SMTA for exchanges of non-Annex I plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture collected before the Treaty’s entry into force (ITPGRFA Article 
15(1)(b)) was addressed at the second session of the ITPGRFA Governing Body, which 
endorsed including an interpretative footnote or series of footnotes to relevant provi-
sions of the SMTA, to indicate that the provisions should not be interpreted as preclud-
ing the use of the SMTA for transfers of non-Annex I material collected before the entry 
into force of the Treaty. See ITPGRFA, “Report of the Second Session of the Governing 
Body of the ITPGRFA” (2007) FAO Doc IT/GB-2/07/Report, 11; and ITPGRFA Secretariat 
“Consideration of the Material Transfer Agreement to be used by international agricul-
tural research centres for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture not included 
in Annex 1 of the Treaty” (2007) FAO Doc IT/GB-2/07/13. Accordingly, the international 
agricultural research centres have been using the SMTA, including interpretative foot-
notes, for transfer of non-Annex I material. The Governing Body reviewed this use of the 
SMTA at all its subsequent sessions, without amending its decision. At its fourth session, 
it noted the continued successful use of the SMTA by the centres, and at the latest fifth 
session, it commended the centres for their continued use of the SMTA for the transfer 
of non-Annex I plant genetic resources. See ITPGRFA, “Report of the Fourth Session of 
the Governing Body to the ITPGRFA” (2011) FAO Doc IT/GB-4/11/Report, Appendix A, 28; 
and “Report of the Fifth Session of the Governing Body to the ITPGRFA (2013) FAO Doc 
IT/GB-5/13/Report, Appendix A, 5.
100 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 106–7
101 See Nagoya Protocol Article 8(c) and this commentary on Article 8, section 4.
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purposes and production of vaccines. Pathogens were not considered as an 
issue in the negotiation of the CBD, or later by CBD Parties when deliberat-
ing on the implementation of the Convention. The issue surfaced for the first 
time in the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol in 2009.102 This followed devel-
opments in the context of WHO negotiations to increase equitable access to 
vaccines for highly pathogenic avian influenza A and pandemic influenza A.103 
Concerns that developing country populations may not have access to influ-
enza vaccines due to insufficient global production, and the lack of any mecha-
nism to ensure equitable access to other benefits from research on influenza 
viruses, prompted Indonesia to refuse to share its H5N1 virus samples with the 
WHO, on the basis of CBD Article 15(7).104 Concretely, Indonesia sought pref-
erential access to vaccines and transfer of related patents developed from its 
virus sample to enable its own pharmaceutical companies to produce vaccines 
at low cost.105 This move was explicitly supported by most developing countries 
102 Nagoya Draft, draft article 3(f). See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the Seventh 
Meeting” (5 May 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, paragraphs 58, 115–116. See also 
ENB, “Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 2–8 April 2009,” Vol 9 No 465, 10 April 
2009.
103 David P. Fidler, “Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global Health 
Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 and Pandemic 
Influenza H1N1, PLoS Medicine 7 (2010): 1. 
104 Indonesia’s refusal to share its virus samples was based on CBD principles: it was argued 
that it had the right to refuse to share the samples because it controlled access on samples 
collected in its territory. Other Parties could not use them without their prior informed 
consent, and their use should result in benefits for Indonesia. See Morgera and Tsioumani, 
“Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 170; David P. Fidler, “Influenza Virus Samples, 
International and Global Health Diplomacy,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 14 (2008): 
88, cited in Regine Andersen et al., International Agreements and Processes Affecting an 
International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing Under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Implications for Its Scope and Possibilities of a Sectoral Approach, Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute Report No. 3/2010 (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2010), 40. 
105 See Marie Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 123. For an overview of the WHO negotia-
tions see also South Centre and Centre for International Environmental Law, Intellectual 
Property Quarterly Update, Third Quarter (South Centre and Centre for International 
Environmental Law, 2009), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.ciel.org/Publications/
IP_Update_3Q09.pdf>, 10; WHO Secretariat, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing 
of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits” (27 November 2008) 
WHO Doc EB124/4; and WHO Secretariat, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of 
Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits: Outcome of the Process to 
Finalize Remaining Elements under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for 
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and initiated a fully-fledged negotiation in the WHO to reform the system for 
the rapid sharing of virus samples and access to vaccines. This resulted in the 
adoption of the PIP Framework only months after adoption of the Nagoya 
Protocol.
During the Protocol negotiations, the issue was addressed under delib-
erations on scope, when developed countries sought an explicit exclusion of 
genetic resources with pathogenic properties from the Protocol’s scope, and 
developing countries sought to explicitly include viruses and other patho-
genic material within the Protocol’s scope. 106 Negotiators finally decided 
against a specific inclusion or exclusion of pathogens in the Protocol, in favor 
of the general provisions under Articles 3–4 and the special considerations 
under Article 8(b). The WHO framework and the importance of ensuring 
access to human pathogens for public health purposes are also reflected in the 
preamble.107 
While it is acknowledged that pathogens used to develop vaccines and med-
icines are economic resources covered by the commercial dimension of ABS, 
strict ABS rules based on the principle of national sovereignty in the case of 
pathogens are generally not regarded as conducive to facilitating timely shar-
ing of virus samples required to improve global health governance.108 In rec-
ognition of this, the PIP Framework is considered ‘the first ABS mechanism in 
the area of public health.’109 Its scope is, however, limited: the PIP Framework 
applies only to influenza viruses with pandemic potential. All other patho-
gens remain under the scope of the Protocol.110 This is in particular the case 
of seasonal influenza viruses, and other non-influenza pathogens or biological 
substances that may be contained in clinical specimens shared through the 
Framework, which, even when accidentally shared, remain outside the scope 
of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, and thus 
within the scope of the Nagoya Protocol.111 
In addition, it has been argued that, as the Framework was adopted through 
a formally non-binding WHO Assembly resolution, it only functions as a 
the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and other Benefits” (10 December 
2009) WHO Doc EB126/4.
106 See ENB 9/465, “Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group on ABS.” For a 
broader discussion on the negotiations on scope, see this commentary on Article 3. 
107 Nagoya Protocol 17th preambular recital.
108 Andersen et al., International Agreements and Processes, op. cit., 37.
109 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 137. For a discussion of the framework, see ibid., 138.
110 Ibid., 126.
111 PIP Framework Article 3(2). See Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 146; and this commen-
tary on Article 8, section 3.
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specialized ABS agreement for transfer of influenza viruses that are covered 
by the Framework’s binding contractual clauses that are stipulated in stan-
dard material transfer agreements (WHO-SMTAs).112 The WHO-SMTAs, which 
regulate the exchange of samples and introduce binding benefit-sharing obli-
gations, automatically apply to any actor that makes use of the WHO system, 
whether it is a submitting National Influenza Centre, a WHO laboratory or an 
outside institution that seeks to receive processes material for commercial or 
non-commercial utilization. Thus, while the Framework agreement is non-
binding for Member States, use of the system is governed by binding WHO-
SMTAs in the form of contract clauses. WHO-SMTA1 applies automatically to 
institutions within the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System 
(i.e., the National Influenza Centres and the WHO laboratories) in accordance 
with standard terms of reference attached to the Framework.113 WHO-SMTA2 
applies to recipients of material outside the system and needs to be negotiated 
by WHO and any outside institution requesting material, prior to the transfer.114 
The discussion above indicates that the PIP Framework establishes a spe-
cialized ABS framework covering influenza viruses with pandemic potential, 
that combines a multilateral system and a bilateral one, which however is 
governed internationally. The PIP Framework negotiations were finalized fol-
lowing conclusion of the Nagoya Protocol negotiations and were informed by 
those.115 In addition, the Framework’s objective is to establish a fair, transpar-
ent, equitable, efficient, effective system for, on an equal footing, the sharing 
of viruses, and access to vaccines and sharing of other benefits. Therefore, in 
line with the Nagoya Protocol, the PIP Framework seeks to ensure both access 
and benefit-sharing, and this objective is strengthened through the provisions 
of the Framework and the WHO-SMTAs. It can thus be concluded that the PIP 
Framework is consistent with, and does not run counter to the objectives of 
the Convention and the Nagoya Protocol, and can therefore be considered a 
specialized instrument in the context of Article 4(4).116 
112 Included in an Annex to the Framework. Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 126.
113 PIP Framework Annexes 4–8. Note that SMTA1 includes no benefit-sharing obligations 
but a statement prohibiting the granting of intellectual property rights on the material. 
See Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 140.
114 PIP Framework Annex 2, Article 4(4). Note that SMTA2 allows for intellectual property 
rights, but combines them with at least two different benefit-sharing activities. See Wilke, 
“A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 140.
115 See Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 146.
116 Ibid., 144. With regard to the CBD objectives of biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
use, Wilke further argues that the fight against highly aggressive zoonotic viruses sup-
ports these objectives, along with public health efforts. 
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4.3 Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction 
A specialized ABS regime concerning marine genetic resources in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction may emerge from ongoing discussions117 that have been 
entertained since 2006 under the UN General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.118 
Such an instrument could cover ABS in relation to genetic resources from the 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), and genetic resources from the 
water column beyond national jurisdiction (the high seas).119
At the time of writing, these discussions, while not having yet reached the 
stage of formal intergovernmental negotiations, have identified a package of 
issues that could be addressed in a new implementing agreement under the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, namely: marine genetic resources, includ-
ing questions on benefits-sharing; but also measures such as area-based man-
agement tools, including marine protected areas and environmental impact 
assessments; capacity building and the transfer of marine technology.120 It is 
117 UN General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” (17 November 2004) UN Doc A/
RES/59/24 establishing the original mandate of the Working Group. See generally, Tullio 
Scovazzi, “Bioprospecting on the Deep Seabed: A Legal Gap Requiring to Be Filled,” in 
Francioni and Scovazzi, Biotechnology and International Law, op. cit., 81; Lyle Glowka, 
“Evolving Perspectives on the International Seabed Area’s Genetic Resources Fifteen Years 
after the ‘Deepest of Ironies’,” in Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation, 
ed. Davor Vidas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 397; Tullio Scovazzi, “The Exploitation 
of Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” in Confronting Ecological 
and Economic Collapse: Ecological Integrity for Law, Policy and Human Rights, ed. Laura 
Westra, Prue Taylor and Agnès Michelot (London: Routledge, 2013), 47; Louise A. de la 
Fayette, “A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity 
and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009): 221; Thomas Greiber, “Common Pools for 
Marine Genetic Resources: A Possible Instrument for a Future Multilateral Agreement 
Addressing Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” in Kamau and 
Winter, Common Pools of Genetic Resources Equity and Innovation in International 
Biodiversity Law, op. cit., 399; Morten W. Tvedt and Ane E. Jørem, “Bioprospecting in 
the High Seas: Regulatory Options for Benefit Sharing,” The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 16 (2013): 150; and Bevis Fedder, Marine Genetic Resources, Access and Benefit-
Sharing (London: Routledge, 2013).
118 For a discussion of the possible interactions between the Working Group and the Nagoya 
Protocol, see Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 179–182.
119 Ibid., 174.
120 UN General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” (5 April 2012) UN Doc A/
RES/66/231, paragraph 14.
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expected that the Working Group will reach a conclusion on the feasibility, 
scope and parameters of a new international instrument on marine biodiver-
sity under UNCLOS towards the end of 2015, with a view to preparing for a 
decision by the General Assembly before the end of its sixty-ninth session.121
Should a formal negotiating process be launched under the General 
Assembly, Parties to the Protocol will be bound by Article 4(2) to ensure that 
specialized ABS arrangements in the context of a new implementing agree-
ment under UNCLOS do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention 
and the Protocol in achieving fair and equitable benefit-sharing among and 
within States, and biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. Even from 
the viewpoint of those arguing that areas beyond natural jurisdiction are out-
side the scope of the Protocol,122 a similar obligation would still exist on the 
basis of a general principle of mutual supportiveness.123
In all events, the concepts of ‘biodiversity’ and ‘genetic resource’ are not 
mentioned in UNCLOS, therefore a certain reliance on the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol will be inevitable in the context of negotiations under the authority 
of the UN General Assembly. There is certainly scope for a mutually supportive 
interpretation of the law of the sea and the international biodiversity regime 
that can build on the open-textured environmental provisions of UNCLOS 
and take advantage of the several textual hooks for an evolving, biodiversity- 
cognizant interpretation.124 On the other hand, however, the fundamental 
difference between the two sets of international rules is that while the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol are mainly premised on genetic resources within national 
jurisdiction and appear to favor a bilateral approach to ABS, a future special-
ized ABS agreement on marine genetic resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction125 will inevitably deal with genetic resources that are open to 
appropriation by any State in the high seas and possibly subject to the com-
mon heritage regime of mankind if found in the Area.126 It therefore appears 
121 UN General Assembly, “Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” (9 December 2013) UN Doc A/
RES/68/70, paragraphs 197–198. 
122 See this commentary on Article 3, section 3.2.
123 See generally Pavoni, “Mutual Supportiveness,” op. cit.
124 Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 256–259; and Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 746–751.
125 Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 174.
126 States participating in the UN General Assembly’s Working Group have put forward two 
different legal interpretations about the legal status of marine genetic resources in the 
Area: they may be subject to the general regime of the freedom of the high seas, as a 
residual regime (UNCLOS Article 86) because the common heritage regime applicable to 
the Area only concerns mineral resources in light of UNCLOS Article 133(a); or they may 
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more likely that a multilateral system of benefit-sharing may be conceived in 
that context.127 
4.4 CGRFA
Since 2007 the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
has reviewed arrangements and policies on uses and exchanges of genetic 
resources in different subsectors of food and agriculture. These subsectors 
include animal, aquatic, forest and microbial genetic resources.128 Following 
the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, the Commission engaged in assessing 
be subject to the common heritage regime under the understanding that the Area and its 
resources include biological resources, as part of customary international law. See ENB, 
“Summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Biodiversity beyond 
Areas of National Jurisdiction:  19–23 August 2013,” unnumbered, accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.iisd.ca/oceans/marinebiodiv6/brief/brief_marinebiodiv6e.html>) or a con-
textual interpretation of UNCLOS according to which the relevant rights and obligations 
are not determined by the nature (mineral or genetic) of the resource, but by the relevant 
maritime area in which resources are found: see Elisa Morgera, “Impressions on the UN 
General Assembly Working Group on Marine Biodiversity,” Environmental Policy and Law 
40 (2010): 67.
127 The EU has in effect suggested drawing inspiration from the ITPGRFA approach in that 
context: ENB, “Summary of the Working Group on Marine Biodiversity Beyond Areas of 
National Jurisdiction: 1–5 February 2010,” unnumbered, accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.iisd.ca/oceans/marinebiodiv3/brief/brief_marinebiodiv3.pdf>, 5; and ENB, “Sum-
mary of the Second Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Biodiversity Beyond Areas 
of National Jurisdiction: 28 April–2 May 2008,” Vol. 25 No. 49, 5 May 2008, 7.
128 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 116. See FAO, The 
Use and Exchange of Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO, 2009), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/ak222e.pdf>; 
FAO, The Use and Exchange of Aquatic Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO, 
2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/ak527e.pdf.; FAO, The Use and Exchange 
of Forest Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO, 2009), accessed 30 November 
2013, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/ak565e.pdf>; and FAO, The Use and 
Exchange of Microbial Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO, 2009), accessed 
30 November 2013, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/ak566e.pdf>. See also, pre-
Nagoya Protocol: CBD Working Group on ABS, “The use and exchange of animal genetic 
resources for food and agriculture - Submission by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO)” (9 March 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/10; “The 
use and exchange of forest genetic resources for food and agriculture - Submission by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)” (9 March 2010) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/11; and “The use and exchange of aquatic genetic resources 
for food and agriculture - Submission by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO)” (9 March 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/12.
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whether distinctive features of the different sectors and sub-sectors of genetic 
resources for food and agriculture may require distinctive solution and in par-
ticular specific ABS modalities ‘taking into account the full range of options, 
including those presented in the Nagoya Protocol.’129
In 2013, the Commission considered it premature to negotiate an inter-
national agreement or agreements on ABS for genetic resources for food and 
agriculture. It rather proposed to engage in further work towards the devel-
opment of a voluntary tool to facilitate domestic implementation of ABS for 
different sub-sectors of genetic resources for food and agriculture, taking into 
account relevant international instruments on ABS, and considering stake-
holder groups’ voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines and best practices in 
relation to ABS for all sub-sectors of genetic resources for food and agriculture.130 
So, while this work does not yet seem relevant for the purposes of the Protocol 
Article 4(4), it will certainly be relevant for the review of ongoing intergov-
ernmental work and practices under Article 4(3). Depending on its focus 
(i.e., if addressed to stakeholder groups directly), it could also potentially feed 
into the review of codes of conduct and other voluntary instruments by the 
Protocol’s governing body.131
129 CGRFA, “Report of the thirteenth regular session of the Commission on Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture” (18–22 July 2011) FAO DOC CGRFA-13/11/Report, paragraph 60 
and Appendix D(1).
130 CGRFA, “Report of the fourteenth regular session of the Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture” (15–19 April 2013) FAO DOC CGRFA-14/13/DR, para-
graph 40(xv).
131 Nagoya Protocol Article 20(2). See also this commentary on Article 20, section 3.
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Article 5. Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing
1. In accordance with Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Convention, 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as sub-
sequent applications and commercialization shall be shared in a fair 
and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that is the 
country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the 
genetic resources in accordance with the Convention. Such sharing 
shall be upon mutually agreed terms.
2. Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that benefits arising from the 
utilization of genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local 
communities, in accordance with domestic legislation regarding the 
established rights of these indigenous and local communities over 
these genetic resources, are shared in a fair and equitable way with the 
communities concerned, based on mutually agreed terms.
3. To implement paragraph 1 above, each Party shall take legislative, 
administrative or policy measures, as appropriate.
4. Benefits may include monetary and non-monetary benefits, including 
but not limited to those listed in the Annex.
5. Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures as 
appropriate, in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in 
a fair and equitable way with indigenous and local communities hold-
ing such knowledge. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.
 Annex. Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits
1. Monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
(a) Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired;
(b) Up-front payments;
(c) Milestone payments;
(d) Payment of royalties;
(e) Licence fees in case of commercialization;
(f) Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity;
(g) Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed;
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(h) Research funding;
(i) Joint ventures;
(j) Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.
2. Non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
(a) Sharing of research and development results;
(b) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific 
research and development programmes, particularly biotechno-
logical research activities, where possible in the Party providing 
genetic resources;
(c) Participation in product development;
(d) Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in education and 
training;
(e) Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to 
databases;
(f) Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge 
and technology under fair and most favourable terms, including 
on concessional and preferential terms where agreed, in particu-
lar, knowledge and technology that make use of genetic resources, 
including biotechnology, or that are relevant to the conservation 
and sustainable utilization of biological diversity;
(g) Strengthening capacities for technology transfer;
(h) Institutional capacity-building;
(i) Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for 
the administration and enforcement of access regulations;
(j) Training related to genetic resources with the full participation 
of countries providing genetic resources, and where possible, in 
such countries;
(k) Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, including biological inven-
tories and taxonomic studies;
(l) Contributions to the local economy;
(m) Research directed towards priority needs, such as health and 
food security, taking into account domestic uses of genetic 
resources in the Party providing genetic resources;
(n) Institutional and professional relationships that can arise from 
an access and benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collab-
orative activities;
(o) Food and livelihood security benefits;
(p) Social recognition;
(q) Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.
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1 Overview
This Article includes three inter-related obligations for State Parties: 1) an 
inter-State obligation to share benefits;1 2) an obligation to share benefits 
with indigenous and local communities when benefits derive from genetic 
resources held by these communities;2 and 3) an obligation to share benefits 
arising from the utilization of traditional knowledge with indigenous and local 
communities holding such knowledge.3 All these obligations (with slightly 
different wording) are to be fulfilled by the enactment of national legislative, 
administrative or policy measures. In all these cases, benefits may be monetary 
and non-monetary, as exemplified in the Annex to the Protocol, which is also 
discussed here in conjunction with Article 5.
Article 5 largely4 reproduces the content of CBD Articles 15(7) and 15(3). 
The indicative list of monetary and non-monetary benefits annexed5 to the 
Protocol furthermore reproduces the list in Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines 
almost verbatim.6 However, the Protocol breaks new ground by: i) using more 
forceful language with respect to benefit-sharing from genetic resources;7 
ii) addressing for the first time questions related to benefit-sharing with indig-
enous and local communities when genetic resources are held by these com-
munities; and iii) addressing benefit-sharing from the use of their traditional 
knowledge for the first time in as far as it is ‘associated with genetic resources.’ 
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1) and (3).
2 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2).
3 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(5). See CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), “How Tasks 7, 10 and 12 
could best contribute,” UNEP/CBD/WG8J/8/4/Rev.2, paragraph 14 and CBD Working Group 
on ABS, “Vienna Workshop on Matters related to Traditional Knowledge Associated with 
Genetic Resources and the International Regime on Access and Benefit-sharing” (18 March 
2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/7. 
4 Particularly Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1) and 5(3).
5 Note that the Annex to the Protocol was not negotiated by CBD Parties, and was introduced 
as Co-Chairs’ text following the Cali meeting: Cali Draft, draft annex I.
6 Besides minor editorial differences (the term ‘provider Party/country’), the only substantive 
difference between the list of benefits in the Bonn Guidelines and the Nagoya Protocol is 
section 2(g) in relation to strengthening capacity for technology transfer. This divergence has 
also resulted in the deletion of a reference to indigenous and local communities.
7 The Nagoya Protocol decidedly indicates that benefits from genetic resources ‘shall be 
shared,’ whereas the CBD Article 15(7) used the more qualified expression ‘Each Contracting 
Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures . . . with the aim of sharing in a 
fair and equitable way the . . . benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of 
genetic resources . . .’ (emphasis added).
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Albeit heavily qualified, the obligations contained in Articles 5(2) and 5(5) 
are major developments in international environmental law. First, while not 
phrased in human rights terms, they nevertheless address an internal situation 
between a State and its communities, which is usually the object of human 
rights treaties.8 Second, the obligations appear underpinned not only by purely 
procedural environmental rights,9 but also substantive environmental rights,10 
as will be discussed below.
The following sections will first identify the innovations of this provision 
vis-à-vis the text of the CBD, and then discuss in more detail the content of 
the three inter-related obligations established by Article 5, in turn. A reflection 
will then be offered on the role of mutually agreed terms in the architecture of 
the Protocol, and on the usefulness of contemplating both monetary and non-
monetary benefits in ABS transactions. 
8 On the debate on environmental human rights, see Human Rights Council, “Human 
rights and the environment” (12 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/11; Human Rights 
Council, “Report of the Independent Expert John H. Knox,” A/HRC/22/43; F. Francioni, 
‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’, European Journal of 
International Law 21 (2010): 41; Alan Boyle, “Human Rights or Environmental Rights? 
A Reassessment,” Fordham Environmental Law Review 18 (2007): 471; and Alan Boyle, 
“Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?,” European Journal of International 
Law 23 (2012): 1.
9 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.3. Human Rights Council, “Report of the 
Independent Expert John H. Knox,” A/HRC/22/43, paragraph 7, also discusses the distinc-
tion between procedural and substantive rights, paragraphs 40–43. 
10 Compare with recognition of certain substantive environmental rights in few regional 
human rights treaties and human rights case law as discussed in Shelton, “Human Rights 
and the Environment,” op. cit. Compare also with the international obligations related 
to purely procedural environmental rights that can be found in the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998, in force 30 October 2001) 2161 UNTS 447 
(hereinafter, Aarhus Convention). Although the Aarhus Convention makes reference to 
a substantive right to a healthy environment in an operative provision (Article 1), such a 
right is only referred to as a rationale for guaranteeing procedural environmental rights, 
which constitute the core of the Convention. E.g., Declaration of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in “Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” UN 
Treaty System, accessed 30 November 2013, <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&lang=en>.
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2 Inter-State Benefit-sharing from the Utilization of Genetic 
Resources
Article 5(1) establishes an inter-State obligation to share benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources but also from ‘subsequent applica-
tions and commercialization’ with the Party providing such resources. It thus 
strengthens the legal obligation already existing under CBD Article 15, which is 
expressly recalled, and confirms that benefit-sharing can arise both from ‘com-
mercial’ and other utilization of genetic resources. The reference to ‘subse-
quent applications and commercialization’ – an expression that is not defined 
in the Protocol – attempts to address practical difficulties in separating differ-
ent phases of the research and development chain. The reference thus under-
lines that inter-State benefit-sharing is to be understood broadly, based on the 
expectation that benefits that must be shared might arise during all the phases 
after a genetic resource was accessed. Necessary details about benefit-sharing 
arising from subsequent applications and commercialization will likely be pro-
vided in domestic ABS frameworks and possibly guidance may be provided by 
the Protocol’s governing body in the future.11
In a regular scenario, the general, inter-State benefit-sharing obligation is 
specified at the time of access, when PIC is obtained and MAT are established.12 
In this scenario, the Protocol envisages that the permit, which is the basis for 
the internationally recognized certificate of compliance,13 is to be issued ‘at 
the time of access.’ Frequently, however, it is during the utilisation of a genetic 
resource, rather than at the time of access, that its actual or potential value 
becomes evident and more easily verifiable.14 So the time of access will often be 
too early to conclusively determine what is fair and equitable benefit-sharing.15 
For this reason, CBD Article 15 has been interpreted as prescribing two MAT-
related obligations: the establishment of MAT at the time of access, and the 
re-establishment or reopening of MAT with regard to benefit-sharing at a later 
stage, in which further or different information on utilization becomes avail-
able. As a result, although MAT are normally established upon access (and can 
possibly be (re)negotiated at a later stage),16 there may be situations in which 
11 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2. 
12 In accordance with Nagoya Protocol Articles 6–7: see this commentary on Article 6, sec-
tions 3–4, and on Article 7, section 2. 
13 Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(3)(e) and 17(2). See this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
14 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 160.
15 Ibid., 163.
16 See Introduction to this commentary, Section 1.3.
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negotiations and establishment of MAT on access and on benefit-sharing can 
occur at different points in time.17 This is why the PIC decision and the initial 
MAT would oblige users to renegotiate the terms of utilisation and benefit-
sharing in case for instance of changes in the understanding of the resource’s 
value, change of the user’s intent (e.g., from non-commercial to commercial), 
or change of the agreed type of utilization.18
In all events, access to genetic resources without PIC and/or MAT in the 
logic of the Convention and the Protocol should not deprive States and/or 
indigenous and local communities of their right to benefit-sharing. Article 5(1) 
links the benefit-sharing obligation to the definition of ‘utilization of genetic 
resources,’ which is provided by the Protocol,19 and which does not men-
tion ‘access’ to the resources. On that basis, an argument can be made that 
benefit-sharing requirements may not necessarily be connected with access 
procedures, as utilization can take place long after the acquisition of genetic 
resources and involve other countries or private parties.20 An alternative 
interpretation would point to Article 6(1), which refers to ‘access to genetic 
resources for their utilization,’ thereby arguably suggesting a sequence and 
direct temporal link between access for, and benefit-sharing from, utilisation. 
Such interpretation would tend to emphasize that the realization of the benefit-
sharing obligation rests on the Protocol provisions on compliance, which in 
turn rely on the existence of a domestic ABS framework.
As anticipated, the benefit-sharing obligation presupposes a bilateral 
relationship between States, with benefits flowing to a ‘Party providing such 
resources that is the country of origin of such resources or the Party that has 
acquired genetic resources in accordance with the Convention.’ This mir-
rors language found in CBD Article 15(3). The reference to ‘genetic resources 
acquired in accordance with the Convention’ points to a country that, with 
the consent of the country of origin, facilitated access to those resources and 
is entitled to receive a share of benefits arising from their utilization.21 The 
opposite situation (i.e., genetic resources acquired not in accordance with 
the Convention) may point to two distinct cases: resources acquired prior 
to the Convention’s entry into force, and resources acquired from the country 
17 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 71; and Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 172. See 
Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3.
18 As anticipated in Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(3)(g) and 8(a).
19 Nagoya Protocol Article 2(c). See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
20 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 84–85. 
21 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 14.
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of origin without PIC and MAT after the Convention’s entry into force.22 The 
first case is linked to the question of temporal scope, which has already been 
discussed.23 In the second case, those countries that have acquired resources 
without PIC and MAT from the country of origin after the Convention’s entry 
into force will have no rights under the Protocol. In other words, they are in 
violation of the Convention and are not entitled to benefit-sharing in case of 
further transfer of the resources originally acquired without PIC and MAT.24 
The benefit-sharing obligation in Article 5(1) does not identify specific 
addressees (it uses an indeterminate passive form ‘benefit-sharing . . . shall be 
shared’). This can be explained by the understanding that in practice benefits 
will be most likely obtained from private parties, such as research institutions 
and biotech companies, who utilize genetic resources. For this reason, the 
Protocol establishes that benefit-sharing shall be upon MAT,25 as MAT is likely 
the most effective way to guide the implementation of Article 5(1). In the light 
of this, the related obligation for States as spelt out in Article 5(3) is to take 
legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to create obliga-
tions for private users under their jurisdiction to share benefits, so as to imple-
ment the corresponding international benefit-sharing obligations.26
Article 5(1) leaves a broad range of implementing measures (by reference to 
‘legislative, administrative or policy measures’) to the discretion of its Parties, 
and does not attempt to establish any guidance on how to address questions 
of fairness and equity in domestic ABS frameworks.27 Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that these measures should be able to contribute to legal certainty 
in ABS transactions, the importance of which is emphasized in the Protocol 
preamble.28 In addition, it should be stressed that the qualifier ‘as appropriate’, 
22 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 77.
23 See this commentary on Article 3, section 3.1.
24 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 79.
25 As is explicitly foreseen in the last sentence of Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1).
26 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 84.
27 Compare with Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(a–b); see this commentary on Article 6, sec-
tion 5. In practical terms, such measures may be taken in the context of access in provider 
jurisdictions or in the context of utilisation activities in user jurisdictions. In the former 
case, Parties should consider whether to move beyond the minimum access requirements 
set out in Article 6. In the latter case, Parties must be mindful of their overarching benefit-
sharing obligation when implementing their obligations related to compliance (Nagoya 
Protocol Articles 15, 16 and 18).
28 Nagoya Protocol 9th preambular recital.
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while emphasizing the margin of appreciation of States in choosing how to 
implement this provision, does not call into question whether States are to per-
form their obligation at all.29 Ultimately the good-faith implementation of this 
provision may be judged against the objective of the Protocol on realizing fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing among and within States.30
3 Intra-State Benefit-sharing from the Utilization of Genetic 
Resources Held by Indigenous and Local Communities
While the wording of Article 5(2) is largely similar to CBD Article 15(7), it is 
worth underlining the fundamental conceptual difference between the two 
provisions. Article 5(2) does not deal with ‘inter-State’ benefit-sharing, but 
with an internal situation: it creates an obligation for each Party to share 
benefits with indigenous and local communities (non-State actors) ‘holding’ 
genetic resources. 
Article 5(2) arguably presupposes that each Party identifies indigenous and 
local communities (for the purposes of implementing the Protocol)31 in its ter-
ritory in order to clarify whether these (or some of these) communities ‘hold’ 
genetic resources. For these Parties the provision sets out an obligation to cre-
ate measures to ‘channel’ resulting benefits to the communities concerned. 
Similarly to the general obligations to share benefits in Article 5(1), ultimately 
the terms of benefit-sharing for indigenous and local communities will be 
spelt out in MAT,32 as most likely private parties will actually do the sharing 
of benefits.
The groundbreaking nature of Article 5(2) should be highlighted from the 
outset: for the first time in international environmental law, a treaty creates 
an obligation for States to establish measures to reward indigenous and local 
communities responsible for the stewardship of genetic resources and their 
resulting contribution to scientific progress for the benefit of the global com-
munity. Article 5(2) in fact goes significantly beyond the letter of the CBD,33 
29 Introduction to this commentary, section 5, fn. 225.
30 See this commentary on Article 1.
31 As discussed in section 3.2 below, the identification of indigenous peoples and local com-
munities may not be a straightforward matter, also in the absence of an international 
definition of either term or international consensus on the difference between the two 
terms: Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 73–74.
32 Final part of Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2).
33 CBD Articles 15 and 8(j).
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and the Protocol’s own negotiating mandate,34 as neither mentions commu-
nities’ rights over genetic resources, nor refers to indigenous and local com-
munities as recipients of a share of the benefits arising from the utilization of 
genetic resources held by them.35 
From a broader international law perspective, this provision can be possibly 
interpreted as implicitly underpinned by a substantive environmental right36 
of indigenous and local communities to their genetic resources.37 It embodies 
an obligation owed directly to them,38 deriving from established international 
human rights, in their collective dimension,39 to indigenous peoples’ self- 
determination, ownership and cultural identity.40 In comparison, UNDRIP 
only includes genetic resources in a list of manifestations of indigenous 
34 As set out in CBD Decision 7/19, section D.
35 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), “How Tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best contribute,” UNEP/
CBD/WG8J/8/4/Rev.2, 14.
36 On the lack of substantive environmental rights in international law, except for the African 
context: Rhona K.M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, 5th ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 390–1; Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment,” 
op. cit., 29–30; and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “Environmental Degradation,” in International 
Human Rights Law, ed. Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 622, 622.
37 Compare with ITPGRFA Article 9, that although titled ‘farmers’ rights’, only contains a 
hortatory provision for States to enact supportive legislation; and the Aarhus Convention, 
that only focuses on procedural environmental rights.
38 International human rights can be identified in ‘obligations [that] are owed directly to 
individuals (and not to the national government of an individual)’: Rosalyn Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 94.
39 On the ‘communitarization’ of indigenous peoples’ rights, see Alessandro Fodella, 
“International Law and the Diversity of Indigenous Peoples,” Vermont Law Review 30 
(2001): 565; Wiessner, “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit.; Human Rights 
Committee, “General Comment No. 31: Nature of the general legal obligations on State 
Parties to the Covenant” (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, paragraph 9, 
which reads: ‘The beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the Covenant are individu-
als. Although, with the exception of article 1, the Covenant does not mention the rights 
of legal persons or similar entities or collectivities, many of the rights recognized by the 
Covenant . . . may be enjoyed in community with others . . . ’
40 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights” 
A/HRC/9/9, paragraph 40. See also UNDRIP, Article 1, which reads: ‘Indigenous peo-
ples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.’ We are 
grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for drawing our attention to this point.
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sciences, technologies and cultures,41 and otherwise generally refers to indige-
nous peoples’ right to manage their natural resources,42 their right to maintain 
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally 
owned resources,43 and the right to own, use, develop and control the resources 
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or use.44 In that respect, 
the Nagoya Protocol implicitly confirms and clarifies that the above-cited 
UNDRIP provisions apply to the specific case of genetic resources.45
In addition, UNDRIP generally calls upon States, in conjunction with indig-
enous peoples, to take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise 
of their right to maintain, control, protect and develop the manifestations of 
their culture, including genetic resources,46 and to create effective mecha-
nisms of preventing and redressing dispossession of their resources.47 UNDRIP 
then only foresees a right of redress for indigenous peoples’ resources that they 
have traditionally owned or otherwise used, and which have been confiscated, 
taken, used or damaged without their PIC.48 The Nagoya Protocol, instead, goes 
beyond UNDRIP by encapsulating, in a legally binding provision, a benefit-
sharing obligation owed directly to49 indigenous and local communities. This 
41 UNDRIP Article 31(1), which reads: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, con-
trol, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cul-
tures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the prop-
erties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games 
and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, 
and traditional cultural expressions.’
42 UNDRIP Article 3.
43 UNDRIP Article 25.
44 UNDRIP Article 26(2).
45 The argument that indigenous peoples’ rights over their resources also encompass their 
rights to their ‘genetic’ resources had been put forward by Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ 
Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 140, on the basis of UN Commission on Human Rights, “Final 
report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources” (12 July 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1, paragraph 11 and 
the inextricable link between genetic resources and traditional knowledge as ‘two insepa-
rable elements of a unique social (and legal) concept that expresses the spiritual rela-
tionship of indigenous groups to their natural resources.’ See also Nagoya Protocol 22nd 
preambular recital.
46 UNDRIP Article 31(2).
47 UNDRIP Article 8(2)(b).
48 UNDRIP 28(1).
49 Paraphrasing Higgins, Problems and Process, op. cit., 94 (see quote at fn. 38 above).
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obligation arises specifically from the use of genetic resources held by them,50 
even in the absence of any restriction or deprivation of their right to use their 
genetic resources51 that may result from an ABS transaction (that is, when they 
have exercised their right to PIC). The Nagoya Protocol also goes beyond exist-
ing human rights instruments by identifying as beneficiaries of such entitle-
ment not only indigenous peoples, but also local communities.52 
Nonetheless, Article 5(2) is heavily qualified. The following subsections will 
thus first offer an interpretation of the obligation in the light of relevant inter-
national human rights standards, and then discuss questions arising from the 
qualifications in Article 5(2), focusing on the lack of a definition of ‘indigenous 
and local communities’ as right-holders under the Protocol, and the references 
to ‘accordance with domestic legislation regarding established rights.’ 
3.1 States’ Obligation
Article 5(2) sets out an obligation for Parties to adopt (or, implicitly, to revise) 
domestic measures ensuring the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources held by indigenous and local commu-
nities. The modalities of such an internal mechanism will be dependent on the 
modalities of the exercise of these communities’ rights over genetic resources 
in a given Party, which will likely vary from one domestic legal framework to 
another. 
In light of international human rights standards, Parties are to discharge 
this obligation with the participation of the communities concerned. UNDRIP, 
for instance, calls upon States to consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in 
order to obtain their PIC53 before adopting legislative or administrative mea-
sures that may affect them:54 clearly domestic measures on benefit-sharing fall 
50 Note that the ILO Convention No. 169 Article 15(2) provides more timidly that indigenous 
peoples shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of exploration or exploitation 
of ‘resources pertaining to lands’ (emphasis added).
51 Compare with the understanding of benefit-sharing as ‘compensation’ in Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Case No. 12,338 (IACtHR, 12 August 2008), 
paragraph 140 (hereinafter, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2008).
52 For a preliminary discussion on the possible legal arguments on the status of the human 
rights of local communities, see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.2.
53 See further discussion on community PIC in this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2 
and on Article 7, section 2.
54 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2). See also Human Rights 
Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41, 
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into this category. Consultations should be carried out through the establish-
ment and implementation, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, 
of a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, recognizing 
the right of indigenous peoples to participate in such process and giving due 
recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws,55 traditions, customs and land tenure 
systems, in order to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peo-
ples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which 
were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.56 Implementation 
of domestic ABS frameworks, then, should be based on States’ obligation to 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their PIC.57
In addition, national measures should not diminish or extinguish existing 
rights of indigenous peoples.58 Taking note of relevant provisions of UNDRIP,59 
these rights include the right of indigenous peoples to maintain, control, pro-
tect and develop manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, 
including genetic resources, seeds, medicines, and knowledge of the proper-
ties of fauna and flora.60 This specifically includes the right to their traditional 
medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation 
of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals.61 UNDRIP also calls 
for just and fair redress if indigenous peoples are deprived of their means of 
subsistence and development,62 which may well include genetic resources 
obtained without their PIC.
paragraphs 19–25; Sarayaku v. Ecuador, paragraph 165: ‘there is currently a clearly rec-
ognized right to consultation based on developments within the Inter-American sys-
tem on the property rights of indigenous peoples, other international instruments, and 
case-law of the highest domestic courts in the Americas.’; and note that ‘[i]t appears that 
through the process evolved from the drafting and adoption of UNDRIP and the creation 
of UNPFII that there is now a principle backed by supporting State practice that rights 
of indigenous peoples cannot be determined without their participation and consent:’ 
Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, op. cit., 50. 
55 Note that this is also reflected in Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1): see this commentary on 
Article 12, section 2.
56 UNDRIP Article 27. See section 3.3 below.
57 UNDRIP Article 32(2), which refers explicitly to ‘particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.’ We are 
grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for her inputs on this section. 
58 Nagoya Protocol 27th preambular recital.
59 Nagoya Protocol 26th preambular recital. 
60 UNDRIP Article 31(1).
61 UNDRIP Article 24(1).
62 UNDRIP Article 20.
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In the light of international human rights standards, it will be necessary to 
ascertain who are the ‘communities concerned’ in a specific Party (considering 
questions of national and international law, as discussed below). UNDRIP rec-
ognizes the right to maintain and develop indigenous peoples’ political, eco-
nomic and social systems or institutions, which in the context of the Protocol 
raises a specific question as to the appropriate community authorities that 
should be engaged in ABS transactions.63 This arguably implies that the Party 
must actively identify all relevant communities that are entitled to receive 
benefits, or at least carefully avoid excluding relevant communities rightfully 
claiming to have a right over the genetic resources at stake from receiving 
benefits.64 The obligation to achieve ‘fair and equitable’ benefit-sharing not 
only refers to the relationship between users of genetic resources and the com-
munities holding rights over these resources, but arguably also encompasses 
notions of inter- or intra-community fairness in distributing benefits.65 
3.2 ‘Established Rights’ and Other Qualifications
International human rights law also indicates how States should interpret the 
puzzling qualifications in Article 5(2) in good faith so as to protect and pro-
gressively realize indigenous and local communities’ rights related to genetic 
resources in light of their applicable international human rights obligations. 
This is particularly the case of the qualification that benefit-sharing from 
the use of genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities is 
to occur ‘in accordance with domestic legislation regarding the established 
rights of indigenous and local communities’ over these genetic resources. 
63 UNDRIP Article 20. Note that the individuals holding the traditional knowledge within 
a certain community may not necessarily be those that are authorised according to the 
community’s customary laws and practices to provide PIC: we are grateful to Nicole 
Schabus for a useful exchange of ideas on this matter. See this commentary on Article 7, 
section 3.
64 On the relevance of indigenous peoples’ human rights for local communities, see 
Introduction to this commentary, section 3.2. 
65 Rachel Wynberg, “Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit Sharing: Use of Traditional Knowledge 
of Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant,” Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 7 (2004): 851, 862; Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” 
op. cit., 262. An example can be found in Peru’s Law Introducing a Protection Regime 
for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological Resources, 
No. 27811, 2002 Article 10. The same law also makes provision for the sharing of profits 
arising from the commercialization of collective knowledge of indigenous peoples and 
local communities that has entered the public domain in the last 20 years. See Singh Nijar 
“An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 261–262.
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The formulation arguably illustrates concerns that benefit-sharing should 
follow recognition in domestic legislation of rights of indigenous and local 
communities over specific genetic resources,66 or concerns that questions 
related to ownership of genetic resources should not be treated in isolation 
from general property laws that differ significantly from one jurisdiction to 
another.67 In that regard, it should first be noted that in many countries no 
legal provisions exist determining ownership over genetic resources.68 Second, 
there may be a discrepancy between the customary law of indigenous and 
local communities recognizing their rights over natural resources and national 
legislation. International human rights bodies, however, have indicated that 
indigenous peoples have rights over natural resources even in the absence of 
recognition in domestic frameworks.69 
66 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 87. For a criticism of this approach, see “Nagoya 
Protocol on access and benefit sharing: Substantive and procedural injustices relating to 
indigenous peoples’ human rights. Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou 
Istchee) et al. to the ICNP,” CBD, (June 2011), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd 
.int/abs/doc/protocol/icnp-1/joint-submission-grand-council-and-others-en.pdf>, para-
graphs 68–75.
67 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
68 CBD, “Overview of recent developments at national and regional levels relating to 
access and benefit-sharing,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/4. See also CBD Working Group on 
ABS, “Analysis of existing national, regional and international legal instruments relat-
ing to access and benefit-sharing and experience gained in their implementation, 
including identification of gaps. Note by the Executive Secretary” (10 November 2004) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/2; and Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, Frederic Perron-Welch 
and Olivier Rukundo, Overview of National and Regional Measures on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing the Nagoya 
Protocol (Ottawa: Centre for International Ssustainable Development Law, 2011), accessed 
30 November 2013, <http://cisdl.org/biodiversity-biosafety/public/docs/Overview_of_
ABS_Measures_2011.doc>.
69 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur of indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/HRC/24/41, paragraphs 9, 12 and 35. The latter paragraph reads: ‘It should be recalled 
that under various sources of international law, indigenous peoples have property, cul-
tural and other rights in relation to their traditional territories, even if those rights are not 
held under a title deed or other form of official recognition,’ emphasis added. See Savaresi, 
“International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 70; Lenzerini, “Indigenous 
Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 137, on the basis of Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement, Case No. 11,577 
(IACtHR, 31 August 2001), (hereinafter, Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua) 153: ‘The 
Court believes that, in light of article 21 of the Convention, the State has violated the right 
of the members of the Mayagna Awas Tingni Community to the use and enjoyment of 
their property, and that it has granted concessions to third parties to utilize the property 
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Against this background, the reference to ‘established rights,’ which can be 
traced back to the Bonn Guidelines,70 may be interpreted in a narrow or broad 
sense with significant implications for the rights of indigenous and local com-
munities under the Protocol. According to a narrow interpretation, the term 
‘established’ may only refer to situations where a particular community can 
demonstrate that its right to genetic resources is already affirmed by domes-
tic legislation, agreement or judicial ruling. According to this interpretation, 
if such rights are not already proved within their national legal order, com-
munities are not entitled to any right to PIC for access to genetic resources in 
their territories under the Protocol.71 Accordingly, the reference to ‘established 
rights’ may possibly leave it to the absolute discretion of the Party concerned to 
determine whether such community rights exist and therefore whether or not 
to develop domestic measures on sharing benefits with relevant communities.72 
This interpretation, however, appears overly restrictive and not in harmony 
with international human rights standards and the Protocol objective.73 In that 
regard, ‘established rights’ can also include community customary rights. This 
alternative interpretation has been supported by the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues,74 recalling that a government distinguishing between 
‘existing’ rights as enshrined in domestic law and the customary rights of indig-
enous peoples was found to be discriminatory by the UN Committee on the 
and resources located in an area which could correspond, fully or in part, to the lands 
which must be delimited, demarcated, and titled.’ See further Moiwana Community v. 
Suriname, 101: ‘the proven facts demonstrate that a N’djuka community’s connection to 
its traditional land is of vital spiritual, cultural and material importance.’ 
70 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 31 reads: ‘Respecting established legal rights of indigenous 
and local communities associated with the genetic resources being accessed or where 
traditional knowledge associated with these genetic resources is being accessed, the 
prior informed consent of indigenous and local communities and the approval and 
involvement of the holders of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices should 
be obtained, in accordance with their traditional practices, national access policies and 
subject to domestic laws,’ emphasis added.
71 See expression of concern in that regard in “Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees 
(Eeyou Istchee) et al.,” 12.
72 This possible interpretation was identified with concern by Gurdial Singh Nijar, The 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and 
Implementation Options for Developing Countries (South Centre and CEBLAW, 2011), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Ev_130201_GNjar1.pdf>, 25–26. 
73 See this commentary on Article 1.
74 UNPFII, “Report on the tenth session,” E/2011/43–E/C.19/2011/14, paragraph 6. 
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Elimination of Racial Discrimination.75 The expression ‘established rights’ can 
also be interpreted to encompass relevant internationally protected human 
rights of indigenous and local communities to the lands and natural (includ-
ing genetic) resources traditionally used by them,76 as upheld in international 
human rights case law.77 Interpreting ‘established rights’ on the basis of rel-
evant international human rights law and in light of community customary 
laws would thus imply an obligation for Parties to map customary rights at the 
domestic level, in consultation with the concerned communities,78 provide for 
their legal recognition, and enact domestic measures to ensure benefit-sharing 
with communities when their customary rights over genetic resources are so 
ascertained.79 The inseparable nature of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge for indigenous and local communities, recognized in the Protocol 
preamble80 and largely underpinning the rationale behind this provision, 
further substantiates the need for a broader interpretation of Article 5(2). As 
noted below,81 the obligation for Parties to enact domestic measures to ensure 
benefit-sharing for indigenous and local communities in relation to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources is not conditioned on the existence 
75 See CERD, “Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. Guyana” (4 April 2006) CERD/C/GUY/CO/14, 1; and Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, parapgrah 140(d).
76 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 139–140; and this commentary 
on Article 5, section 3.
77 For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has noted that there is 
a ‘customary international law norm, which affirms the rights of indigenous peoples to 
their traditional lands’: Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, paragraphs 148–155. See also 
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, paragraphs 140(d), 196 and 207. For a discussion on the 
existence of customary international law in this regard, see Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples, 
the Environment and International Jurisprudence,” op. cit., 360 (fn. 73) and 354–356; 
Hendrick A. Strydom, “Environment and Indigenous Peoples,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia, op. cit., paragraphs 4–8 and 17–19; Wiessner, “Indigenous Sovereignty”, 
op. cit.; and International Law Association, The Hague Conference Report, op. cit., 48. 
78 See fn. 54 above.
79 On global jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources, see 
sources analysed by Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples, the Environment and International 
Jurisprudence,” op. cit., 349 (fn. 59), 351 and 353 (fn. 11 and 26). On the human right to 
land as a self-standing right that is part of indigenous peoples’ right to property and as 
a component of the right to food, see also De Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to 
Land,” op. cit., particularly 310–314. 
80 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital.
81 See section 4 below on Article 5(5).
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of specific rights, but it is rather based on the right to cultural identity82 of 
these communities.
According to the broad interpretation of ‘established rights,’ a human 
rights-cognizant interpretation of Article 5(2) seems to point to an underly-
ing obligation for Parties to the Protocol to recognize the rights of commu-
nities in national legislation, in accordance with their international human 
rights obligations, taking into account the customary laws of indigenous and 
local communities83 and as a result of good-faith consultation with these 
communities.84 In light of these considerations, the right of communities 
extends to retaining possession of genetic resources that are decisive for the 
enjoyment of their rights to safeguard their cultural identity and integrity.85 
Should the State, however, claim ownership over genetic resources held by 
communities, specific procedures are to be put in place to ascertain to which 
degree indigenous peoples’ rights are prejudiced, and still ensure benefit- 
sharing for the relevant communities in light of their right to PIC.86 As a mini-
mum, therefore, Parties are to ensure respect for indigenous peoples’ right to 
participate in the decision-making and management of any kind of initiative 
taken by the government concerning their genetic resources, as well as to guar-
antee a certain degree of legal and administrative autonomy for these commu-
nities in the administration of these resources.87 
Two other qualifications are worth briefly discussing here. First, it should 
be noted that Article 5(2) only refers to benefit-sharing for the utilization of 
genetic resources held by communities. Unlike Article 5(1), it does not refer 
82 Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit., 350, (fn. 4): Human Rights Committee, Kitok v. 
Sweden, Communication no. 197/1985 (27 July 1988), UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, 
paragraph 9(2); Human Rights Committee, Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication 
no. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), UN Doc CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, paragraph 32(2); General 
Comment No. 23, paragraphs 3(2) and 7.
83 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1).
84 See fn. 54 above. 
85 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 137, based on Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, paragraph 153; and Moiwana Community v. Suriname, 
paragraph 101.
86 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 139, based on ILO Convention 
No. 169 Article 15 and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs , Judgment, Case 
No. 12,313 (IACtHR, 17 June 2005), paragraphs 140–148.
87 Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 135, based on Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “General Recommendation No. 23: indigenous peo-
ples” (18 August 1997) UN Doc A/52/18, paragraph 5.
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explicitly to ‘subsequent applications and commercialization’. A strictly literal 
interpretation that would result in depriving indigenous and local communi-
ties from benefit-sharing arising from the subsequent applications and com-
mercialization related to genetic resources held by them should be rejected. 
Such restrictive reading would unfairly limit the scope of benefits flowing 
back to indigenous and local communities concerned, which would not serve 
the Protocol objective of realizing equitable and fair benefit-sharing vis-à-vis 
these communities.88 Furthermore, as Article 5(2) addresses a sub-set of 
benefit-sharing under Article 5(1), a systemic interpretation would support 
an understanding of benefit-sharing from subsequent applications and com-
mercialization both for genetic resources held by States and for those held by 
communities. In practice, it will be particularly significant for Parties to clearly 
address this point in their domestic ABS frameworks, and for indigenous 
and local communities representatives to be involved in the development of 
domestic measures on this point. Second, the qualifier ‘as appropriate’ leaves 
discretion as to the type of implementing measures that Parties have to adopt, 
but not as to whether to adopt measures at all or not.89
4 Benefit-sharing from the Utilization of Traditional Knowledge
In accordance with Article 5(5), Parties are required to take the appropriate 
legislative, administrative or policy measures, to ensure that benefits arising 
from the utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
are shared in a fair and equitable way with the indigenous and local commu-
nities holding such knowledge. In contrast to the obligation included in 5(2), 
Parties’ obligation with regard to traditional knowledge is unencumbered by 
references to the need for accordance with national law.90 
Article 5(5) is a new obligation that goes beyond the CBD text.91 For the first 
time in international environmental law, a treaty creates a binding obligation 
for States to establish measures to reward communities for developing and 
preserving traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and for thus 
contributing to scientific progress for the benefit of the global community. From 
88 See this commentary on Article 1, section 2.
89 See Introduction to this commentary, section 5 and fn. 227.
90 As observed earlier, the qualifier ‘as appropriate’ leaves discretion in relation to the type 
of implementing measures that Parties have to adopt, not as to whether these measures 
should be adopted at all or not.
91 Compare with CBD Article 15(7).
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a broader international law perspective, even if this provision does not employ 
human rights language, it can be interpreted as implicitly underpinned by a 
substantive environmental right92 for indigenous and local communities to 
their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. This can be seen 
as an implication deriving from the established international human rights, in 
their collective dimension, concerning indigenous peoples’ self-determination 
and cultural identity. The Nagoya Protocol, however, goes beyond the letter of 
international human rights instruments, by encapsulating, in a legally binding 
provision, a benefit-sharing obligation owed directly to communities that arises 
specifically from the use of traditional knowledge associated with the genetic 
resources. In comparison, UNDRIP recognizes more generally the right to 
maintain, control, protect and develop traditional knowledge, including intel-
lectual property over such traditional knowledge.93 In addition, the Protocol 
identifies not only indigenous peoples, but also local communities94 as benefi-
ciaries of such obligation.
As opposed to the rest of Article 5, the obligation is two-fold. On the one 
hand, it entails the development of national measures to ensure that a benefit-
sharing obligation arises from the utilization of traditional knowledge at the 
inter-State level (hence, the provision on inter-State collaboration on compli-
ance elsewhere in the Protocol).95 On the other hand, it entails the develop-
ment of a domestic mechanism for such benefits to be shared internally with 
the relevant indigenous and local communities.
As regards Parties where an indigenous or local community is located, 
Article 5(5) obliges governments to put in place conditions that enable indig-
enous and local communities to engage in ABS-related activities concerning 
their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. At a minimum – 
reading Article 5(5) in conjunction with Article 16(1) and 7 – Parties with 
indigenous and local communities in their territories must establish domestic 
ABS measures that articulate how to engage with these communities so as to 
obtain either their PIC or their prior approval and involvement for access to 
their traditional knowledge, and how to establish MAT. In this regard, Parties 
with such communities holding traditional knowledge must also be mindful of 
92 See parallel discussion in section 3 above.
93 UNDRIP Article 31(1). Note that the ILO Convention No. 169 does not mention benefit-
sharing in relation to traditional knowledge. 
94 For a preliminary discussion on the possible legal arguments on the status of the human 
rights of local communities, see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.2.
95 See this commentary on Article 16.
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their obligations to take into account communities’ customary laws,96 ensure 
communities’ effective participation97 and endeavor to support these commu-
nities in ABS transactions,98 as well as take into account their capacity needs 
and priorities as identified by them.99 
Difficulties may arise in practice in determining which indigenous and local 
communities are ‘holding’ traditional knowledge concerned in a specific ABS 
transaction and should therefore be the ‘beneficiaries’ of benefit-sharing.100 
Article 5(5) seems to apply only to situations where the traditional knowledge 
is actually held by one or more communities.101 Read in light of the pream-
ble, it is then up to these communities to identify the rightful holders in that 
connection,102 in light of the diversity of circumstances in which traditional 
knowledge is held or owned by them.103 
One particular situation arises in the case of traditional knowledge that has 
been documented or held in other form by a State entity,104 such as in tradi-
tional knowledge registries or digital libraries.105 Traditional knowledge in such 
registries could be publicly available or not, depending on who is authorized to 
96 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
97 UNDRIP Article 19 and comments by Boyle and Chinkin, Making of International Law, 
op. cit., 50
98 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3). See this commentary on Article 12, section 4.
99 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(3). See this commentary on Article 22, section 4.
100 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that ‘the determination of those ben-
eficiaries must be made in consultation with the Saramaka people, and not unilaterally 
by the State’ and that ‘these matters can be discussed and addressed during the consulta-
tions and process of reaching agreement on the legislative and administrative measures 
required to give effect to, inter alia, the benefit sharing requirement.’ Saramaka People v. 
Suriname 2008, paragraphs 25–27.
101 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 88.
102 Nagoya Protocol 24th preambular recital. Although general international human rights 
law may call for States to engage in a complex balancing of competing international 
human rights in that regard, particularly in the case of variance with international norms 
against discrimination (based on gender, in light of the Protocol 11th preambular recital). 
See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.3. 
103 Nagoya Protocol 23rd preambular recital.
104 Nagoya Protocol 25th preambular recital.
105 See, for example “Traditional Knowledge Digital Library,” Indian Government, accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Home.asp?GL=Eng>; 
“Traditional Chinese Medicine Patents Database,” Chinese Government, accessed 
30 November <http://chmp.cnipr.cn/englishversion/help/help.html>. See also discussion 
in this commentary on Article 7, section 3.
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have access to the registries.106 In this case, traditional knowledge may either 
have not been obtained directly by the relevant communities or may no longer 
be attributable to them.107 While the Protocol negotiators discussed whether 
to address or not publicly available traditional knowledge,108 the Protocol 
eventually remains silent on this issue. It thus remains to be clarified whether 
and how the benefit-sharing obligation applies to traditional knowledge that 
is publicly available.109 This may be particularly complicated depending on 
whether such traditional knowledge is regarded as national heritage and/
or whether it can still be traced back to one or more particular community. 
Parties would be well advised to clarify in their domestic ABS frameworks this 
question,110 or consider the development of guidance by the Protocol’s govern-
ing body.111
Another difficulty may arise from traditional knowledge shared by different 
indigenous and local communities within the territory of the same Party, as 
only some of these communities may wish to grant access and enter into MAT 
and others may not. Parties are well advised, therefore, to articulate in their 
domestic ABS frameworks how to engage with indigenous and local communi-
ties so that all communities holding relevant knowledge do (or have at least a 
fair and reasonable opportunity to) receive benefits arising from the utiliza-
106 In India, for instance, the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) is only accessible 
to the patent offices that have signed a TKDL access agreement, including the European 
Patent Office, and the patent offices of Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US. 
See V.K. Gupta “Protecting India’s Traditional Knowledge,” WIPO Magazine (June 2011), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2011/03/article_0002.
html>. 
107 Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis, op. cit., 28.
108 See draft article 9(5) in Nagoya Draft, which reads: ‘[5. Parties shall [encourage][require] 
the users of [publicly available] traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
[which has been lawfully obtained by that user from a source other than an indigenous 
and local community] to take reasonable measures to enter into fair and equitable ben-
efit-sharing arrangements with the [rightful] holders of [such] knowledge.]’ (brackets in 
the original).
109 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 259–263; Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 113. 
110 Unless this case is further complicated by the presence of traditional knowledge occur-
ring in transboundary situations, in which case Nagoya Protocol Article 11(2) and possibly 
Article 10 apply.
111 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(d): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2. Note that 
the issue of ‘publicly known’ traditional knowledge is currently being negotiated under 
WIPO, with regard to issues including disclosure requirements, the creation of digital 
libraries and the prevention of erroneous patents. See WIPO General Assembly, “Matters 
concerning the IGC,” WO/GA/43/14, Annex B, 5. 
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tion of their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.112 A truly 
inclusive and transparent domestic process of consultation between the gov-
ernment and communities, taking in consideration of communities’ custom-
ary laws, protocols and procedures,113 seems to be a pre-requisite for effectively 
and fairly addressing these questions. Such process should also allow for con-
sultations within and among communities, with a view to ensuring inter- and 
intra-community fairness in relation to benefit-sharing.114 
5 The Role of Mutually Agreed Terms
Article 5 reiterates that benefit-sharing deriving from genetic resources 
(whether held by the State or indigenous or local communities) and from tra-
ditional knowledge is to be based on mutually agreed terms.115 This is because, 
as noted above,116 the international obligations enshrined in Article 5 will in 
practice most often lead to sharing benefits obtained from private parties, such 
as research institutions and biotech companies, utilizing genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. MAT, a private-law contract,117 is thus seen in the 
Protocol’s architecture as an effective and easily enforceable way to realize 
benefit-sharing obligations.118 A key element in a functioning ABS relationship 
based on mutual confidence, such a contract is expected to clarify individual 
parties’ specific rights and obligations, restrictions in the use of specific mate-
rial and/or traditional knowledge throughout the research and development 
chain, as well as information sharing and monitoring duties.
112 Nagoya Protocol Article 11(2).
113 See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
114 The Inter-American Court observed that ‘in the event that any internal conflict arises 
between members of the Saramaka community regarding [benefit-sharing], it ‘must be 
resolved by the Saramaka people in accordance with their own traditional customs and 
norms, not by the State or this Court in this particular case.’ Saramaka People v. Suriname 
2008), paragraphs 25–27.
115 See final clause of Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1–2) and (5).
116 See section 2 above.
117 This is, to some extent, a simplification for the sake of clarity. As explained in the 
Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3, parties to and the form of MAT, as well as 
their relation with PIC, may vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another, and possi-
bly also from one case to another. In some instances, the goverment or its designee nego-
tiates MAT and there is at least one separate negotiation with the specific provider(s): we 
are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
118 As is explicitly foreseen in the last sentence of Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1).
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Article 5(2) is silent on the question whether representatives of indigenous 
and local communities will be parties to MAT spelling out benefit-sharing 
arrangements for utilizing genetic resources held by these communities, and 
who will be the other parties (individual users, or the government who may 
have established a separate set of MAT with the users). The government could 
also be acting on behalf of relevant communities in establishing MAT with 
users. In all events, governments may be expected to strengthen the capacity of 
indigenous and local communities,119 upon their request. Similar observations 
can be made with regard to MAT spelling out specific benefit-sharing modali-
ties arising from the use of traditional knowledge under Article 5(5). One dif-
ference, however, is that States have also a best-endeavor obligation to support 
the development by indigenous and local communities of minimum require-
ments for MAT to secure fair and equitable benefit-sharing from the utilization 
of traditional knowledge.120 
In any of the cases envisaged in Article 5, one should expect that concrete 
terms for the implementation of the benefit-sharing obligations of the Protocol 
will, on the basis of applicable national measures, be set out in MAT, such as 
the conditions, types, timing, and procedures/mechanisms for distribution of 
benefits.121 Notably, however, the Protocol does not attempt to set any substan-
tive or procedural criteria122 for establishing MAT123 so as to provide for fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing, but rather leaves any consideration of what is fair 
and equitable to contractual negotiations. Parties providing genetic resources 
may consider establishing some substantive rules on the contents of MAT in 
their domestic ABS frameworks. That being said, it may be difficult for pro-
vider countries to rely on their domestic ABS frameworks in a foreign court in 
that regard, if the determination of what is fair and equitable benefit-sharing is 
not reflected also under MAT.124 Perhaps for this reason, the Protocol requires 
Parties individually and collectively through the Protocol’s governing body to 
119 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(1) and (5)(j).
120 See commentary on Article 12, section 4. Note, however, that the Protocol only establishes 
such as obligation in relation to MAT concerning the utilization of traditional knowledge 
in Article 12(3)(b), but not about MAT concerning genetic resources held by indigenous 
and local communities.
121 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 90.
122 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 161 and 163.
123 Note the reference to ‘benefit-sharing’ (and the absence of reference to ‘fair and equi-
table’) in Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g)(ii): see this commentary of Article 6, section 7.
124 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 160–161 and 163. See this commentary on 
Article 18.
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explore model contractual clauses125 and voluntary instruments126 as a source 
of inspiration for fair and equitable benefit-sharing contracts. It also points to 
awareness-raising127 and training activities128 to that end. That being said, the 
Protocol preamble reflects Parties’ recognition of the importance of promot-
ing equity and fairness in the negotiations of MAT,129 which appears crucial for 
Parties to effectively and in good faith contribute to the realization of the fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing objective of the Protocol.130 
Other provisions of the Protocol, however, do not address this point, but 
rather contain a list of minimum requirements on the content of MAT to be 
included in domestic access measures;131 envisage that Parties support indig-
enous and local communities in determining minimum requirements for MAT 
concerning traditional knowledge;132 provide for legal recourse in user coun-
tries for ensuring users’ compliance with MAT, which can rely on existing rules 
of private international law;133 and encourage including in MAT requirements 
on information-sharing and reporting on implementation.134 
6 Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits
According to Article 5(4), benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources and from traditional knowledge concern monetary and non-mone-
tary benefits, including but not limited to those in the Annex to the Protocol. 
Read together with the Annex, therefore, Article 5(4) provides guidance to 
Parties developing domestic ABS frameworks and engaging in the establish-
ment of MAT in their consideration of a range of benefits to be shared. It will 
also guide private providers and users when negotiating MAT.
Non-monetary benefits may be more immediately identifiable and available, 
given the usually lengthy research and development process and uncertainty 
related to ultimate commercialization. Non-monetary benefits can also con-
tribute to gradually building the capacity of provider countries in utilizing their 
125 Nagoya Protocol Article 19.
126 Nagoya Protocol Article 20.
127 Nagoya Protocol Article 21.
128 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(c) and 22(5)(b).
129 Nagoya Protocol 10th preambular recital.
130 See this commentary on Article 1, section 2 and Conclusions to this commentary, section 2.
131 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g). See this commentary on Article 6, section 6.
132 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(b).
133 See this commentary on Article 18.
134 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(b).
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genetic resources.135 In that connection, some non-monetary benefits may be 
seen as having ‘high value to the provider and low marginal cost to the user.’136 
Certain types of non-monetary benefits may be targeted to support long-term 
cooperative relations among the parties to the ABS transaction, such as shar-
ing of research and development results, collaboration in scientific research 
and development, participation in product development, and admittance to 
ex situ facilities and databases.137 This is also the case of capacity building and 
training.138 In addition, non-monetary benefits may be targeted to specifically 
contribute to conservation efforts,139 and/or to the sustainable development at 
the national and local level,140 such as food and livelihoods security benefits, 
and contributions to the local economy.141 These types of benefits, however, 
may raise concerns about undue interferences of user countries and users into 
the exercise of provider countries’ sovereignty in determining the domestic 
sharing of benefits.142
That being said, monetary benefits may also contribute to long-term col-
laboration among parties to ABS transactions through joint ventures and joint 
ownership of relevant IPRs.143 It is worth emphasizing that the Annex to the 
Protocol includes, both in relation to monetary and non-monetary benefits, one 
of the very few references to IPRs that can be found in the whole Protocol text.144 
This may be surprising as IPR-related concerns were prominent throughout 
the negotiations of the operative text of the Protocol. Eventually, however, the 
relationship between ABS and IPRs was not addressed in the Protocol.145
 In addition, monetary benefits may also contribute to conservation efforts 
(special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity).146 Most notably, they also include actual financial benefits 
135 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 32.
136 We are thankful to Geoff Burton for making this point, which is also reflected in Greiber 
et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 88.
137 E.g. Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(a–c) and (e).
138 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(d), (g–i), (n) and (j).
139 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(k) and (m).
140 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 269.
141 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(o) and (l).
142 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
143 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(i) and (j).
144 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(j) and 2(q), both reading ‘joint ownership of relevant intellec-
tual property rights.’ The other reference can be found in Article 6(3)(g)(ii) on possible 
elements of MAT.
145 On this issue, see Introduction to this commentary, section 1.1 and Pavoni, “The Nagoya 
Protocol and WTO,” op. cit., 200–205. 
146 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(f).
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reaching the provider country and relevant communities in the form of access 
fees, up-front or milestone payments, royalties and license fees.147
Finally, it should be noted that while the Annex identifies types of benefits 
to be shared, it is silent on possible links between specific benefit types and 
specific ABS transactions. Parties to the Protocol, and subject to possible limi-
tations in national legislation, individual parties to specific ABS transactions, 
therefore, retain quite some flexibility in tailoring benefit-sharing on a case-
by-case basis. Nevertheless, the objective of the Protocol to achieve fairness 
and equity through benefit-sharing, and to contribute to biodiversity conser-
vation and sustainable use, 148 should guide Parties in the exercise of their dis-
cretion when setting relevant domestic measures and directly participating in 
the establishment of MAT. When government entities are not directly involved 
in the establishment of MAT, their good-faith efforts in realizing the objective 
of the Protocol will rather take the form of proactive encouragement,149 and 
possibly also control and monitoring,150 of private parties. In the specific case 
of benefit-sharing reaching indigenous and local communities, relevant inter-
national human rights standards should also be taken into account: caution 
should be exercised in identifying benefits that are culturally appropriate and 
endogenously identified,151 as certain benefit types or benefit-sharing arrange-
ments can have disruptive effects on the communities’ identities and internal 
governance structures.152
147 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(a–e).
148 See this commentary on Article 1.
149 As specifically mandated by Nagoya Protocol Article 9 in relation to directing benefits 
towards conservation and sustainable use: see this commentary on Article 9.
150 In the light of the general notion of due diligence in international law: see discussion in 
Conclusions to this commentary, section 3.
151 As a result of the interpretation of human rights instruments, such as ILO Convention 
No. 169, Article 15(2) and UNDRIP Article 32. See also American Convention on Human 
Rights (San Jose, 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123, Articles 1(1) 
and 21. 
152 For example, Munyi and Jonas report how the Hoodia benefit-sharing agreement repre-
sents ‘a process that has arguably further undermined [communities’] traditional values 
and knowledge and resource governance system’ and ‘weakened the San’s traditional form 
of authority,’ increasing reliance on ‘external expert opinion,’ leading to ‘largely misunder-
stood and, at times corrupt new forms of governance,’ and exacerbating ‘power and infor-
mation asymmetries in and across San communities,’ as well as fostering mistrust. Peter 
Munyi and Harry Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol in Africa: Opportunities and 
Challenges for African Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities,” in Morgera, Buck 
and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 
217, 227. 
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Article 6. Access to Genetic Resources
1. In the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, and sub-
ject to domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory 
requirements, access to genetic resources for their utilization shall 
be subject to the prior informed consent of the Party providing such 
resources that is the country of origin of such resources or a Party that 
has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention, 
unless otherwise determined by that Party.
2. In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that the prior informed consent 
or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities is 
obtained for access to genetic resources where they have the estab-
lished right to grant access to such resources.
3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 above, each Party requiring prior informed 
consent shall take the necessary legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, to:
(a) Provide for legal certainty, clarity and transparency of their 
domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory 
requirements;
(b) Provide for fair and non-arbitrary rules and procedures on 
accessing genetic resources;
(c) Provide information on how to apply for prior informed consent;
(d)  Provide for a clear and transparent written decision by a compe-
tent national authority, in a cost-effective manner and within a 
reasonable period of time;
(e) Provide for the issuance at the time of access of a permit or its 
equivalent as evidence of the decision to grant prior informed 
consent and of the establishment of mutually agreed terms, 
and notify the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House 
accordingly;
(f) Where applicable, and subject to domestic legislation, set out 
criteria and/or processes for obtaining prior informed consent 
or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communi-
ties for access to genetic resources; and
(g) Establish clear rules and procedures for requiring and establish-
ing mutually agreed terms. Such terms shall be set out in writing 
and may include, inter alia:
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(i) A dispute settlement clause;
(ii) Terms on benefit-sharing, including in relation to intellec-
tual property rights;
(iii) Terms on subsequent third-party use, if any; and
(iv) Terms on changes of intent, where applicable.
1 Overview
Access to genetic resources is one of the main pillars of the Nagoya Protocol 
and is considered to be one of the preconditions for the sharing of benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources. This is recognized in the 
Protocol’s preamble, which points to the ‘linkage’ between access to genetic 
resources and benefit-sharing.1 Concluded following intense negotiations, the 
Protocol’s provisions on access aim to build the foundation for the cooperation 
between provider and user countries that will lead to benefit-sharing. These 
provisions represent the compromise between developed countries that con-
sidered themselves as predominantly user countries, which prioritized effi-
ciency in access-related decision-making and legal certainty, in order to avoid 
hampering research on genetic resources; and developing countries consider-
ing themselves as predominantly provider countries, which called for benefit-
sharing as a self-standing obligation of result for user countries, irrespective of 
provider countries’ regulatory requirements on access.2
The Protocol’s provisions on access build on the foundational principle 
enshrined in the CBD3 that sovereign rights over genetic resources are the basis 
for requiring PIC and establishing MAT. At the same time, Article 6 goes sig-
nificantly beyond the CBD in three respects. First, it elaborates in greater detail 
the rights and obligations of Parties in regulating access to genetic resources, 
aiming to address the enforcement challenges resulting from the transnational 
component of the ABS transactions.4 Second, it promotes best practice in 
contractual drafting, by providing for clauses that could be negotiated as part 
1 Nagoya Protocol 8th preambular recital. See discussion in this commentary on Article 1, sec-
tion 2.
2 Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol, op. cit., 57–59. 
3 CBD Article 15. Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” 
op. cit., 29; Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 94.
4 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 453; see also Introduction to this 
commentary, section 1.
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of MAT.5 Third, it addresses, for the first time in a legally-binding international 
treaty,6 the issue of access to genetic resources held by indigenous and local 
communities.
Following a brief discussion of the background to Article 6, with reference 
to the CBD provisions and the Bonn Guidelines, the following sections will 
focus on each of the components of Article 6, namely: the inter-State obliga-
tions related to access to genetic resources;7 the obligations related to genetic 
resources held by indigenous and local communities;8 the access standards 
that will inform the development of domestic ABS frameworks; the minimum 
procedural requirements for PIC; and the minimum requirements for MAT.9
2 Background
By clarifying that the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources 
also applies to genetic resources,10 and by establishing the obligation for fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing, the CBD introduced key rules on access to 
genetic resources: the authority of national governments to authorize access 
to genetic resources under their jurisdiction as part of States’ sovereign rights 
over their natural resources;11 the general requirement of PIC for access, unless 
otherwise determined by the provider Party;12 and establishment of MAT in 
cases access is granted.13 These provisions are coupled by the CBD benefit-
sharing obligation,14 which applies only to genetic resources provided by 
Parties that are countries of origin or that have acquired them in accordance 
with the Convention.15
Early attempts to implement these CBD provisions and develop domestic 
ABS frameworks revealed lack of conceptual clarity about ABS transactions and 
corresponding legal challenges. These related, for instance, to the frequently 
5 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 30.
6 Ibid., 40.
7 Based on a combined reading of Nagoya Protocol Article 6(1) and the chapeau of 
Article 6(3).
8 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2).
9 The latter three are covered by Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3).
10 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3.
11 CBD Article 15(1).
12 CBD Article 15(5).
13 CBD Article 15(4).
14 As set out in CBD Article 15(7). See this commentary on Article 5.
15 CBD Article 15(3). See discussion in Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3.
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unclear status of the ownership over genetic resources at the domestic level, 
resulting in lack of clarity on who was responsible to grant PIC.16 In addition, 
early ABS laws tended to focus mostly on the safeguarding of Parties’ sover-
eign rights to genetic resources in order to secure benefit-sharing, includ-
ing through permitting and oversight systems, rather than on the efficiency 
of access-related processes.17 This resulted in practical challenges, stemming 
from the lack of standardized access procedures, as well as the lack of capacity 
to negotiate benefit-sharing agreements.18
Researchers and companies have frequently reported that they avoid juris-
dictions with unclear ABS legal frameworks and prefer operating in provider 
countries where they managed to create predictable working relationships.19 
However, even countries with supposedly simple access systems have not 
been significantly more successful in attracting researchers and companies.20 
Overall what seemed to be lacking was confidence in functioning ABS frame-
works as tools for the generation of benefits and support of biodiversity-based 
research. In addition, ex situ collections in non-CBD parties continued provid-
ing genetic material without having to adhere to the CBD requirements.21
This reality, which reflected the legal and practical challenges to develop 
and implement domestic ABS legislation, did not change significantly after the 
adoption of the Bonn Guidelines, which represented a first attempt to opera-
tionalize the provisions of CBD Article 15,22 and constituted the background to 
the negotiations of Article 6 of the Nagoya Protocol.
16 E.g., Cabrera Medaglia, “The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 332 and 
357.
17 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 453.
18 See CBD Secretariat, Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across 
Sectors. CBD Technical Series No. 38 (Montreal: CBD Secretariat, 2008); FAO, Framework 
Study on Food Security and Access and Benefit-Sharing for Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (FAO, 2009), accessed 30 November 2013, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/
fao/meeting/017/ak526e.pdf>; and Jorge Cabrera Medaglia and Christian Silva López, 
Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting Sources, While Giving Users Certainty (Gland: 
IUCN, 2007).
19 CBD Secretariat, Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice, op. cit., 25.
20 Cabrera Medaglia and Silva López, Addressing the Problems of Access, op. cit., 1.
21 Notably collections in the US, which is not a Party to the CBD. See FAO The Second Report 
on the State of the World Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome: FAO, 
2010), chapter 3.
22 See Introduction to this commentary, section 2.
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3 Access to Genetic Resources: The Inter-State Dimension
The term ‘access to genetic resources’ is not defined in the CBD or the Nagoya 
Protocol.23 Under the Protocol, it can be argued that in light of the definition 
of ‘utilization of genetic resources’ (which itself does not include reference 
to ‘access’),24 and considering the wording of Article 6(1) (‘access for their 
utilization’), access may constitute the beginning of the conduct aimed at 
research and development in the jurisdiction of one Party on the genetic or 
biochemical composition of genetic resources that are provided by another 
Party. In addition, taking into account the CBD definition of ‘country provid-
ing genetic resources,’25 it can be inferred that genetic resources supplied by a 
Party to the Nagoya Protocol may originate from both in situ or ex situ sources. 
In practice, therefore, ‘access’ can be achieved through different activities in 
the jurisdiction of the Party providing genetic resources, including by: collect-
ing biological material in the wild; obtaining samples of genetic resources or 
biochemicals from genebanks,26 research institutions or the private sector; or, 
arguably, obtaining digitalized information about genetic resources and their 
genetic or biochemical composition.27 Against all these possible scenarios, a 
definition or clarification of the term ‘access’ in domestic ABS frameworks, 
possibly following a decision by the Protocol’s governing body,28 would likely 
assist in promoting common understanding among Parties and thus legal cer-
tainty. It would also facilitate the issuance of domestic permits, which provide 
23 For a discussion on this term in relation to Article 15 CBD see Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin 
and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 79.
24 See discussion of the relevance of utilization, rather than ‘access’, for the triggering of the 
benefit-sharing obligation in this commentary on Article 5, section 2.
25 CBD Article 2, defines the term as ‘the country supplying genetic resources collected from 
in situ sources, including populations of both wild and domesticated species, or taken 
from ex situ sources, which may or may not have originated in that country.’ In addition, 
according to CBD Article 15(3), in case the provider country is not the country of origin, 
the access-related provisions apply if that Party has acquired the genetic resources in 
accordance with the Convention. See Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 14; Cariño 
et al., Nagoya Protocol, op. cit., 63. See also this commentary on Article 5, section 2.
26 Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol, op. cit., 63. 
27 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.1.1. Margo A. Bagley and Arti K. Rai, The Nagoya 
Protocol and Synthetic Biology Research: A Look at the Potential Impacts (Washington DC: 
Wilson Centre, 2013), accessed 30 November 2013, <www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/
the-nagoya-protocol-and-synthetic-biology-research-look-the-potential-impacts>.
28 Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
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the basis for the internationally recognized certificates of compliance,29 that is 
to occur ‘at the time of access.’
The following sub-sections will first discuss the notion of national sover-
eignty over genetic resources and the Protocol’s obligation to develop domes-
tic measures on access – based on a combined reading of Article 6(1) and 6(3), 
and then the concept of State PIC concerning access to genetic resources.
3.1 National Sovereignty over Genetic Resources and Domestic Measures 
on Access
Based on the reaffirmation of the principle of national sovereignty over natural 
resources,30 Parties have the authority to regulate access to genetic resources 
and require PIC as the key precondition for access, unless they determine 
otherwise, subject to domestic ABS legislation or regulatory requirements.31 
The latter reference is elaborated upon in Article 6(3), which lists, inter alia, 
a series of standards and minimum requirements for the development of leg-
islative, administrative or policy measures of the provider country regulating 
access to its genetic resources. The combined reading of the two provisions, 
however, may arguably give rise to differing interpretations.32 Article 6(1) 
clearly indicates that access to genetic resources is subject to the provider 
Party’s PIC, unless that Party specifically determines that it does not require 
PIC. Article 6(3) calls on Parties ‘requiring PIC’ to take the necessary legislative, 
administrative or policy measures satisfying a series of standards and minimum 
requirements. Article 6(3) may thus be interpreted so as to imply that the PIC 
requirement must be explicitly spelt out in domestic measures. Such an inter-
pretation could lead to a practical problem when a Party is silent with regard to 
its access requirements – i.e., it has not (yet) regulated access in any way nor it 
has expressly waived its right to PIC – and a user accesses its genetic resources 
assuming that no PIC is required. In this case, giving priority to the wording 
of one provision of Article 6 over the other has significant consequences. Is 
it the user’s responsibility to confirm whether PIC is required, in the absence 
29 Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(3)(e) and 17(2). See this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
30 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(1).
31 In line with CBD Article 15(1), which reads: ‘Recognizing the sovereign rights of States 
over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests 
with the national governments and is subject to national legislation,’ emphasis added; 
and CBD Article 15(5), which reads: ‘Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior 
informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise 
determined by the Party.’
32 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point. 
142 Article 6
of any indication from the provider country, to respect Article 6(1)? Or is it 
the responsibility of the provider country to set up its regulatory framework, 
based on a reading of Article 6(3) creating an obligation for Parties to actively 
exercise their right to require PIC through the establishment of a domestic 
ABS framework?33 The former interpretation seems to be supported by the fact 
that Article 6(3) is expressly subordinated to Article 6(1).34 It is also supported 
by the wording of Article 6(1), which indicates that a Party should make an 
explicit decision against requiring PIC.35 Furthermore, even if the mandatory 
wording of Article 6(3) indicates an obligation for countries requiring PIC to 
regulate access to genetic resources at the domestic level (‘shall’), failure to do 
so could possibly qualify as an instance of non-compliance with the Protocol 
provisions,36 rather than leading to the deprivation of the Party’s right to PIC, 
which is protected in mandatory terms under Article 6(1) and is a fundamen-
tal expression of national sovereignty. That being said, lack of domestic mea-
sures on PIC could make it very difficult for the compliance provisions of the 
Protocol to apply.37 Provider countries, therefore, are well advised to develop 
their domestic ABS frameworks to take full advantage of the Protocol provisions 
fostering international cooperation, particularly with regard to compliance.
Against this background, users will therefore be well advised to take a 
cautious approach in cases in which a Party’s domestic framework is silent 
on access to genetic resources, and as a default position assume that PIC is 
required.38 This is already reflected in what is currently considered best prac-
tice for user groups: users confirm this with the CBD national focal point of the 
provider country even in cases where PIC has been specifically waived.39
33 See Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis, op. cit., 16; and Buck and 
Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 51. 
34 Note that Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3) starts with the expression ‘Pursuant to para-
graph 1.’
35 As Nagoya Protocol Article 6(1) specifically states ‘unless otherwise determined by that 
Party.’ See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 96. 
36 See this commentary on Article 30.
37 See this commentary on Articles 15–16. Similar concerns about enforceability arose in the 
context of the CBD: Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit.
38 See also reference to foreign investors’ due diligence in this regard in this commentary on 
Article 4, section 2.1.
39 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 96, citing “Access and Benefit-Sharing – 
ABS,” Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association (2010), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.ornamental-fish-int.org/uploads/c2/c8/c2c896efd06e24d26710d8b90a40d478/
ABS.pdf>.
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Developing a comprehensive domestic ABS framework would protect first 
and foremost the rights of the provider country, as well as facilitate imple-
mentation of, and compliance with, other provisions of the Protocol.40 To that 
end, Parties enjoy a wide margin of discretion in developing their regulatory 
approach to ABS under Article 6(3), and could in practice opt for a gradual 
approach to the setting up of their domestic ABS framework, first through 
interim policy and administrative measures,41 and then legislative measures. 
This would allow Parties to comply with Article 6(3) in the context of time-
consuming legislative processes and in dealing with unprecedented legal 
questions at the domestic level.42 In these situations, users should ensure they 
consult with national authorities competent to implement the Nagoya Protocol 
in a given country, who could be mandated to advise on interim procedures 
and requirements for PIC and MAT.43 Provider countries, in turn, would be well 
advised to promptly identify competent national authorities while the domes-
tic ABS framework is being developed.44 Overall, peer learning and developing 
guidance at the international level (to be agreed upon by the Protocol’s govern-
ing body)45 in this regard would certainly be welcome.
It should be further noted that a vast variety of situations could be possible, 
including Parties waiving their right to PIC and still regulating otherwise access 
to their genetic resources (for instance, by allowing free access to their genetic 
resources, but requiring users to establish MAT directly with private providers 
and provide information to relevant authorities for inclusion into a national 
register). In these cases, waiving PIC does not necessarily mean renouncing to 
benefit-sharing.46
40 In particular due to the linkages between Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3) and the 
compliance-related provisions under Articles 15–18.
41 On whether policy and administrative measures would qualify as ‘domestic ABS legislation 
or regulatory requirements’, for the purposes of triggering the compliance provisions of 
the Protocol (Articles 15–16), see this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1.
42 See discussion on law-making capacity issues raised by the Nagoya Protocol in this 
commentary on Article 22. 
43 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2): see this commentary on Article 13, section 3. 
44 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
45 Article 26(4)(a): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
46 See this commentary on Article 5, section 2.
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3.2 The Concept of State PIC
PIC is a well-known tool in international law, used in and adapted to different 
contexts.47 It has been used widely in international instruments in the fields 
of chemicals and hazardous waste.48 In that context, it was based on the prin-
ciple that prior to an activity involving risks, those affected and authorized to 
make a decision should be informed in detail about the potential risks, and 
was used to protect importing countries from environmental and health haz-
ards. The concept has been used differently in the CBD context, as a tool to 
protect countries’ sovereignty over natural, including genetic, resources.
Like the CBD, the Protocol’s provisions on access are based on the concept 
of PIC, as an expression of the principle of national sovereignty over natural 
resources. In this case, therefore, PIC is meant to protect the Party providing 
genetic resources, rather than the one acquiring them.49 This means that, to 
give its consent to a request for access to genetic resources, the provider coun-
try must be informed in advance and in detail about the envisioned research 
or bioprospecting activity from the applicant. On the basis of this information, 
the competent authority50 of the provider country makes a decision regarding 
the access request,51 and sets (or orders the negotiation of) the MAT that will 
apply to the transaction. According to the Protocol provisions, the country’s 
national ABS framework must include a procedure by which the decision on 
PIC is documented at the time of access by the issuance of a permit or its 
equivalent.52
47 One example of its use in international environmental instruments is found in the FAO 
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides: “International 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides” in FAO Council Resolution 
1/123 “Revised Version of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use 
of Pesticides” (1 November 2002). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 95.
48 Rotterdam PIC Convention; see generally Katharina Kummer Peiry, “Prior Informed 
Consent,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit.
49 Note that in the context of the Biosafety Protocol, CBD Parties opted for using the 
Advance Informed Agreement, rather than PIC, as the central administrative procedure 
for regulating transboundary movements of living modified organisms. The Advance 
Informed Agreement procedure was loosely modelled along the PIC processes of the 
Rotterdam PIC Convention and Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 
05 May 1992) 1673 UNTS 57, but allowing for a greater degree of flexibility. See Mackenzie 
et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 63.
50 See this commentary on Article 13, section 3.
51 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 95.
52 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e). On the internationally recognized certificate of 
compliance, see this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
145Access to Genetic Resources
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol have discretion to exercise their right to 
require PIC fully or partially, or fully exempt access from the PIC requirement. 
A Party may decide, for instance, to use as criteria for exemption from the PIC 
requirement the ownership (public or private), location (for example, within 
or outside protected areas), type (plant, animal, aquatic, forest, micro-organ-
isms) of genetic resources or the intent of the research envisioned (non-com-
mercial or commercial purpose, or aiming to address health emergencies, or 
agricultural research purposes).53
4 Access to Genetic Resources Held by Indigenous and Local 
Communities
State PIC, as enshrined in the CBD and the Protocol, should be differentiated 
from indigenous and local community PIC. Article 6(2) represents a notable 
development with respect to the Convention, as well as from an international 
human rights perspective.54 It is the first international legally binding provi-
sion explicitly and specifically addressing the regulation of access to genetic 
resources ‘held by’ indigenous and local communities. The provision, how-
ever, is heavily qualified, both by reference to cases where communities have 
‘the established right’ to grant access to such resources and by reference to ‘in 
accordance with national legislation,’ in parallel with Article 5(2).
Parties are required to take domestic measures to ensure that community 
PIC, or approval and involvement, is obtained. The Protocol does not, there-
fore, directly recognize rights for indigenous and local communities to grant 
access to genetic resources in their territories. Rather, it requires Parties to 
put legislation or other domestic measures in place on community PIC (or 
approval and involvement) in case communities’ rights over genetic resources 
are already established or will be explicitly established in the future. The provi-
sion therefore embodies a ‘community PIC requirement’ that is separate from 
53 See this commentary on Article 8. 
54 Bavikatte and Robinson note: ‘If we approach the law as a site of struggle, Article 6(2) of 
the Nagoya Protocol is a monumental achievement by communities. It is a testimony to 
six years of hard work and careful lobbying and has extended the scope of Article 8(j) in 
ways that were inconceivable in 1993. It had capitalised on the important victory . . . that 
for indigenous peoples and local communities, there is an inseparable link between 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge.’ See Kabir Bavikatte and Daniel F. Robinson, 
“Towards a People’s History of the Law: Biocultural Jurisprudence and the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit Sharing,” Law, Environment and Development 7 (2011): 35, 47.
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(and possibly additional to) State PIC for access to relevant genetic resources 
pursuant to Article 6(1). As discussed in relation to the corresponding Protocol 
provisions on benefit-sharing for indigenous and local communities,55 these 
provisions may be considered an implicit recognition of an underlying sub-
stantive environmental right of these communities to their genetic resources. 
Article 6(2) specifies the UNDRIP standard on PIC concerning the use of indig-
enous peoples’ natural resources in as far as it concerns genetic resources used 
for research and development.56 The Nagoya Protocol also goes beyond exist-
ing international human rights standards by extending the community PIC 
requirement to local communities.
The following analysis of Article 6(2) and its implications will focus first on 
the contours of Parties’ obligations with respect to genetic resources held by 
indigenous and local communities (that is, how Parties will comply with the 
Protocol’s community PIC requirement); and then on the concept of ‘commu-
nity PIC’ (or approval and involvement) concerning genetic resources.57
4.1 Parties’ Obligation
With regard to the community PIC requirement established by the Protocol, 
the mandatory wording of Article 6(2) (‘shall’) leaves little doubt that Parties 
are under an obligation to enact domestic measures with the aim of ensur-
ing PIC (or approval and involvement) for indigenous and local communities 
that hold genetic resources within their jurisdiction. This requirement there-
fore limits the discretion of those Parties considering not requiring PIC for 
access to genetic resources in accordance with Article 6(1). At the same time, 
the qualifications found in the text (‘in accordance with domestic law’ and ‘as 
appropriate’) leave a degree of discretion to Parties with regard to the types of 
measures to be taken for the implementation of the community PIC require-
ment. The term ‘as appropriate’, however, does not leave discretion with regard 
to whether to take any domestic measures at all on this matter, as long as indig-
enous or local communities are found in the territory58 and have established 
55 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2). See this commentary on Article 5, section 3.
56 UNDRIP Article 32(2) reads: ‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order 
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their . . . resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources’ (emphasis added).
57 For a complementary discussion of community PIC in relation to traditional knowledge, 
see this commentary on Article 7, section 2.
58 On the identification of indigenous peoples and local communities, in the absence of an 
international definition, see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
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rights over genetic resources.59 As for other provisions in the Protocol that 
relate to indigenous peoples and local communities, Article 6(2) is to be inter-
preted and implemented in the light of relevant international human rights 
standards,60 and with due consideration of communities’ customary laws, pro-
tocols and procedures.61
A difficulty, however, arises from the reference in Article 6(2) to ‘the estab-
lished right’ for indigenous and local communities to grant access to genetic 
resources. Depending on its interpretation, this qualification could prove 
highly limiting for the involvement of indigenous and local communities in 
ABS transactions concerning genetic resources in their territories. The refer-
ence reflects language in Article 5 on benefit-sharing arising from the use of 
genetic resources held by communities, and the same considerations already 
discussed in that context apply here.62 According to a narrow interpretation, 
the term ‘established’ may only refer to situations where a particular commu-
nity can demonstrate that its right to genetic resources is already affirmed in the 
domestic legal order, possibly leaving it to the absolute discretion of the Party 
concerned to determine whether such community rights exist and therefore 
whether or not to develop domestic measures on community PIC on genetic 
resources.63 This, however, appears overly restrictive and not in harmony with 
international human rights standards and the Protocol objective.64 A broader 
interpretation of ‘established rights’ on the basis of relevant international 
human rights law and in light of community customary laws would instead 
imply an obligation for Parties to map customary rights at the domestic level, 
in consultation with the concerned communities,65 provide for their legal rec-
ognition, and enact domestic measures to ensure community PIC in case com-
munities’ customary rights are ascertained. The inseparable nature of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge for indigenous and local communities66 
further substantiates the need for a broader interpretation of Article 6(2): as 
59 See Introduction to this commentary, section 5 and fn. 225.
60 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
61 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
62 See this commentary on Article 5, section 3.2.
63 This possible interpretation was identified with concern by Singh Nijar, The Nagoya 
Protocol: Analysis and Implementation Options for Developing Countries, op. cit., 25–26. 
64 See this commentary on Article 1, section 3.
65 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2). See also Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador, paragraph 165.
66 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital.
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noted below,67 the obligation for Parties to enact domestic measures to ensure 
community PIC to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is 
not conditioned on the existence of specific rights.
4.2 The Concept of Community PIC Concerning Genetic Resources
While State PIC is premised on the general principle of national sovereignty 
over natural resources, community PIC for access to genetic resources is based 
on international human rights law, namely indigenous peoples’ rights to: man-
age their natural resources;68 maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiri-
tual relationship with their traditionally owned resources;69 own, use, develop 
and control the resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership 
or use;70 be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and 
development;71 and obtain just and fair redress if deprived of their means of 
subsistence and development,72 or dispossession of their resources.73
Community PIC is in fact a well-known tool in the human rights field, where 
it has been interpreted as integrating both ‘positive’ and ‘defensive’ protection 
sides.74 As a positive tool, PIC is used to empower indigenous peoples by giving 
them the right to control and benefit from the use of their natural resources. 
As a defensive tool, for instance with regard to development projects affecting 
indigenous peoples’ lands and resources, PIC focuses on the potential negative 
impacts of the proposed activity – this is a connotation that is more akin to the 
67 See this commentary on Article 7, section 2.
68 UNDRIP Article 3. For the relevance of these and other sources on indigenous peoples’ 
human rights with respect to local communities, see Introduction to this commentary, 
section 4.2.
69 UNDRIP Article 25.
70 UNDRIP Article 26(2). On the international judicial recognition of the right to ‘dispose 
of their natural resources’, see Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit., 350–1 and fns. 5 
and 15–16; Human Rights Committee, Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication 
no. 547/1993 Views (27 October 2000), UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, paragraph 
9(2); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), “General 
Recommendation No. 23,” paragraph 5.
71 UNDRIP Article 20(1).
72 UNDRIP Article 20(2).
73 UNDRIP Article 8(2)(b). 
74 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), “How Tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best contribute,” UNEP/
CBD/ WG8J/8/4/Rev.2, paragraph 43. On the international judicial recognition of the right 
to PIC, see sources analysed by Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit., 350–352 and fns. 6, 
13, 17 and 20.
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use of PIC in multilateral chemicals conventions than in the CBD.75 Given that 
CBD Parties have not yet elaborated consensus guidance on community PIC 
concerning their genetic resources, it appears useful to draw on international 
human rights standards on community PIC for access to natural resources or, 
mutatis mutandis, on community PIC to developments/extractive activities in 
their lands.
In the context of international human rights processes, community PIC 
has been interpreted as entailing that consent should be given freely, with-
out coercion, intimidation or manipulation (hence, the emphatic use of ‘free’ 
before PIC in UNDRIP).76 In addition, it should be sought sufficiently at all 
stages, from the inception to the final authorization and implementation of 
proposed activities (‘prior’). It should be based on an understanding of the full 
range of issues and implications entailed by the activity or decision in ques-
tion (‘informed’), and given by the legitimate representatives of the indigenous 
peoples concerned.77 With a view to providing indigenous peoples with ‘full 
and objective information about all aspects of the project that will affect them, 
including the impact of the project on their lives and environment,’ an envi-
ronmental and socio-cultural impact study should be carried out and its out-
come should be presented to indigenous communities concerned at an early 
stage of the consultations preceding the community’s decision on PIC.78
75 See however “Akwé: Kon Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which 
are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied 
or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities” in CBD Decision 7/16, “Article 8(j) and 
related provisions” (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/16 (hereinafter, 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines). On the risks that knowledge exchanges may entail for indigenous 
peoples and local communities, see Terry Williams and Preston Hardison, “Culture, Law, 
Risk and Governance: Contexts of Traditional Knowledge in Climate Change Adaptation,” 
Climatic Change (2013) 120: 531.
76 In strictly legal terms, ‘consent’ is always free as the notion inherently embodies the 
absence of any coercion. See Findlaw Legal Dictionary, accessed 30 November 2013, 
<http://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/consent.html>: ‘compliance in or approval of 
what is done or proposed by another; (. . .) the voluntary agreement or acquiescence by 
a person of age or with requisite mental capacity who is not under duress or coercion 
and usually who has knowledge or understanding. In fact, coercion nullifies/invalidates 
any expression of consent.’ (emphasis added). Compare Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, 
op. cit., 110–111.
77 UNPFII, “Report on the tenth session,” E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14, paragraphs 34–38, 
particularly paragraph 34.
78 Human Rights Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Report of the 
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Several challenges arise for States to ensure community PIC. International 
human rights bodies have confirmed that PIC ‘does not necessarily require una-
nimity and may be achieved even when individuals or groups within the com-
munity explicitly disagree.’79 Nonetheless, States are still responsible to ensure 
the genuine involvement of legitimate representatives of indigenous peoples 
and the true nature of ‘consent’ in the context of indigenous customary institu-
tions, including applicable customary decision-making processes and taking 
into account that consent may be withdrawn at a later stage.80 States are also 
expected to ensure that women and other potentially disenfranchised groups 
are included in the community PIC process.81
Overall, what emerges hitherto from relevant human rights processes is 
that PIC entails good-faith and culturally-appropriate consultation proce-
dures, according to the communities’ customs and traditions, where every 
effort is made to build consensus on the part of all concerned in reaching an 
agreement that is seen as legitimate by the community82 and leads to benefit-
sharing arrangements that must accord with indigenous peoples’ own under-
standing of benefits.83 Thus, assimilating PIC to a veto power for communities, 
referring to the possibility to reject a proposal without providing adequate jus-
tification, is an oversimplification.84 Ultimately, the right to PIC is seen as a 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya” (15 July 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, paragraph 53. See 
also: Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007, parapgraph 134; African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Centre for Economic 
and Social v. Nigeria, Communication no. 155/96 (27 October 2001), paragraph 53; and 
Fodella, “Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit., 356 and 360. 
79 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises,” paragraph 11.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. See also Nagoya Protocol 11th preambular recital and Article 12(3)(b), and 
brief discussion on the challenges in tackling discrimination based on gender in the 
Introduction to this commentary, section 4.3.
82 Human Rights Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights,” A/HRC/12/34, 
paragraphs 46–48. 
83 Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision-making, with a focus on extractive industries” (16 August 2012) 
UN Doc A/HRC/21/55, paragraph 43; also UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples” (13 August 2012) UN Doc A/67/301, 
paragraph 78.
84 Human Rights Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights,” A/HRC/12/34, 
paragraphs 46–48; and Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 30, which reads ‘. . . But it must be 
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procedural safeguard for the exercise of indigenous peoples’ substantive right 
to self-determination, including their rights to property, culture, religion and 
non-discrimination, as well as the right to set and pursue their own priorities 
for development.85 Despite conceptual progress at the international level, 
however,86 questions remain concerning the implementation of the right to 
community PIC.87 In addition, the community PIC requirement may be par-
ticularly challenging to implement when two or more indigenous peoples or 
local communities share genetic resources.88
emphasized that the consent is not a free-standing device of legitimation. The principle 
of free, prior and informed consent, arising as it does within a human rights framework, 
does not contemplate consent as simply a yes to a predetermined decision, or as a means 
to validate a deal that disadvantages affected indigenous peoples. When consent is given, 
not just freely and on an informed basis, but also on just terms that are protective of 
indigenous peoples rights, it will fulfil its human rights safeguard role’.
85 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
peoples, James Anaya” (6 July 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, paragraph 50; and Human 
Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 28.
86 E.g., UNPFII, “Report of the international workshop on methodologies regarding 
free, prior and informed consent and indigenous peoples” (17 February 2005) UN Doc 
E/C.19/2005/3; “Report of the international technical workshop on indigenous traditional 
knowledge” (15 December 2005) UN Doc E/C.19/2006/2); “Report on the fifth session” 
(13 June 2006) UN Doc. E/2006/43–E/C.19/2006/11; and “An overview of the principle of 
free, prior and informed consent and indigenous peoples in international and domestic 
law and practices. Contribution by Parshuram Tamang Paper prepared for the UNPFII 
workshop on free, prior and informed consent” (17–19 January 2005) UN Doc PFII/2004/
WS.2/8.
87 The Permanent Forum has therefore indicated that it will explore the opportunity to 
develop guidelines on the implementation of free PIC, in collaboration with the UN 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: UNPFII, “Report on the tenth session,” E/2011/43–
E/C.19/2011/14, paragraph 37. 
88 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point. The Nagoya 
Protocol only addresses situations in which traditional knowledge is shared by different 
indigenous and local communities located in different States (Article 11(2); see this 
commentary on Article 11, section 4), although it can be argued that the provision on 
inter-State cooperation in relation to genetic resources found in situ within the territory 
of more than one Party can also include instances in which different indingeous and 
local communities in different Parties share genetic resources (Article 11(1); ); see this 
commentary on Article 11, section 3).
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4.2.1 Approval and Involvement
The reference to ‘or approval and involvement’ in Article 6(2) reiterates the 
wording of CBD Article 8(j) and reflects the reluctance by some CBD Parties 
to fully endorse in the Protocol the right to community PIC as developed in 
international human rights law and enshrined in UNDRIP. The expression 
‘approval and involvement’ was introduced in the Protocol in order to allow 
for a greater degree of flexibility in implementation at the national level,89 in 
the light of different domestic legal arrangements concerning the relations 
between governments and indigenous and local communities within their 
territories.90 This reluctance is also illustrated by the timid preambular refer-
ence to UNDRIP,91 and by references to ‘PIC and approval and involvement’ in 
previous CBD COP decisions.92 The matter continues to remain very conten-
tious in relevant discussions under the CBD at the time of writing,93 although 
89 Caution about using PIC in the Nagoya Protocol text was explained by the possible 
implication of ‘creating/expanding “sovereign rights” for communities to control genetic 
resources that would run against constitutional provisions or domestic practices in certain 
countries’: Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries,” 
op. cit., 318–328, particularly 318–319. See also CBD Working Group on ABS, “Concerns 
relating to CBD process, revised draft Protocol and indigenous peoples’ human rights” 
(22 September 2010) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/21. For an academic argument 
on ‘parallel’ sovereignty of States and indigenous peoples, see generally Lenzerini, 
“Sovereignty Revisited,” op. cit.
90 “Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee),” 133–136, and comments 
by Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 70. The Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reported on concerns raised in the 
submission above, in UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/67/301, paragraphs 58–59. Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya 
Protocol,” op. cit., 55. 
91 Nagoya Protocol 26th preambular recital simply ‘notes’ UNDRIP. 
92 E.g., Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 31; and CBD Decision 5/16, paragraph 5: ‘access to 
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
should be subject to prior informed consent or prior informed approval from the holders 
of such knowledge . . .’ Note, however, the 2004 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines refer 
consistently only to ‘prior informed consent’ (Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraphs 29, 
52–53 and 60).
93 For an indication of continued divergence of views on utilising UNDRIP language in the 
context of the CBD, see ENB, “Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group 
on Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 31 October–4 November 2011,” 
Vol. 9 No. 557, 7 November 2011, 5–6; and ENB, “Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Article 8(j) and 17th Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 7–18 
October 2013,” Vol. 9 No. 611, 21 October 2013, 4, 6–7 and 20.
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commentators have suggested that CBD Parties can consider the two expres-
sions as having essentially the same meaning in practice.94
Given that the right to PIC is considered to imply the right for indigenous 
and local communities to allow or refuse95 access to their genetic resources, 
the crucial issue with regard to the alternative term ‘approval and involve-
ment’ is whether it provides equal guarantees in the context of communities’ 
own decision-making processes or communities’ participation in government 
decision-making processes.96 In the latter case, it may well be that community 
PIC is embodied in the same decision embodying State PIC. This may raise par-
ticular difficulties in situations where ownership over genetic resources is not 
clarified in domestic ABS frameworks or where the government also asserts 
its own sovereignty over genetic resources held by communities and consulta-
tions with communities in this regard are inconclusive.
In this connection, the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights has recommended interpreting and implementing relevant inter-
national environmental treaties in a way that is consistent with UNDRIP, 
whether or not the specific text of these instruments matches exactly the 
terms of the Declaration.97 So, ‘approval and involvement’ should still provide 
94 Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis, op. cit., 26; Buck and Hamilton, 
“Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 55; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 110–111. Note 
that any community PIC process should be as far as possible determined and controlled 
by the particular indigenous community: Human Rights Council, “Promotion and 
protection of all human rights,” A/HRC/12/34; Human Rights Council, “Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41 paragraphs 26–36; CERD, 
“General Recommendation No. 23;” and Human Rights Committee, Ángela Poma Poma v. 
Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, (27 March 2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006.
95 A definition recently discussed (but not intergovernmentally approved) in the 
CBD framework considers PIC as the procedure through which indigenous or local 
communities properly supplied with all the required information, decide to allow or 
refuse access to their traditional knowledge under mutually agreed conditions of equality, 
respect and fair compensation. See “Set of relevant definitions/glossary of terms for 
Article 8(j) and related provisions,” in CBD Article 8(j) Working Group, “Development of 
elements of sui generis systems for the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations 
and practices. Note by the Executive Secretary” (24 November 2005) UN Doc UNEP/
CBD/WG8J/4/7, Annex II, which refers to UNPFII, “Report of the international workshop 
on methodologies regarding free, prior and informed consent and indigenous peoples,” 
E/C.19/2005/3, emphasis added.
96 E.g., the Sami People have set up Sami parliaments that constitute an integral part of the 
governmental structure in Sweden, Finland and Norway (“Politics,” Sami People, accessed 
6 February 2014, <www.eng.samer.se/servlet/GetDoc?meta_id=1009>).
97 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/67/301, paragraphs 92 and 61, where the Special Rapporteur specifically expresses the 
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a genuine and effective guarantee to uphold indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination and to protect their rights over genetic resources found in their 
territories, by empowering them to ‘effectively determine the outcome of 
decision-making . . . not merely a right to be involved in such processes.’98 Thus, 
when States claim ownership on, or otherwise assert the power to expropriate 
community property interests in, genetic resources in order to have or permit 
access to these resources, this amounts to a limitation of community rights, 
including their right to property and culture, even if those rights are not held 
under a title deed or other form of official recognition, and even if just com-
pensation is provided. Such expropriation can only be considered valid from 
an international human rights perspective if it is pursuant to a valid public pur-
pose, which cannot be a mere commercial interest, revenue-raising objective, 
or the conduct of activities that are primarily for private gain.99 In addition, 
the limitation must comply with standards of strict necessity and proportion-
ality, be determined by law and be non-discriminatory.100
Furthermore, even if it is an alternative standard to PIC, ‘approval and 
involvement’ should be interpreted and applied also in light of more general 
international human rights standards such as the right to access information, 
participation and transparency in decision-making and access to adequate 
remedies.101 Ultimately, Parties to the Protocol will need to strike an equitable 
balance between the need to establish some formal processes to effectively 
engage indigenous and local communities in good faith when access to genetic 
resources in their territories is requested and the need to genuinely respect 
their rights as enshrined in international human rights law.102
‘hopeful expectation’ that the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol will be implemented ‘in 
harmony with’ UNDRIP. 
98 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Advice No. 2, Indigenous peo-
ples and the right to participate in decision-making,” (2011), accessed 30 October 2012, 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/Advice2_Oct2011.pdf>, paragraph 1, 
emphasis added.
99 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 35.
100 Ibid.; and UNDRIP Article 46(2).
101 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 70. Compare with 
ICCPR Article 2(3), although the latter refers only to access to remedies.
102 See Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ 
rights,” A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 25. We are grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for a useful 
exchange of ideas on this matter.
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4.2.2 Community PIC and Private-sector Users
International human rights processes have started to provide guidance on the 
role of States in legislating for, and supporting community PIC vis-à-vis pri-
vate developers, and have also elaborated on private operators’ own respon-
sibility to respect community PIC.103 These international developments, that 
are based on the recognition that community PIC and the substantive human 
rights tied to PIC requirements are often directly affected by business,104 may 
have significant resonance in the context of community PIC and ABS transac-
tions involving private parties.
In that connection, the duty of States to protect indigenous peoples’ rights 
applies also when granting permits to private parties relating to indigenous 
peoples’ resources,105 and includes the obligation to provide business with 
clarity on the right of indigenous peoples in that regard, including when indig-
enous peoples do not have a State-recognized title to the lands and resources 
affected by extractive activities.106 States are also called upon to establish 
mechanisms and procedures to verify that community PIC has been sought 
by private-sector operators, and to include indigenous peoples in the develop-
ment of such mechanisms. Should these mechanism lead to the determination 
that community PIC has not been respected, the State may revoke any autho-
rization given.107 These indications can certainly apply to provider countries 
under the Protocol.
With regard to user countries, even if no indigenous peoples reside within 
their borders, other indications from human rights bodies appear relevant, par-
ticularly for home States of transnational corporations operating in territories 
103 Elisa Morgera, “From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms,” 
in Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection Incentives and 
Safeguards, ed. Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 321.
104 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations,” A/68/279, 
paragraph 10.
105 ILO Convention No. 169 Article 15(1); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Merits, Judgment, Case no. 
12.053 (12 October 2004), 194–195 (hereinafter, Maya Indigenous Community v. Belize); 
and, more generally, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources. Norms and 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System,” American Indian Law Review 
35 (2010): 386. 
106 Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report,” A/HRC/21/47, paragraphs 32–35; and Human 
Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/HRC/24/41, paragraphs 26–40.
107 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations,” A/68/279, 
paragraph 11.
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used or inhabited by indigenous peoples.108 In particular, user countries are to 
consider ways to ensure that indigenous peoples affected by the operations of 
their biotech multinationals abroad have access to effective remedy,109 taking 
into account the specificities of indigenous peoples and ensuring that any bar-
riers to their access to the mechanisms are addressed and removed.110
With regards to business enterprises’ own responsibility to respect human 
rights,111 companies’ due diligence is increasingly expected to factor in risks 
related to the respect for indigenous peoples’ rights, in particular respect for 
their collective rights to lands and resources in accordance with their own cus-
tomary laws, traditions and practices.112 Companies’ policies are expected to 
include a commitment to seek to ensure respect for community PIC, based 
on international human rights law, including UNDRIP and ILO Convention 
169.113 This should be operationalized through the conduct of human rights 
impact assessment,114 leverage in business relationships to prevent and 
address adverse impacts, and the exercise of regular and direct consultations 
with indigenous peoples when their human rights may be affected, taking into 
account language and other potential barriers to effective engagement. In 
addition, companies are expected to establish mediation-based and culturally 
appropriate operational-level grievance mechanisms that take into account 
traditional indigenous mechanisms.115 Specific reference, in that context, is 
made to business’ responsibility to respect PIC in relation to benefit-sharing 
arrangements that must accord with indigenous peoples’ own understanding 
108 Ibid., paragraph 55(a).
109 Ibid., paragraph 55(j). See also this commentary on Article 18.
110 Ibid., paragraph 37.
111 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights” 
(7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5; and “Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework” (21 March 2011) 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, paragraph 11.
112 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations,” A/68/279, 
paragraph 24.
113 Ibid., paragraph 56.
114 Note that the relevance of the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines in this respect has already been 
highlighted by human rights bodies: see discussion in Morgera, “From Corporate Social 
Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms,” op. cit., 335–336 and 348–349.
115 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations,” A/68/279, 
paragraph 56; Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report,” A/HRC/21/47, paragraph 28(d); 
and Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ 
rights,” A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 78.
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of benefits.116 These indications are clearly relevant to private-sector users 
under the Protocol.
Consequently, in the absence of an adequate State-led process to ensure 
community PIC, private-sector users may need to consider carefully whether 
they can proceed with access to genetic resources without the risk of causing 
or contributing to adverse impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples.117 This 
in effect provides an incentive for provider and user countries to establish 
appropriate measures on community PIC, with a view to attracting respon-
sible users.
5 Access Standards
When a Party develops domestic measures on access to its genetic resources, 
it has discretion in choosing legislative, administrative or policy measures 
‘as appropriate.’ Each Party will therefore have to determine what types (or 
what mix) of measures are necessary to regulate access to its genetic resources 
domestically. The choice will reflect the constitutional, legal and administra-
tive context of a Party, and will also likely be based on an assessment of the 
capacities and resources to implement and enforce the proposed ABS frame-
work (in the case of developing countries, the Protocol provisions on capacity 
and financial support are therefore relevant).118
In developing domestic access measures, Parties must respect a series of 
‘standards’119 and include a series of minimum requirements that are detailed 
in Article 6(3)(a–g). The list of standards and requirements is cumulative. 
Parties therefore do not have discretion to implement only one or other 
standard/requirement from the list – with the exception of the criteria and 
116 Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report,” A/HRC/21/47, paragraph 43; and Human 
Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/
HRC/21/47. On benefit-sharing and business’ responsibility to respect human rights, see 
Elisa Morgera, “Environmental Accountability of Multinational Corporations: Benefit-
Sharing as a Bridge between Human Rights and the Environment,” in The Environmental 
Dimension of Human Rights, ed. Ben Boer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 
2014).
117 UN General Assembly, “Human rights and transnational corporations,” paragraph 21.
118 See this commentary on Articles 22 and 25.
119 The Protocol negotiators referred to Article 6(3)(a–g) as ‘international access standards’ 
and this were among the most contentious issues in the negotiation of the Nagoya 
Protocol: Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 51. As the commentary will 
discuss below, however, only Article 6(a–b) can be technically considered legal ‘standards.’
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processes to obtain community PIC, because it is the only requirement quali-
fied by ‘where applicable.’120 Parties may, however, go beyond the standards 
and requirements set out in Article 6(3), which can be considered a minimum 
necessary to support user countries in understanding the applicable rules of 
the provider country, and therefore be put in an easier position when imple-
menting their compliance-related obligations under the Protocol.121
Some commentators have criticized the standards contained in Article 6(3) 
because they are framed in too general terms and do not appear amenable to 
an objective assessment of whether domestic measures satisfy them or not.122 
In general international law, legal provisions of a more general normative con-
tent than rules123 can be considered ‘legal standards’.124 They imply the idea 
of a ‘level or model to which to conform and with reference to which one can 
evaluate or critically appraise certain behavior.’125 In other words, they pro-
vide a legal benchmark allowing an appreciation of whether a certain con-
duct126 can be considered ‘reasonable’ or ‘just’127 in specific circumstances.128 
120 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(f).
121 See this commentary on Articles 15–18.
122 Gurdial Singh, The Nagoya Protocol: An Analysis, op. cit., 16. The concern may be 
understood in the light of a proposal to allow user countries to decide whether and to 
what extent users’ non-compliance in their jurisdictions was partly due to deficiencies in 
the domestic ABS framework of a provider country. The EU maintained until September 
2010 bracketed text to this effect in draft article 12(2) in Montreal I Draft: ‘Parties may 
refrain from taking such measures if the domestic access and benefit-sharing framework 
of another Party providing the misappropriated genetic resources at the time of 
misappropriation was not in conformity with Article 5(2).’
123 According to Hart, rules require human beings to do or abstain from certain actions, 
whether they wish to or not: Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 81.
124 Jean Salmon, ed., Dictionnaire de Droit International Public (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2001), 
1049; Abd Al-Razzâq Al-Sanhoury and Édouard Lambert, Les Restrictions Contractuelles 
à la Liberté Individuelle de Travail dans la Jurisprudence Anglaise. Contribution à l’étude 
Comparative de la Règle de Droit et du Standard Juridique (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1925).
125 These elements are suggested by Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., 32.
126 Jules Basdevant, ed., Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International (Paris: Sirey, 
1960), 581. Pound, along the same lines, defines standards as ‘measures of conduct 
prescribed by law from which one departs at his peril of answering for resulting damage’: 
Roscoe Pound, Social Contract through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942) 
44–49.
127 Ibid., 47–49.
128 Richard Dworkin, ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ in The Philosophy of Law, ed. Richard 
Dworkin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 38, 43.
159Access to Genetic Resources
Legal standards therefore involve an idea of striking a reasonable balance 
between legal requirements and legitimate expectations based on experience 
or on moral sentiment.129 It follows that legal standards are used when it would 
be ‘unreasonable to attempt to formulate a definition of reasonable’130 ex ante.
Against this background, the recourse to legal standards in Article 6(3)(a–b) 
seems suitable to give direction to domestic implementation efforts while 
allowing for case-by-case determinations of the appropriate, context-specific 
measure on access that appear apt to reach the objective of the Protocol of 
realizing fair and equitable benefit-sharing,131 taking into account national 
legal and administrative traditions and constraints, as well as capacity needs 
particularly in the time period immediately following the entry into force of 
the Protocol. As the other provisions in Article 6(3)(c–g) clearly point to a spe-
cific conduct, rather than a legal standard, they will be discussed separately 
below, as minimum requirements.
The access standards and minimum requirements in Article 6(3) may con-
tribute to a certain common approach to the development of domestic access 
rules that could facilitate the creation of an international functional ABS legal 
system (as applicants will better understand what is expected of them and 
enforcement in user countries may be easier). But it has been observed that 
the Protocol does not provide similar minimum standards and requirements 
also for benefit-sharing obligations.132 Proposals to this effect were considered 
during the negotiations. As opposed to establishing international standards in 
the Protocol, however, the proposal was to insert an obligation for Parties to 
establish domestically minimum conditions and standards for sharing results 
of research, and benefits arising from every commercial and other forms of 
utilization of genetic resources, derivatives and traditional knowledge, upon 
MAT, building on the list of monetary and non-monetary benefits that is 
now included the Protocol Annex.133 It can thus be argued that the Nagoya 
129 Pound, Social Control through Law, op. cit., 80; Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., 132; and 
André-Jean Arnaud, ed., Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie du Droit 
(Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1988), 581. For a more detailed 
discussion on standards, on which this section draws upon, see Elisa Morgera, Corporate 
Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 66–70.
130 Pound, Social Control through Law, op. cit., 48.
131 See this commentary on Article 1.
132 Under Nagoya Protocol Article 5. See Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 166. 
133 Proposal by India in CBD Working Group on ABS, “Collation of operative text submitted,” 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/4, 13.
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Protocol rather encourages indirectly the achievement of substantive fairness 
of benefit-sharing conditions set out in MAT, through lessons learnt by various 
stakeholders that participate in the elaboration of model contractual clauses 
and voluntary instruments,134 and through training and capacity-building of 
relevant stakeholders.135
5.1 Legal Certainty, Clarity and Transparency
The first legal standard for domestic access measures is legal certainty,136 clar-
ity and transparency. These concepts reflect very concrete concerns that had 
emerged in the development and implementation of national ABS frameworks 
preceding the conclusion of the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol. These 
concerns include difficulties encountered by users in trying to obtain PIC to 
access genetic resources and ensuring that such access was indeed lawful 
under the provider countries’ legal system.137 Legal certainty, clarity and trans-
parency generally aim to promote the rule of law138 and good governance139 in 
the ABS context.
Based on a literal interpretation, legal certainty may refer to the role of 
law in providing those subject to it with an unambiguous basis on which to 
determine whether their actions are legal and thereby protecting them from 
arbitrary use of State power.140 Clarity may refer to sufficiently precise con-
tent and internal coherence that allow foreseeing, to a reasonable degree, the 
consequences of a given action.141 Transparency may refer to the provision of 
relevant information in a manner that is accessible and easily understand-
able to those affected, including information on how national authorities’ 
134 See this commentary on Articles 19–20.
135 See this commentary on Articles 21 and 12, section 4. 
136 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(a). See also Nagoya Protocol 9th preambular recital.
137 Tomme Young, “Summary Analysis: Legal Certainty for Users of Genetic Resources under 
Existing Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) Legislation and Policy,” in Young, Covering ABS, 
op. cit., 77. See also Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
sharing,” op. cit., 29; and Cabrera Medaglia, “The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 357. 
138 Simon Chesterman, “Rule of Law,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia op. cit., 
specifically section C “Promotion of the Rule of Law Through International Forums.”
139 Edith Brown Weiss and Ahila Sornarajah, “Good Governance,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia, op. cit.
140 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 102.
141 Ibid., 103.
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decision-making on access, and implementation and enforcement of ABS 
decisions, comply with applicable rules and procedures.142
At the same time, however, these concepts have been elaborated in the 
context of other areas of international law, such as foreign investment and 
human rights. As to the latter, international case law has elaborated on the 
meaning of transparency in the context of procedural rights, such as the right 
of access to information and public participation in decision-making.143 As to 
the former, international investment case law has elaborated on notions of cer-
tainty, consistency and transparency with a view to protecting the reasonable 
expectations of investors vis-à-vis the application of domestic laws or their 
reform in as far as these may affect the stability and predictability of the legal 
and business framework in which investors operate.144 It remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent courts (or the Protocol’s compliance mechanism)145 
will take these indications into account if requested to assess compliance 
by Parties with this access standard. Other applicable international treaties, 
such as regional human rights treaties (note, in particular the relevance of the 
Aarhus Convention) or bilateral agreements,146 may also provide indications 
as to how this standard may be interpreted and expected to apply in specific 
countries.
142 Brown Weiss and Sornarajah, “Good Governance,” op. cit. See also Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 103.
143 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 70–71.
144 Christoph Schreuer, “Investments, International Protection,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia, op. cit., 4; and Matthias Herdegen, “International Economic Law,” in 
Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit., 37. See also Thomas W. Wälde and Abba 
Kolo, “Coverage of Taxation under Modern Investment Treaties,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of International Investment Law, ed. Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph 
Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 305, 356. See also Akira Kotera, 
“Regulatory Transparency,” in Muchlinski, Ortino, and Schreuer, Oxford Handbook 
of International Investment Law, op. cit., 617; Todd J. Grierson-Weiler and Ian I. Laird, 
“Standards of Treatment,” in Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer, Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, op. cit., 259; Wenhua Shan, “Towards a Balanced Liberal 
Investment Regime: General Report on the Protection of Foreign Investment,” ICSID 
Review 25 (2010): 421; and Michele Potestà, “Legitimate Expectations in Investment 
Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept,” ICSID 
Review 28 (2013): 88.
145 See this commentary on Article 30.
146 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
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5.2 Fair and Non-arbitrary Access Rules and Procedures
The second standard for domestic access measures concerns fair and non-
arbitrary rules and procedures. This expression appears to cover both sub-
stantive and procedural measures, and aims at providing guarantees against 
an unjustified or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the decision-making 
process147 (that is, access decisions that are based on prejudice or personal 
preference).148 It may also extend to guarantees against excessive delays,149 or 
against corruption150 in domestic decision-making on access.
This provision was intensely negotiated, as an alternative to a reference to 
‘non-discriminatory’151 access measures, amidst developing countries’ con-
cerns that either expression would ‘import’ into the Protocol notions such as 
national treatment from international economic law.152 Negotiators debated 
whether provider countries could differentiate among foreign users depend-
ing on the domestic ABS framework of the users’ country (that is, as an incen-
tive for user countries to develop and implement appropriate domestic ABS 
systems that can effectively ensure compliance with the provider country’s 
domestic ABS framework) or depending on whether the user country has 
ratified the CBD or the Nagoya Protocol.153 As the proposed reference to ‘non-
discriminatory’ was dropped from the Protocol’s text, it can be assumed that 
such distinctions are acceptable as long as they support the effective func-
tioning of the Protocol. This is the case of domestic ABS measures requiring 
147 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 275.
148 Schreuer, “Investments, International Protection,” op. cit., 60–62, who provides a concise 
review of relevant international case law.
149 Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment, op. cit., 356. See also Nagoya Protocol 
Article 6(3)(d) and section 4 below.
150 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point. See generally 
Kenneth W. Abbott, “Corruption, Fight against,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, 
op. cit.
151 See draft article 5(2)(a bis) in Nagoya Draft, which reads: “[[Provide for equal treatment 
in applications for access to genetic resources between similar domestic and foreign 
applicants and between similar foreign applicants of different Parties][Parties shall 
avoid application of discriminatory rules in processing access permits except where 
such rules aim at advancing local, non-commercial biodiversity and ecosystem research 
and education][Provide for fair and non-arbitrary rules and procedures on accessing 
genetic resources];]” (brackets in the original). On environmental measures and non-
discriminatory standards, Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment, op. cit., 
Ch. 13.
152 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 251–252.
153 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 193.
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foreign users to be affiliated or represented by a local person or entity,154 with 
a view to encouraging capacity-building and non-monetary benefit-sharing;155 
or accord preference to local users engaged in non-commercial biodiversity 
research.156 It may also be the case of users based in countries that have con-
cluded a bilateral treaty with the provider country.157
Similarly to Article 6(3)(a), the access standard concerning fair and non-
arbitrary rules and procedures in Article 6(3)(b) resonates with concepts that 
have been elaborated in the context of international investment law, but also 
international human rights law.158 In international investment law, for instance, 
‘fair treatment’ can be seen as a combination of the protection of legitimate 
expectations, good faith, transparency and consistency.159 ‘Non-arbitrary’ 
may point to the avoidance of unreasonable treatment that affects certain 
investors.160 In that context, it has also been emphasized that the concepts 
of ‘non-arbitrariness’ differs in international and national law: consequently, a 
national court’s determination of arbitrariness based on national administra-
tive law may be a useful indication, but not conclusive proof, of arbitrariness as 
it is understood at the international level.161 In other words, a broader notion 
of arbitrariness may be drawn on the basis of international investment law.162 
154 Some examples of the latter can be found in Latin America: see Cabrera Medaglia, 
“The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 357–8. For potential WTO law 
incompatibility issues, see Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 195.
155 See this commentary on Articles 22 and 5.
156 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 104. While a country may certainly differentiate 
among its own nationals and foreign users, the first instance will not need to be governed 
by the Nagoya Protocol rules, as it is a purely national situation.
157 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
158 Lorand Bartels, “Trade and Human Rights,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, 
op. cit., 5.
159 E.g. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) 
Ltd v Tanzania, Case no ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008), paragraph 591, as commented 
upon by James Harrison, “United Kingdom Report on the Protection of Foreign 
Investment” (presented at the International Congress of Comparative Law, Washington 
DC, 2010). See generally, Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment, op. cit., Ch 14.
160 Schreuer, “Investments, International Protection,” op. cit., 57–66. We are thankful to 
James Harrison for a useful preliminary exchange of ideas on this point.
161 ICJ, Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgement 
(20 July 1989), paragraphs 124–125; as discussed in Nadakavukaren Schefer, International 
Investment Law, op. cit., 275.
162 For instance, procedural irregularities amounting to bad faith, wilful disregard of due 
process, or extreme insufficiency of action, measures inflicting damage on investor 
without serving any apparent legitimate purpose (reasonable and proportionate reaction 
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It remains to be seen whether and to what extent courts (or the Protocol’s com-
pliance mechanism) will take these indications into account if requested to 
assess compliance by Parties with this access standard.
Even if the terms of the Protocol were not going to be interpreted in the 
light of international investment law, however, it cannot be excluded that an 
investment dispute settlement mechanism may be seized to consider whether 
restrictive domestic access provisions may conflict with the terms of bilateral 
investment treaties concluded by the provider country,163 including when 
the domestic access measures are specifically aimed at operationalizing the 
PIC requirement for access to genetic resources held by indigenous and local 
communities. In the latter case, provider countries may be well advised to 
justify their domestic access measures on the basis of relevant international 
human rights obligations, in addition to the relevant provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol, as investment tribunals are generally reluctant to fully consider the 
implications of international environmental law for the disputes they are 
tasked to decide.164
6 Minimum Procedural Requirements for PIC
Article 6(3)(c–f) spells out minimum procedural requirements that must 
be included in domestic access frameworks of Parties requiring PIC. First of 
all, Parties are to specify in domestic access measures how to apply for PIC.165 
This includes clarifying which national authorities166 are empowered to grant 
PIC, which specific requirements should be fulfilled to apply for PIC (such 
as details on the application format and content) and specific procedures to 
be followed.167 These minimum requirements should be read in conjunction 
with other Protocol provisions requiring Parties to provide general and spe-
cific information, namely: the obligation to submit information about domes-
tic ABS frameworks, national focal point and competent national authority or 
to objectively verifiable circumstances); measures that are based on discretion, prejudice 
or personal preference, or measures based on pretext: Christoph Schreuer, “Protection 
against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures,” in The Future of Investment Arbitration, 
ed. Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183, 
188.
163 Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment, op. cit., 205–206.
164 Ibid., 215.
165 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(c).
166 See this commentary on Article 13, section 3.
167 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 104.
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authorities to the ABS Clearinghouse;168 the obligation for national ABS focal 
points to make information on procedures for obtaining PIC and establish-
ing MAT available to applicants seeking access to genetic resources;169 and the 
responsibility of competent national authorities to advise on applicable proce-
dures and requirements for obtaining PIC.170
The second minimum requirement calls for providing a clear and trans-
parent written171 decision on PIC172 by the competent national authority, in a 
cost effective manner and within a reasonable period of time.173 Notably, the 
Protocol does not set itself specific time limits for domestic access decision-
making,174 but rather leaves discretion to Parties in striking a balance between 
the interests of users and providers, taking into account the specific circum-
stances and capacities of relevant authorities. What is considered ‘reasonable’ 
may also vary depending on the complexity of the access request, and should 
be understood in connection with the fair and transparent standards enshrined 
in Article 6(3)(a–b). There is therefore no expectation that the Protocol will 
lead to uniform national practices in this regard.175 The provision basically 
seeks to prevent unreliable/unpredictable decision-making on access and to 
reduce transaction costs, with a view to reasonably meet users’ expectations.176
The third requirement for domestic access measures is to provide for the 
issuance at the time of access of a permit or its equivalent,177 as evidence of the 
decision to grant PIC and of the establishment of MAT, and notify178 the ABS 
Clearinghouse accordingly.179 This complements the previous requirement, 
168 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(a–b). See this commentary on Article 14, section 3.
169 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(1)(a). See this commentary on Article 13, section 2.
170 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2). See this commentary on Article 13, section 3.
171 Note that the reference to the ‘written decision’ on access should be read in conjunction 
with the Protocol provision on national competent authorities ‘issuing written evidence 
that access requirements have been met’: Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2).
172 Based on a combined reading with Article 6(3)(c) and (e): Greiber et al., Explanatory 
Guide, op. cit., 104.
173 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(d).
174 Compare with Biosafety Protocol Article 10.
175 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 104.
176 Ibid., 104.
177 Article 6(3)(3). On the meaning of ‘its equivalent,’ see this commentary on Article 14, 
section 4.
178 Note that this provision may create some interpretative difficulties when read in 
conjunction with the other Protocol provisions on the internationally recognized 
certificate of compliance. See this commentary on Article 17, section 3, and Young, “An 
International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 470.
179 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e).
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which basically requires the creation in domestic ABS frameworks of a legal 
basis for domestic decision-making on granting PIC by competent national 
authorities. The third requirement instead addresses the necessary evidence of 
such decisions with a view to facilitating implementation of the Protocol’s com-
pliance obligations180 and protecting the interests of those acquiring genetic 
resources and of subsequent users. The third requirement must therefore be 
read in conjunction with other Protocol provisions concerning the interna-
tionally recognized certificate of compliance,181 as well as on the possibility 
for competent national authorities to issue either a permit or ‘its equivalent.’182
An interpretative problem may arise with reference to ‘the time of access’, as 
there is no definition of ‘access’ in the Nagoya Protocol or the CBD. Nevertheless, 
as discussed above,183 access can occur at the time of different activities in the 
jurisdiction of the Party providing genetic resources both from in situ or ex situ 
sources that led to their ‘utilization’184 in another Party’s jurisdiction. From a 
practical perspective, it has also been noted that it is at the point of utiliza-
tion, rather than at the time of access, that actual or potential value of genetic 
resources becomes evident and more easily verifiable.185 So the time of access 
may be too early to decide what is fair and equitable benefit-sharing.186 This 
may be particularly relevant as negotiations on MAT may precede the issu-
ance of PIC. Ultimately, the uncertainty at the time of access about the actual 
or potential value of genetic resources may be addressed by a clause in MAT 
requiring parties to re-negotiate benefit-sharing at the time of utilization.187
The fourth requirement concerns the inclusion in domestic access mea-
sures of criteria and processes for obtaining PIC or approval and involvement 
of indigenous and local communities for access to genetic resources held by 
them,188 for Parties on the territory of which these communities hold genetic 
resources (‘where applicable’). In other words, Parties are under an obliga-
tion to provide potential users of genetic resources with information on how 
to apply for community PIC when indigenous and local communities have 
180 See this commentary on Article 15.
181 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2–4). 
182 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2).
183 See section 3 above.
184 Nagoya Protocol Article 2(c).
185 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 160.
186 Ibid., 163.
187 See this commentary on Article 5, section 2.
188 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(f).
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established rights to grant access to their genetic resources.189 This comple-
ments the obligation for Parties to establish domestic measures on community 
PIC for genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities.190 The 
reference to ‘accordance with domestic legislation’ seems to indicate here that 
criteria and processes for obtaining community PIC will likely vary from one 
Party to another. As for other community-related provisions of the Protocol, 
this requirement should be implemented by taking into consideration the cus-
tomary laws, protocols and procedures of indigenous and local communities,191 
and with their effective participation.192 It should also be interpreted and 
implemented in the light of other relevant international human rights obliga-
tions and standards.193
7 Minimum Requirements for MAT
The final portion of Article 6(3)(g) sets out minimum requirements on estab-
lishing MAT, to be included in domestic access measures: it therefore requires 
Parties to specify at least some ‘clear’ rules and procedures for requiring and 
establishing MAT.194 In effect, this is a critical provision, because besides requir-
ing that MAT be established in writing, Article 6(3)(g) contains one of the very 
few sources of substantive guidance on the establishment of MAT under the 
Protocol.195 That being said, Article 6(3)(g) only contains a non-exhaustive 
and non-prescriptive list of minimum requirements on the content of MAT.196 
Parties therefore have discretion to decide to what extent to determine the 
minimum content of MAT in their domestic ABS frameworks.
189 This complements the obligation under Nagoya Protocol Article 12(2) and in line with 
relevant international human rights law: see section 4.2.2 above. On established rights, 
see section 4.1 above.
190 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2). See also Article 13(1)(b).
191 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
192 UNDRIP Article 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2).
193 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
194 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g).
195 The only other provision of the Protocol detailing the establishment of MAT is Article 18(1), 
whereas the remaining provisions in Article 18 refer to ensuring compliance with MAT: 
see this commentary on Article 18. See also the obligation for Parties to encourage users 
and providers to include provisions facilitating monitoring of the utilization of genetic 
resources in MAT in Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(b) and this commentary on Article 17.
196 As appears evident from the use of the terms ‘may include, inter alia’. Along the same 
lines, Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 106.
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In a light-touch manner, therefore, the Protocol ‘promotes best practice 
in contractual drafting with the aim of protecting the provider of genetic 
resources.’197 This minimalist approach, however, may be criticized in light of 
experience accrued in ABS transactions occurred prior to the negotiations of 
the Protocol, which demonstrated that MAT ‘are the most complex and contro-
versial elements of ABS practice.’198 The same commentator also underscores 
that there are few, if any, national ABS measures that regulate the establish-
ment of MAT in a manner that guarantees enforceability; and that therefore 
international guidance on this matter is necessary.199
Specifically, the Protocol limits itself to suggesting that the minimum con-
tent of MAT200 be specified in domestic access measures to include, but not 
be limited to: a dispute settlement clause, the details of which are further 
elaborated elsewhere in the Protocol;201 terms on benefit-sharing including 
IPRs; terms of subsequent third-party use; and terms on change of intent, 
which may be particularly relevant when access is sought to conduct non-
commercial research.202 As to the latter two instances, the Protocol acknowl-
edges that ABS transactions often involve a chain of providers and users and 
underscores the need to address in contractual terms whether and which MAT 
are to apply to subsequent users. That can be the case of genetic resources 
utilized by the initial user for non-commercial purposes and then utilized by 
a subsequent user for commercial purposes, in which case ‘MAT could include 
a requirement either for the initial user or the third-party user to first seek the 
PIC of the initial provider.’203 It can also be the case of the same user chang-
ing his/her intent, in which case ‘MAT could provide a requirement to seek 
[anew] the PIC of the provider country to use the same genetic resources for a 
new purpose.’204 The reference to IPRs is particularly noteworthy. It has been 
argued that Article 6(3)(g) serves to recall that the sharing of benefits arising 
197 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 30.
198 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 500.
199 Ibid. Such guidance could arguably be provided by the Protocol’s governing body at 
a future stage, in the context of its review of the effectiveness of the international 
obligations concerning compliance with MAT: Nagoya Protocol Article 18(3).
200 For an indication of possible specific items to be included in domestic access measures in 
this regard, see Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 106–107.
201 Nagoya Protocol Article 18(1).
202 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). See this commentary on Article 8, section 2.
203 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 31.
204 Ibid., 31.
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from IPRs should explicitly be addressed through MAT,205 because the Protocol 
itself ‘does not impose IPRs-related benefit-sharing.’206
Based on domestic experience predating the Nagoya Protocol, it has been 
observed that the crucial matter is to ensure that domestic access frameworks 
create the right system of incentives for private and public entities to engage 
in legal ABS transactions and share benefits.207 For this reason, the Protocol 
also foresees that inspiration may be drawn from pre-existing and ongoing 
practice, including through the use of model contractual clauses and volun-
tary instruments.208 Furthermore, as the Protocol specifically provides for 
legal recourse in user countries for ensuring users’ compliance with MAT (but 
not with PIC),209 it has been argued that Parties would be well advised to set 
conditions for access in MAT as much as in the decision on PIC, so as to maxi-
mize the chance of enforcing any conditions set in PIC.210 Finally, it should be 
anticipated that the Protocol envisages that Parties support indigenous and 
local communities in their determination of minimum requirements for MAT 
with specific regard to benefit-sharing from the use of traditional knowledge.211 
205 Ibid., 30.
206 Pavoni, “The Nagoya Protocol and WTO,” op. cit., 202, emphasis in the original, and his 
discussion on potential incompatibility with WTO law at 203.
207 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 160–161.
208 See this commentary on Articles 19–20.
209 As compliance with MAT can rely on existing rules of private international law: see this 
commentary on Article 18.
210 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 172–173.
211 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(b).
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Article 7. Access to Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources
In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appro-
priate, with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources that is held by indigenous and local communities is 
accessed with the prior and informed consent or approval and involvement 
of these indigenous and local communities, and that mutually agreed terms 
have been established.
1 Overview
Article 7 goes significantly beyond the text of the CBD by establishing an obliga-
tion for Parties to develop domestic measures on access to traditional knowl-
edge. Such measures are aimed at ensuring that access to traditional knowledge 
can only proceed with the PIC or approval and involvement of indigenous and 
local communities. In line with the other access provisions of the Protocol,1 
such domestic measures are to provide for the establishment of MAT.
The conceptual difference between State PIC over genetic resources and 
community PIC over traditional knowledge will be examined below, followed 
by an interpretation of the qualified language of Article 7.
2 Community PIC in Relation to Traditional Knowledge
While the Protocol does not explicitly recognize ‘the right’ of indigenous and 
local communities to PIC for granting access to their traditional knowledge, 
it does so implicitly by requiring Parties to put legislation or other domestic 
measures in place on community PIC (or approval and involvement) in that 
regard. Conceptually, Article 7 embodies a ‘community PIC requirement’ that 
is separate from and possibly additional to State PIC for access to associated 
genetic resources,2 and that is parallel to the ‘community PIC requirement’ for 
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g). See this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
2 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(1): see this commentary on Article 6, section 3.
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genetic resources ‘held’ by indigenous and local communities.3 While State 
PIC is premised on the general principle of national sovereignty over natural 
resources, the requirement for community PIC concerning traditional knowl-
edge is based on international human rights law, namely the right to cultural 
identity.4 From an international environmental law perspective, the ratio-
nale for this provision can be found in the preamble to the Protocol, where 
Parties note
the interrelationship between genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge, their inseparable nature for indigenous and local communities, and 
the importance of the traditional knowledge for the conservation of bio-
logical diversity and the sustainable use of its components and for the 
sustainable livelihoods of these communities.5
From a broader international law perspective, the Protocol further elaborates 
on UNDRIP’s recognition of the right of indigenous peoples6 to maintain, con-
trol, protect and develop indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge,7 provid-
ing for more specific rules about traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources. As discussed in relation to the corresponding Protocol provisions 
on benefit-sharing arising from the use of traditional knowledge,8 these provi-
sions may be considered an implicit recognition of an underlying substantive 
3 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2): see this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2.
4 See ICCPR, Articles 1 and 27; ILO Convention No. 169, Article 2(b); and UNDRIP Articles 3–4. 
Note also that the Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 37, provide that ‘Permission to access genetic 
resources does not necessarily imply permission to use associated knowledge and vice versa.’
5 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital, emphasis added.
6 On the rights of local communities under the Protocol and international human rights law, 
see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.2.
7 UNDRIP Article 31(1) reads: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect 
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expres-
sions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and 
flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and per-
forming arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intel-
lectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural 
expressions.’ The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples considered the 
recognition of the right to PIC over traditional knowledge and the implicit recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ ownership of traditional knowledge in the Protocol as ‘positive aspects’ 
of the adoption of the Protocol: Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report on indigenous 
peoples,” A/HRC/C/21/55, paragraph 59.
8 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(2). See this commentary on Article 5, section 4.
172 Article 7
environmental right of these communities to their traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources. The Protocol is also notable in extending 
this right to local communities.9
As opposed to community PIC over genetic resources held by indigenous 
and local communities,10 the requirement for community PIC over traditional 
knowledge is put forward in stronger language in the Protocol and is not con-
ditional upon the existence of ‘established rights to grant access.’ This can be 
explained by the fact that traditional knowledge is a product, as well as a part 
and parcel, of the identity and traditional way of life of a community, and 
therefore national sovereignty cannot be asserted over it.11
As traditional knowledge is therefore seen as ‘owned’ by the indigenous and 
local communities concerned and inextricably linked to its identity and way of 
life, it is essential that Parties to the Protocol develop the relevant implementing 
measures with the full and effective participation of these communities12 and 
ensure due consideration of their customary laws, protocols and procedures.13 
How community PIC will be implemented in practice will likely vary from 
one country to another, or even within the same country, depending on the 
concerned communities’ customary laws, protocols and procedures. As high-
lighted in the Protocol preamble, in fact, there is a ‘diversity of circumstances 
under which traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is held 
or owned by indigenous and local communities’14 and there are ‘unique cir-
cumstances where traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is 
held in countries, which may be oral, documented or in other forms, reflecting 
a rich cultural heritage relevant for conservation and sustainable use.’15
No international process has yet spelt out the specific procedural and sub-
stantive requirements for community PIC over traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources,16 although guidance developed by CBD Parties 
9 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
10 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2) and this commentary on Article 6, section 4 – although note 
the practical difficulty to regulate separately access to genetic resources held by indigenous 
and local communities and access to traditional knowledge associated with such genetic 
resources in light of their inseparable nature for indigenous and local communities.
11 See generally on traditional knowledge as part of the collective cultural rights of indig-
enous peoples: Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., and Lenzerini 
and Fraboni, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Biogenetic Resources, ” op. cit., 201.
12 See fn. 54 in commentary on Article 5.
13 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
14 Nagoya Protocol, 23rd preambular recital.
15 Nagoya Protocol, 25th preambular recital.
16 In fact, CBD Parties have identified the need to develop guidelines in that respect: CBD 
Article 8(j) Working Group, Recommendation 8/4, “How tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best 
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provides consensus, soft-law determinations in that regard, in particular in 
the framework of the Working Group on Article 8(j).17 First, the CBD Akwé: 
Kon Guidelines18 provide specifications for community PIC, also touching 
upon issues related to traditional knowledge. According to the Guidelines, 
the requirement for community PIC implies: consideration of the rights, 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities;19 
respect of customary laws governing ownership, access, control, use and dis-
semination of traditional knowledge;20 the use of culturally appropriate lan-
guages and processes; and the allocation of sufficient time and the provision 
of accurate, factual and legally correct information.21 Modifications to the ini-
tial proposal require additional PIC of the affected community.22 Community 
PIC may be established through protocols,23 consistent with relevant national 
legislation, on access to and use of traditional knowledge, and assistance by 
the government in establishing such protocols should be provided by the gov-
ernment if so requested.24 Second, according to the CBD Tkarihwaié:ri Code of 
contribute to work under the Convention and to the Nagoya Protocol,” in “Report of the 
eighth meeting,” Annex 1, paragraph 2(2).
17 These normative developments may be explained by the broad participation that 
indigenous and local community representatives enjoy in the proceedings of the 
Working Group on Article 8(j). The ‘fullest possible participation’ of indigenous and 
local communities is ensured in all meetings, including in contact groups, by inviting 
community representatives as Friends of the Co-Chairs, Friends of the Bureau 
and Co-Chairs of contact groups. However, text proposals by indigenous and local 
communities’ representatives must be supported by at least one Party. See the CBD 
Article 8(j) Working Group, “Report of the seventh meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/7, 
paragraph 20.
18 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, section F, paragraph 29 reads: ‘In the conduct of cultural impact 
assessments, due consideration should be given to the holders of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices and the knowledge itself. Customary laws governing ownership, 
access, control, use and dissemination of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices 
should be observed. Protocols with regard to indigenous and local communities should 
be followed with regard to the disclosure of secret and or sacred knowledge, including 
those that may involve public hearings and judicial processes in the courts. In the event 
of the disclosure of secret and or sacred knowledge, prior informed consent and proper 
protection measures should be ensured.’
19 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraph 53.
20 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraph 29.
21 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraph 53.
22 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraph 53.
23 Note that the Nagoya Protocol includes the notion of community ‘protocols’ in Article 12 
and 21(1): see discussion on community protocols in this commentary on Article 12, sec-
tion 2.1.
24 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, paragraph 60, emphasis added.
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Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of 
Indigenous and Local Communities,25 consent should not be coerced, forced 
or manipulated.26 In addition, where consent or authority of indigenous and 
local communities is required with respect to traditional knowledge, it is the 
right of indigenous and local communities, according to their customary law 
and procedures, to identify the relevant holders of their knowledge.27
Significant work on the concept of free PIC has been undertaken in the 
context of international human rights processes, although without spe-
cific regard to traditional knowledge. International guidance on indigenous 
peoples’ right to free PIC for development projects impacting their land28 
25 “The Tkarihwaié: Ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and 
Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities relevant to the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity” in CBD Decision 10/42, “The Tkarihwaié:ri 
Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of 
Indigenous and Local Communities” (20 January 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 
(hereinafter, Tkarihwaié: Ri Code).
26 Tkarihwaié: Ri Code, paragraph 11 reads: ‘Any activities/interactions related to traditional 
knowledge associated with the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
occurring on or likely to impact on sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally 
occupied or used by indigenous and local communities and impacting upon specific 
groups, should be carried out with the prior informed consent and/or approval and 
involvement of indigenous and local communities. Such consent or approval should not 
be coerced, forced or manipulated.’
27 Tkarihwaié: Ri Code, paragraph 4.
28 In relation, for instance, to the relocation of a community from its traditional lands due 
to the storage or disposal of toxic waste, or when large-scale development or investment 
projects have a major impact on traditional territories of indigenous peoples: Human Rights 
Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights,” A/HRC/12/34, paragraph 47; 
“Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41, section 
B. See also work undertaken by the Expert Mechanism, “Final report of the study on 
indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making. Report of the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (17 August 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/42. 
Note further worky by CERD, “Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties 
under Article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. India” (5 May 2007) UN Doc CERD/C/IND/CO/19, 
paragraph 19; “Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of 
the Convention. Argentina” (8 June 2009) UN Doc CERD/C/ARG/CO/19–20, paragraph 26; 
“Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention. 
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
Philippines” (28 August 2009) UN Doc CERD/C/PHL/CO/20, paragraphs 22 and 26; 
“Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention. 
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
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may thus be of some use as a source of inspiration in implementing 
Article 7.29
3 Qualifications
The language of Article 7 is qualified and attention must be paid to the specific 
terms used in it. First of all, the obligation to provide for procedures for com-
munity PIC and establishment of MAT is limited to traditional knowledge ‘held’ 
by indigenous and local communities. The Protocol does not arguably require 
community PIC for access to traditional knowledge ex situ, for example docu-
mented in databases, genebanks or libraries outside community control, if it is 
no longer held by the community. On the other hand, the Protocol is silent as to 
the situation in which the traditional knowledge is still held by indigenous and 
local communities, but also publicly available in other forms. In either case, 
the non-applicability of the community PIC requirement may not necessarily 
exclude benefit-sharing, as it can be envisaged that Parties holding traditional 
knowledge in databases may require benefits in exchange for allowing access 
to it.30 It could also be argued that in cases where no community ‘holding’ tra-
ditional knowledge can be identified, the multilateral benefit-sharing mecha-
nism envisaged by the Protocol31 could come into play.
A related question is the actual identification of the relevant communities 
(‘these indigenous and local communities’ – emphasis added) that have the 
right to provide PIC and engage in the negotiation of MAT. This may be par-
ticularly problematic where the same traditional knowledge is shared by more 
than one community located in several Parties: cooperation among relevant 
Parties, with the involvement of concerned communities, will be needed.32
In addition, Article 7 (similarly to the Protocol provision on community 
PIC on genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities), does not 
clearly endorse the international human rights-based standard of community 
Chile” (7 September 2009) CERD/C/CHL/CO/15–18, paragraph 22; and other reports cited 
in Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report on indigenous peoples,” A/HRC/C/21/55, 
fn. 14.
29 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2. 
30 For a discussion on publicly available traditional knowledge, see this commentary on 
Article 5, section 4.
31 See this commentary on Article 10.
32 Nagoya Protocol Article 11(2). See this commentary on Article 11, section 4.
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PIC, but adds ‘or approval and involvement.’ As already discussed,33 Parties 
to the Protocol will need to establish some formal processes to engage indig-
enous and local communities and respect their rights as enshrined in human 
rights law.34 This will be particularly important when community PIC may be 
embodied in the same decision providing State PIC as a result of communities’ 
participation in government decision-making processes on access. It may raise 
particular difficulties in situations where under national legislation States 
have claimed that traditional knowledge is ‘the patrimony of the State,’35 or 
when traditional knowledge is held in centralized registries or databases out-
side community control.36
Similarly in Article 6,37 the reference to ‘accordance with domestic law,’38 
would not justify an interpretation that the right of community PIC on tra-
ditional knowledge is dependent on its recognition in national legislation. It 
should rather be implemented as referring to the need for Parties to devise 
implementing measures that functionally fit with other relevant areas of 
national legislation, while ensuring the respect of relevant international 
human rights obligations and taking into account communities’ customary 
laws. The reference may also be interpreted as pointing to a facilitative role of 
the State in situations where indigenous and local communities within their 
jurisdiction may request support in their interactions with third parties seek-
ing utilization of traditional knowledge.39
The due diligence obligation to establish measures providing for commu-
nity PIC and the establishment of MAT specifically aimed at benefit-sharing 
with indigenous and local communities is also qualified. It can be assumed 
that Parties can take any legal, administrative or policy measures, binding 
or not, ‘in accordance with domestic law’ and ‘as appropriate.’ In all events, 
domestic measures should detail the procedural requirements to obtain the 
33 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2). See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2.1.
34 See Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” A/HRC/24/41, paragraph 
25; and this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2.
35 E.g., Brazil, Medida Provisória No. 2186-16, 2001, Article 8(2); see discussion in Singh Nijar, 
“Incorporating Traditional Knowledge,” op. cit., 465.
36 See for instance the inventories of intangible cultural heritage created under the UNESCO 
Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage, Article 12 (for a brief discussion of the 
interactions between the UNESCO Convention and the Protocol, see this commentary on 
Article 4, section 2.1).
37 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2.
38 Which should be contrasted with CBD Article 8(j) language (‘subject to national 
legislation’): Bavikatte and Robinson, “Towards a People’s History of the Law,” op. cit., 45.
39 Ibid.
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PIC or approval and involvement of the community concerned, and to estab-
lish MAT with them, prior to access to their traditional knowledge, taking into 
consideration customary laws, protocols and procedures of indigenous and 
local communities.40 This is in line with UNDRIP, that expects States to take 
‘effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of [traditional knowl-
edge-related] rights’, ‘in conjunction with indigenous peoples.’41
The qualifications found in the provision allow Parties to take measures to 
fit their national circumstances and regulatory traditions, but does not support 
a potential decision by a Party not to take any measures at all to regulate access 
to traditional knowledge. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Article 7 
does not include the clause found in Article 6 ‘unless otherwise determined 
by that Party,’ which allows States not to require PIC for access to their genetic 
resources.42 Therefore, it can be argued that even if a State opts for not requir-
ing PIC for access to genetic resources or some categories of them, it is still 
obliged to develop the procedures required for users to obtain community PIC 
for access to traditional knowledge associated with such resources.
It should be finally recalled that the in-built flexibility of Article 7 can also 
benefit indigenous and local communities in the light of the diverse and 
unique circumstances under which traditional knowledge is held or owned by 
these communities.43 These circumstances inevitably require a variety of legal 
and other approaches to implement in an effective and culturally appropri-
ate manner Article 7 in different countries, particularly where indigenous and 
local communities may have conceptual relations to the land that do not fit 
with statutory concepts of property and use.44
40 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1) and this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
41 UNDRIP Article 31(2), emphasis added.
42 See this commentary on Article 6.
43 Nagoya Protocol 23rd and 25th preambular recitals.
44 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
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Article 8. Special Considerations
In the development and implementation of its access and benefit-sharing 
legislation or regulatory requirements, each Party shall:
(a) Create conditions to promote and encourage research which contrib-
utes to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
particularly in developing countries, including through simplified 
measures on access for non-commercial research purposes, taking 
into account the need to address a change of intent for such research;
(b) Pay due regard to cases of present or imminent emergencies that 
threaten or damage human, animal or plant health, as determined 
nationally or internationally. Parties may take into consideration the 
need for expeditious access to genetic resources and expeditious fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of such genetic 
resources, including access to affordable treatments by those in need, 
especially in developing countries;
(c) Consider the importance of genetic resources for food and agriculture 
and their special role for food security.
1 Overview
Article 8 identifies three sets of international concerns with regard to which 
Parties are called upon, with decreasing stringency, to differentiate in their 
domestic ABS framework: a) research contributing to conservation and sus-
tainable use of biodiversity b) health-related emergencies and c) genetic 
resources for food and agriculture.
The obligations set out in Article 8 apply both in the development and in 
the implementation of national ABS legislation or regulatory requirements. In 
other words, Parties are to take into account these special considerations both 
when developing general rules implementing the Nagoya Protocol in their 
domestic legal system, and also when applying their domestic ABS frameworks 
to specific cases, including when granting PIC and establishing MAT. In addi-
tion, national legislation could possibly address some of these issues in its pro-
visions on minimum requirements for MAT.1
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g): see this commentary on Article 6, section 7. The authors are 
grateful to Tomme Young for drawing their attention to this point.
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As the special considerations identified by Article 8 allow for departures 
from the general provisions of the Protocol, they have to be interpreted 
restrictively.2 The following sections will discuss each of the special consid-
erations in turn, analyzing how each has been framed so as to avoid creating 
potential loopholes in the international ABS regime.
2 Research Contributing to Conservation and Sustainable Use
The obligation related to research contributing to conservation and sustain-
able use is the most stringent among those included in Article 8. It specifi-
cally requires Parties to create favorable ‘conditions’ to promote and encourage 
research contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
This may be particularly important in the light of CBD Parties’ obligation to 
identify and monitor biodiversity components, which requires ‘major scientific 
effort in basic science such as taxonomy, ecology and conservation biology.’3 
The following subsections will first discuss the rationale of this provision, and 
then analyze its text against that backdrop.
2.1 Rationale
The provision aims at addressing concerns that ABS rules may unnecessarily 
and unintentionally hamper scientific research, particularly with no commer-
cial intent. The underlying rationale is that the Protocol should also contribute 
to the realization of the other two objectives of the CBD.4 The expectation thus 
is that successful implementation of the international ABS regime will not only 
provide innovative funding, but also give rise to scientific findings, that may 
contribute to more effective conservation and sustainable use.
The provision implicitly recognizes the scientific research community 
as a key ABS stakeholder, allowing flexibility for transnational collaborative 
research partnerships and practices that advance the science of biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use.5 At the same time, it takes stock of the practi-
cal difficulties reportedly encountered by researchers facing overly stringent or 
2 Luigi Crema, “Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s),” European 
Journal of International Law 21 (2010): 681, 692–693.
3 Biber-Klemm et al., “Governance Options,” op. cit., 218.
4 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4.
5 Tom Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Scientific Research Commons under the Nagoya 
Protocol,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 389.
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uncertain access conditions before the negotiations of the Protocol,6 including 
fears of excessive waiting time for approval of access applications and transac-
tion costs.7 Article 8(a) is linked to other provisions in the Protocol, which allow 
for learning from, and possibly building on, the research community’s codes of 
conduct in the implementation of the Protocol;8 aim to contribute to building 
capacity and transferring technology for scientific research across Parties;9 and 
aim to increase scientific research cooperation, particularly with researchers 
in developing countries, as a form of non-monetary benefit-sharing.10
Research contributing to conservation and sustainable use includes dis-
tinct ‘communities of practice’ such as those involved in taxonomy, system-
atics and evolutionary biology, microbial systematics and ecology, ecosystem 
research, genomics and metagenomics. Such research may provide a series of 
non-economic benefits (contribution of data to public databases, deposition 
of specimens and samples in ex situ collections, public dissemination of new 
knowledge through peer-reviewed publications and academic conferences, 
etc.) that could not be generated without access to genetic resources.
There is, however, always the possibility that a project that begins with 
non-commercial intent can develop commercial intent at a later stage, either 
because the researchers themselves may uncover potential for commercial 
development; or individuals not associated with the research team may use 
the published results and/or the specimens obtained from that research as a 
starting point for commercial development.11 If access with non-commercial 
intent is left unregulated, commercial users could gain access to genetic 
6 Cabrera Medaglia, “The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 357–358.
7 Draft article 6(a) titled ‘Considerations relevant to research and emergency situations’ in 
Cali Draft reads: ‘In the development and implementation of their national legislation 
on access and benefit-sharing, Parties shall pay due regard to: a) Avoiding or minimizing 
impediments to biodiversity-related research, important for the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components,’ emphasis added. See also Sikina 
Jinnah and Stefan Jungcurt, “Could Access Requirements Stifle Your Research?,” Science 
323 (2009): 464.
8 See this commentary on Article 20.
9 See this commentary on Articles 22(4)(d) and 23 (and note in particular the reference to 
‘development and strengthening of a sound and viable technological and scientific base.’)
10 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(5) and Nagoya Protocol Annex, paragraphs 2(a–b), also 
discussed in this commentary on Article 5, section 6.
11 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of a Workshop on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Non-commercial Biodiversity Research,” (9 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/
INF/6, 9.
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resources and traditional knowledge via academic channels and circumvent 
benefit-sharing obligations.12
Against this background, a balance has been struck between creating favor-
able conditions for access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge for 
the purposes of conducting research needed to achieve the Convention’s and 
Protocol’s objectives, and the need to prevent circumvention of the ABS gen-
eral rules to ensure benefit-sharing resulting from commercial research and 
development.13 To that end, all Parties (both user and provider countries) need 
to consider measures from both perspectives of the ABS relationship: both 
with regard to foreign researchers seeking to access genetic resources in their 
jurisdiction, and with regard to users based in their jurisdiction seeking access 
in another jurisdiction for research purposes – in the latter case addressing in 
particular the issue of change of intent.
In doing so, Parties will face the practical challenge to distinguish between 
research projects that do or do not contribute to conservation and sustain-
able use.14 In addition, it is not always easy to distinguish non-commercial 
from commercial research.15 In broad approximation, commercial research 
may limit benefit-sharing by restricting the release of research findings (e.g., 
through non-disclosure agreements or unwillingness to publish results); 
delaying the public release of data resulting from the research; or engaging 
in product development or testing of technology or products as part of a 
wider undisclosed project.16 Commercial research also raises the concern of 
excessive fees for access to data, technology, or materials resulting from the 
research; of retention of monetary benefits from sale or lease for profit, pat-
enting, or licensing of research results; or of reserved rights to file patents or 
maintain ownership of IPRs.17 While there is some regulatory experience in 
distinguishing commercial and non-commercial research on genetic resources 
(as discussed below),18 in many countries this remains a challenge. Experience 
preceding the Nagoya Protocol shows that most requests for access to genetic 
resources are to conduct non-commercial research.19
12 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 167.
13 Ibid., 4.
14 We are thankful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
15 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.1.
16 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of a Workshop on ABS in Non-commercial 
Biodiversity Research,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/6, 9.
17 Ibid.
18 Mostly from developed countries, such as Australia: see Burton, “Implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries,” op. cit., 303.
19 Cabrera Medaglia, “The Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 363–364.
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2.2 The Obligation
Article 8(a) establishes a general obligation for Parties to ‘create conditions’ 
favorable to research contributing to conservation and sustainable use when 
developing and implementing their national ABS frameworks. It specifies that 
this should be implemented particularly when such research is carried out in 
developing countries. The provision appears to complement an often-forgotten 
CBD obligation for Parties to ‘endeavor to develop and carry out scientific 
research based on genetic resources provided by other Parties with the full 
participation of, and where possible in, such Parties.’20 Thus, while Article 8(a) 
does not mention explicitly provider countries and benefit-sharing, it could 
be inferred that national measures creating favorable conditions for research 
contributing to conservation and sustainable use are to ensure the sharing of 
benefits with provider developing countries. Such benefits could include the 
participation of provider-country researchers in research endeavors and the 
building of research capacity in developing countries.21 The provision is to be 
implemented both by providing for favorable conditions for research contrib-
uting to conservation and sustainable use and support to developing countries 
in ABS legislation, as well as through MAT.22 It could also impact on the regula-
tion (or self-regulation) of research funders.
Article 8(a) does not specify what kinds of ‘conditions’ are expected to favor 
research contributing to conservation and sustainable use. Standardized terms 
and streamlined procedures for ABS agreements are an obvious option. The 
provision, however, provides one specific example (‘including’)23 that relates 
in particular to non-commercial research – ‘simplified measures for access.’ 
The Australian legislation provides a useful illustration in this regard. Australia 
already introduced simplified procedures for non-commercial research in 
2005, which provided for the grant of a succinct non-commercial access per-
mit and an accompanying Statutory Declaration, without fees.24 However, as 
in other open-ended provisions of the Protocol, Parties will have considerable 
20 CBD Article 15(6): we are thankful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this 
point.
21 The obligation thus to create favourable conditions for research does not exclude the 
regulation of benefit-sharing from biodiversity-related research.
22 As inferred by the reference to ‘the implementation’ of ABS legislation.’
23 We are thankful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point. See also Greiber 
et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 121.
24 “Permits for non-commercial purposes,” Australian Government Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, accessed 30 November 
2013, <www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/science/access/permits/non-commercial 
.html>. As discussed in Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ 
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leeway in selecting and implementing favorable conditions for research con-
tributing to conservation and sustainable use, and also in determining how 
to ‘simplify’ access in the specific case of non-commercial research. Although 
Article 8(a) does not make the creation of simplified measures on access for 
non-commercial research mandatory, Parties will be well advised to specifi-
cally provide for those cases. Parties will also be well advised to couple simpli-
fied access with enforceable and simplified benefit-sharing obligations if any 
monetary benefit occurs from non-commercial research, and detail rules on 
change of intent.25
As anticipated above, it may be challenging in practice to distinguish 
between research of commercial and non-commercial nature, and national 
legislators may rely on the stated intention of a researcher at the time of 
access. In addition, the importance of addressing possible changes in intent is 
also addressed elsewhere in the Protocol, namely in the context of the mini-
mum requirements for MAT.26 National legislation should therefore address 
this situation by including a clause on change of intent among the minimum 
requirements for MAT,27 whereby researchers are subjected to a contractual 
obligation to inform the provider country authority of any change of intent 
and to negotiate benefit-sharing arrangements,28 or to obtain a new PIC and 
establish new MAT before any IPRs can be retained or commercial research 
can begin.29
It cannot be excluded that the favourable conditions mandated30 by 
Article 8(a) may apply also to commercial research. On the one hand, this could 
be inferred from the implicit distinction that Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a) 
draws when referring to ‘including through simplified measures on access for 
non-commercial research purposes’ (emphasis added). Commercial research 
such as that leading to the development of biodiversity-friendly technology 
Countries,” op. cit., 308. More examples are summarised in Greiber et al., Explanatory 
Guide, op. cit., 121.
25 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 168. 
26 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g)(iv). See this commentary on Article 6.
27 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 119–120 and generally CBD Working Group on 
ABS, “Report of a Workshop on ABS in Non-commercial Biodiversity Research.” UNEP/
CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/6.
28 This is the case of Australia: Burton, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ 
Countries,” op. cit., 327–328.
29 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of a Workshop on ABS in Non-commercial 
Biodiversity Research,” 10.UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/6, 10.
30 But not the simplified measures on access, which specifically refer to non-commercial 
research.
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could thus be promoted and encouraged, as long as it can be demonstrated 
that it contributes to conservation and sustainable use. On the other hand, 
the beginning of Article 8(a) refers to ‘research’ (used on its own)31 rather than 
to ‘research and development’, which characterizes research with commercial 
intent elsewhere in the Protocol.32 A clarification by the Protocol’s govern-
ing body33 may become necessary in this regard, if divergent State practice 
emerges on the basis of different interpretation of this provision.
It should be finally noted that Article 8(a) refers specifically to neither 
genetic resources nor traditional knowledge with regard to access. While it can 
be assumed that the provision applies to both instances, particularly given the 
inextricable link between genetic resources and traditional knowledge,34 the 
general community PIC requirement with regard to traditional knowledge, as 
well as genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities, continues 
to apply even in the context of favorable conditions for research contributing 
to conservation and sustainable use.35 Therefore, a requirement for commu-
nity PIC should be clearly articulated in Parties’ regulation of research contrib-
uting to conservation and sustainable use under Article 8(a). As long as this 
fundamental obligation is observed, Article 8(a) as regards traditional knowl-
edge reflects the importance of better understanding knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional life-
styles for conserving and sustainably using biodiversity. It thus complements 
CBD Article 8(j) from the specific angle of the contribution of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources to scientific research. In addi-
tion, it can be argued that the full and effective participation of indigenous and 
local communities,36 taking into account their customary laws, procedures and 
31 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on definitions,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/2, paragraph 10.
32 Ibid., paragraphs 17 and 43–45. See also CBD Group of Legal and Technical Experts on 
Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches, “Concepts, terms, 
working definitions and sectoral approaches relating to the international regime on 
access and benefit-sharing, Submission from the International Workshop on the topic 
of ‘access and benefit-sharing in non-commercial biodiversity research’ ” (29 November 
2008) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/ GTLE/1/INF/2, paragraph 5. We are grateful to Evanson 
Chege Kamau for an exchange of ideas on this question.
33 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
34 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital.
35 As in Nagoya Protocol Articles 7 and 6(2). See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2 
and on Article 7, section 2.
36 UNDRIP Article 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2); and fn. 53 in this 
commentary on Article 5.
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protocols,37 should be ensured during the development of simplified access 
measures in the context of Article 8(a), in case such measures might affect 
these communities’ rights over genetic resources and traditional knowledge.
3 Genetic Resources and Health-related Emergencies
Article 8(b)38 creates the regulatory space for Parties to ensure that general 
ABS rules and procedures do not interfere with public health efforts, both 
in terms of development of needed pharmaceutical products and access to 
them.39 While its inclusion in the Protocol was mainly motivated by parallel 
negotiations related to pathogens under the WHO,40 the provision refers gen-
erally to situations of emergency that threaten or damage health.41
As opposed to Article 8(a), the provision does not establish an obligation 
to ‘create conditions’ – but rather to ‘pay due regard’ to health-related emer-
gencies; and it does not make reference as an option to ‘simplified’ measures 
for access, but rather to ‘expeditious’ measures that may concern access, but 
also benefit-sharing. It therefore rather requires that Parties ‘ensure that pub-
lic health objectives can be met and are indeed supported by access as well as 
benefit-sharing rules.’42
Special ABS procedures can therefore be established under Article 8(b) 
upon the condition that a ‘present or imminent emergency that threatens or 
damages human, animal or plant health’ is determined nationally or interna-
tionally. The Protocol determines the ‘subjects threatened by the emergency, 
the cause of the emergency and the regulatory status of the emergency.’43 The 
wording is broad enough to include emergencies that threaten biodiversity 
37 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
38 The authors are particularly grateful to Marie Wilke, as this section in great part draws 
upon her book chapter: Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit.
39 Ibid., 125. 
40 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.2. See also draft article 3.H in Montreal I 
Draft; and ENB 9/465, “Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 
5. See also Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 127.
41 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 169–170, criticizing International Chamber of 
Commerce, Pathogens and the International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Non-
Commercial Biodiversity Research (Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 2009), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/2009/Pathogens-and-the-
International-Regime-on-Access-and-Benefit-Sharing/>, 5–6.
42 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 126.
43 Ibid., 127.
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and that are caused by non-natural pathogens or other instances (that is, not 
necessarily by genetic resources but rather by natural disasters, industrial 
accidents or contaminated food products).44 In these situations, therefore, 
Article 8(b) applies to genetic resources that are ‘relevant’ either as a cause of 
the emergency or as an emergency response to it – in other words, both genetic 
material with pathogenic potential but also material with anti-pathogenic45 or 
adaptive properties.46
Health emergencies that trigger Article 8(b) should either already be pres-
ent (‘existing’), therefore demanding immediate action, or be likely or about 
to occur (‘imminent’), thereby calling for preparedness and prevention.47 
Article 8(b) refers to an international or national determination of a health 
emergency, as alternatives. An international determination of a health emer-
gency can certainly be that provided by the WHO on the basis of its International 
Health Regulations,48 that are referred to in the Protocol preamble in relation 
to the importance of ensuring access to human pathogens for public health 
preparedness and response purposes.49 The broad formulation of Article 8(b), 
however, does not exclude that other international organizations working on 
pathogens, such as the International Plant Protection Convention,50 or the 
World Organization for Animal Health, and potentially others may also be con-
sidered relevant for the purposes of determining an international health emer-
gency. National determinations of health emergencies, instead, are left to the 
discretion of individual States, as there is no internationally agreed definition 
of local or national health emergency.51 The latter instances raise more com-
plicated scenarios for the application of Article 8(b): are only provider coun-
tries to determine whether a nationally determined health emergency exist in 
relation to ABS from their own genetic resources? And if user countries estab-
lish such an emergency, would this unilateral determination in and of itself 
facilitate access to genetic resources in third countries?52 It can be expected 
that further clarification on these questions will be solicited from the Nagoya 
44 Ibid., 128–130.
45 Ibid., 133.
46 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
47 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 122.
48 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 130.
49 Nagoya Protocol 17th preambular recital.
50 International Plant Protection Convention (Rome, 6 December 1951, in force 3 April 1952) 
2367 UNTS 223.
51 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 131.
52 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing out attention to these points.
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Protocol’s governing body, under its power to make recommendations on any 
matter necessary for the implementation of the Protocol.53
Article 8(b) enables Parties to take into consideration the need for ‘expedi-
tious’ access to genetic resources and ‘expeditious’ benefit-sharing arising out 
of the use of such genetic resources, including access to affordable treatments 
by those in need, especially in developing countries. The expression ‘expedi-
tious’ may not be understood as ‘immediate’,54 but rather, on the basis of its 
ordinary meaning, as a fast-track procedure.55 Overall, Parties are to consider 
ways to prevent delays that would otherwise arise from the application of their 
general ABS procedures,56 so that effective access should be commensurate to 
the magnitude of the emergency situation. With specific regard to expeditious 
benefit-sharing, the provision does not exclude usual benefit-sharing arrange-
ments with the provider country. But it creates an expectation for Parties 
to consider expeditious benefit-sharing towards those in ‘need,’ in particu-
lar developing countries, possibly through donations and development aid, 
including through multilateral channels.57 In that regard, the provision refers 
to the specific example of access to affordable medical treatments. It remains 
within the purview of Parties to determine in their national ABS frameworks 
and their implementation who will be the recipient of benefit-sharing on the 
basis of ‘need.’ As there are no further specifications, Article 8(b) can cover 
all benefit-sharing obligations that are relevant to ensure appropriate public 
health responses in times of emergency, ranging from knowledge or technol-
ogy transfer to in-kind contributions of pharmaceutical products, in accor-
dance with established MAT.58
Finally, as traditional knowledge is not mentioned in this provision, whereas 
genetic resources are explicitly referred to (as opposed to Article 8(a)), it may 
be inferred that this provision does not apply to access to traditional knowl-
edge, for which the general ABS provisions, including the community PIC 
53 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
54 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 122.
55 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 133.
56 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 122 and fn. 8.
57 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 134–5. This provision may therefore embody a departure 
from the general bilateral ABS approach of the Protocol towards multilateral solutions 
(we are thankful to Riccardo Pavoni for drawing our attention to this point). Note that the 
need to couple expeditious access and expeditious benefit-sharing should be reflected 
also in other multilateral processes, such as under the WHO: Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” 
op. cit., 170–171.
58 Wilke, “A Healthy Look,” op. cit., 134–5.
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requirement,59 apply also in case of a present or imminent health emergency. 
That being said, there might be situations in which a conflict arises between 
international human rights, i.e. the rights of indigenous and local communi-
ties over their traditional knowledge and the right to health of the general 
population.60 Such situations may potentially lead to a permissible exception 
to the community PIC requirement as long as it is strictly necessary, solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others, and is proportionate, determined by law, and non-discriminatory.61
4 Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
Article 8(c)62 addresses the concern that most domestic ABS frameworks cur-
rently in existence do not sufficiently factor in the special characteristics of 
genetic resources for food and agriculture that are important to world food 
security.63 The Protocol preamble also recognizes the ‘special nature of agri-
cultural biodiversity,64 its distinctive features and problems needing distinctive 
59 See this commentary on Article 7, section 2.
60 In an apocalyptic scenario, a case might arise where a specific indigenous or local com-
munity survives an epidemic using its traditional knowledge. Whether it would have to 
share such knowledge or not is an issue of balancing human rights-related consider-
ations that could be addressed either by the international community or by a Party in its 
national legislation. See Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights,” op. cit., 146.
61 UNDRIP Article 46(2) and Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
indigenous peoples’ rights,” A/HRC/24/41, 32. We are grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for 
having drawn our attention to this point.
62 Originally proposed in the negotiations in the non-paper by the co-chairs of the Working 
Group on ABS of 19 March 2010, “Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity” (on file with the authors).
63 Gurdial Singh Nijar et al., Framework Study on Food Security and Access and Benefit-
Sharing for Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Kuala Lumpur: CEBLAW, 2009), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/framework.pdf>; 
and CBD Decision 9/12, “Access and benefit-sharing” (9 October 2008) UN Doc UNEP/
CBD/COP/9/29.
64 See the CBD programme of work on agricultural biodiversity: CBD Decision 3/11, 
“Conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biological diversity” (11 February 
1997) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38; and COP Decision 5/5, “Agricultural biological 
diversity: review of phase I of the programme of work and adoption of a multi-year work 
programme” (22 June 2000) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, Annex. See also Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 52.
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solutions,’65 and more generally the importance of genetic resources for food 
security and for climate change mitigation and adaptation.66 The international 
community, however, is still seeking consensus on the exact determination of 
these distinctive features.67 Nevertheless, for the purposes of understanding 
the rationale of this provision, it can be pointed out that some of the most 
important distinguishing characteristics include, first, that genetic resources 
for food and agriculture are to a large extent the result of human activity and 
intense transfrontier exchanges from time immemorial. As a result, no coun-
try is self-sufficient with regard to genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture – in contrast, all countries depend on genetic resources originating from 
65 Nagoya Protocol 15th preambular recital, emphasis added. This language was inspired 
by CGRFA Resolution 18/2009, “Policies and arrangements for access and benefit-sharing 
for genetic resources for food and agriculture,” paragraph 3 (transmitted to the attention 
of the Protocol negotiations as “Extract from the report of the twelfth regular session of 
the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 19–23 October 
2009” (11 November 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/INF/7): ‘The CGRFA invites the 
Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, to take into account the special 
nature of agricultural biodiversity, in particular genetic resources for food and agriculture, 
their distinctive features, and problems needing distinctive solutions; in developing policies 
they might consider sectoral approaches which allow for differential treatment of 
different sectors or subsectors of genetic resources, different genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, different activities or purposes for which they are carried out,’ emphasis 
added.
66 Nagoya Protocol 16th preambular recital. On CGRFA and climate change, see CGRFA, 
“Roadmap on climate change and genetic resources for food and agriculture” (2013) 
CGRFA-14/13/5 and CGRFA, “Selected processes and initiatives on climate change of 
relevance to genetic resources for food and agriculture” (2013) CGRFA-14/13/Inf.10.
67 CGRFA, “Report of the fourteenth regular session,” paragraph 40(x) and Appendix E, 
where the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture requests 
the Secretary to develop explanatory notes to the distinctive features of CGRFA, taking 
into account the specificities of the different sub-sectors, for consideration by CGRFA 
15, while acknowledging the need to further refine the list of distinctive features and to 
focus on the utilization of CGRFA; and an appended list of distinctive features of CGRFA 
requiring specific solutions for ABS, which focuses on: the role of CGRFA for food security; 
the role of human management; international exchange and independence; the nature 
of innovation processes; holders and users of CGRFA; CGRFA exchange practices; and 
benefits generated with the use of CGRFA. The list contains the indication that the features 
are distinctive, but not necessarily unique to CGRFA, although the specific combination 
of the listed features distinguishes CGRFA from most other genetic resources.
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somewhere else.68 It is therefore difficult to distinguish between provider and 
user countries when it comes to agricultural biodiversity. Furthermore, the 
genetic erosion in the food and agriculture sector comes as a result of under-
utilization rather than over-exploitation.69 The survival of genetic resources 
for food and agriculture depends on the active cooperation among all stake-
holders involved in their conservation, breeding, sustainable utilization and 
benefit-sharing, which includes dynamic management by farmers, pastoral-
ists, and indigenous and local communities.70 Finally, it is important to note 
that most products derived from genetic resources for food and agriculture can 
themselves be used both as a biological resource (for production and trade) 
and as genetic resources (for research and development).71
Against this background, it should be recalled that the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture is considered as a special-
ized ABS instrument under the Protocol. Therefore, the plant genetic resources 
under the Treaty’s Multilateral System are excluded from the Protocol’s scope 
when they are used for food and feed purposes.72 As a result, Article 8(c) 
could apply to the development and implementation of national ABS frame-
works covering plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, not included 
in ITPGRFA Annex I,73 and other genetic resources for food and agriculture, 
including animal, aquatic, forest and microbial genetic resources.74 In addi-
tion, Article 8(c) is particularly important for Protocol Parties that are not 
Parties to the ITPGRFA.75 Arguably, ITPGRFA Annex I plant genetic resources 
not used for food and feed purposes, but used for instance for pharmaceutical 
and cosmetic research and development, would fall under the general Protocol 
68 CGRFA Resolution 18/2009, 3rd preambular paragraph. See Tsioumani, “International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources,” op. cit., 122.
69 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 84–86.
70 CGRFA Resolution 18/2009, 4th preambular paragraph.
71 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.2.2.
72 See this commentary on Article 4, section 4.1. Similarly to Article 8(b), Article 8(c) may 
also embody a departure from the general bilateral ABS approach of the Protocol towards 
multilateral solutions. We are thankful to Riccardo Pavoni for drawing our attention to 
this point.
73 In cases of countries of origin or when the material was acquired in accordance with the 
CBD, this differentiated treatment could include the voluntary use of the ITPGRFA SMTA 
for transfer of non-Annex I material. See also this commentary on Article 4, fn. 99.
74 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 124.
75 The ITPGRFA has 131 Parties: “The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture,” ITPGRFA, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.planttreaty.org/
list_of_countries>.
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provisions and not Article 8(c), as in this case food security considerations are 
not relevant.
With a notably weak formulation, Parties are thereby required to ‘consider 
the importance’ of these resources and their ‘special role for food security.’ As 
opposed to the previous provisions in Article 8, therefore, the Protocol does not 
necessarily require the adoption of any specific measures in this regard or even 
the identification of possible ways to implement the provision. Nonetheless, it 
creates the regulatory space for Parties to differentiate ABS concerning genetic 
resources for food and agriculture from other genetic resources, with a view to 
striking a balance between fostering and preserving patterns of use, exchange 
and benefit-sharing adapted for the food and agricultural sectors, on the one 
hand, and preventing such specialized ABS measures from being abused to cir-
cumvent users’ benefit-sharing obligations, on the other hand.76 In that regard, 
it remains unclear whether Protocol Parties which are not countries of origin 
may allow for facilitated access to genetic resources for food and agriculture 
in their ex situ collections without the consent of the country of origin or the 
country that had acquired the material in accordance with the CBD.
Finally, it should be noted that traditional knowledge is not mentioned in 
this provision, whereas genetic resources are explicitly referred to. Although 
it could be inferred from a textual interpretation that the provision does not 
apply to traditional knowledge in the food and agriculture sector, it should 
be taken into account that traditional knowledge in this area is practically 
embodied in the genetic resources themselves, the landraces and varieties 
developed by farmers in the field and on the basis of continuous exchanges of 
genetic material and breeding techniques. Therefore, a preferable interpreta-
tion would allow for a differentiated treatment in national ABS frameworks of 
farmers’ varieties, as genetic resources embody traditional knowledge, and the 
customary exchanges that allow for their development.77 
76 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 100–101.
77 See also Nagoya Protocol Article 12(4) and this commentary on Article 12, section 5.
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Article 9. Contribution to Conservation 
and Sustainable Use
The Parties shall encourage users and providers to direct benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation of bio-
logical diversity and the sustainable use of its components.
1 Overview
This provision1 aims to ensure a coherent interpretation and integrative imple-
mentation of the CBD three objectives in the context of the Nagoya Protocol, 
by placing an obligation on Parties to encourage individual users and provid-
ers to direct benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards 
conservation and sustainable use.
The obligation may not appear very demanding, as Article 9 limits itself to 
require Parties to ‘encourage’, but not necessarily to ‘ensure,’ directing ben-
efits to conservation and sustainable use, or adopt specific measures in this 
regard. Arguably, it may simply be interpreted as an obligation for Parties to 
create incentives to that end, but not necessarily enshrining such incentives in 
domestic law. Nonetheless, Parties could possibly be found in non-compliance 
with this obligation if, for instance, their domestic ABS frameworks (or other 
relevant legislation)2 created obstacles or disincentives, or made it otherwise 
impossible, for private users and providers to direct benefits towards conserva-
tion and sustainable use. To that extent, it cannot be excluded that compliance 
1 Note that this is one of the provisions that was not subject to textual negotiation: it was first 
incorporated in the Cali Draft, draft article 7 and remained unchanged until the very end of 
the negotiation in Nagoya, when the final words ‘. . . direct benefits arising from the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity 
in support of the objectives of the Convention’ were replaced by ‘its components’ (emphasis 
added).
2 Young identifies a series of domestic laws that will affect the effective functioning of domes-
tic ABS frameworks, such as general environmental law, social-welfare law, property law, 
administrative law, commercial law, contract law, etc.: Young, “An International Cooperation 
Perspective,” op. cit., 462–463.
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with this provision could be assessed under the Protocol’s compliance mecha-
nisms and procedures.3
The following sections will discuss the contribution of Article 9 to the coher-
ent interpretation of the three CBD objectives, the means for this provision’s 
implementation, and questions arising from Article 9 in relation to indigenous 
and local communities.
2 Contribution to a Coherent Interpretation of the Three CBD 
Objectives
Article 9 encapsulates the idea that ABS can function as a source of funding 
or non-monetary incentives for the achievement of the other two objectives 
of the Convention at the level of individual providers and users of genetic 
resources.4 It has been suggested that Article 9 aims to address real-life situ-
ations in which users and providers may not have an interest in, or be aware 
of, conservation and sustainable use efforts in need of support.5 That being 
said, Article 9 should be read in conjunction with Article 1, which makes the 
Convention’s first and second objectives part and parcel of the Protocol’s 
objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing.6 Parties should therefore take 
this obligation seriously with a view to effectively contributing to the realiza-
tion of the Protocol’s objective.
It can also be noted that Article 9 can be seen as a complement to the possi-
ble establishment of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, through 
which benefits arising in specific circumstances7 will be directed to support 
conservation and sustainable use globally.8 In comparison, Article 9 applies 
to a significantly wider range of circumstances (as it covers potentially any 
instance of ABS transaction related to genetic resources), and it focuses on the 
3 See contra Wolff, “Nagoya Protocol and the Diffusion,” op. cit., 136. See this commentary on 
Article 30.
4 The idea was already reflected in the Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 48, last sentence, which 
reads: ‘Benefits should be directed in such a way as to promote conservation and sustain-
able use of biological diversity.’ See comments on Article 9 in this regard by Wolff, “Nagoya 
Protocol and the Diffusion,” op. cit., 134.
5 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 125.
6 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4.
7 Namely, benefits arising from the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge that 
occur in transboundary situations (see also this commentary on Article 11), or for which it is 
not possible to grant or obtain PIC.
8 See this commentary on Article 10, section 4.
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private relations between individual users and providers, rather than on the 
relations between Parties to the Protocol.
3 Means of Implementation
The wording of Article 9 leaves a wide margin of discretion to Parties in choos-
ing the specific means through which to implement their obligation. This there-
fore opens the door for voluntary measures as well as regulatory approaches at 
the national level. On the one hand, therefore, individual Parties could limit 
themselves to implement Article 9 through the provision of capacity-building 
(as explicitly foreseen by the Protocol),9 the deployment of awareness-raising 
activities,10 the development of model contractual clauses,11 or the encourage-
ment of voluntary instruments.12 On the other hand, national ABS legal frame-
works could include a general obligation on users and providers to consider 
ways to contribute to conservation and sustainable use, more specific require-
ments or incentives in that regard, or specific mechanisms such as national 
funds.13 National ABS laws could also implement this provision in the context 
of their rules on minimum requirements for MAT.14 Bilaterally, Parties could 
also explore ways to encourage users and providers to contribute to conserva-
tion and sustainable use through technology transfer.15 Finally, Parties could 
multilaterally engage in an exchange of ideas and experiences with regard 
to the implementation of Article 9 through the Protocol’s governing body,16 
including on the basis of information that may be included in the future in 
the ABS Clearinghouse.17 Implementation of Article 9 could also be discussed 
9 Article 22(5)(h), See this commentary on Article 22.
10 See this commentary on Article 21: in particular, it could be argued that this is implicitly 
referred to in Article 21(a), which makes reference to Article 1 of the Protocol.
11 See this commentary on Article 19.
12 See this commentary on Article 20.
13 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 263; and Lago Candeira and 
Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 290.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g). See this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
15 See this commentary on Article 23, where reference is made to enabling the development 
and strengthening of a sound and viable technological and scientific base for the 
attainment of the objectives of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.
16 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
17 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 126. See this commentary on Article 14, sec-
tions 3–4.
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by the Protocol’s governing body in the context of its consideration of model 
contractual clauses and voluntary instruments.18
Article 9 does not specify whether preference should be accorded to mon-
etary or non-monetary benefits, although elsewhere the Protocol specifically 
clarifies that both types of benefits are relevant in this regard. The Protocol’s 
Annex, in fact, singles out special fees to be paid to a trust fund supporting 
conservation and sustainable use; and the transfer of technology, or access to 
scientific information, including biological inventories and taxonomic studies, 
that are relevant for conservation and sustainable use.19
4 Benefits for Indigenous and Local Communities
In case genetic resources are held by indigenous or local communities,20 par-
ticular attention should be paid by Parties to encourage these communities 
as providers to direct benefits to conservation and sustainable use in a way 
that respects their entitlements under the Protocol in light of applicable inter-
national human rights law.21 Thus, at a minimum, States should not unduly 
interfere with the terms of these communities’ PIC, which may already express 
preference with regard to the channeling of benefits to specific uses that may 
be culturally appropriate in the specific instance and respect the objectives of 
the Protocol. In addition, States should implement Article 9 so as to actively 
contribute to channeling benefits towards indigenous or local communities’ 
traditional practices that contribute to conservation and sustainable use, 
according to their preferences.22
It should be finally remarked that there is no reference to the sharing of 
benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge in this provision. This 
may be motivated by the negotiators’ desire to leave indigenous and local com-
munities to decide on the direction of the benefits arising from the use of tra-
ditional knowledge without any State interference. It is worth recalling that 
numerous decisions adopted by the CBD COP have provided indications on 
how benefit-sharing from traditional knowledge should be operationalized, 
18 Nagoya Protocol Articles 19(2) and 20(2).
19 Nagoya Protocol Annex, paragraphs 2(f) and (k). See this commentary on Article 5, 
section 6.
20 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2).
21 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
22 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
A/HRC/24/41, paragraphs 75–77.
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and some of them may be directly applicable in relations between individ-
ual providers and users.23 This is the case of the integration of traditional 
knowledge and community concerns in management plans, the setting-up of 
benefit-sharing mechanisms when revenue is accrued by outside investors, the 
provision of livelihood-based mitigation and compensatory measures, pay-
ments for ecosystem services, as well as the re-investment of benefits in the 
protection of traditional knowledge and traditional sustainable practices.24 
These options seem to reflect the assumption that the maintenance of tradi-
tional knowledge, lifestyles and sustainable customary practices of indigenous 
and local communities already contribute to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity.
23 See Introduction to this commentary, section 3; and this commentary on Articles 5 and 7.
24 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 167–168 and sources cited 
therein.
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Article 10. Global Multilateral Benefit-sharing 
Mechanism
Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral 
benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in transboundary 
situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources through this mechanism shall 
be used to support the conservation of biological diversity and the sustain-
able use of its components globally.
1 Overview
In the context of the mainly bilateral ABS system set up by the Nagoya 
Protocol, Article 10 refers to the possible creation of a multilateral benefit-
sharing mechanism at the global level for two situations – transboundary 
situations or situations when it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC. To 
be considered as part of the exercise of national sovereignty over natural 
resources,1 a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism therefore would not be 
intended to replace the regulation of bilateral ABS transactions supported by 
the Protocol2 but to supplement it. That is, it would be intended to address 
situations in which sovereignty is not clear3 and thus the bilateral approach 
1 CBD, “Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing,” (19 September 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, paragraph 3. 
Compare with ITPGRFA Articles 10(1) and 10(2) which state that ‘In the exercise of their sov-
ereign rights [over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture], the Contracting Parties 
agree to establish a multilateral system, which is efficient, effective, and transparent, both to 
facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and to share, in a fair and 
equitable way, the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, on a complemen-
tary and mutually reinforcing basis.’
2 CBD, “Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10,” UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, paragraph 4.
3 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418.
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may not be feasible.4 Potentially, the situations covered by Article 10 could 
apply to ‘a very large percentage of the planet’s genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge’,5 as a significant portion of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge is shared by different countries.
It should be recalled from the outset that this provision was considered a 
compromise solution to the protracted debates during the negotiations on the 
scope of the Protocol.6 The African Group had proposed the idea of a ‘trust 
fund’ for sharing the benefits arising from transactions that CBD Parties could 
not agree to include or exclude from the temporal and spatial scope of the 
Protocol – namely, acquisitions before the entry into force of the Protocol, 
notably in ex situ collections, and acquisitions from areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. The African proposal was argued on the rationale that users have 
a moral obligation to share benefits from new and continued uses of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge accessed before the entry into force of 
the Protocol, and that benefits could be used to contribute to conservation and 
sustainable use efforts.7 In the final hours of the negotiations of the Protocol, as 
part of its comprehensive compromise proposal, the Japanese COP Presidency 
introduced Article 10, which was never subject to formal negotiation.
It is noteworthy that the obligation created by Article 10 is of a purely pro-
cedural nature: it requires Parties to ‘consider the need for and modalities’ of 
a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism. It does not mandate Parties 
to establish such a mechanism and/or provide for a deadline to that end (as 
is the case, for instance, of the compliance procedures and mechanisms).8 It 
could thus be argued that nothing in this Article prevents Parties from decid-
ing against establishing such a mechanism, although the Protocol preamble 
stresses that ‘an innovative solution is required to address the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in transbound-
ary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent.’9 A decision against establishing a global benefit-sharing mechanism, 
4 Ibid., 417; and Maria Julia Oliva, “The Implications of the Nagoya Protocol for the Ethical 
Sourcing of Biodiversity,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective, op. cit., 381.
5 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 489.
6 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 42–43; 
Elsa Tsioumani, “Access and Benefit Sharing: The Nagoya Protocol,” Environmental Policy and 
Law 40 (2010): 288, 289. See this commentary on Article 3, section 3.
7 ENB 9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 4–5.
8 See this commentary on Article 30.
9 Nagoya Protocol 13th preambular recital, emphasis added.
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however, would be politically difficult to take, as it could be considered to 
undermine the trust between developed and developing country Parties 
under the Protocol.10 In recognition of this situation, the CBD Conference 
of the Parties had decided to address Article 10 at the second meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Committee preparing for the entry into force of the Nagoya 
Protocol, which convened in April 2012.11 Discussions in that forum highlighted 
the need for Parties to find common ground in interpreting the fairly open and 
laconic wording of Article 10 before making a decision on its establishment.12 
An intersessional process established to that end13 attempted to explore ques-
tions raised by the provision and its linkages with other Protocol provisions in 
a non-negotiating setting.14 It revealed, however, continued lack of common 
understanding on the scope of the provision, while participants acknowledged 
the need to ‘build trust and enhance legal certainty and transparency for the 
situations covered in Article 10.’15 In general terms, a narrow interpretation 
would point to genetic resources of unknown origin found in user countries’ 
jurisdictions, for example in their ex situ collections; while a broader interpre-
tation would also address genetic resources collected in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction or the Antarctic Treaty System area.16
10 ENB 9/579, “Summary of the Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Nagoya Protocol,” 9, where the African Group is reported to have recalled the African 
Group’s agreement to the Nagoya Protocol with the understanding that there would be 
future good-faith efforts to establish the mechanism. See also Elisa Morgera, “Second 
Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing: Emerging Legal Questions,” Environmental Policy and Law 42 (2012): 246.
11 CBD Decision 10/1, section B, paragraph 10.
12 ENB 9/579, “Summary of the Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Nagoya Protocol,” 9 and 14, and Morgera, “Second Meeting of the ICNP,” op. cit., 247.
13 See fn. 20 below.
14 For instance, if a Party decides to waive PIC under Article 6(1) or Article 8, could the 
relevant benefit-sharing obligations be met through a multilateral mechanism? And how 
would a multilateral mechanism be used in the case of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge found in situ in transboundary areas, in view also of Article 11: see CBD, 
“Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10,” UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, paragraph 4. 
15 Ibid.
16 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418. See 
also ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting on the Global Multilateral Benefit-
Sharing Mechanism Submitted by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute,” (10 January 2012) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2, 7; and list of questions in CBD, “Report of the Expert 
Meeting,” on Article 10,” UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, paragraph 5. As discussed in this 
commentary on Article 3, section 3.2 and fn. 32, for those arguing that genetic resources 
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2 The Need for a Multilateral Benefit-sharing Mechanism
Against this background, the following sub-sections will first discuss the two 
situations in which a multilateral mechanism is envisaged to operate, which 
inform current discussions on the need for its establishment. Attention will 
then turn to the possible features of such a multilateral mechanism, as fore-
shadowed in Article 10, which will inform future discussion on the modalities 
of the mechanism. A brief assessment of the possible contribution of Article 10 
to the holistic implementation of the Convention in the context of ABS will 
conclude this chapter.
2.1 Transboundary Situations
The first situation to which a potential multilateral benefit-sharing mecha-
nism may apply is that of the utilization of genetic resources and of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources17 that occur in ‘transboundary 
situations.’ The latter expression could arguably cover two instances: ‘an in situ 
transboundary situation’ in which genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
have developed their special characteristics and are still found across borders 
in natural circumstances; and ‘an ex situ transboundary situation’ in which 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge are now found outside the habitats 
where they developed their essential characteristics in more than one country.18 
In the latter sense, it could be argued that Article 10 could cover situations in 
which resources are accessed in situ but then ‘become’ transboundary because 
of the need to share them among many researchers in different countries. In 
microbial genetic resources, for instance, taxonomic type strains are deposited 
in two different collections in two different countries.19 In the former sense, 
it remains to be clarified whether ‘transboundary situations’ would involve 
countries sharing the same ecosystem, the same species (particularly in the 
case of migratory species), or the same population of a species.20 A future 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction are outside the scope of the Protocol, this would 
imply a decision to re-open the scope of the Protocol.
17 See this commentary on Article 2, section 3.
18 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2, 6. Note, 
however, that Article 11 only refers to in situ situations.
19 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418–419.
20 These questions have indeed been identified by CBD Parties as requiring further discussion 
at the second meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol, 
which developed a roadmap for continuing discussions. The roadmap includes through 
Secretariat-led consultations on the basis of an indicative list of questions prepared 
by the Committee and the convening of an expert group to identify potential areas of 
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determination by the Protocol’s governing body may be needed as to whether 
the mere occurrence of a species in two or more countries is sufficient for 
Article 10 to be triggered, and whether there is a need to distinguish situations 
in which only the genetic resources or only the traditional knowledge associ-
ated with those specific genetic resources is transboundary.21
A well-known case of traditional knowledge in a transboundary situation 
is that of the San peoples’ knowledge of the hunger-suppressant properties 
of hoodia, which was shared by San communities in South Africa, Namibia, 
Angola and Botswana: eventually the San tribes formed a council to negotiate 
a benefit-sharing agreement among themselves.22
Another question that remains to be clarified is the relationship between 
Article 10 and Article 11 on ‘transboundary cooperation,’23 which covers situ-
ations where the same genetic resources are found in situ within the territory 
of more than one Party, and where the same traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources is shared by indigenous and local communities found in 
several Parties. When discussing the global multilateral benefit-sharing mech-
anism, Parties may clarify whether recourse to this mechanism is alternative, 
or a last resort, vis-à-vis transboundary cooperation called for under Article 11.24
2.2 Situations Where it is Not Possible to Grant or Obtain PIC
The second instance in which the potential multilateral benefit-sharing mech-
anism may come into play is that of the utilization of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources ‘for which it is not 
possible to grant or obtain PIC.’ This laconic provision leaves the interpreter 
many options open. Arguably it could cover the following situations: genetic 
common understanding and areas that could be further examined for consideration by 
a future meeting of the Committee or the Protocol governing body at its first meeting: 
Recommendation 2/3, “The need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-
sharing mechanism (Article 10),” in ICNP, “Report of the second meeting,” UNEP/CBD/
COP/11/6, Annex, Part A, question 1 and Part B, questions 1–2.
21 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, 10. As there may 
be significant genetic variety within species (as exemplified by the existence of subspecies, 
plant varieties and polymorphism), framing the discussion on species occurrence may be 
seen as inherently flawed: we are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this 
point.
22 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 261; and generally: Munyi 
and Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol”, op. cit.; and Wynberg, Schroeder and 
Chennells, Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing, op. cit. 
23 See this commentary on Article 11.
24 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part B, question 10. 
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resources accessed prior to the entry into force of the CBD and/or the Protocol; 
genetic resources of unknown origin held in ex situ collections; genetic 
resources accessed in areas beyond national jurisdiction; publicly available 
traditional knowledge of unknown origin;25 or diffused traditional knowl-
edge (traditional knowledge that is so widespread that it is no longer possible 
to attribute ownership to one or more indigenous and local communities).26 
Other issues under discussion relate to whether it could also cover benefit-
sharing in cases PIC has been waived, or in the absence of a clear domestic 
framework on PIC.27
On the one hand, therefore, Parties will need to find agreement as to 
whether to interpret and operationalize Article 10 with a view to addressing 
certain questions related to its temporal and spatial scope that remain unclear 
under the Protocol,28 notably questions related to ex situ collections holding 
material accessed before the entry into force of the Protocol,29 materials in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction such as the high seas and the Area,30 and 
publicly available traditional knowledge.31
In view of the mechanism’s complementarity to the bilateral system estab-
lished by the Protocol, several Parties have indicated their concern about the 
25 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2, 3.
26 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 261.
27 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, 11; and CBD, 
“Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10,” UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, paragraph 4. 
See this commentary on Article 6, section 2. 
28 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part A, question 2 and Part B, questions 8–9. See this 
commentary on Article 3, section 3.2; and Dedeurwaerdere et al, “Governing Global 
Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418.
29 With regard to ex situ collections holding material acquired before the entry into force of 
the CBD (see this commentary on Article 3, Section 3.1), the multilateral benefit-sharing 
mechanism could prevent the ‘chilling effect’ that may derive from the exclusion of 
collections outside provider countries’ jurisdictions from the Protocol’s framework: that 
is, users may find it more convenient to use genetic resources in such collections rather 
than accessing them from a country of origin subject to the Protocol rules. Note that it has 
been suggested that in practice public-sector ex situ collections that do not differentiate 
between pre- and post-CBD/Nagoya Protocol accessions, have a ‘moral duty for sharing 
benefits . . .via contributions to a funding system under Article 10’: Biber-Klemm et al., 
“Governance options,” op. cit., 225.
30 Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 181–182, notes that ‘Progress under the Protocol in regards 
of the global mechanism, or lack thereof, could sway discussions at the General Assembly 
[on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including on benefit-
sharing form marine genetic resources] either way.’ 
31 See this commentary on Article 5, section 4.
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need to ensure that any multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism does not 
undermine national sovereignty and would only be used when there is no real 
possibility to obtain PIC,32 therefore implying a requirement for due diligence 
by users to actively seek PIC before resorting to the multilateral mechanism.33 
In addition, a question remains about how to ensure that a multilateral mecha-
nism does not represent a disincentive for the implementation of the bilateral 
system of the Protocol.34 Countries may be skeptical of the need to establish 
any multilateral mechanism, as users may find it easier to go to a global entity 
than to engage in bilateral negotiations. Such recourse would have the disad-
vantage for provider countries that the benefits to be shared, according to the 
letter of the provision, would be used to support biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable use globally rather than to their own advantage.35
That being said, in situations where resources are shared amongst several 
countries or where a clear distinction between provider and user countries 
is not so obvious, a bilateral approach to ABS would not reward all those who 
have contributed to the conservation of a specific genetic resource, particu-
larly when these have greater needs and less capacity. In these cases, a multilat-
eral approach (especially when associated to transnational cooperation) may 
be more efficient than a bilateral one and the main benefits are non-monetary: 
there is an overall gain for all concerned Parties in working jointly towards the 
conservation of the same resources and sharing information about it.36
3 Features of a Global Benefit-sharing Mechanism
Article 10 is quite laconic about the possible feature of the multilateral benefit-
sharing mechanism, although the Protocol preamble indicates the need for 
an ‘innovative’ solution to the two situations identified under Article 10.37 
The choice of the term ‘mechanism’ may exclude the creation of a ‘fund’, 
so as to allow the sharing of not only monetary but also non-monetary 
benefits.38 In that regard, the mechanism could serve as a platform for the 
32 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part B, question 7.
33 See also this commentary on Article 6, section 3.
34 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part B, question 11.
35 See Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418.
36 We are grateful to Sélim Louafi for drawing our attention to this point.
37 Nagoya Protocol 13th preambular recital. 
38 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2, 3.
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exchange of information and technology transfer, as well as for the sharing of 
monetary benefits.39
It is also noteworthy that Article 10 focuses on ‘benefits shared by users 
through the mechanism,’ rather than by Parties or ‘user countries.’ It can there-
fore provide a specific way to operationalize the Protocol’s general clause 
encouraging users and providers to direct benefits arising from the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources towards conservation and sustainable use.40 From 
the perspective of the private sector, Article 10 can therefore be seen as an 
acknowledgement of the need for further discussion on specific, proactive 
tools to facilitate the operationalization of benefit-sharing in the face of com-
plex or unclear international obligations.41 The multilateral mechanism could 
also create an opportunity for private companies to voluntarily apply ABS prin-
ciples derived from the Protocol beyond its legal obligations. In other words, 
private users may decide to share benefits even if no international or domestic 
requirements are in place to that end, such as in the case of publicly available 
traditional knowledge or pre-CBD accessions,42 because of ethical, corporate 
accountability or marketing reasons.43
Article 10 is, on the whole, silent on the governance of the multilateral 
mechanism: who would be managing the mechanism and decide about the 
allocation of benefits? It may be expected that the Protocol’s governing body 
would be in charge of the mechanism, but the text of the Protocol leaves it 
open to Parties to decide otherwise. A related question is whether contribu-
tions to the mechanism would be mandatory or voluntary.44 It has been argued 
that if the mechanism is established through a (formally non-binding) decision 
of the Protocol’s governing body, the provision of benefits to the mechanism 
39 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 382. Compare with the platform 
for the co-development and transfer of technologies, an initiative developed in the 
framework of the Funding Strategy of the ITPGRFA by a group of institutions with 
expertise of various relevant types of technologies, for the benefit of small-scale farmers 
in developing countries. See ITPGRFA Governing Body, “Reports of meetings on the 
establishment of a platform for the co-development and transfer of technology,” (24–28 
September 2013) FAO Doc IT/GB-5/13/Inf.16.
40 See this commentary on Article 9, sections 1 and 3.
41 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 381.
42 See this commentary on Article 6.
43 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 381. This is indeed a question that will 
be considered by CBD Parties: see ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part B, question 18.
44 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part B, question 17.
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would also be of a voluntary nature.45 The Protocol’s governing body could, 
however, decide to amend the Protocol with a view to establishing a global 
benefit-sharing mechanism with legally binding features. Entry into force of 
such amendment would then require ratification by a sufficient number of 
Parties to the Protocol.46
In deciding the features of the multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, 
Parties may likely consider other relevant existing international processes and 
instruments,47 such as the benefit-sharing regime for the mineral resources 
in the Area, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,48 or the Global 
Mechanism established under the UN Convention to Combat Desertification.49 
The most prominent source of inspiration, however, would likely be the 
Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-sharing established under the 
ITPGRFA.50
Benefits shared under the Multilateral System include non-monetary ones, 
such as exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity 
building, as well as monetary benefits arising from commercialization. The lat-
ter is done through standard payments by the users of material accessed from 
the Multilateral System, according to the provisions of the standard Material 
Transfer Agreement, adopted by the ITPGRFA Governing Body.51 Such pay-
ments, together with voluntary donations, are directed to the Treaty’s benefit-
sharing fund, which allocates funds under the direction of the ITPGRFA 
Governing Body, to particular activities designed to support farmers in devel-
oping countries conserve crop diversity in their fields, and assist farmers and 
45 See Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 59; and Dedeurwaerdere et al., 
“Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 418.
46 In accordance with CBD Article 29.
47 ICNP Recommendation 2/3, Annex, Part A, question 7.
48 UNCLOS Part XI and 1994 Agreement: Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 182; and Young, 
“An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 490. See also David Kenneth Leary, 
International Law and the Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2007), 179. 
49 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (Paris, 14 October 1994, in force 26 December 
1996) 1954 UNTS 3, Article 21(4). Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” 
op. cit., 490.
50 ITPGRFA Article 10. See Tsioumani, “International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources,” 
op. cit., 121; and Cooper, “The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture,” op. cit., 4. See also this commentary on Article 4, section 3.1.
51 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006; SMTA Articles 6(7) and 6(11); and this 
commentary on Article 4, fn. 93. 
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breeders globally adapt crops to changing needs and demands. Mandatory 
payments, however, seem to be taking even longer than initially expected to 
materialize.52 Despite two project cycles funded under the benefit-sharing 
fund, benefit-sharing seems to be lagging behind as a whole in comparison 
to facilitated access under the Multilateral System. As a result, Parties to the 
Treaty have recently decided to establish an intersessional process tasked to 
develop a range of measures that will increase user-based payments and con-
tributions to the benefit-sharing fund in a sustainable and predictable long-
term manner, as well as enhance the functioning of the Treaty’s Multilateral 
System by additional measures.53
This recognized shortcoming in a system already operational for several 
years indicates that operationalization of Article 10 would be a challenging task. 
In addition, there are fundamental differences between the Nagoya Protocol 
and the International Treaty that will limit the opportunities for Parties 
to draw on the Multilateral System for inspiration. First of all, the ITPGRFA 
Multilateral System is a comprehensive system for ABS, of which the Benefit-
sharing Fund is only a part, and addresses one specific sector only of genetic 
resources. Second, the Multilateral System in effect largely consolidated the 
operation of a pre-existing network of research centers under the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),54 whereas the Nagoya 
Protocol would start from scratch.55 Third, benefits under the Multilateral 
System should be directed to farmers in all countries, albeit especially in devel-
oping countries and countries with economies in transition,56 whereas under the 
Nagoya Protocol mechanism, benefits would be directed to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity globally.57
52 See Nina I. Moeller and Clive Stannard, Identifying Benefit Flows, Studies on the Potential 
Monetary and Nonmonetary Benefits Arising from the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome: FAO, 2013), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.planttreaty.org/content/identifying-benefit-flows>.
53 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2013 Implementation of the Funding Strategy of 
the International Treaty (2013). Part IV: Terms of Reference for the Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Working Group to Enhance the Functioning of the Multilateral System of Access and 
Benefit-Sharing. 
54 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 490.
55 Ibid.
56 See ITPGRFA Article 13(3).
57 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 130. See further discussion in this regard in 
section 4 below.
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4 Promoting a Coherent Interpretation of the Three CBD Objectives
As already discussed,58 the Nagoya Protocol promotes a coherent interpreta-
tion and integrative implementation of the three CBD objectives in the context 
of ABS. Article 10 further contributes to this end, by clearly making the objec-
tive of the global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism that of supporting 
the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components 
globally. If established, the multilateral fund might therefore be another source 
of funding and non-monetary benefits, together with the voluntary efforts of 
users and providers under Article 9, for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity.59
It should be emphasized, however, that by making reference to ‘globally,’ 
Article 10 refrains from directing benefits to countries of origin, exclusively 
or specifically, which could have a ‘life-changing impact’ on ABS under the 
Protocol.60 In that regard, Parties will be well advised to ensure that the proce-
dure for the allocation of benefits aims to recognize local contributions to con-
servation and sustainable use, reaching those countries and indigenous and 
local communities that made it possible for genetic resources and/or tradi-
tional knowledge to be used.61 In devising the allocation method, lessons learnt 
in the context of the ITPGRFA Multilateral System could be taken into account, 
including the eligibility criteria for applying for funding, and identified priori-
ties such as the focus on smallholder farmers and climate change adaptation 
58 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4; Article 5, section 5; Article 8, section 2; and 
Article 9, section 2.
59 This may possibly contribute to make the Protocol, to some extent, a type of an ‘innovative 
financial mechanism.’ Note, however, that discussion of ‘innovative financial mechanisms’ 
for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use have been very controversial in the CBD 
processes: for instance, CBD COP 10 considered the creation of a ‘green development fund’ 
modelled after the Clean Development Mechanism to reward trade-certified ‘land areas 
managed in compliance with the CBD,’ in accordance with the requirements for offsets 
and restoration for the private sector. The proposal, however, encountered the opposition 
of developing countries, which wished to ensure that innovative financial mechanisms 
would supplement, and not replace, public funding under the CBD’s financial mechanism. 
The other draft text on innovative financial mechanisms was withdrawn altogether 
during the final plenary: see ENB 9/544, “Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity,” 13. See comments in Morgera and Tsioumani, 
“Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 26–29. In the absence of a definition, it can be 
argued that the expression ‘innovative financial mechanism’ only applies to market-based 
mechanisms.
60 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 489–90.
61 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 382. 
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needs.62 That being said, there appears to be limitations to the project-based 
approach currently followed by the Treaty, which may be seen as introducing 
a competitive logic into a global cooperative framework and which may not 
be necessarily effective in fulfilling benefit-sharing expectations at national 
and local levels.63 Attention would therefore be drawn on devising a global 
mechanism that is inclusive and does not disadvantage stakeholders who are 
less equipped to obtain the benefits generated at the global level.64
62 ICNP, “A Report from the First Reflection Meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2, 14. For 
information on the ITPGRFA benefit-sharing fund, see “The Benefit-Sharing Fund,” 
ITPGRFA, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.planttreaty.org/content/benefit-sharing-
fund>. The list of projects approved under the first project cycle, see: “Projects under 
the Benefit-Sharing Fund (2009–2011) – 1st Call,” ITPGRFA, accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.planttreaty.org/content/projects-2009-2011>; and under the second one: “Call 
for Proposals 2010–2011,” ITPGRFA, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.planttreaty.org/
content/call-proposals-2010-2011>. 
63 Sélim Louafi, “Reflections on the Resource Allocation Strategy of the Benefit Sharing 
Fund” (paper for the fifth meeting of the Governing Body of the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; Bern: Swiss Federal Office for 
Agriculture, 2013).
64 We are grateful to Sélim Louafi for drawing our attention to this point.
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Article 11. Transboundary Cooperation
1. In instances where the same genetic resources are found in situ within 
the territory of more than one Party, those Parties shall endeavor to 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the involvement of indigenous and 
local communities concerned, where applicable, with a view to imple-
menting this Protocol.
2. Where the same traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources is shared by one or more indigenous and local communities 
in several Parties, those Parties shall endeavor to cooperate, as appro-
priate, with the involvement of the indigenous and local communities 
concerned, with a view to implementing the objective of this Protocol.
1 Overview
Article 11 identifies two instances in which transboundary cooperation is 
required, at least as a best-endeavor effort: when the same genetic resources 
are found in the territory of more than one country; and when the same tra-
ditional knowledge is shared by indigenous and local communities located 
in several Parties. This is an acknowledgment of the complexities that will be 
faced in implementing the mainly bilateral ABS approach embodied in the 
Nagoya Protocol, in particular in consideration of the fact that several genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are shared among different Parties. One 
of the best-known ABS transactions, in fact, involved the San peoples’ knowl-
edge of the hunger-suppressant properties of hoodia, which was shared by San 
communities in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Botswana.1
Although similarly worded, the two provisions contained in Article 11 are 
based on different legal concepts. Transboundary cooperation related to genetic 
resources is based on the notion of sovereign rights of States over genetic 
resources and establishes a duty to endeavor to cooperate in instances where 
the same genetic resources are found in situ under the jurisdiction of more 
than one Party. It also foresees a role for indigenous and local communities 
1 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 261; and generally: Munyi and 
Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit.; and Wyndberg, Schroeder and Chennels, 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit-sharing, op. cit.
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in case the genetic resources at stake are ‘held’ by these communities.2 
Article 11(1) thus specifically concerns countries of origin of genetic resources. 
Transboundary cooperation related to traditional knowledge, on the other 
hand, reflects the obligation of States under international law to protect the 
rights of indigenous and local communities over their traditional knowledge, 
which extends to inter-State cooperation with the involvement of the com-
munities concerned.
Both obligations aim to address the concern about a possible competition 
for benefits in the development and implementation of national ABS frame-
works to attract potential users interested in obtaining access to the same 
genetic resource or the same traditional knowledge that are present in differ-
ent Parties.3 The two obligations will be analyzed in turn below, after having 
commented on their common features in terms of the obligation to cooperate.
2 Obligation to Cooperate
The duty of international cooperation has never been defined internation-
ally, but is understood as the obligation for States to enter into coordinated 
action under a legal regime so as to achieve its specific goal.4 As opposed to 
an obligation of solidarity,5 each State is expected to benefit from the coopera-
tive relationship in a direct and concrete manner.6 In both cases addressed by 
Article 11, the obligation to cooperate is qualified: it requires States to ‘endeavor 
to cooperate, as appropriate.’ The Protocol, therefore, does not require Parties 
to reach agreement on joint PIC and MAT.7 It rather requires Parties to exert 
2 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2). See this commentary on Articles 5, section 3, and 6, 
section 4.
3 See proposal of operational text on benefit-sharing by Namibia on behalf of the African 
Group in CBD Working Group on ABS, “Collation of Operative Text submitted,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/4, 15, paragraphs 5–6. Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 133.
4 Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Cooperation, International Law of,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, 
op. cit., paragraph 2; and particularly in the case of international environmental law, para-
graphs 28–31.
5 Discussed in this commentary on Articles 22–25.
6 Danilo Campanelli, “Solidarity, Principle of,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit., 
paragraph 12.
7 The Permanent Court of International Justice has stated that ‘an obligation to negotiate 
does not imply an obligation to reach agreement’: Permanent Court of International Justice, 
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion (15 October 1931), 116. We are 
grateful to James Harrison for a useful exchange of ideas on this matter.
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good-faith efforts to identify potentially concerned Parties and engage them 
with a view to reaching agreement on coordinated action.8 The choice of the 
means to identify and engage other concerned States is left to each Party (‘as 
appropriate’). But lack of any reasonable effort to identify and engage poten-
tially concerned States would be in violation of this due diligence obligation. 
If agreement cannot be reached, Article 11 does not impede States from mak-
ing unilateral decisions, but it creates the expectation that such decisions will 
be made taking in consideration other States’ and, where relevant, indigenous 
and local communities’ interests, in realizing the objective of the Protocol.9 
Article 11 may also entail the obligation for Parties to address persistent or 
recurring difficulties in implementing this provision by progressively develop-
ing the legal regime established by the Nagoya Protocol,10 through its govern-
ing body.11
Article 11 does not specify which types of measures Parties should consider 
in transboundary cooperation. The purpose of such measures is, however, 
‘implementing this Protocol’,12 so transboundary cooperation arguably extends 
to access, benefit-sharing and compliance.13 This could include collaboration 
to document existing genetic resources within the jurisdiction of cooperat-
ing Parties; establish joint facilities for deciding on access requests; engage in 
8 International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand 
v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order (27 August 1999), 280, paragraph 90(1)(e).
9 See this commentary on Article 1.
10 Wolfrum, “Cooperation,” op. cit., paragraph 28.
11 Nagoya Protocol Article 16(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
12 It remains unclear why Article 11 seems to establish two slightly different aims for 
transboundary cooperation: in the case of cooperation over shared genetic resources, 
cooperation is aimed to implement the Protocol in its entirety, whereas in the case of 
shared traditional knowledge, cooperation is specifically targeting the objective of the 
Protocol (Article 1). In particular, the aim of the cooperation effort under Article 11(2) 
is not to implement the Protocol tout court, but only to implement its objective. Given 
the close relationship between Article 11(2) and the obligation of Parties under Articles 7 
and 12, this seems illogical; not least, since traditional knowledge is not referred to in 
Article 1 of the Nagoya Protocol. The limiting reference to ‘implementing the objective 
of this Protocol’ rather than to ‘implementing this Protocol’ thus appears as a drafting 
oversight, that might be explained by the fact that Parties closed negotiations on 
Article 11(2) already in July 2010, when all the main substantive issues and related 
draft articles under negotiation, in particular those on traditional knowledge, were still 
unresolved. Compare draft article 8 in Cali Draft and in Montreal I draft. 
13 Transboundary cooperation is in the latter sense a sub-set of the cooperation obligation 
in relation to alleged violations of domestic ABS frameworks under Article 15(3). See this 
commentary on Article 15, section 5.
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capacity building in neighboring Parties; establish common benefit-sharing 
mechanisms; and undertake joint compliance and enforcement initiatives. To 
provide an example, the 1996 Andean Community regime on genetic resources 
created a committee tasked with promoting management, monitoring, and 
control of access authorizations relating to genetic resources and their deriva-
tives that exist in two or more member countries.14 The conclusion of bilateral 
and regional agreements can also be envisaged to implement Article 11,15 and 
could result in the establishment of future specialized ABS agreements.16
As already discussed,17 the relationship between Article 11 and the ‘trans-
boundary situations’ that may fall under a future multilateral benefit-sharing 
system under Article 10 is still to be clarified by Parties. So it may be expected 
that the interpretation of Article 11, and particularly the role of transboundary 
cooperation and its limitations vis-à-vis a possible multilateral benefit-sharing 
mechanism, will be clarified by the Protocol’s governing body18 in the context 
of negotiations under Article 10. In that connection, it may be worth noting 
that Article 11 does not provide guidance as to benefit-sharing specifically, 
whereas Article 10 requires allocating benefits to conservation and sustainable 
use globally: this difference may contribute to create an incentive for Parties 
to exhaust all possible means for transboundary cooperation with a view to 
obtaining arising benefits.19
It can also be expected that certain institutions established at the interna-
tional level under the Nagoya Protocol can support Parties in implementing 
Article 11. Information on the ABS Clearinghouse20 and instances of alleged 
non-compliance arising in the context of the Protocol’s compliance proce-
dures and mechanisms21 may facilitate the identification of situations requir-
ing transboundary cooperation.
14 Andean Community, Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources (Decision 391, 
2 July 1996, in force 17 July 1996), Article 51; cited in Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, 
op. cit., 134.
15 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 496.
16 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
17 See this commentary on Article 10, section 3.
18 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
19 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 419.
20 See this commentary on Article 14, sections 3–4.
21 See this commentary on Article 30.
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3 Transboundary Cooperation Concerning Genetic Resources
Parties are obliged to make a best-endeavor effort to cooperate in the Protocol’s 
implementation in instances where more than one Party is the country of ori-
gin of genetic resources. The provision is, however, silent on how to establish 
that such situations exist. It remains to be seen how a Party can determine 
that the ‘same genetic resource’ is at stake. When are two or more Parties to 
be considered countries of origin of the same genetic resource?22 Does the 
gene sequence need to be identical? Or mainly identical? Or only identical as 
regards genes that have expressed themselves in the organism under consider-
ation? It seems to be excluded that Article 11 would bind all Parties within the 
geographical range of the ‘species’ whose genetic resources are utilized. Rather, 
as the ‘genetic resources’ utilized in research and development are frequently 
not present in all populations within a species, Article 11(1) may apply only 
when the populations of a species in these territories share the specific genetic 
or biochemical characteristics utilized.23 It has been noted that, from a scien-
tific perspective, only plant genetic resources can be found in more than one 
country, because they can be characterized by great genetic stability, whereas 
microbial strains within the same species are not the same, and animal genetic 
resources may present differences from one individual to another within the 
same breed.24 As these questions were not discussed during the negotiation of 
the Protocol, some clarification by the Protocol’s governing body would seem 
essential for operationalizing Article 11.
One possible challenge for the effective implementation of Article 11(1) 
could be situations where one Party that is a country of origin requires PIC and 
MAT for access to certain genetic resources, whereas another Party having the 
same genetic resources in its territory operates a free-access regime.25 Parties 
operating a free-access regime might also be less interested in documenting 
their genetic resources in situ so as to identify situations within the scope of 
Article 11(1). It appears difficult for a Party allowing free access to cooperate 
with neighboring Parties harboring the same genetic resources so as not to 
undermine the effectiveness and integrity of the latter’s access framework. 
A balance between the obligation to cooperate and the right of a Party to 
decide in favor of a free-access regime will have to be struck in practice.
22 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 419.
23 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 134.
24 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research Commons,” op. cit., 419.
25 That could be the case if a Party waives its right to require PIC: see this commentary on 
Article 6, section 3.1.
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When genetic resources are held by indigenous and local communities26 
(‘where applicable’), transboundary collaboration must occur with the involve-
ment of the communities concerned. In this respect, the obligation should be 
understood and implemented in conjunction with other relevant Protocol pro-
visions on benefit-sharing and relevant procedural guarantees, read in the light 
of relevant international human rights standards.27 Challenges may arise, in 
this respect, when indigenous and local communities have rights over genetic 
resources in one/some, but not, all relevant States. Still, all concerned States 
will be expected to exert best-endeavor efforts to effectively involve these com-
munities in transboundary cooperation.
4 Transboundary Cooperation Concerning Traditional Knowledge
Article 11(2) calls for transboundary cooperation in the case of transboundary 
situations related to traditional knowledge, with a view to ensuring the effec-
tive involvement of all relevant communities in taking decisions on PIC and 
MAT. The provision may apply where members of the same indigenous or local 
communities live in more than one Party and where different indigenous or 
local communities in several Parties share the same traditional knowledge.28 
As opposed to Article 11(1), this provision does not include the term ‘where 
applicable,’ as the Protocol recognizes that access to traditional knowledge can 
only occur with community PIC, or approval and involvement.29 As recalled 
above, the provision should be read in conjunction with other relevant Protocol 
provisions on benefit-sharing and relevant procedural guarantees, including 
relevant international human rights standards.30
It is not self-evident what ‘same’ traditional knowledge means, however. It 
could point to traditional knowledge linked to the same biochemical composi-
tion or to similar properties or applications31 that is held by indigenous and 
local communities living across national boundaries. The determination of the 
26 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2). See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.
27 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4 and this commentary on Article 6, 
section 3, and Article 12.
28 On issues related to shared traditional knowledge, see Manuel Ruiz Muller, Protecting 
Shared Traditional Knowledge: Issues, Challenges and Options (Geneva: International 
Centre for Trade and Susatinable Development, 2013).
29 See this commentary on Article 7.
30 See fn. 27 above.
31 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 135.
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existence of a situation falling under the scope of Article 11(2) could be left to 
indigenous peoples and local communities as the holders of the knowledge in 
question, in accordance with their customary laws and procedures,32 and pos-
sibly through the development of community protocols.33 The role of Parties is 
therefore to facilitate communities’ identification of such situations and their 
effective involvement in transboundary cooperation. Challenges may arise, 
however, if different Parties in the territories of which the concerned commu-
nities are located regulate differently ABS in relation to traditional knowledge. 
There may also arise practical difficulties if the relevant traditional knowl-
edge is considered a secret by some of the concerned communities, but not 
by others. Once again, peer learning and development of international guid-
ance by the Nagoya Protocol’s governing body would be useful,34 particularly 
in the context of its consideration of model contractual clauses and voluntary 
instruments.35
32 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
33 See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.1.
34 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
35 See this commentary on Articles 19–20.
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Article 12. Traditional Knowledge Associated 
with Genetic Resources
1. In implementing their obligations under this Protocol, Parties shall in 
accordance with domestic law take into consideration indigenous and 
local communities’ customary laws, community protocols and proce-
dures, as applicable, with respect to traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources.
2. Parties, with the effective participation of the indigenous and local 
communities concerned, shall establish mechanisms to inform poten-
tial users of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
about their obligations, including measures as made available through 
the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House for access to and fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge.
3. Parties shall endeavor to support, as appropriate, the development 
by indigenous and local communities, including women within these 
communities, of:
(a) Community protocols in relation to access to traditional knowl-
edge associated with genetic resources and the fair and equi-
table sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of such 
knowledge;
(b) Minimum requirements for mutually agreed terms to secure the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources; and
(c) Model contractual clauses for benefit-sharing arising from the 
utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources.
4. Parties, in their implementation of this Protocol, shall, as far as pos-
sible, not restrict the customary use and exchange of genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge within and amongst indigenous 
and local communities in accordance with the objectives of the 
Convention.
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1 Overview
Although generally recognized as a cross-cutting issue during the negotiations,1 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources has eventually been 
addressed in various, occasionally stand-alone, provisions in the Protocol.2 
Article 12 serves as an overarching and wide-reaching provision enshrining: a 
general clause concerning indigenous and local communities’ customary laws, 
that is applicable in the implementation of all other obligations under the 
Protocol;3 two broadly framed obligations for Parties to support understand-
ing and fairness in ABS transactions involving traditional knowledge;4 and a 
prohibition for Parties to restrict communities’ customary use and exchange 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge that are in accordance with the 
CBD.5 The following sections will analyze these provisions in turn.
2 General Clause
Article 12(1) requires Parties to ‘take into consideration’ customary laws, com-
munity protocols and procedures of indigenous and local communities in 
their implementation of the Protocol with respect to traditional knowledge 
‘as applicable’ and ‘in accordance with domestic law.’6 The provision therefore 
leaves a considerable degree of discretion to Parties: it does not go as far as 
to require Parties to recognize or apply customary law, community protocols 
and procedures. However, it does oblige Parties at a minimum to factor in the 
development and application of domestic ABS measures the existence and 
relevance of indigenous and local communities’ customary laws, even if such 
consideration may not necessarily determine the content of the final legal act 
or administrative decision. This requires that national authorities identify and 
understand relevant communities’ customary laws, protocols and procedures, 
which would be practically impossible to achieve without the full and effec-
tive involvement of indigenous and local communities in the development 
1 See generally, Singh Nijar, “Incorporating Traditional Knowledge,” op. cit.; and Singh Nijar, 
“Traditional Knowledge Systems,” op. cit.
2 See this commentary on Article 5, section 4, Article 7 and Article 16.
3 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1).
4 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(2–3).
5 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(4).
6 For a commentary on the term, see this commentary on Article 7, section 3.
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and implementation of these measures.7 In this context, national authorities 
will then have to determine whether legal recognition or other mechanisms 
to support the understanding and respect of customary laws, protocols and 
procedures are needed with a view to ensuring the implementation of the 
Protocol’s provisions on community PIC and benefit-sharing.8 That is, the con-
sideration of customary laws, protocols and procedures needs to be functional 
to the actual realization of PIC and benefit-sharing for indigenous and local 
communities. And, as previously argued,9 in applying Article 12(1), Parties will 
have to respect their relevant international human rights obligations.
The relevance of customary laws, protocols and procedures of indigenous 
and local communities in the implementation of the traditional knowledge-
related provisions of the Protocol is an important development in international 
law. It has been considered an unprecedented recognition of legal pluralism 
in international treaty law.10 The study of the role of indigenous peoples’ and 
local communities’ customary laws in contributing to sustainability is still in its 
infancy, but there are indications that customary laws may inspire innovation 
in administering living resources and adapting to changing circumstances.11 
The Protocol, therefore, opens the door for Parties individually and collectively 
(most likely in the course of the review of implementation by the Protocol’s 
governing body12 and possibly its compliance procedures and mechanisms)13 
to explore the interactions of indigenous and local communities’ customary 
laws with international and national law on ABS, while ensuring a certain mea-
sure of inter-operability14 among Parties’ domestic ABS frameworks.15 That 
7 UNDRIP Article 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2).
8 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2), 6(2) and 7.
9 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4 and this commentary on Article 5, 
sections 3–4, Article 6, section 4 and Article 7.
10 Bavikatte and Robinson, “Towards a People’s History of the Law,” op. cit., 45–46.
11 See generally Peter Orebech et al., The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Brendan Tobin, “Setting 
Protection of TK to Rights – Placing Human Rights and Customary Law at the Heart of 
TK Governance,” in Kamau and Winter, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the 
Law, op. cit., 102.
12 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
13 See this commentary on Article 30; and Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service,” op. cit., 
760–763.
14 This concept is discussed in Young, “International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 
491–492.
15 The Nagoya Protocol may therefore provide a laboratory for the understanding of ‘global 
environmental law’ – a concept that is emerging from the promotion of environmental 
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being said, principled and practical difficulties in understanding and provid-
ing due consideration for indigenous and local communities’ customary laws 
in a ‘transcultural context’ should not be underestimated.16
Article 12(1) is a general clause applying to the implementation of all 
Protocol provisions. It applies in particular to those provisions expressly 
related to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, namely 
on benefit-sharing, access, the multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, trans-
boundary cooperation, compliance with domestic ABS frameworks and MAT, 
awareness-raising and capacity,17 as well as the other provisions contained in 
Article 12 itself. It may also be argued, in light of the interrelationship between 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge,18 that Article 12(1) also applies 
to the Protocol provisions on genetic resources held by indigenous and local 
communities.19 It should be further noted that Article 12(1) does not exclude 
any provision of the Protocol from its applicability, so other Articles may be 
implemented in light of Article 12(1), when these turn out to be, on a case-by-
case basis, relevant to traditional knowledge.20
2.1 Community Protocols
The reference to ‘community protocols’ in Article 12(1) is also particularly note-
worthy in facilitating the understanding and due consideration of the laws and 
procedures of indigenous and local communities. A community protocol is a 
written document developed by a community following a consultative pro-
cess, to outline the core ecological, cultural and spiritual values and customary 
laws relating to the community’s traditional knowledge and resources, based 
on which the community provides clear terms and conditions to regulate 
access to and benefit-sharing from their knowledge and resources.21 It typically 
protection as a global public good through a plurality of legal mechanisms relying on 
a plurality of legal orders. Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service Community Interests?,” 
op. cit., 760–763.
16 Saskia Vermeylen, “The Nagoya Protocol and Customary Law: The Paradox of Narratives 
in the Law,” Law Environment and Development Journal 9 (2013): 185. 
17 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(5), 7, 10, 11(2), 16, 18, 21 and 22. See this commentary on 
Articles 10–11, 16, 18 and 21–22.
18 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital; and Lenzerini, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural 
Rights,” op. cit., 140.
19 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2).
20 See, for example, this commentary on Article 18.
21 At the time of writing, existing literature is written by practitioners involved in the 
promotion of community protocols in the field and their recognition at the interna-
tional level. See Kristina Swiderska et al., Biodiversity and Culture: Exploring Community 
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sets out the community’s customary rights and responsibilities for resource 
management and access, and the provisions in national and international 
law that recognize their rights and responsibilities to those resources.22 It 
may thus serve as a tool to promote recognition and application of customary 
laws and procedures concerning traditional knowledge and genetic resources 
through a bottom-up approach, by articulating them in a way that can be eas-
ily understood by national authorities and users. This may potentially make 
their recognition or integration in domestic law easier, as well as facilitate ABS 
transactions with potential users. At the same time, community protocols offer 
an articulation of the holistic approach of communities to the regulation and 
management of natural resources and the environment, which may challenge 
the sectoral approach to environmental regulation in statutory law.23
The process of developing a community protocol is believed to have a value 
per se: it may serve to bring the entire community together, as an opportunity to 
collectively map and evaluate customary laws, governance systems, traditional 
resource uses and community development plans.24 A holistic community 
Protocols, Rights and Consent, Participatory Learning and Action Series no. 65 (London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2012), accessed 30 November 
2013, <http://pubs.iied.org/14618IIED.html>, 28; Kabir Bavikatte and Harry Jonas, 
Bio-Cultural Community Protocols: A Community Approach to Ensuring the Integrity 
of Environmental Law and Policy (Nairobi: UNEP, 2009), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.unep.org/communityprotocols/PDF/communityprotocols.pdf>; Harry Jonas, Holly 
Shrumm and Kabir Bavikatte, Biocultural Community Protocols and Conservation Pluralism 
(Cape Town: Natural Justice, 2010), accessed 30 November 2013, <http://naturaljustice 
.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/BCPs_and_conservation_pluralism_jonas_et_al2010.pdf>; 
Holly Shrumm and Harry Jonas, Biocultural Community Protocols: A Toolkit for Community 
Facilitators (Cape Town: Natural Justice, 2012), accessed 30 November 2013, <www 
.community-protocols.org/toolkit>; and Munyi and Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya 
Protocol,” op. cit., 238–244.
22 From this perspective, community protocols can be considered an essential tool for the 
understanding and development of global environmental law (Morgera, “Bilateralism 
at the Service of Community Interests?,” op. cit., 762) and for facilitating the integrated 
implementation of different multilateral environmental agreements on the ground 
(Elisa Morgera, “No Need to Reinvent the Wheel for a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Tackling Climate Change: The Contribution of International Biodiversity Law,” in Climate 
Change and the Law, ed. Erkki Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (Springer, 2013), 
350).
23 Jonas, Shrumm and Bavikatte, Biocultural Community Protocols and Conservation Pluralism, 
op. cit., at 104, refer to ‘laws compartmentaliz[ing] the otherwise interdependent aspects 
of biocultural diversity by drawing legislative borders around them and addressing them 
as distinct segments.’
24 Bavikatte and Jonas, Bio-Cultural Community Protocols, op. cit., 20.
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protocol usually involves a community’s reflection about the interconnected-
ness of the elements of their way of life, as well as an increased understanding 
within the community of the international and national legal ABS frameworks 
and of the extent to which they impact on their customary practices, values 
and norms.25 It can also lead to establishing internal community rules for the 
sustainable management of natural resources, equitable sharing of benefits 
and conflict resolution.26
The inter-community agreement established among the six communi-
ties managing communally Peru’s Potato Park provides an illustration in that 
regard. The agreement aims to conserve the hundreds of potato varieties culti-
vated in the area and share equitably the financial benefits arising from a num-
ber of initiatives in the park. Following a three-year long participatory process, 
the agreement established new inter-community governance structures and 
a framework for equitably sharing the benefits from economic collectives in 
the park, including gastronomy and ecotourism initiatives, and the production 
and selling of medicinal plants, potatoes and crafts. The agreement is rooted 
in conservation and equity values enshrined in customary laws, and is regu-
lated by community and inter-community authorities. It has minimized the 
risk of conflicts over resources and of elites unfairly benefiting from revenues. 
A percentage of the revenues is reinvested into a communal fund that is used 
to sustain and manage the park’s agro-ecosystem, and provide a safety net for 
the poorest people in the park communities. At the same time, the agreement 
has acted as a community protocol in the sense of the Nagoya Protocol, as it 
sets out the rules for access by outsiders to the park’s genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge and for equitable benefit-sharing by outsiders.27
Overall, community protocols appear to have two advantages for indigenous 
and local communities.28 From an outward perspective, they provide a specific 
framework for defining in a participatory manner the types of benefits indig-
enous and local communities may wish to secure, to support their culture and 
25 Ibid.
26 On questions related to intra-community equity and fairness in sharing benefits, see this 
commentary on Article 5, sections 3.1 and 4.
27 See Alejandro Argumedo, Community Biocultural Protocols: Building Mechanisms for 
Access and Benefit-Sharing among the Communities of the Potato Park Based on Quechua 
Customary Norms (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 
2011), accessed 30 November 2013, <http://pubs.iied.org/G03168.html>. See also Tobin, 
“Setting Protection of TK to Rights,” op. cit., 101.
28 Elsa Tsioumani, “Community Protocols: An Emerging Tool for Managing the Com-
mons” (presented at the Against Crisis, For the Commons: Towards a New Medi-
terranean, Mataroa, 2013), accessed 30 November 2013, <http://mataroanetwork.
org/2013-conference-proceedings/public-events-2013/returning-to-the-commons/>.
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livelihoods, prior to being required for PIC and having to engage in the estab-
lishment of MAT. As such, the process leading to the development of a com-
munity protocol allows a community to prepare in advance for negotiations 
with outsiders of an ABS arrangement, rather than enter into such negotiations 
in an ad hoc manner, contributing thus to a more level-playing field among the 
parties. In addition, a community protocol can serve as a guide for outsiders 
(whether it is the State, a company or a research institution) to begin interact-
ing with an indigenous or local community. From an inward perspective, the 
development of a community protocol may allow an indigenous or local com-
munity to identify any question related to the authority to provide PIC and 
the governance of future benefit-sharing, thus preventing internal conflicts.29 
Where in-depth participatory processes are followed, such process can also 
strengthen communities’ organizational capacity, and collective identity and 
goals, and develop a sense of self-empowerment.30
Compliance with the provisions of community protocols, however, remains 
voluntary, unless it is secured through national legislation or through contracts. 
In addition, development of community protocols would generally require 
capacity-building and legal assistance, so that community members can better 
understand the relevant international and national legal regimes, the interests 
involved and the consequences of their choices.31 The development of com-
munity protocols is in fact often supported by international and transnational 
networks of experts comprising State and non-State entities: community pro-
tocols have been developed before the conclusion of the negotiations of the 
Nagoya Protocol through the involvement of networks of NGOs, intergovern-
mental organizations, and bilateral donors, as well as the private sector.32
In a broader perspective, community protocols attempt to bridge inter-State 
obligations established at the international level vis-à-vis traditional knowl-
edge and genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities with 
specific communities’ needs, aspirations and livelihoods at the local level. 
Community protocols can therefore be seen as an instrument to link the local 
and the international legal levels, according to standards set out in custom-
ary, national and international law, with a view to mobilizing communities to 
29 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 157–158.
30 Elsa Tsioumani, “Community Protocols,” op. cit.
31 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 157–158. 
32 See the website of a coalition of different actors supporting community protocols: 
“Community Protocols,” UNEP et al., accessed 30 November 2013, <www.community-
protocols.org/>.
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use international and national law to support the local manifestations of their 
right to self-determination.33
The importance of the development of community protocols for the imple-
mentation of traditional knowledge-related provisions of the Protocol is fur-
ther highlighted elsewhere in the Protocol, which provides a best-endeavor 
obligation for Parties to ‘support, as appropriate,’ the development by indig-
enous and local communities of these protocols.34 Community protocols are 
also to be supported through capacity-building,35 awareness-raising measures,36 
and international funding.37 It should be finally noted that further guidance 
for Parties’ consideration and support of community protocols may be devel-
oped in the context of other work carried out under CBD Article 8(j), such as 
the sui generis system of protection of traditional knowledge38 and customary 
sustainable use in protected areas.39
3 Obligation to Inform Potential Users
According to Article 12(2), Parties are under an unqualified obligation to estab-
lish mechanisms to inform potential users of traditional knowledge about their 
obligations towards indigenous and local communities, including through the 
ABS Clearinghouse.40 Basically, this provision implicitly recognizes that it is the 
responsibility of State Parties to inform potential users of the rights of indig-
enous and local communities under the Protocol and to create ways to support 
the respect of such rights by private operators. This is particularly relevant in 
light of the ‘right of indigenous and local communities to identify the right-
ful holders of their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
33 Harry Jonas, Kabir Bavikatte and Holly Shrumm, “Community Protocols and Access and 
Benefit-Sharing,” Asian Biotechnology and Development Review 12 (2010): 49, 62.
34 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3).
35 See this commentary on Article 22.
36 Nagoya Protocol Article 21(i). See this commentary on Article 21.
37 CBD Decision 11/14, paragraph 8 and as part of guidance to the GEF in CBD Decision 11/15, 
“Review of the programme of work on island biodiversity,” (5 December 2012) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, Appendix I, paragraph 1(d)(ii).
38 CBD Decision 11/14, section E, paragraphs 2 and 9. 
39 Ibid., section F, paragraph 10(c)(iii) and Annex, section A, Tasks 3 and 14(c).
40 See this commentary on Article 14, sections 3–4, in particular on legal questions arising 
from the inclusion of information relevant to traditional knowledge and to indigenous 
and local communities through that mechanism.
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within their communities,’41 and supports also the consideration of applicable 
customary laws, procedures and protocols.42 The rationale of Article 12(2) is 
to facilitate users’ compliance with domestic ABS requirements related to tra-
ditional knowledge.43 This provision is therefore complementary to Parties’ 
international responsibility vis-à-vis users’ violations of domestic ABS require-
ments related to traditional knowledge, which is spelt out elsewhere in the 
Protocol.44
In implementing this obligation, Parties must proceed with the effective 
participation of the indigenous and local communities concerned. This lan-
guage should be read in light of the principle of full and effective participation 
of indigenous peoples in decision making,45 which can be seen as an impor-
tant aspect of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination46 and is also con-
sidered a principle in the guidelines developed by CBD Parties by consensus, 
notably the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct.47 As for other provisions 
of the Protocol, relevant international human rights obligations and standards 
should guide the interpretation and implementation of this obligation.48
4 Obligation to Support
Article 12(3) establishes a best-endeavor obligation for Parties to support 
indigenous and local communities in the development of a series of tools 
41 Nagoya Protocol 24th preambular recital.
42 When read in conjunction with Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1).
43 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 140.
44 See this commentary on Article 16.
45 UNDRIP Article 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No 169, Article 6(2).
46 “Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee),” 25–26. On the relevance 
of the internationally human rights of indigenous peoples for local communities, 
see Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
47 Tkarihwaié:Ri Code, paragraph 30, which reads: ‘Full and effective participation/
participatory approach. This principle recognizes the crucial importance of indigenous 
and local communities fully and effectively participating in activities/interactions related 
to biological diversity and conservation that may impact on them, and of respecting their 
decision-making processes and time frames for such decision-making. Ethical conduct 
should acknowledge that there are some legitimate circumstances for indigenous and 
local communities to restrict access to their traditional knowledge,’ emphasis added. 
Full and effective participation is also called for in the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines, 
paragraphs 3(a) and 15.
48 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4. Savaresi, “International Human Rights 
Law Implications,” op. cit., 53.
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aimed at ensuring fair and equitable ABS transactions concerning traditional 
knowledge. The tools include: community protocols,49 minimum require-
ments for MAT,50 and model contractual clauses.51 These are not only tools 
supporting transparent and equitable internal governance within commu-
nities in relation to ABS, but also their capacity to negotiate with outsiders/
users.52 As to the latter, it has been observed that community protocols can 
be used as a basis for dialogue between communities and private companies.53 
In that regard, support from national authorities to the development of com-
munity protocols may lead to ‘concrete tools [that] business needs to put ABS 
in practice.’54 On the other hand, it has been cautioned that minimum require-
ments for MAT and model contractual clauses are among the ‘most complex 
and controversial elements of ABS practice,’ therefore mutual learning should 
be encouraged and possibly international guidance should be developed on 
this matter by the Protocol’s governing body.55
Implementation of Article 12(3) will be supported by indigenous and local 
communities’ own identification of their priority capacity-building needs.56 
As a result, it remains the prerogative of indigenous and local communities to 
develop the tools required for their traditional knowledge-related ABS arrange-
ments. Support to this end can be expected from the State, particularly in light 
of its own obligations vis-à-vis an indigenous or local community under the 
Protocol, on the basis of good-faith and reasonable efforts. The provision, 
however, also implicitly points – when read in light of relevant international 
human rights obligations and standards – to a certain responsibility of Parties 
in ensuring some guarantees for the substantive equity of MAT concerning tra-
ditional knowledge.57
The best-endeavor obligation to support indigenous and local communi-
ties is qualified by the term ‘as appropriate.’ In this specific case, this quali-
fier may be understood as ‘upon request from the relevant communities’ or 
49 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1) See section 2 above.
50 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g). See this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
51 See this commentary on Article 19.
52 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point. See also Munyi 
and Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 222 and 234, who consider this 
provision as contributing to the legal empowerment of indigenous and local communities.
53 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 379.
54 Ibid.
55 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 500.
56 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(3) and (5)(j). 
57 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 73.
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‘where these tools are not already in existence,’58 with a view to preventing 
States from exercising undue control over communities’ internal processes of 
governance in relation to ABS59 in exercising their discretion in selecting the 
means to implement this provision. Specific emphasis is placed, in the context 
of the obligation to support, on the participation of women in community pro-
cedures for the development of the tools listed in Article 12(3),60 while consid-
eration should be given to communities’ customary laws and procedures, as 
well as human rights obligations.61
Pragmatically, national authorities would be well advised to, first of all, 
determine whether community laws and protocols on traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources exist, and if so, support their respect. If these 
procedures do not exist, encourage and, where so required by these communi-
ties, support the development of community procedures in this regard. And 
only as a last resort and until such community procedures are in place, act on 
behalf of these communities in a facilitating role.62 It can be argued that devel-
opment of tools provided for under Article 12(3) has the potential to relieve 
Parties (at least partially) from developing from scratch processes for obtain-
ing community PIC, which would be a ‘formidable task.’63 This is particularly 
true when taking into account the diversity of circumstances in which tradi-
tional knowledge is held by indigenous and local communities, the right of 
these communities to identify their rightful holders of traditional knowledge 
58 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 256.
59 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 141, along similar lines, suggests that ‘as 
appropriate’ makes reference to the fact that ‘not all communities may need or desire 
such assistance.’
60 See also Nagoya Protocol 11th preambular recital and this commentary on Article 5, 
section 3, and Introduction to this commentary, section 4. See also Akwé: Kon Voluntary 
Guidelines, paragraph 54, which reads: ‘The vital role that women and youth play, 
in particular women and youth within indigenous and local communities, in the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and the need for the full and 
effective participation of women in policy-making and implementation for biological 
diversity conservation should be fully taken into consideration.’
61 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). On relevant international human rights law, see Introduction 
to this commentary, section 4.
62 These options have been identified and prioritized by Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing 
Country’s View,” op. cit., 257–8.
63 Ibid., 257. This perception is confirmed by Cabrera Medaglia, “Implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 360–361 and 364, where the author notes that even if certain 
Latin American countries have already legislated on ABS in relation to traditional 
knowledge, very few had developed detailed procedures for obtaining community PIC or 
model contractual clauses targeting traditional knowledge.
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and the unique circumstances in which traditional knowledge is held in differ-
ent countries.64
5 Prohibition to Restrict Customary Use and Exchange
According to Article 12(4), Parties are subject to a qualified obligation (‘as far as 
possible’) not to restrict the customary use and exchange of genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge within and amongst indigenous and 
local communities in accordance with the objectives of the Convention. This 
provision therefore envisages that States avoid placing restrictions on tra-
ditional use and exchanges within communities within their territory and 
also located in other States,65 particularly as long as such traditional use and 
exchange contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
This provision confirms once again the holistic approach of the Protocol to 
the three objectives of the Convention,66 in light of the importance of tradi-
tional knowledge for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, as well as 
for indigenous and local communities’ rich cultural heritage that is relevant for 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.67 The rationale is to recognize, 
due to the inseparable nature of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
for indigenous and local communities,68 that traditional use and exchanges 
of genetic resources are essential for the preservation and continued evolu-
tion of traditional knowledge, and for its role in the preservation of communi-
ties’ cultural identity. Tensions however may arise between certain customary 
practices and conservation objectives, which Parties would need to resolve in 
the light of this holistic interpretation of the CBD objectives and international 
human rights norms.69
64 Nagoya Protocol 23rd–25th preambular recitals.
65 Nagoya Protocol Article 11(2). See this commentary on Article 11, section 4.
66 See this commentary on Articles 1, section 4; 8, section 2; 9, section 2, and 10, section 4.
67 Nagoya Protocol 22nd and 25th preambular recitals. See also Konstantia Koutouki and 
Katharina von Bieberstein, “The Nagoya Protocol: Sustainable Access and Benefits-
Sharing for Indigenous and Local Communities,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 
13 (2011): 513, 534.
68 Nagoya Protocol 22nd preambular recital.
69 Also from a human rights perspective, it can be argued that the right to own and use 
traditional resources implies an ‘obligation of stewardship toward the resource, for 
the benefit of future generations of the community and for the planet’: Wiessner, “The 
Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” op. cit., 240.
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Article 12(4) thus represents an elaboration of the more general obligation 
under the CBD to ‘protect and encourage customary use of biological resources 
in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with 
conservation or sustainable use requirements.’70 The provision can be com-
pared with, and used to reinforce at the national level, farmers’ rights currently 
addressed under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture.71 When compared with the ITPGRFA provision, Article 12(4) 
of the Nagoya Protocol not only has a much wider scope (it applies to all genetic 
resources, encompassing – but not limited to – plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture). It is also framed as a positive (albeit qualified) obligation for 
Parties, thereby providing an additional legal basis for national legislation on 
farmers’ rights.
70 CBD Article 10(c). See Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
sharing,” op. cit., 40.
71 ITPGRFA Article 9(3), whereby, using a formulation in the negative ‘Nothing in this Article 
[on farmers’ rights] shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, 
exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as 
appropriate.’ On the interactions between the Nagoya Protocol and the International 
Treaty provisions on farmers rights, see Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the 
Relationship,” op. cit., 93–100 and 110. See also Munyi and Jonas, “Implementing the 
Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 222 and 234.
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Article 13. National Focal Points and Competent 
National Authorities
1. Each Party shall designate a national focal point on access and benefit-
sharing. The national focal point shall make information available as 
follows:
(a) For applicants seeking access to genetic resources, information 
on procedures for obtaining prior informed consent and estab-
lishing mutually agreed terms, including benefit-sharing;
(b) For applicants seeking access to traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources, where possible, information on pro-
cedures for obtaining prior informed consent or approval and 
involvement, as appropriate, of indigenous and local communi-
ties and establishing mutually agreed terms including benefit-
sharing; and
(c) Information on competent national authorities, relevant indig-
enous and local communities and relevant stakeholders.
The national focal point shall be responsible for liaison with the Secretariat.
2. Each Party shall designate one or more competent national authori-
ties on access and benefit-sharing. Competent national authorities 
shall, in accordance with applicable national legislative, administra-
tive or policy measures, be responsible for granting access or, as appli-
cable, issuing written evidence that access requirements have been 
met and be responsible for advising on applicable procedures and 
requirements for obtaining prior informed consent and entering into 
mutually agreed terms.
3. A Party may designate a single entity to fulfil the functions of both 
focal point and competent national authority.
4. Each Party shall, no later than the date of entry into force of this Protocol 
for it, notify the Secretariat of the contact information of its national 
focal point and its competent national authority or authorities. Where 
a Party designates more than one competent national authority, it shall 
convey to the Secretariat, with its notification thereof, relevant infor-
mation on the respective responsibilities of those authorities. Where 
applicable, such information shall, at a minimum, specify which
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 competent authority is responsible for the genetic resources sought. 
Each Party shall forthwith notify the Secretariat of any changes in the 
designation of its national focal point or in the contact information or 
responsibilities of its competent national authority or authorities.
5. The Secretariat shall make information received pursuant to para-
graph 4 above available through the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House.
1 Overview
Article 13 outlines the necessary institutional arrangements to be taken at the 
domestic level to implement the Protocol. It follows the model adopted in 
the Bonn Guidelines1 and in the Biosafety Protocol2 of relying on a combina-
tion of a national focal point and one or more competent national authori-
ties. Accordingly, the former is the primary external contact point between a 
Party and the Secretariat of the Protocol or for users inquiring about access 
procedures, and the latter is responsible for granting access or issuing written 
evidence about PIC according to domestic requirements. The Nagoya Protocol, 
however, is much more detailed than the Bonn Guidelines and the Biosafety 
Protocol with respect to the tasks of the national focal points as key points of 
reference for users in understanding domestic ABS frameworks. This level of 
additional detail arguably seeks to address concerns expressed by both govern-
ments of developed countries and the research community, about difficulties 
in obtaining correct information on requirements for obtaining PIC and MAT.3
Article 13 refers to ‘each Party’ with a view to underlining that although the 
tasks for national focal points and competent national authorities are pre-
dominantly focused on access (and therefore of great importance to provider 
countries), the obligation applies also to Parties that see themselves as user 
countries. That being said, Article 13 leaves broad discretion to Parties as to the 
specific institutional arrangements to be put in place, which will ultimately 
depend on national and sub-national legal and institutional legal frameworks 
and practices. Accordingly, Article 13(3) explicitly provides that a Party may 
1 Bonn Guidelines, paragraphs 13–14. 
2 Biosafety Protocol, Article 19. For a commentary, Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the 
Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 129.
3 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
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designate a single entity to fulfil the functions of both focal point and compe-
tent national authority.4
Information on national focal points and competent national authorities 
will be included in the ABS Clearinghouse,5 possibly including information on 
relevant competent authorities of indigenous and local communities.6 Parties 
are responsible for communicating any changes to these designations to the 
Secretariat, so that these can be promptly reflected in the ABS Clearinghouse 
and that relevant stakeholders may easily find out about the key officers for the 
national implementation of the Protocol.7
2 National Focal Points
The national focal point will have a dual external function. On the one hand, it 
will ensure direct communication with the Secretariat of the Protocol. In that 
capacity, the national officer serving as focal point will receive, for example, 
notifications of meetings relating to the Protocol and invitations to submit views 
on matters on the agenda of these meetings.8 On the other hand, the national 
focal point is mandated to familiarize prospective users (applicants seeking 
access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge) with the domestic ABS 
framework, by providing information on procedures for obtaining PIC and 
establishing MAT,9 including with indigenous and local communities.10 In the 
latter sense, the national focal point will basically serve as a ‘helpdesk’ or ‘infor-
mation hub’, whose practical role will be to enable potential users to avoid, 
and possibly prevent,11 unintended breaches of domestic ABS frameworks and 
4 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 144.
5 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(b). See this commentary on Article 14.
6 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(3)(a).
7 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(4).
8 As suggested in relation to the corresponding provision in the Biosafety Protocol by 
Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 129.
9 See this commentary on Article 6.
10 Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(2) and 7. See this commentary on Article 6, section 4, and 
Article 7.
11 If the national focal point is so empowered at the national level (since nothing in the 
Protocol requires this, but nothing in the Protocol prevents this domestic implementation 
choice either): we are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing out attention to this point.
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minimize users’ costs and efforts in understanding provider countries’ domes-
tic ABS frameworks.12
The task of providing information on applicable rules and procedures or 
prospective users seeking access to traditional knowledge is qualified by the 
phrase ‘where possible.’ This may imply that in the case of countries with vari-
ous, geographically remote or voluntarily isolated indigenous and local com-
munities, the national focal point may not be aware of, and therefore be unable 
to share, relevant information. It remains to each Party, therefore, to clarify the 
extent of the role of national focal points with regard to these communities’ 
requirements for access to traditional knowledge. This determination is to be 
made with the effective participation of the indigenous and local communi-
ties concerned,13 in light of Parties’ obligation to raise awareness and support 
the development of community protocols and procedures14 and to take into 
consideration their customary laws, protocols and procedures.15 These provi-
sions are to be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with relevant 
international human rights norms and standards.16
The task of providing information on competent national authorities, as well 
as on relevant indigenous and local communities and stakeholders17 does not 
make reference to access. Consequently, Article 13(1) only provides an explicit 
indication of the role of national focal points in user countries, in addition to 
being the liaison with the Protocol Secretariat. It is left to the broad discretion 
of Parties to determine the role of national focal points when a State acts as the 
user country in a specific ABS transaction.
3 Competent National Authorities
Competent national authorities must be authorized by a Party to act on its 
behalf 18 in relation to two implementation functions: first, granting access or 
issuing written evidence that access requirements have been met; and second, 
12 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 144; see also discussion of information to be 
provided: ibid., 145–146.
13 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2).
14 Nagoya Protocol Articles 21(i) and 12(3)(a). See this commentary on Article 21.
15 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
16 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
17 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(1)(c).
18 As suggested in relation to the corresponding provision in the Biosafety Protocol by 
Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 129–130.
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advising on procedures and requirements for PIC and MAT. As a consequence, 
although Article 13(2) clearly indicates that ‘each Party’ should designate com-
petent national authorities, it remains unclear what tasks will be performed by 
relevant officers in user countries.19
As to the advisory role of competent national authorities, this is a comple-
mentary function to that of the national focal point. In that regard, the Protocol 
provides significantly less details than the Bonn Guidelines. The latter specify 
that competent national authorities should be responsible for advising on: the 
negotiating process and the requirements for obtaining PIC and establishing 
MAT; monitoring and evaluation of ABS agreements; implementation/enforce-
ment of ABS agreements; processing of applications and approval of agree-
ments; conservation and sustainable use of the genetic resources accessed; 
mechanisms for the effective participation of different stakeholders, as appro-
priate for the different steps in the process of ABS, in particular indigenous and 
local communities; and mechanisms for the effective participation of commu-
nities, while promoting the objective of having decisions and processes avail-
able in a language understandable to relevant communities.20 A Party may opt 
for introducing such guidance in its national legislation in that regard.21
As to its role regarding access, the Protocol envisages that the national com-
petent authority will be necessarily tasked with issuing written evidence that 
access requirements have been met.22 The Protocol also indicates that the 
same authority may be mandated under the domestic ABS framework to grant 
access (i.e., provide PIC and engage in MAT negotiations). Notably, the provi-
sion is silent on whether national competent authorities are responsible for 
submitting permits to the ABS Clearinghouse,23 thereby elevating them to an 
internationally recognized certificate of compliance.24 It can be argued that 
to enhance legal certainty and predictability at the international level, domes-
tic ABS legislation could specify that competent national authorities are the 
only authorized to submitting permits to the ABS Clearinghouse. In addition, 
through a combined reading of several Protocol provisions, it could be argued 
that national competent authorities in user countries will be responsible for 
19 We are grateful to Tomme Young for a useful exchange of ideas on this provision.
20 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 14(1). We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our 
attention to this point.
21 See Introduction to this commentary, section 2. 
22 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2). This complements the obligation under Article 6(3)(d).
23 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(c). This is also the case of Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e): 
we are grateful to Evanson Chege Kamau for drawing our attention to this point.
24 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2). See this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
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managing the information received by checkpoints25 and posting this and 
other required information to the ABS Clearinghouse, as appropriate.26 In 
combination with the requirement that Parties notify the Secretariat of the 
contact information of their national focal point and competent authorities,27 
this would further enhance legal certainty and assist in maintaining the integ-
rity and accuracy of the information in the ABS Clearinghouse.28
As revealed by the expression ‘as applicable,’ however, the Protocol does not 
prevent Parties (or their national competent authority in that regard)29 from 
delegating the power to grant access to other individuals or entities.30 That 
may be the case of Parties deciding to use a decentralized system of grant-
ing access due to the federal or devolved nature of government,31 or Parties 
preferring to delegate such power to non-State entities, such as genebanks or 
research centers. In addition, in the case of genetic resources held by indig-
enous and local communities32 and/or traditional knowledge, the authority 
to grant PIC or approval and involvement will be found within the relevant 
communities. This determination is to be made with the effective participa-
tion of the indigenous and local communities concerned,33 taking into con-
sideration these communities’ customary laws, protocols and procedures.34 
Once again, Parties’ obligation under the Protocol to support the development 
25 See Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iii), which requires information from checkpoints 
to be provided to ‘relevant national authorities.’ See also this commentary on Article 17, 
section 2.
26 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2).
27 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(4).
28 This would result in avoiding the posting of drafts by organizations or individuals – a 
problem experienced with the Biosafety Clearinghouse. See Tomme Young, “Use of the 
Biosafety Clearing-house in Practise,” in Legal Aspects of Implementing the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, ed. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Frederic Perron-Welch and 
Christine Frison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 137. 
29 As also foreseen in the Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 14(2).
30 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 459 fn. 22.
31 For a more general discussion of questions of multi-level governance of ABS arising 
from the implementation of the Protocol in context of federal or highly decentralised 
States, see Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 264–266; and 
Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 277 and 287–292.
32 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2).
33 See fn. 13 above.
34 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1).
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of community protocols and procedures35 is relevant to this end, as are inter-
national human rights norms and standards.36 As noted above, for reasons 
of legal certainty and predictability at the international level, the designated 
competent authorities notified to the Secretariat would be the ones issuing 
written evidence that access requirements have been met.
The Protocol explicitly allows Parties to designate more than one compe-
tent national authority, and to specify the nature of their ABS-related (deci-
sional or administrative) authority in detail, so each of these authorities could 
be responsible to grant access on genetic resources of different nature or for 
different intended uses.37 The Protocol thus specifically requires Parties choos-
ing to designate more than one competent national authority, to inform the 
Secretariat about which authority is responsible for dealing with which type of 
genetic resources.38 As a result, specific institutional arrangements for grant-
ing access may vary significantly from one Party to another, and Parties will be 
well advised to set out in detail in their domestic ABS frameworks the specific 
arrangements for granting PIC.39 In that respect, a distinction will likely be 
drawn between access in situ and ex situ. As regards the former, the decision-
making process for reaching a decision on access is likely to involve a wide 
range of national authorities, including those involved in the implementation 
of other relevant international obligations, such as under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species and on animal and plant health,40 
or under the law of the sea,41 as well as stakeholders. Parties thus will be well 
advised to spell out in their national ABS frameworks the specific domestic 
procedures for consultations to be carried out prior to granting access,42 or 
to devise a ‘one-stop-shop’ system to streamline procedures.43 The latter may 
35 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(a).
36 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
37 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 146.
38 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(4).
39 Particularly in view of the Protocol requirement for a clear and transparent written 
decision on access, in a cost-effective manner and within a reasonable period of time: 
Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(d).
40 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
41 Salpin, “Law of the Sea,” op. cit., 168.
42 As suggested in relation to the corresponding provision in the Biosafety Protocol by 
Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 130.
43 E.g., Institute for European Environmental Policy, “Study to analyse legal and eco-
nomic aspects of implementing the Nagoya Protocol on ABS in the European Union,” 
(undated) accessed 1 November 2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/
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also be useful in situations where access to one or more samples is sought from 
a collection in a provider country.44
international/abs/pdf/ABS%20FINAL%20REPORT%20-%20Annexes.pdf>, 28; Martin 
Brink, “Implementation of Access and Benefit Sharing Policies in Sub-Sahara Africa: 
Inventory, Analysis and Proposals” (June 2013), accessed 11 November 2013, <http://
edepot.wur.nl/280508>, 13 and 19. See also discussion in Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd 
Winter, “Streamlining Access Procedures and Standards,” in Kamau and Winter, Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law, op. cit., 38.
44 At least in the case of the EU, it appears that it is mostly university-based researchers 
and scientists affiliated with ex situ collections that engage in bioprospecting activities, 
usually with an explicitly non-commercial purpose. Commercial users of genetic 
resources, in contrast, rarely collect genetic resources in the wild but source new material 
from collections, except in some particular niches of innovation, such as the biocontrol 
industry, parts of industrial biotechnology, and some small pharmaceutical biotechnology 
companies. See European Commission, Impact Assessment (Part 1), SWD(2012) 292 
final, 15.
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Article 14. The Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House and Information Sharing
1. An Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House is hereby established as 
part of the clearing-house mechanism under Article 18, paragraph 3, 
of the Convention. It shall serve as a means for sharing of informa-
tion related to access and benefit-sharing. In particular, it shall pro-
vide access to information made available by each Party relevant to 
the implementation of this Protocol.
2. Without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, each 
Party shall make available to the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-
House any information required by this Protocol, as well as informa-
tion required pursuant to the decisions taken by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The 
information shall include:
(a) Legislative, administrative and policy measures on access and 
benefit-sharing;
(b) Information on the national focal point and competent national 
authority or authorities; and
(c) Permits or their equivalent issued at the time of access as evi-
dence of the decision to grant prior informed consent and of the 
establishment of mutually agreed terms.
3. Additional information, if available and as appropriate, may include:
(a) Relevant competent authorities of indigenous and local commu-
nities, and information as so decided;
(b) Model contractual clauses;
(c) Methods and tools developed to monitor genetic resources; and
(d) Codes of conduct and best practices.
4. The modalities of the operation of the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House, including reports on its activities, shall be consid-
ered and decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first meeting, and kept 
under review thereafter.
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1 Overview
Article 14 is a key provision for the effective and transparent implementa-
tion of the Protocol. It establishes an international clearinghouse (the ABS 
Clearinghouse) to share information on ABS, that is linked to the pre-existing 
CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism. It further places an obligation on Parties to 
provide information to the ABS Clearinghouse, distinguishing between infor-
mation to be provided on a mandatory and a voluntary basis. Notably, Article 14 
also raises the issue of confidentiality concerns in ABS transactions.
The implementation of Article 14, however, poses a number of legal ques-
tions. In the following sections, the link between the ABS Clearinghouse and 
the CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism will be discussed. Attention will then be 
turned to the functions of the ABS Clearinghouse, the type of information to 
be included in it, and outstanding legal issues.
2 Link with the CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism
The ABS Clearinghouse will be ‘part’ of the CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism.1 
The latter aims to promote ‘international technical and scientific coopera-
tion in the field of the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity’ and 
consists of the CBD website, including its Information Centre, the network of 
national clearinghouse mechanisms and various partner institutions.2
It can be expected that the ABS Clearinghouse will be created along the lines 
of the CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism. This implies taking into account the 
CBD COP decisions that have gradually spelt out the latter’s characteristics and 
procedures, such as: compatibility with national capacities; need-driven and 
decentralized functioning; access to metadata; support to decision-making; 
and involvement of the private sector to the extent possible.3 Similarly to the 
Biosafety Protocol, Article 14 puts the Protocol’s governing body in charge of 
1 Established under CBD Article 18(3). For an introduction, see box 35 in Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 132–133.
2 CBD Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Clearing-house, “Issues for consideration in the Establishment of the Access and Benefit-
Sharing Clearing-house” (22 March 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 9. 
Note that this is a study commissioned by the CBD Secretariat to support intergovernmental 
discussions.
3 Ibid., paragraph 10.
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determining how the ABS Clearinghouse will operate and of keeping its func-
tioning under review.4
That being said, both the CBD Clearinghouse Mechanism and Biosafety 
Clearinghouse have been, according to critics, ‘underutilized’ and ‘developed 
rather haphazardly.’5 It has thus been observed that the shortcomings of the 
existing mechanisms under the international biodiversity regime should be 
taken in serious consideration in designing the ABS Clearinghouse.6 The inter-
governmental negotiations preparing for the entry into force of the Protocol 
have in effect identified the need to implement the ABS Clearinghouse in a 
phased manner,7 with a pilot phase being put in place at the time of writ-
ing with a view to refining the draft modalities of operation of the ABS 
Clearinghouse on the basis of preliminary experience in the implementation 
of the pilot phase.8
The experience gained in the framework of the ITPGRFA could also be use-
ful to that end. At the time of writing, the Informal Advisory Committee to 
the pilot phase of the ABS Clearinghouse has already considered the relevance 
of an information technology system developed in support of users of the 
ITPGRFA Multilateral System – the ‘Easy-SMTA.’ The Easy-SMTA supports users 
in generating standard material transfer agreements and reporting on these 
agreements to the ITPGRFA Governing Body.9
4 Biosafety Protocol Article 20(4). For a commentary, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide 
to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 132. 
5 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 473.
6 We are grateful to Tomme Young for sharing her views on some of the shortcomings of the 
CBD and Biosafety Clearinghouses. On the Biosafety Clearinghouse, see generally Young, 
“Use of the Biosafety Clearing-house in Practise,” op. cit.
7 ICNP Recommendation 1/1, “The modalities of operation of the Access and Benefit-
sharing Clearing-house” in ICNP, “Report of the first meeting of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization” (21 July 2011) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/8.
8 CBD Decision 11/1, “Status of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization and related develop-
ments” (5 December 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, section C, paragraph 2. See also 
“ABS Clearinghouse,” CBD, accessed 30 November 2013, <http://absch.cbd.int/>.
9 See CBD, “Summary of outcomes of the meeting of the Informal Advisory Committee to 
the Pilot Phase of the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-house” (2–4 October 2013) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/ABS/IAC-CH/1/3. Easy-SMTA combines the SMTA generating and report-
ing functions, which enable data to flow into a secure Data Store, with two additional tools: 
the Online SMTA Generating and Reporting, which supports the full SMTA workflow with 
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3 The Functions of the ABS Clearinghouse
Article 14(1) quite succinctly indicates that the overall function of the ABS 
Clearinghouse will be ‘sharing of information’ related to ABS and, in particular, 
‘providing access to information made available by each Party relevant to the 
implementation of this Protocol.’10 The provision does not indicate whether 
access to all or part of the information will be open to the general public, 
although practice under the CBD indicates that this will likely be the case for 
a great part of the information to be provided in the ABS Clearinghouse. It 
should also be noted that access to information is a well-established principle 
in international human rights law insofar as it is necessary to give effect to 
other human rights such as the rights to life, private life, or access to justice.11 
Given the relevance of the Nagoya Protocol for the internationally recognized 
human rights of indigenous peoples,12 more general standards related to 
access to information under human rights law may be relevant in the context 
of Article 14.13 In addition, access to information is a well-established principle 
in international environmental law,14 which is relevant for individual providers 
and users, but also the public at large or NGOs interested in following up on the 
implementation of the Protocol.
To a significant extent, the ABS Clearinghouse is intended to function as an 
‘information hub’ for both providers and users and may possibly also assist to 
ascertain their rights and obligations before entering into an ABS transaction 
in a specific country,15 based on the information provided on domestic ABS 
 functions for the generation, revision and acceptable of new SMTAs, as well as for the 
reporting to the ITPGRFA Governing Body on concluded SMTAs; and the Online Reporting 
Form, which addresses exclusively the reporting to the Governing Body on concluded 
SMTAs. See ITPGRFA Secretariat, “Vision paper on the further development of Article 17, 
Global Information System” (24–28 September 2013) FAO Doc IT/GB-5/13/17. 
10 Emphasis added.
11 Alan Boyle, “Environment and Human Rights,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, 
op. cit., paragraph 28.
12 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
13 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 74 and 72.
14 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in “Report of the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development” (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol I), 
Annex (hereinafter, Rio Declaration), Principle 10; Jonas Ebbesson, “Access to Information 
on Environmental Matters,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit. 
15 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 150–151. But note that absence of information 
posted on the ABS Clearinghouse does not provide a defense for an alleged failure to 
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frameworks.16 As indicated elsewhere in the Protocol, the ABS Clearinghouse 
will also provide information for potential users of traditional knowledge 
about their obligations.17 Overall, it can be expected to have a ‘major impact on 
commercial aspects of ABS transactions.’18 Checking information on the ABS 
Clearinghouse may thus likely become a step in the due diligence procedures 
carried out by users.19
In addition, the ABS Clearinghouse may help keeping tabs of progress in 
national implementation of the Protocol; as well as cross-checking informa-
tion provided by checkpoints on PIC, source of genetic resources, establish-
ment of MAT and/or utilization of genetic resources.20 The ABS Clearinghouse 
may also contribute to capacity building21 and awareness raising.22 It will store 
information on capacity-building initiatives, with a view to promoting synergy 
and coordination on capacity-building on ABS,23 and by sharing information 
it will itself build capacity and raise awareness. Finally, the ABS Clearinghouse 
may also provide an opportunity for national authorities of various countries 
to network with one another, as well as with providers, users and experts in 
other jurisdictions. It may also possibly facilitate communication between one 
country’s ABS national focal point, competent national authorities and other 
national authorities under other international environmental agreements.24
4 Types of Information
Article 14 leaves quite some discretion as to the type of information that 
should be included in the ABS Clearinghouse, by making reference to infor-
mation that is ‘relevant for the implementation of the Protocol’ and is to be 
comply with the domestic ABS frameworks: we are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing 
our attention to this point.
16 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(a).
17 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(2). See this commentary on Article 12, section 3.
18 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 469.
19 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point. On users’ due 
diligence (as opposed to States’ due diligence under the Protocol), see Conclusion to this 
commentary, section 3.
20 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iii). See this commentary on Article 17, section 2.
21 See this commentary on Article 22.
22 See this commentary on Article 21.
23 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(6). CBD, “Issues for consideration in the Establishment of the 
ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 4.
24 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 473–475.
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provided, updated and processed through national focal points and/or compe-
tent national authorities.25
Article 14(2) indicates information that should be mandatorily provided to 
the ABS Clearinghouse, notably information relating to domestic ABS frame-
works26 that will be the basis of the cooperation between provider and user 
countries and will determine the conditions for ABS among users and provid-
ers. In addition, Parties are to provide information on the national focal point 
and competent national authorities, which in case of multiple authorities27 
must be accompanied by information on the respective responsibilities and 
specifications as to which authorities are responsible for specific genetic 
resources.28
The third type of mandatory information is ‘permits or their equivalent 
issued at the time of access as evidence of the decision to grant PIC and of the 
establishment of MAT.’29 This is linked to the obligation for Parties to notify the 
ABS Clearinghouse of the issuance of a permit granting PIC,30 and the related 
indication that permits made available on the ABS Clearinghouse ‘shall consti-
tute an internationally recognized certificate of compliance.’31 The Protocol, 
however, does not clarify specifically how information about domestic permits 
will be made available to the ABS Clearinghouse. A decision of the Protocol’s 
governing body is therefore necessary to choose either to place an electronic 
copy of each permit into the Clearinghouse, although these would have dif-
fering formats and possibly be submitted in different languages; or place the 
information contained in the domestic permit into a common format,32 as was 
the case for the Biosafety Clearinghouse.33 At the time of writing, it appears 
from the intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the entry into force of 
25 See this commentary on Article 13.
26 See discussion on difference in terminology in Nagoya Protocol Articles 5–7 and 15–16 in 
this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1.
27 In accordance with Nagoya Protocol Article 13(4).
28 CBD, “Issues for consideration in the establishment of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/
CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 3.
29 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(c).
30 Which is ‘alluded to’ in Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e), as underlined by Young, 
“An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 470.
31 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2).
32 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 470–471.
33 ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Clearing-house” (2 May 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 7.
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the Protocol that a common format will likely be used for all information being 
included in the ABS Clearinghouse.34
In addition, it has been considered ‘not entirely clear’ if some verification 
of the permits (or information on permits) will be carried out at the interna-
tional level, particularly if they are posted by individuals that do not appear 
to be the national competent authority issuing the permit.35 That may be the 
case of national competent authorities of user countries36 that are expected 
to receive information on permits provided by their users to their checkpoints 
and to provide such information to the ABS Clearinghouse.37 In addition, 
as Article 14 does not exclude that information may be provided to the ABS 
Clearinghouse by entities other than national authorities, intergovernmental 
organizations and other stakeholders may also provide information to the ABS 
Clearinghouse. While such information may be useful for the Protocol’s imple-
mentation, managing possible conflicts or uncertainty that may arise vis-à-vis 
the information provided by Parties may become necessary.38 At the time of 
writing, there are indications that metadata about the record, including status 
and who published a record, is likely to be made publicly available, and that 
a clear distinction is likely to be made between records that have been vali-
dated by governments and records that have been made available by others.39 
In addition, discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of having one 
single person responsible for authorizing the publication of national records 
34 CBD, “Summary of outcomes of the meeting of the Informal Advisory Committee to the 
Pilot Phase of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/IAC-CH/1/3.
35 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 470. 
36 See this commentary on Article 13, section 3, noting that the Protocol is silent on the 
duties of user-country Parties’ competent national authorities.
37 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iii), where it is not clear whether the checkpoints 
themselves will submit such information to the ABS Clearinghouse (‘such 
information . . . will . . . be provided’). It can be argued, however, that for reasons of legal 
certainty and practicality at the international level, the national competent authorities 
should be the only ones submitting information to the ABS Clearinghouse (this would 
indeed allow for easier receipt at the international level, as Parties are obliged to notify 
who these authorities are to the CBD Secretariat: Nagoya Protocol Article 13(4)). Indeed, 
at the time of writing, intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the Protocol’s entry 
into force have concluded that the information being provided to the ABS Clearinghouse 
under Article 17(1)(a)(iii) would be published by the national publishing authority: 
see CBD, “Summary of outcomes of the meeting of the Informal Advisory Committee to 
the Pilot Phase of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/IAC-CH/1/3.
38 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
39 Ibid.
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in the ABS Clearinghouse have resulted in the proposal for a ‘national publish-
ing authority’ validating records entered by authorized national users.40
The provisions on mandatory information to be included in the ABS 
Clearinghouse should be read in conjunction with the minimum information 
required for the internationally recognized certificate of compliance spelt out 
elsewhere in the Protocol, namely: issuing authority, date of issuance, provider, 
unique identifier of the certificate, person or entity to whom PIC was granted, 
subject-matter or genetic resource covered by the certificate; confirmation that 
MAT were established; confirmation that PIC was obtained; and commercial or 
non-commercial use.41 The reference to permits or ‘their equivalent’ includes 
the voluntary use of the ITPGR standard Material Transfer Agreement for trans-
fers of plant genetic resources falling outside ITPGR Annex I,42 leaving flexibil-
ity to Parties to include information on the SMTA in the ABS Clearinghouse 
rather than issuing an additional permit. Statutory collection permissions or 
reliance on long-standing agreements between institutions and governments 
may also be covered by the term ‘their equivilent’.43
The accuracy of information provided in permits, and the need for updat-
ing or amending a certificate,44 represent a specific concern. In effect, over 
the twenty years of experience in ABS transactions accrued before the conclu-
sion of the Protocol negotiations, users have noted problems in understanding 
whether an ABS permit is ‘final’ – in other words, no longer subject to appeal, 
alteration or withdrawal.45 Intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the 
entry into force of the Protocol have likely clarified that the ABS Clearinghouse 
should allow Parties to amend or update submitted information in a way that 
preserves legal certainty, clarity and transparency in accordance with the 
Protocol, particularly in the case of a permit or its equivalent, if necessary and 
if mutually agreed, to reflect new circumstances relating to the utilization of 
the genetic resource.46 In such instances, the original permit or its equivalent 
40 Ibid. It can be argued that such a body could likely be the national focal point or the 
national competent authority: we are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention 
to this point.
41 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4). CBD, “Issues for consideration in the Establishment of the 
ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 4.
42 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 104.
43 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
44 CBD, “Issues for consideration in the Establishment of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/
CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 6.
45 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 472.
46 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
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should be retained in archived form.47 According to the expert group on the 
ABS Clearinghouse, ‘circumstances warranting updating a permit may include 
the subsequent taxonomic identification of new species collected under the 
permit or the inclusion of information that would enhance legal certainty, 
such as evidence of compliance with permit conditions and/or with [MAT].’48
Article 14(3) lists types of information that may be provided on a voluntary 
basis, including methods and tools developed to monitor genetic resources,49 
model contractual clauses50 and codes of conduct and best practices.51 In this 
connection, the ABS Clearinghouse can contribute to peer learning and bottom-
up development of the international ABS regime. Significantly, Article 14(3) also 
points to the need to include information on relevant competent authorities of 
indigenous and local communities and information on genetic resources held 
by them and traditional knowledge as so decided, in light of the Protocol provi-
sions related to these communities. Parties are expected to involve these com-
munities in making available through the ABS Clearinghouse measures related 
to ABS for the utilization of traditional knowledge.52 Community protocols 
and procedures53 could also be made available through the ABS Clearinghouse 
with a view to raising awareness.54 Another key legal question relates to the 
submission and management of information from indigenous and local com-
munities, and particularly the extent to which these communities could retain 
control over information submitted by them. The intergovernmental nego-
tiations preparing for the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol resulted in 
a recommendation that in the context of the guidance on the pilot phase, 
Parties ‘could consider’ the establishment of ‘community contact points’ for 
the ABS Clearinghouse to facilitate effective participation of indigenous and 
local communities.55
47 ICNP Recommendation 1/1, paragraph 11.
48 ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the ABS Clearing-
house,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 7.
49 Nagoya Protocol Article 17.
50 See this commentary on Article 19.
51 See this commentary on Article 20.
52 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(2). This was suggested in CBD, “Issues for consideration in the 
Establishment of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 4.
53 In light of Article 12(1). On community protocols, see commentary on Article 12 sec-
tion 2.1.
54 Nagoya Protocol Article 21(i). This is discussed in CBD, “Issues for consideration in the 
Establishment of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 22.
55 ICNP Recommendation 1/1, paragraph 10.
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Overall, nothing in the Protocol prevents the inclusion of additional infor-
mation beyond what is required or specifically suggested. For instance, it 
would be interesting to provide information on bilateral, regional and multi-
lateral ABS and ABS-related agreements and arrangements,56 as is specifically 
required under the Biosafety Protocol.57 This type of information, as well as fur-
ther information on domestic ABS frameworks, would be particularly impor-
tant when implementing Parties’ obligation under the Protocol to encourage 
non-Parties to submit information to the ABS Clearinghouse.58
5 Outstanding Legal Issues
The intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the entry into force of the 
Protocol have identified the need for Parties to reach common understanding 
on a series of legal questions that arise from the Protocol provisions on the ABS 
Clearinghouse.59
First, Article 14(2) points to the need to address situations of confidentiality,60 
which is also recalled elsewhere in relation to checkpoints collecting informa-
tion on PIC.61 The Protocol, however, does not provide any indication as to 
the kind of information that could be regarded as confidential or how such 
information should be protected.62 The Protocol leaves this determination to 
national law, which varies greatly from one country to another in the matter 
of confidentiality.63 As a result, uncertainty arises as to whether the domes-
tic law of the user country, provider country or other country may apply,64 
although it may be argued that the applicable law would be that of the country 
56 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
57 Biosafety Protocol, Article 20(3)(b).
58 See this commentary on Article 24. See discussion on the US in Burton, “Implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries,” op. cit., 323.
59 ICNP Recommendation 2/4, “Modalities of operation of the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing house” (26 July 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/REC/2/4, paragraph 6; and ICNP 
Recommendation 1/1, paragraph 1.
60 See also reference to confidentiality in Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4).
61 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iii).
62 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 153, where a comparison is drawn with the 
stand-alone article on confidential information in the Biosafety Protocol Article 21 and 
comments by Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 137 ff.
63 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 471–472. 
64 Ibid.
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providing information to the ABS Clearinghouse.65 It would be particularly 
useful for the Protocol’s governing body to clarify the matter.66 Indeed, inter-
governmental negotiations preparing for the entry into force of the Protocol 
have considered whether no confidential information should be made avail-
able to the ABS Clearinghouse; whether the ABS Clearinghouse could receive 
confidential information and keep it confidential until confidentiality is no 
longer required;67 or whether only partial information could be posted, with 
the explicit clarification that portions of information are left out for reasons of 
confidentiality.68 Reasons for confidentiality may vary, ranging from commer-
cial confidentiality to protect the economic interests of users, matters affect-
ing national security, secret knowledge of indigenous and local communities, 
and the need to protect biodiversity from possible damage (with regard, for 
instance, to the location of rare and fragile species or ecosystems).69 At the 
time of writing, intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the entry into 
force of the Protocol appear oriented to conclude that confidential informa-
tion should not be submitted to the ABS Clearinghouse, as all information pub-
lished there is likely going to be publicly available.70
Second, questions arising from the combined reading of Articles 14 and 17 
that may require further intergovernmental negotiations include third-party 
transfers,71 which could be disclosed together with other information on the 
internationally recognized certificate to enhance legal certainty, although there 
is no provision to that end in the Protocol. Questions also concern the tracking 
of the utilization of genetic resources;72 and the identification of genetic 
65 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
66 Joji Cariño et al., Nagoya Protocol, op. cit., 103.
67 ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the ABS Clearing-
house,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 7.
68 CBD, “Issues for consideration in the Establishment of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/
CBD/ABS/EM-CH/1/2, paragraph 5.
69 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
70 CBD, “Summary of outcomes of the meeting of the Informal Advisory Committee to the 
Pilot Phase of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ABS/IAC-CH/1/3.
71 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(3). See ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities 
of Operation of the ABS Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 17(c). It should 
be recalled that Article 6(3)(g)(iii) does not create an obligation to include as a minimum 
requirement for MAT in domestic ABS frameworks clauses on third party transfers (‘may 
include’): see this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
72 ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the ABS 
Clearing-house,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 7. Note discussion on ‘tracking’ in this 
commentary on Article 17, section 2.1.
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resources covered by a certificate,73 in case of changes in taxonomic nomencla-
ture resulting from scientific research, or following changes in identification.74
73 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4)(f).
74 ICNP, “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Modalities of Operation of the ABS Clearing-
house,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, paragraph 7.
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Article 15. Compliance with Domestic Legislation 
or Regulatory Requirements on Access and 
Benefit-sharing
1. Each Party shall take appropriate, effective and proportionate leg-
islative, administrative or policy measures to provide that genetic 
resources utilized within its jurisdiction have been accessed in accor-
dance with prior informed consent and that mutually agreed terms 
have been established, as required by the domestic access and benefit-
sharing legislation or regulatory requirements of the other Party.
2. Parties shall take appropriate, effective and proportionate measures 
to address situations of non-compliance with measures adopted in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above.
3. Parties shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate in cases 
of alleged violation of domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation 
or regulatory requirements referred to in paragraph 1 above.
1 Overview
Article 15 is the first of a series of provisions on compliance, that as a whole 
address both the development of domestic measures in provider and user 
countries and forms of international cooperation.1 These can be considered 
the ‘most far-reaching innovations of the Protocol . . . with a view to ensur-
ing PIC and benefit-sharing.’2 Together with the creation of an international 
compliance committee under the Protocol,3 Articles 15–18 form the compli-
ance pillar of the Protocol.4 They are aimed to address long-standing concerns 
about the difficulty for provider countries alone to prevent, detect or obtain 
1 See also Nagoya Protocol Articles 16–18.
2 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 3.
3 See this commentary on Article 30.
4 CBD Access and Benefit-sharing Friends of the Co-Chairs Meeting, “Paper on selected key 
issues submitted by the Co-Chairs” (26–29 January 2010), paragraphs 10–14.
250 Article 15
remedy from breaches of their domestic ABS measures related to their genetic 
resources when they are utilized in another country.5
Article 15 focuses on compliance with domestic ABS frameworks on genetic 
resources, whereas compliance with domestic ABS frameworks on traditional 
knowledge is addressed in a separate, similarly worded provision.6 Both are 
aimed at achieving the Protocol’s objective, i.e. ensuring fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing,7 by creating obligations for Parties with users in their jurisdic-
tion to take measures to support compliance with PIC and MAT established 
in the provider country.8 Specifically, Article 15 creates three sets of obliga-
tions for State Parties (be they predominantly user or provider countries) with 
respect to compliance by individual users: 1) an obligation to adopt domestic 
measures to ‘provide’ for the respect of provider countries’ national ABS mea-
sures related to PIC and MAT; 2) an obligation to enforce the user countries’ 
domestic measures providing for the respect of provider countries’ national 
ABS measures related to PIC and MAT; and 3) an obligation to cooperate with 
other States in addressing the violation of provider countries’ national ABS 
measures.
The following sections will first clarify which specific instance of ‘compli-
ance’ is addressed by Articles 15 and 16, and then address each obligation 
under Article 15 in turn, discussing key interpretative questions. These include 
the details of the obligation to enact domestic measures; the practical implica-
tions of the obligation to enforce these measures; and the situations in which 
international cooperation may be needed.
5 Glowka and Normand, “The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 34. 
See also on national measures to support compliance with PIC, CBD Working Group on ABS, 
“Measures to support compliance with prior informed consent of the contracting party pro-
viding genetic resources and mutually agreed terms on which access was granted, in con-
tracting parties with users of such resources under their jurisdiction” (2 December 2005) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/4/INF/1; and on claims of misappropriations, CBD Working 
Group on ABS, “Analysis of claims of unauthorised access and misappropriation of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge” (22 December 2005) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/4/INF/6.
6 See this commentary on Article 16.
7 See this commentary on Article 1, section 2.
8 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 35.
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2 ‘Compliance’ under Articles 15 and 16: Context and Responses 
to Conceptual Challenges
It should be preliminarily emphasized that the Nagoya Protocol refers to ‘com-
pliance’ not only in the traditional sense under international environmental 
law of State Parties’ respect for their international obligations,9 but also to 
address the case of users’ compliance with domestic ABS requirements and pri-
vate-law contractual arrangements (MAT) – where users will most likely be pri-
vate individuals or entities.10 Therefore, as opposed to the Protocol provision 
on a multilateral system to address cases of non-compliance with international 
ABS obligations by State Parties under Article 30, Articles 15–18 extend the 
bilateral approach to ABS transactions to issues of compliance with domestic 
ABS requirements and contractual arrangements.11 In other words, the Protocol 
promotes the creation of ‘direct lines of communication between a Party pro-
viding genetic resources and a Party with users in its jurisdiction that may have 
violated the former’s ABS requirements,’12 rather than requiring a harmonized 
approach to compliance among all Parties.13 Against this background, under 
Articles 15 and 16, the Protocol focuses on a specific case of lack of compliance 
with domestic ABS frameworks and MAT, namely, misappropriation14 – the 
9 The term has been used to avoid the diplomatically more ‘explosive’ term ‘violation’ of 
international environmental law: Jan Klabbers, “Compliance Procedures,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, ed. Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and 
Ellen Hey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 997, 1007.
10 See ENB, “Summary of the First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 5–10 June 2011,” vol. 9 no. 551, 
13 June 2011, 12; and discussion in Elisa Morgera, “First Meeting of the Intergovernmental 
Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 247; and Young, “An International 
Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 459.
11 Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 292.
12 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 35.
13 Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 292.
14 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 424. The terms ‘misappropriation’ 
and ‘misuse’ were referred to in the negotiations of the Protocol CBD, “Report of the 
eighth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-
sharing” (20 November 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.2, paragraphs 84–86; 
and draft article 1 in the Cali Draft. While these two terms were not included in the final 
text of the Protocol, they continue to be used in ABS literature: see Glowka and Normand, 
“Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit.; Chiarolla, “Role of Private 
International Law,” op. cit., and Young, “International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit.
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violation by a user of the requirements of a provider country for obtaining and 
respecting PIC at the time of access15 and establishing contractual arrange-
ments in accordance with domestic ABS frameworks.
Articles 15 and 16, therefore, seek to address a series of conceptual difficul-
ties arising in the context of ABS under the CBD. The first conceptual difficulty 
concerns the fact that while benefit-sharing according to the CBD rests on an 
inter-State approach, in practice it is mostly private actors that manage trans-
actions of genetic resources and produce benefits to be shared.16 The second, 
consequent difficulty is that PIC is normally issued as an administrative deci-
sion governed by domestic public and/or administrative law, whereas MAT are 
normally set out in contracts under private law that are governed, to differ-
ing extents, by contractual freedom and by, in situations involving more than 
one jurisdiction, private international law.17 Matters may be further compli-
cated when the authority to grant PIC is attributed to non-State entities such 
as research institutes, in which case PIC is embodied in a private-law act and 
possibly combined with MAT; and when public authorities may include in 
their PIC certain standard contractual clauses, so that MAT are to some extent 
embodied in the administrative decision issuing PIC. The CBD reflects these 
conceptual challenges by providing for an obligation of means for all States to 
take measures ‘with the aim of ’ benefit-sharing,18 while clarifying that concrete 
benefit-sharing arrangements must be set out in MAT.19 Beyond this, however, 
the CBD is silent on the specific measures or the mix of specific measures that 
15 Note that the reference to ‘accessed in accordance with prior informed consent’ in Nagoya 
Protocol Article 15(1) can be interpreted as an obligation to carry out a substantive check 
of whether the content of PIC has been complied with at the time of access. On the other 
hand, there seems to be no requirement under the Protocol for a substantive check of 
compliance with the content of PIC after the time of access.
16 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 82; and Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 48.
17 See generally Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit.; and also Tvedt, 
“Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 172.
18 CBD Article 15(7).
19 Concrete benefit-sharing arrangements in MAT are thus linked to decision-making on 
access by Parties providing genetic resources: see CBD Articles 15(4–5). As discussed 
in the Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3 and fn. 81 and this commentary 
on Articles 5, section 5, and 6, section 2, however, MAT may entail two contractual 
negotiations (at the time of access and possibly at a later stage, if the benefit-sharing 
clauses need to be adjusted because the value of the genetic resources has become clearer 
as a result of research).
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must be taken by Parties to ensure compliance with domestic requirements 
and contractual clauses on benefit-sharing.
Such specific measures have, however, been identified by the Bonn 
Guidelines in a non-exhaustive manner:
 • mechanisms to provide information to potential users on their obligations 
regarding access to genetic resources;
 • measures encouraging the disclosure of the country of origin of the genetic 
resources and of the origin of traditional knowledge in applications for 
IPRs;
 • measures aimed at preventing the use of genetic resources obtained with-
out the PIC of the Party providing such resources;
 • cooperation between Parties to address alleged infringements of ABS 
agreements;
 • voluntary certification schemes for institutions abiding by ABS rules;
 • measures discouraging unfair trade practices; and
 • measures encouraging users to comply with their contractual obligations 
set out in MAT.20
As ‘virtually none of the user-side legislative requirements set out in the 
Bonn Guidelines have been adopted in any country,’21 there was little relevant 
experience at the time of the negotiations of the Protocol.22 As a result, the 
Protocol leaves considerable flexibility to Parties in deciding which domestic 
measures will be necessary to implement Articles 15 and 16.23 Nonetheless, in 
practice there is an underlying need to achieve inter-operability among Parties’ 
respective domestic ABS frameworks with a view to ensuring that ‘individu-
ally tailored national measures’ work together to support a coherent and 
functioning international ABS framework.24 Thus, although nothing in the 
Protocol requires coordination among Parties in the development of domestic 
ABS measures, exchange of information and consideration of other countries’ 
20 Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 16(d).
21 Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 129; and CBD Secretariat, “Overview of recent 
developments at national and regional levels relating to access and benefit-sharing” 
(30 August 2007) UN Doc UNEP/ CBD/WG-ABS/5/4, paragraph 3.
22 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the meeting of the group of legal and technical 
experts on compliance in the context of the international regime on access and benefit-
sharing” (10 February 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/3.
23 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 163.
24 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 37.
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domestic ABS frameworks will likely occur.25 These exchanges may be facili-
tated by the Protocol’s governing body,26 but may also arise in the context of 
bilateral negotiations among Parties,27 including in the context of capacity-
building activities.28
3 Obligation to Adopt Domestic User-side Measures
Article 15(1) obliges Parties to the Protocol to take domestic user-side mea-
sures. The reference to ‘each Party’ in that regard serves to underline that all 
countries should take such measures in recognition of the fact that no Party is 
uniquely a provider or user country.29 In addition, this reference also indicates 
that a Party that waives its right to PIC remains subject to this obligation, in 
order to support the measures adopted in another Party.30
Under Article 15(1), user countries’ obligations relate only indirectly to the 
breach of the provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks. That is, the obli-
gation is to adopt domestic user-side measures that will relate to a breach of 
domestic provider-side measures on PIC and MAT. In practice, however, the 
breach of the domestic user-side measures is inherently linked to the ‘original’ 
breach of provider-side measures – that is, the misappropriation of genetic 
resources in violation of the PIC requirement and the requirement to estab-
lish MAT in accordance with provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks. 
The following sub-sections will first discuss the meaning of the obligation to 
‘provide’ for the respect for provider-side domestic ABS frameworks, including 
interpretative difficulties arising from the text of Article 15(1), and then discuss 
means of implementation.
3.1 The Obligation to ‘Provide’
Article 15(1) establishes a procedural obligation to ‘provide for’ the respect of 
provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks. Instead of requiring Parties to 
25 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
26 Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
27 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 496–498. See this commentary 
on Article 4, section 3.
28 The Protocol provision on capacity-building specifically mentions the need for assistance 
in developing domestic ABS measures, Nagoya Protocol Article 22(5)(a). See this 
commentary on Article 22.
29 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3.
30 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 160. On State PIC, see Nagoya Protocol 
Article 6(1) and this commentary on Article 6, section 3.1.
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ensure users’ compliance with provider countries’ measures,31 the obligation 
to provide can be interpreted as a procedural duty to confirm that users have 
complied with PIC at the time of access32 and established MAT in accordance 
with the provider countries’ ABS framework. It does not create an obligation 
for each Party to recognize and apply in its jurisdiction the ABS laws of another 
Party where genetic resources had been acquired, and sanction breaches of 
domestic legislation of other Parties by users in its jurisdiction.33 Although 
such an approach is not excluded by the letter of the Protocol, it would in prac-
tice be quite difficult for Parties to enforce a variety of different approaches 
to ABS transactions regulated by different provider countries making use of 
the flexibility for national implementation built into the Protocol.34 Against 
this background, the Protocol arguably requires at a minimum the adop-
tion of domestic user-side measures that would task user countries to check 
the formal issuance of PIC and the formal establishment of MAT in another 
Party.35 This would, as a first step, entail that user countries check the exis-
tence of the internationally recognized certificate of compliance in the ABS 
Clearinghouse.36 This could also possibly entail more than simply requiring 
users to provide a declaration to that end without any form of verification by 
the provider country, particularly as Article 15(1) refers to ‘accordance with’ PIC 
(whereas it refers only to the existence, i.e. the establishment, of MAT). Rather, 
Parties to the Protocol need to exercise due diligence37 in order to confirm that 
31 Negotiators considered and eventually decided against using the term ‘ensure:’ Cali Draft, 
draft Article 12(1), paragraph 98. Agreement on the final wording ‘to provide’ was reached 
in July 2010: see Montreal I Draft, draft article 12(1), 27. Note, however, that the French and 
Spanish versions of the Protocol (that are equally authentic: Nagoya Protocol Article 36) 
use the terms ‘garantir’ and ‘asegurar’, both of which can be translated as ‘to guarantee’ in 
English. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
32 See fn. 15 above.
33 See CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the eighth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing” (20 November 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/8/8, Annex, paragraphs 60–61; Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 173, noting that 
the Protocol does not make the law of a provider country ‘directly enforceable’ under the 
jurisdiction of the user country.
34 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on compliance”, UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/3, paragraphs 16 ff.; ENB 9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of 
the Working Group on ABS”, 9–10.
35 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 163.
36 See this commentary on Article 14, section 3, and on Article 17, section 3.
37 See Conclusions to this commentary, section 3.
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the users under their jurisdiction respected the applicable domestic frame-
work of the provider country.
That being said, although the Protocol does not require user-side mea-
sures for the direct extraterritorial enforcement of domestic ABS frameworks 
of other Parties, these could still be given some extraterritorial application. It 
has in fact been argued that in as far as instances of non-compliance with PIC 
and MAT requirements have to be determined in the user-country jurisdiction, 
provider-country Parties’ domestic ABS frameworks would need to be applied 
in user-country courts to qualify the disputed facts on the merit.38
Three other interpretative questions arise in the context of Article 15(1). One 
interpretative difficulty arises from the difference in wording between the pro-
vider country’s domestic ABS measures mentioned in Article 15(1) (‘legislation 
or regulatory requirements’), which reflects the expression used in Article 6(1), 
and those that are to be adopted under Article 6(3) (‘legislative, administrative 
or policy measures’).39 While in principle these two sets of provisions speak to 
the same set of domestic measures that require PIC and MAT in the provider 
country prior to access to genetic resources, Article 6(3) allows Parties to adopt 
not only legislative, but also administrative or policy measures. Articles 6(1) 
and 15(1) in turn appear to refer only to ABS legal requirements established 
by parliament or the administration. A literal interpretation could lead one to 
understand that only in the case in which the provider country has adopted 
legislation, will it be able to benefit from the user compliance measures under 
Article 15(1).40 In other words, policy or administrative measures on ABS would 
not trigger user countries’ international obligations concerning their individ-
ual users’ compliance under Article 15. A systematic and effectiveness-oriented 
interpretation, however, leads to consider that administrative or policy mea-
sures adopted under Article 6(3) could amount to ‘regulatory requirements’ 
for the purposes of Article 15(1) as long as they are properly publicized, under-
standable, internally coherent and containing clear indications about the need 
to obtain PIC and establish MAT (both in writing), and on benefit-sharing.41 
In that regard, even if a Party encounters difficulty in passing legislation on 
ABS immediately following the entry into force of the Protocol, it would be 
38 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 440.
39 The same terminological discrepancy can be found when comparing Nagoya Protocol 
Articles 16 and 7 on PIC and MAT for access to traditional knowledge: see this commentary 
on Article 16, section 2.
40 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 169.
41 In that regard, the ABS Clearinghouse could be used to publicize the measures, according 
to Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(a). 
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well advised to establish policy or administrative measures that are publi-
cized, clear and comprehensive, with a view to benefitting from the compli-
ance provisions of the Protocol.42 A good-faith interpretation of Articles 6 and 
15 also leads to this conclusion, in particular in consideration of the explicitly 
acknowledged capacity issues of developing countries in developing domestic 
ABS measures.43 The absence of any domestic measure amounting to domes-
tic ‘regulatory requirements’ on ABS would deprive provider countries of their 
possibility to trigger user countries’ international obligations on their users’ 
compliance under Article 15.44
Another element of Article 15(1) in need of clarification is the reference to 
‘the other Party’, as opposed to the expression used elsewhere in the Protocol 
‘the Party providing [genetic] resources that is the country of origin or a Party 
that acquired genetic resources in accordance with the Convention’.45 It has 
been argued that the expression ‘the other Party’ refers ‘the Party that factu-
ally provided the material and issued PIC.’46 This would suggest that Parties 
where genetic resources are utilized must accept PIC decisions of other Parties 
and internationally recognized certificates of compliance at their face value. In 
other words, unless there are indications to the contrary, user countries would 
not be expected to check whether sovereign claims of provider countries over 
the genetic resources at stake are well founded.47 The potential for this inter-
pretation to lead to contradictory results has, however, been highlighted. It 
may allow a Party to be in compliance with the Protocol even if it only takes 
measures to ensure compliance with domestic ABS requirements of interme-
diary countries regardless of whether the genetic resources have been legally 
acquired by such countries.48 The provision may further be interpreted so 
that possible disputes about sovereignty claims over genetic resources would 
42 Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 254.
43 The Nagoya Protocol specifically acknowledges these challenges in Article 22(4)(c).
44 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 164, who notes that ‘the main regulatory burden is left 
with the provider country.’
45 See this commentary on Article 5, section 2. The same expression also appears in Nagoya 
Protocol Articles 6(1) and 23, while ‘the other Party’ only appears in Article 16(1): Greiber 
et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 163. Note that a reference to ‘country of origin’ appeared 
in draft article 12 in the Nagoya Draft. The reference was deleted in the final negotiation 
of the Protocol.
46 As reported by Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 442; see also 
reference in Nagoya Protocol Article 17(3) to ‘the Party providing’ PIC.
47 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 163–164. See this commentary on Article 6, 
section 3.
48 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 443.
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need to be settled between the States claiming sovereign rights over the same 
genetic resource.
Third, Article 15(1) focuses on genetic resources ‘utilized’ within user coun-
tries’ jurisdiction, based on the definition of ‘utilization of genetic resources’ in 
the Protocol.49 It can be argued that the flexibility inherent in the definition of 
utilization may lead Parties to adjust or possibly expand measures taken under 
Article 15(1) in response to new forms of research and development on gene 
sequences and naturally occurring biochemicals. In addition, Article 15(1) 
applies to the ‘utilization’ of genetic resources – i.e., on research and devel-
opment. Article 15(1) in effect does not mention ‘subsequent applications 
and commercialization’ of genetic resources, although these are explicitly 
covered by the general, inter-State benefit-sharing obligation in Article 5(1). 
A combined reading of Article 15(1) and Article 5 would support the argu-
ment that obligations related to providing for users’ compliance with provider 
countries’ domestic ABS frameworks should be extended so as to correspond 
to the obligation to ensure benefit-sharing also from subsequent application 
and commercialization. This argument may be backed up by practical con-
siderations: regulating only activities intended for research and development, 
which mostly occur as internal processes within private companies that are 
often covered by confidentiality, and distinguishing them clearly from further 
utilization and commercialization is very difficult in practice.50 On the other 
hand, it can be contended that Protocol negotiators discussed, and eventu-
ally decided against, referring to ‘subsequent application and commercializa-
tion’ in Article 15,51 because of practical enforcement challenges and concerns 
about possible implications for international trade. This may suggest that non-
compliance issues related to the final phase of the genetic resource value chain 
should be addressed on the basis of contractual claims in the context of the 
Protocol’s provision on compliance with MAT.52 Ultimately, in the absence of 
an explicit exclusion of subsequent application and commercialization from 
the definition of ‘utilization’ in Article 2 and from Article 15(1), Parties have 
discretion to extend their implementing measures under Article 15(1) also to 
subsequent application and commercialization of genetic resources, particu-
larly where – in their respective domestic context – this seems necessary to 
49 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
50 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
51 ENB, “Summary of the Interregional Negotiating Group on Access and Benefit-sharing: 
18–21 September 2010”, 2–3.
52 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 162. See this commentary on Article 18.
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effectively implement their obligation to ensure benefit-sharing also from sub-
sequent application and commercialization.53
3.2  Means of Implementation
The reference in Article 15(1) to ‘appropriate, effective and proportionate’ mea-
sures implies that user-side measures should be fit for the purpose of contrib-
uting to compliance with provider countries’ measures and of ensuring the 
realization of the Protocol’s objective of fairly and equitably sharing benefits. 
That being said, such measures could also be understood as being reasonable, 
workable and not excessively burdensome,54 taking into account the actual 
implementation and enforcement capacities of different countries. The ref-
erence to ‘appropriate, effective and proportionate’ user-side measures has 
also been interpreted in a more expansive way, so as to argue that domestic 
user-side measures would ‘fall short of meeting [these requirements] unless 
the concerned Parties provide that an opportunity to seek recourse is available 
under their legal system in case of disputes arising from non-compliance with 
such user measures.’55
It should be emphasized, however, that there is a scarcity of examples of 
user-side measures.56 Possible measures could include requiring users to prove 
that the genetic resources were accessed legally according to the provider coun-
try’s domestic ABS framework at the time of import of the genetic resources, or 
at the time of seeking an authorization to develop and/or place on the market 
products based on genetic resources.57 Some countries have interpreted this as 
obliging all users of genetic resources to exercise due diligence so that appli-
cable ABS requirements in provider countries have been respected.58
53 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1). See this commentary on Article 5, section 2.
54 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 161.
55 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 434 and 439.
56 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 164; one exception is Norwegian law, discussed by 
Morten W. Tvedt and Ole K. Fauchald, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol on ABS: 
A Hypothetical Case Study on Enforcing Benefit Sharing in Norway,” The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 14 (2011): 383, 392–398.
57 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 164.
58 EU draft regulation, draft article 4(1), which reads: ‘Users shall exercise due diligence 
to ascertain that genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources used were accessed in accordance with applicable access and benefit-sharing 
legislation or regulatory requirements and that, where relevant, benefits are fairly and 
equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms.’ 
260 Article 15
It is also noteworthy that, as opposed to the access standards outlined else-
where in the Protocol with a view to guiding provider countries,59 Article 15(1) 
does not provide any standard for user-side measures.60 In particular, it does 
not address whether user countries should also assess the content of MAT and 
the extent to which benefit-sharing requirements contained in MAT corre-
spond to the notions of fairness and equity.61
4 Obligation to Enforce
Article 15(2) creates an obligation for Parties to establish domestically how 
breaches of domestic user-side measures on their users’ compliance with pro-
vider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks will be identified and sanctioned. 
Put differently, the remedies and sanctions provided for in the law of the 
user country will be enforced against the user, for breaching user-side mea-
sures on compliance with PIC and MAT requirements of the provider country. 
Conversely, Article 15(2) does not imply that the remedies and sanctions pro-
vided for in the law of the provider country will be applied in user countries.62
Appropriate, effective and proportionate enforcement measures will vary 
from case to case depending on the type of domestic measure violated, the 
gravity of the breach, and also on whether measures are applied by the pub-
lic administration or by domestic courts of a Party. As the Protocol leaves an 
ample margin of discretion to Parties, sanctions may include: revocation of 
IPRs and market approvals;63 obligation on the user to seek PIC and establish 
MAT from the legitimate provider as a precondition for continuing utilization; 
in case economic benefits have already been accrued, obligation to negotiate 
benefit-sharing arrangement with the legitimate provider; obligation to pay a 
fixed amount to the legitimate provider, irrespective of MAT; monetary fines 
or the criminalization of certain acts and the prohibition of using genetic 
resources when obligations have been violated.64 It has been suggested that 
59 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(a–b) See this commentary on Article 6, section 6.
60 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 165.
61 Ibid. See also Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(3)(g) and 18; and this commentary on Article 6, 
section 7 and on Article 18, section 1; and Conclusions to this commentary, section 3.
62 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 440, note 53.
63 These and other ideas were proposed in the negotiation: see, on disclosure requirement 
and tools to enforce compliance, CBD Working Group on ABS “Report of the seventh 
meeting,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, Annex, 51–53.
64 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 164.
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sanctions should be at least as serious and costly as the implications arising 
from MAT, to avoid creating a disincentive for users to adhere to the rules of the 
providing country.65 Against this backdrop, the Protocol’s governing body may 
initiate a process to consider best practices in implementing Article 15(2) and 
possibly provide some guidance on this matter in the future.66
Article 15(2) in effect presupposes that Parties will actively detect instances 
where users within their jurisdiction are in a situation of non-compliance, in 
particular through the information gathered by checkpoints67 and internation-
ally recognized certificates of compliance in the ABS Clearinghouse, particu-
larly if (some) Parties determine that issuance of the certificate is mandatory.68 
Additional information may be provided by users themselves, either on the 
basis of voluntary due diligence or mandatory reporting and auditing proce-
dures. Factual, administrative and judicial findings by responsible authorities 
of provider countries may also serve as a useful source of evidence for rele-
vant authorities in user countries. Although findings from provider countries 
will not be the only determinant factor in triggering user countries’ enforce-
ment measures, complete disregard for these determinations in the provider 
country may be considered as proof of lack of good faith in implementing 
Article 15(2).69 Particularly in the case of third-party transfers – i.e., in cases 
when the person/entity misappropriating the material is not the one utiliz-
ing it, information from the provider country may be especially useful. Other 
sources that may contribute to detecting instances of users’ non-compliance 
include media reports or communications from other Parties to the Protocol.
5 Obligation to Cooperate
The third obligation under Article 15 concerns an obligation to cooperate in 
cases of alleged violation of the ‘other’ countries’ domestic ABS framework. 
Thus, as opposed to Article 15(1)–(2), the obligation is triggered in a broader 
set of instances, namely violation of the provider country’s ABS legislation 
65 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 165.
66 See this commentary on Article 26.
67 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2–4). See this commentary on Article 17, section 2.
68 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1). See this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
69 It should be noted that questions related to the legal recognition and enforcement of 
foreign administrative or judicial decisions in the jurisdiction of Parties where genetic 
resources are utilized are addressed under Nagoya Protocol Article 18(2)(b). See this 
commentary on Article 18, section 3.
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in general, and not necessarily limited to specific requirements on PIC and 
MAT. Clearly, violations of domestic ABS frameworks may occur even if PIC 
was granted and MAT were established. So the scope of application of Parties’ 
obligation to cooperate could cover other instances, such as disregard for 
minimum requirements for MAT in provider country’s legislation or failure to 
provide required information on bioprospecting activities to be included in 
national registries in provider countries.
Article 15(3) obliges all Parties (whether provider and user countries) to 
cooperate on specific cases of alleged violations of domestic ABS frameworks. 
According to general international law, the obligation to cooperate requires 
States to enter into coordinated action under a legal regime so as to achieve 
its specific goal.70 In this specific case, the obligation entails that Parties exert 
good-faith efforts to identify potentially concerned Parties and engage them 
with a view to reaching agreement on coordinated action in the investigation 
of and/or follow up on alleged non-compliance by users.71 Such cooperation 
can either involve the provision of information from user countries to provider 
countries trying to ascertain whether a violation of their own domestic ABS 
frameworks has occurred, or from provider countries to user countries trying 
to ascertain whether a violation of other Parties’ domestic ABS frameworks has 
occurred. As Article 15(3) is broadly framed, cooperation with other Parties 
that were not involved in the potential situation of non-compliance72 and on a 
multilateral (rather than merely bilateral) basis is also possible.
The choice of the means to identify and engage other concerned States is 
left to each Party (‘as far as possible and as appropriate’), but the qualified lan-
guage of this provision does not leave discretion for a Party to decide against 
cooperation.73 Therefore, lack of any reasonable effort to identify and engage 
potentially concerned States would be in violation of this due diligence obli-
gation. If agreement cannot be reached, the Protocol does not impede States 
from making unilateral decisions, but it creates the expectation that such 
decisions will be made taking into consideration other States’ and, where rel-
evant, indigenous and local communities’ interests, in realizing the objective 
of the Protocol in relation to fair and equitable benefit-sharing.74 It may also 
entail the obligation for Parties to address persistent or recurring difficulties in 
70 For a discussion, see this commentary on Article 11, section 2.
71 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 164.
72 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 165.
73 See Introduction to this commentary, section 5 and fn. 227. See contra Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 164.
74 See this commentary on Article 1, section 2.
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implementing Article 15(3) by progressively developing the legal regime estab-
lished by the Nagoya Protocol.75 The reference to ‘alleged’ violations implies 
that there is no requirement to prove that there has been an actual violation in 
order for Parties to seek collaboration with each other.76
The obligation, as is customary in international treaties, also leaves Parties 
discretion in determining which administrative entity will be responsible for 
such cooperation. The point of first contact in this regard is likely to be the 
national ABS focal point,77 which could then also support the channeling 
of cooperation requests to the political, administrative or judicial authority 
responsible for appropriate follow-up. This, however, is more likely to func-
tion as an initial, informal contact between Parties. Diplomatic processes must 
likely be followed to formalize the cooperation.78 Depending on the desig-
nated authority, powers in carrying out such cooperation may vary.
75 This argument is developed in this commentary on Article 11, section 2.
76 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 164.
77 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(1); see this commentary on Article 13, section 2.
78 We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point.
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Article 16. Compliance with Domestic Legislation 
or Regulatory Requirements on Access and Benefit-
sharing for Traditional Knowledge Associated with 
Genetic Resources
1. Each Party shall take appropriate, effective and proportionate legis-
lative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to provide 
that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources utilized 
within their jurisdiction has been accessed in accordance with prior 
informed consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and 
local communities and that mutually agreed terms have been estab-
lished, as required by domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation 
or regulatory requirements of the other Party where such indigenous 
and local communities are located.
2. Each Party shall take appropriate, effective and proportionate mea-
sures to address situations of non-compliance with measures adopted 
in accordance with paragraph 1 above.
3. Parties shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate in cases 
of alleged violation of domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation 
or regulatory requirements referred to in paragraph 1 above.
1 Overview
Article 16 creates a set of novel international obligations, going much beyond 
the CBD, which was silent on ABS related to traditional knowledge and there-
fore also on questions related to compliance in that connection. Article 16 was 
subject to arduous negotiations, due to a divergence of views as to whether 
other international processes such as negotiations under WIPO should provide 
for the protection of traditional knowledge1 or whether the Protocol should 
1 It was opposed in particular by the EU, who preferred that the issue be dealt with in the 
framework of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in 
the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 292.
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create a comprehensive compliance system that would apply both to the uti-
lization of genetic resources and to the utilization of traditional knowledge.2
Specifically, Article 16 creates a series of obligations for Parties with respect 
to compliance by traditional knowledge users: 1) an obligation to adopt user-
side domestic measures to ‘provide’ for the respect by users of domestic ABS 
requirements of ‘other Parties where indigenous and local communities [pro-
viding PIC on traditional knowledge] are located’3 regarding community PIC 
and MAT concerning traditional knowledge utilization;4 2) an obligation to 
enforce domestic user-side measures in relation to users’ non-compliance with 
domestic ABS requirements of other Parties related to community PIC and 
MAT on access to traditional knowledge; and 3) an obligation to cooperate in 
addressing the violation of domestic ABS measures on traditional knowledge.
The following sections will briefly recapitulate the findings related to the 
interpretation of Article 15, which (given similarity in structure and wording) 
are of relevance for the interpretation of Article 16, and then discuss key asym-
metries in the provisions of the Protocol on users’ compliance in relation to 
traditional knowledge as opposed to users’ compliance in relation to genetic 
resources.
2 Similarities and Differences vis-à-vis Article 15
Article 16 mirrors the structure and wording of Article 15. The general observa-
tions made with regard to the latter’s rationale also apply here.5 Some of the 
more specific arguments made in relation to the interpretation of the text of 
Article 15 are summarized below for ease of reference.
The obligation under Article 16(1) to adopt user-side measures on compli-
ance with traditional knowledge applies to ‘each Party,’ in order to underline 
that all countries should take such measures in recognition of the fact that 
no Party is uniquely a provider or user country. It also indicates that coun-
tries where traditional knowledge is not present should enact user measures 
in relation to ABS from the utilization of traditional knowledge located in 
2 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 168. On the lack of definition of utilization of tradi-
tional knowledge, see this commentary on Article 2, section 3.
3 This expression is considered more specific than the reference to ‘other Party’ in Nagoya 
Protocol Article 15: Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 441; and this com-
mentary on Article 15, section 3.1.
4 I.e., measures adopted under Nagoya Protocol Article 7. See this commentary on Article 7.
5 See this commentary on Article 15, section 2.
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other countries. The obligation to ‘provide’ respect for other Parties’ national 
ABS frameworks entails at the very least confirming that users have complied 
with the PIC requirement and established MAT in accordance with the other 
Parties’ domestic ABS framework. In other words, Parties are to exercise due 
diligence6 in order to confirm that the users under their jurisdiction respected 
the applicable domestic framework of the provider country on PIC and MAT. 
While therefore the Protocol does not require user-side measures for the direct 
extraterritorial enforcement of domestic ABS frameworks of other Parties in 
relation to traditional knowledge, these could still be given some extraterritorial 
application. It has in fact been argued that in as far as instances of non-compli-
ance with PIC and MAT have to be determined in the user-country jurisdic-
tion, provider-country Parties’ domestic ABS frameworks would need to be 
relied upon in user-country courts to qualify the disputed facts on the merit.7
The obligation in Article 16(1), however, contains the qualification ‘as appro-
priate,’ which is not present in Article 15(1), thereby indicating that while 
Parties are still obliged to fulfill this obligation, they have a larger margin of 
discretion in choosing the means of implementation.8 In that regard, it may 
also be useful to recall that the reference to ‘appropriate, effective and pro-
portionate’ user-side measures can be interpreted as implying the need to 
also provide an opportunity for recourse under the provider country’s legal 
system in case of disputes arising from non-compliance with user-side mea-
sures related to traditional knowledge.9 This qualification may also point to 
the challenge that might be encountered by a user country becoming aware of 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge from a provider country where no 
domestic ABS framework related to traditional knowledge is in place. In such 
a hypothetical scenario, the user country may find itself in the impossibility to 
apply its user-side compliance measures, as these would not be triggered by a 
violation of the provider country’s domestic ABS framework. It can be specu-
lated that in this case the concerned Parties, and possibly also representatives 
of indigenous and local communities,10 may bring the case to the Protocol’s 
compliance mechanism.11
6 See Conclusions to this commentary, section 3.
7 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law, ” op. cit., 440.
8 See Introduction to this commentary, section 5 and fn. 227.
9 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law, ” op. cit., 434 and 439.
10 See this commentary on Article 30, section 3.2.
11 This commentary on Article 30, section 3. It may also be observed that this could be a 
case in which the establishment of an international ombudsman (discussed in this 
commentary on Article 30, section 3.2) may be particularly useful.
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The interpretative difficulty arising from the difference in wording between 
the provider country’s domestic ABS measures on traditional knowledge 
mentioned in Article 16(1) and those that are to be adopted under Article 7,12 
should be addressed through systemic and effectiveness-oriented interpreta-
tion. Accordingly, administrative or policy measures adopted under Article 7 
could amount to ‘regulatory requirements’ for the purposes of Article 16(1), as 
long as they are properly publicized, capable of comprehension, prospective, 
internally coherent and containing clear indications on issuing PIC and estab-
lishing MAT in writing, and on benefit-sharing. The absence of any domestic 
measure amounting to domestic ‘regulatory requirements’ on ABS from tradi-
tional knowledge would deprive provider countries of the possibility to trigger 
user countries’ international obligations concerning users’ compliance under 
Article 16.
Article 16(2) creates an obligation for Parties to establish domestically how 
breaches of domestic user-side measures on compliance with other Parties’ 
domestic ABS requirements related to traditional knowledge will be identified 
and sanctioned. Non-compliance by users under Article 16(2) is constituted 
by a breach of the measures taken by the Party where traditional knowledge 
is utilized, and not directly by a breach of other Parties’ domestic ABS frame-
works provisions on access to traditional knowledge (i.e., violation of PIC and 
MAT requirements). Nonetheless, in practice, the breach of the user country’s 
measures on compliance is inextricably linked to the breach of the other 
Party’s domestic framework on PIC and MAT. Similarly to Article 15(2), this 
obligation presupposes that Parties will actively detect instances where users 
in their jurisdiction are in a situation of non-compliance vis-à-vis other Parties’ 
domestic ABS frameworks on traditional knowledge.
Article 16(3) creates an obligation for all Parties to cooperate in following 
up on specific cases of alleged violations of Parties’ domestic ABS frameworks 
in as far as they concern traditional knowledge, even where there is no proof 
of actual violation of the provider country’s ABS legislation and not neces-
sarily with regard only to possible violations of specific requirements on PIC 
and MAT.
Given the novelty of Article 16, this provision appears as one of the most 
challenging to implement at the national level, as it will present unprece-
dented legal questions, particularly with regard to the cross-cutting obligation 
under the Protocol to take due regard to indigenous and local communities’ 
12 Article 7 simply refers to the adoption of ‘measures’ (and not more specifically ‘legislative, 
administrative or policy measures’ on benefit-sharing arising from the utilization of 
traditional knowledge called for in Article 6(5)).
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customary laws13 and the duty under general international law to interpret 
and apply this provision in the light of relevant international human rights 
standards.14 In the light of the open-ended drafting of Article 16, the Protocol’s 
governing body may initiate a process to consider best practices in imple-
menting Article 16 and possibly provide some guidance on this matter in the 
future.15 This may also become necessary in case of subsequent developments 
in other relevant international processes. For this reason, the first review of the 
Protocol16 is expected to assess in particular the implementation of Article 16 
in light of developments in other relevant international organizations, includ-
ing, inter alia, WIPO,17 provided that they do not run counter to the CBD and 
the Protocol objectives.18 It should be finally noted that the implementation of 
Article 16 may be facilitated by, and fuel, efforts to make indigenous and local 
communities’ customary laws and procedures better understood by govern-
ments and users.19
3 Lack of Parallel Provisions on Compliance Concerning ABS Related 
to Genetic Resources and ABS Related to Traditional Knowledge
International obligations related to users’ compliance with domestic ABS 
frameworks related to traditional knowledge, similarly to those related to 
genetic resources, may be expected to be triggered by monitoring activities,20 
which are addressed in Article 17. That provision, however, only focuses on 
monitoring utilization of genetic resources, and makes no reference to tradi-
tional knowledge. Therefore, the Protocol establishes no obligation for Parties’ 
checkpoints to collect information on PIC and MAT relating to traditional 
knowledge utilization. Similarly, the internationally recognized certificate 
of compliance does not seem to relate to traditional knowledge associated 
13 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1) and this commentary on Article 12, section 2. See also 
CBD Working Group on ABS, “Study on compliance in relation to the customary law of 
indigenous and local communities, national law, across jurisdictions, and international 
law” (6 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/5.
14 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
15 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
16 See this commentary on Article 25.
17 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.1.
18 CBD Decision 10/1, paragraph 6.
19 Nagoya Protocol Article 12: see this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
20 See this commentary on Article 15, section 4.
269Compliance With Domestic Legislation
with genetic resources: its minimum information requirements make no 
reference to it.21
This arguably reflects the fact that the Protocol negotiators were unclear 
whether it would be feasible to include traditional knowledge in the interna-
tionally recognized certificate of compliance.22 The effect of this omission 
seems to be a serious loophole in the Protocol with regard to implementation 
of Article 16, particularly since most biopiracy cases to date have related to 
IPRs with regard to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. 
In turn, it could be argued that the requirement for checkpoints to collect or 
receive, as appropriate, ‘relevant information’ related to PIC and the establish-
ment of MAT23 implies also PIC and MAT requirements concerning traditional 
knowledge, and if provided for in domestic ABS frameworks, such information 
would need to be supplied by the user.24 This extensive interpretation would 
be based on the preambular reference to the interrelationship between genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, and their inseparable nature for indig-
enous and local communities.25 This interpretation could also possibly be sup-
ported by the reference to ‘subject-matter’ as information to be mandatorily 
included in the internationally recognized certificate.26
Conversely, it has been argued that the omission of traditional knowledge 
from this provision was intentional, as negotiators had specifically considered 
and then decided against including it in Article 17,27 with a view to leaving 
regulatory space for the WIPO negotiations to address compliance with ABS 
on traditional knowledge.28 In order to ensure the effective implementation 
21 As laid out in Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4). See this commentary on Article 17, section 3.
22 Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 56. These concerns had already been 
raised in CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical 
Experts on an Internationally Recognized Certificate of Origin/Source/Legal Provenance” 
(20 February 2007) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/7, paragraph 19.
23 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(i).
24 In accordance with Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(ii): see Gurdial Nijar Singh, The 
Nagoya Protocol: Analysis and Implementation Options for Developing Countries, op. cit., 11.
25 Nagoya Protocol Preamble, 22nd paragraph.
26 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4)(f).
27 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 174. This may be based also on the requirement, 
discussed above, to include in the review of the effectiveness of the Protocol a specific 
discussion on Article 16 and progress in WIPO negotiations: CBD Decision 10/1, para-
graph 6.
28 Lago Candeira and Silvestri, “Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 292. However, it remains to be clarified why the same solution was not adopted for 
genetic resources, as the WIPO negotiations cover both genetic resources and traditional 
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of the traditional knowledge-related provisions of the Protocol, in particular 
in the absence of progress under WIPO, the Protocol’s governing body should 
consider developing guidance29 on how Parties may include traditional knowl-
edge in the internationally recognized certificate of compliance, since the 
Protocol only sets out the minimum information that must be contained in 
the certificate,30 and does not exclude expanding its content to other issues. The 
Protocol’s governing body could address this issue when considering whether 
the WIPO negotiations outcome is in support of and does not run counter to 
the objectives of the CBD and Protocol in this regard.31 In alternative, Parties 
to the Protocol may consider (collectively or individually) whether to take into 
consideration future guidance to be developed under the Convention on the 
unlawful appropriation of traditional knowledge32 and other relevant work,33 
under the CBD Work Programme on Article 8(j) and related provisions.
In the absence of international rules or guidance on this matter, provider 
countries would be well advised to include requirements related to the moni-
toring of traditional knowledge in their national ABS frameworks, including 
requiring inclusion of monitoring obligations in national permits, as well as 
in MAT.34
knowledge. In addition, at the time of writing, WIPO negotiators could not agree whether 
to include or not disclosure requirements and the draft text on traditional knowledge 
contains several options in brackets, see WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC)” (14 August 2013) WIPO Doc WO/GA/43/14, 
Annex B, draft articles Rev. 2 (26 April 2013).
29 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
30 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4).
31 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.1.
32 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), Recommendation 8/4 in “Report of the eighth 
meeting of the Article 8(j) Working Group” UNEP/CBD/COP/12/5, Annex.
33 CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), Recommendation 8/5 on sui generis systems for the 
protection of traditional knowledge in “Report of the eighth meeting of the Article 8(j) 
Working Group” UNEP/CBD/COP/12/5, Annex.
34 We are grateful to Ruth Mackenzie for drawing our attention to this point. See this 
commentary on Article 18, section 5, about easier enforceability in a transnational 
context of MAT than of PIC.
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Article 17. Monitoring the Utilization of Genetic 
Resources
1. To support compliance, each Party shall take measures, as appropri-
ate, to monitor and to enhance transparency about the utilization of 
genetic resources. Such measures shall include:
(a) The designation of one or more checkpoints, as follows:
(i) Designated checkpoints would collect or receive, as appro-
priate, relevant information related to prior informed 
consent, to the source of the genetic resource, to the estab-
lishment of mutually agreed terms, and/or to the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources, as appropriate;
(ii) Each Party shall, as appropriate and depending on the par-
ticular characteristics of a designated checkpoint, require 
users of genetic resources to provide the information speci-
fied in the above paragraph at a designated checkpoint. 
Each Party shall take appropriate, effective and proportion-
ate measures to address situations of non-compliance;
(iii) Such information, including from internationally recog-
nized certificates of compliance where they are available, 
will, without prejudice to the protection of confidential 
information, be provided to relevant national authorities, 
to the Party providing prior informed consent and to the 
Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House, as appropriate;
(iv) Checkpoints must be effective and should have functions 
relevant to implementation of this sub-paragraph (a). They 
should be relevant to the utilization of genetic resources, or 
to the collection of relevant information at, inter alia, any 
stage of research, development, innovation, pre-commer-
cialization or commercialization.
(b) Encouraging users and providers of genetic resources to include 
provisions in mutually agreed terms to share information on 
the implementation of such terms, including through reporting 
requirements; and
(c) Encouraging the use of cost-effective communication tools and 
systems.
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2. A permit or its equivalent issued in accordance with Article 6, para-
graph 3(e) and made available to the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House, shall constitute an internationally recognized certifi-
cate of compliance.
3. An internationally recognized certificate of compliance shall serve as 
evidence that the genetic resource which it covers has been accessed 
in accordance with prior informed consent and that mutually agreed 
terms have been established, as required by the domestic access and 
benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements of the Party 
providing prior informed consent.
4. The internationally recognized certificate of compliance shall contain 
the following minimum information when it is not confidential:
(a) Issuing authority;
(b) Date of issuance;
(c) The provider;
(d) Unique identifier of the certificate;
(e) The person or entity to whom prior informed consent was 
granted;
(f) Subject-matter or genetic resources covered by the certificate;
(g) Confirmation that mutually agreed terms were established;
(h) Confirmation that prior informed consent was obtained; and
(i) Commercial and/or non-commercial use.
1 Overview
Article 17 creates an obligation for each Party, particularly Parties with users in 
their jurisdiction, to take domestic measures to monitor and enhance trans-
parency regarding the utilization of genetic resources,1 as a way to support 
other provisions related to compliance in the Protocol.2 The obligation mainly 
singles out two means of implementation: the establishment of checkpoints 
and the issuance of internationally recognized certificates of compliance. 
Checkpoints were one of the most contentious items in the negotiations of 
the Protocol, which may explain the unfortunate and convoluted drafting of 
Article 17(1), mainly due to political sensitivities concerning the linkages to the 
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1).
2 Nagoya Protocol Articles 14–16 and 18.
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IPR system.3 Article 17(2–4) focuses on the internationally recognized certifi-
cate of compliance:4 a conceptually complex tool that serves as evidence in a 
transnational context of the granting of PIC and establishment of MAT.
To fully appreciate the relevance of Article 17 in the international ABS regime 
created by the Protocol, it should be recalled that the CBD is silent on specific 
measures to monitor the utilization of genetic resources and the implementa-
tion of related benefit-sharing obligations. Some commentators have argued 
that the CBD5 contains an obligation of result to share benefits arising from 
research and development in a fair and equitable way, and the need for moni-
toring measures is a logical consequence of functional ABS frameworks.6 The 
Bonn Guidelines paid little attention to monitoring measures, although they 
included some reference to national monitoring and reporting,7 as well as to 
means for verification.8 State practice so far has been limited in implement-
ing user measures in general, let alone in providing for systematic monitoring 
for the purpose of ABS.9 Against this background, the role of Article 17 is to 
complement the general obligations for Parties to provide for users’ compli-
ance with domestic ABS frameworks10 and facilitate compliance with MAT.11 
To that end, Article 17 contains more detailed obligations focusing on ‘concrete 
tools’12 for monitoring uses and/or users of genetic resources to detect possible 
instances of users’ violations of domestic ABS measures.
3 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 200–205, particularly 203–204, and 213.
4 Brendan Tobin, Geoff Burton and José C. Fernandez-Ugalde, Certificates of Clarity or 
Confusion: The Search for a Practical, Feasible and Cost Effective System for Certifying 
Compliance with PIC and MAT (Yokohama: UNU-IAS, 2008), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<http://collection.unu-mc.org/view/UNU:3123>.
5 CBD Article 15(7) first sentence.
6 E.g., Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 40.
7 Bonn Guidelines, paragraphs 55–56.
8 Bonn Guidelines, paragraphs 57–58.
9 Brendan Tobin, Sam Johnston and Charles V. Barber, Options for Developing Measures in 
User Countries to Implement the Access and Benefit-Sharing Provisions of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (Yokohama: UNU-IAS, 2003), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<http://unu.edu/publications/policy-briefs/options-for-developing-measures-in-user-
countries-to-implement-the-access-and-benefit-sharing-provisions-of-the-convention-
on-biological-diversity-2nd-edition.html>; Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Conclusions,” 
op. cit., 515; Tvedt and Fauchald, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol on ABS,” op. cit., 
383–402.
10 Nagoya Protocol Articles 15–16.
11 Nagoya Protocol Article 18.
12 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 37.
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Article 17 also includes other mandatory means of implementation (as 
part of a non-exhaustive list), such as an obligation to ‘encourage’ (i.e. at least 
to remove barriers to, and/or create incentives for)13 users and providers to 
include in MAT provisions on reporting and information-sharing,14 and all 
ABS stakeholders to use cost-effective communication tools.15 As to the latter, 
Parties may consider encouraging users to participate in existing initiatives,16 
such as IT-based communication tools for exchanging information on genetic 
resources.17 The following sections will focus on the more complex interpreta-
tive questions raised by the provisions on checkpoints and the internationally 
recognized certificate of compliance, in turn.
2 Checkpoints
Checkpoints under the Protocol have the responsibility to monitor the uti-
lization18 of genetic resources, in order to support the possible detection of 
user’s violations of domestic ABS frameworks in other countries. It remains to 
be seen whether Parties may empower checkpoints to also check breaches of 
MAT, although the Protocol does not require checking their content but only 
their formal establishment.19 On the other hand, domestic ABS frameworks 
may provide for specific requirements on the substantive content of MAT20 
13 On the obligation to encourage, see this commentary on Article 9, section 1.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(b). See also Article 6(3)(g) and this commentary on 
Article 6, section 7. It may be usefully recalled that Parties will be well advised to 
effectively encourage such inclusion in MAT, which are more easily enforced than PIC in 
a transnational context, as discussed in this commentary on Article 18, section 5.
15 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(c).
16 For example, the EU draft regulation would encourage users’ associations to seek 
recognition of a combination of procedures, tools or mechanisms (e.g., on the deployment 
of data-sharing tools for tracking) developed for the purpose of implementing their 
obligations under the regulation as ‘best practice’, by subjecting users implementing such 
recognized best practice to less intense compliance checks (see draft articles 8–9).
17 One example can be found in the microbial sector, where efforts are undertaken to 
integrate all known equivalent strain numbers and corresponding information into a 
single strain passport page: “StrainInfo,” University of Gent et al., accessed on 7 February 
2014, <www.straininfo.net/>.
18 Nagoya Protocol Article 2(c). See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
19 Article 17(1)(a)(i).
20 As the list of minimum requirements for MAT to be established in domestic ABS 
frameworks at Article 6(3)(g) is non-exhaustive: see this commentary on Article 6, 
section 7.
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and Parties can therefore require their checkpoints to carry out monitoring 
tasks also in that regard, particularly if these requirements are well publicized. 
The designation of checkpoints needs to be backed up by domestic measures 
to obtain from users relevant information.21 This is coupled with an obligation 
for each Party to take measures to address situations of non-compliance by 
users with requirements to provide relevant information.22
During the negotiations, developing countries argued for the obligatory 
establishment of predetermined checkpoints, particularly at patent offices, so 
that users seeking IPRs on inventions using genetic resources would be obliged 
to disclose information on PIC and MAT. This was based on the understanding 
that IPRs are usually sought at an early stage of the research and development, 
and/or commercialization, process with a view to securing monetary benefits 
from the utilization of genetic resources. Industrialized countries, on the other 
hand, argued against creating unduly burdensome procedures at the national 
level in relation to IPRs,23 and expressed concerns about flexibility and cost-
effectiveness.24 Certain developed countries explicitly opposed any manda-
tory requirement for disclosure of ABS-related information in IPR applications 
and an obligation to designate patent offices as checkpoints, in line with their 
position in the WTO TRIPS negotiations.25 The question of how to establish 
mechanisms or obligations that can capture genetic resources-related benefits 
from the IPR systems and channel them back to the country providing genetic 
resources and/or traditional knowledge26 remains open in various fora.27
21 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(ii), first sentence.
22 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(ii), second sentence. This provision can be read together 
with Parties’ obligations to establish appropriate, effective and proportionate measures to 
address situations of non-compliance, which is provided for in Nagoya Protocol Article 15.
23 Singh Nijar, “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 252–254.
24 Buck and Hamilton, “Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 53. These concerns were related to 
the expectation that Parties with users within their jurisdiction would need to carry 
out inspections of private research facilities and laboratories in their territory and 
determine the source of ‘all biological material involved in such utilization’ in order to 
effectively monitor users within their jurisdiction: Young, “An International Cooperation 
Perspective,” op. cit., 476.
25 A number of developed countries oppose amendment of Article 27(3)(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement to introduce a mandatory disclosure requirement: see Morgera and 
Tsioumani, “Evolution of Benefit-Sharing”, op. cit., 168–169; and Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol 
and WTO Law,” op. cit., 208–212.
26 The omission of traditional knowledge from Nagoya Protocol Article 17 is discussed in this 
commentary on Article 16, section 3.
27 See Introduction to this commentary, section I.1. Andersen et al., International Agreements 
and Processes, op. cit., 34. Note also Oldham and Burton, “Defusing Disclosure in Patent 
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As a result, Article 17(1) places an obligation on each Party (whether it char-
acterizes itself mainly as provider or as user of genetic resources) to designate 
one or more checkpoints to gather/receive information on the utilization of 
genetic resources. In other words, the Protocol requires Parties to designate 
at least one checkpoint, but leaves them flexibility in deciding which national 
entity will play that role. So, nothing in the Protocol prevents Parties from des-
ignating patent offices as checkpoints. It has been argued however that, in the 
absence of a ‘clear mandate and authoritative guidance from the Protocol’ in 
that regard, Parties’ domestic rules designating patent offices as checkpoints 
may arguably be considered in tension with WTO law.28
Parties may as well decide to designate other entities as checkpoints, includ-
ing competent national authorities,29 other authorities providing regulatory 
or marketing approval of products, customs officers,30 and/or research fund-
ing institutions.31 The flexibility left by Article 17 is such that Parties may also 
decide to provide government incentives for user self-monitoring and for oth-
erwise creating transparency in the chain of users (for instance, through inde-
pendent third-party monitoring such as certification),32 and also designate 
Applications,” op. cit., who argue that as a result of unilateral action on disclosure in 
patent applications in major national product markets, no significant genetic resource-
based product can be launched internationally without disclosure having taken place in 
several key markets.
28 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 204. Note also conceptual and practical 
difficulties in utilising the patent system for enforcement of ABS laws discussed by Young, 
“An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 478–479. Such difficulties include the 
imposition of significant costs on providers challenging a patent and the fact that the 
patent offices are ‘strongly skewed in favour of patent issuance’ because they are funded 
by patent application fees (ibid., 479). 
29 See lack of Protocol indications on role of competent national authorities in user 
countries: this commentary on Article 13, section 3. See also EU draft regulation, draft 
article 7(2).
30 This could arguably include also the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington DC, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 
1975) 993 UNTS 243 (CITES) enforcement officers: on the difficulties in combining 
systems of enforcement under the two multilateral environmental treaties, see Young, 
“An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 479–481.
31 Some of these options were outlined in the Nagoya Draft, draft article 13(1)(a). For a brief 
discussion in the European region and in Latin America, see Lago Candeira and Silvestri, 
“Challenges in the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 279–280 and 291; and 
Cabrera Medaglia, “Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 362–363.
32 Note that certification was one of the means to support compliance suggested in the 
Bonn Guidelines, paragraph 16(d)(v). On the likely shortfalls of certification in the ABS 
context, see Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 481–482.
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non-government entities as checkpoints, such as researchers in receipt of pub-
lic funding and genebanks.33 It remains to be seen, however, whether these 
non-government checkpoints would ensure monitoring of the entirety of ABS 
transactions in a given country, and could be considered ‘effective’ to perform 
all the functions foreseen in Article 17 and ultimately contribute to the realiza-
tion of the objectives of the Protocol on fair and equitable benefit-sharing.34
2.1 Characteristics and Functions
Designated checkpoints must meet all of the cumulative criteria concerning 
their characteristics and functions set out in Article 17(1)(a). First of all, desig-
nated checkpoints must either actively gather (‘collect’) or at least be the recip-
ients (‘receive’) of information on PIC, the source35 of the genetic resource, the 
establishment of MAT, and/or the utilization of genetic resources.36 It may be 
argued that tasking checkpoints with active duties in this regard may facili-
tate the detection of cases of misappropriation. Article 17(1)(a) leaves Parties 
discretion as to whether to task checkpoint(s) to take both an active and a pas-
sive role, and whether to extend their duties to utilization. The qualification 
‘as appropriate’ points to different tasks depending on the different types of 
checkpoints that will be designated. The reference to ‘and/or’ at the end of the 
list of types of information to be collected/received, read together with the 
qualification ‘as appropriate’, suggests that designated checkpoints will need 
to collect one, more or all of the types of information listed.
Second, checkpoints are mandated37 to provide relevant information to 
relevant national authorities (including competent national authorities),38 
the Party providing PIC, and to the ABS Clearinghouse,39 as appropriate. 
Information to be channeled by checkpoints may also include information 
from the internationally recognized certificates of compliance ‘where they 
are available.’ The latter expression points to instances in which the genetic 
33 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 39.
34 See this commentary on Article 1.
35 This was inserted to achieve consistency with some pending proposal on the disclosure 
of origin or source in the WTO/TRIPS negotiation. Reference to ‘source’ might be quite 
useful in case in which users obtained genetic resources from a country that is not the 
country of origin: Tobin, Johnston and Barber, Options for Developing Measures, op. cit.
36 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(i). See Article 2(c) and this commentary on Article 2, 
section 2.
37 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a) (iii), although the wording relies on a passive formulation 
that may engender some uncertainty in that regard.
38 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2). See this commentary on Article 13, section 3.
39 Nagoya Protocol Article 14.
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resources utilized are considered outside the scope of the Nagoya Protocol,40 
countries do not require PIC41 or do not require issuance of certificates of 
compliance,42 or may have taken into account in different ways the ‘special 
considerations’ identified in the Protocol.43 The qualification of the mandate 
for checkpoints to channel relevant information ‘without prejudice to the 
protection of confidential information’ points to unresolved legal questions 
regarding confidentiality that still need to be clarified under the Protocol.44
Third, designated checkpoints must be ‘effective.’45 Such effectiveness refers 
to the actual capabilities of designated checkpoints to ensure monitoring and 
enhanced transparency in the utilization of genetic resources, and ultimately 
contribute to realizing the objective of the Protocol.46 Effectiveness is there-
fore the yardstick to evaluate whether Parties comply with Article 17, including 
by the compliance procedures and mechanisms to be established under the 
Protocol.47 Effectiveness of designated checkpoints in a user country may also 
be used as a criterion for evaluating individual applications for access to genetic 
resources, if so determined by provider countries’ national access measures.48
Fourth, checkpoints’ functions as spelt out in domestic measures should 
effectively contribute to gathering or at least receiving relevant information, 
as well as channeling it appropriately (domestically or externally). The provi-
sion, however, leaves discretion to Parties in determining whether designated 
checkpoints will monitor the whole of the research-development value chain, 
or just some of its stages (‘at, inter alia, any stage’).49 So, it remains to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis whether in countries where checkpoints(s) col-
lect information only at the very early stages of the research and development 
process, such checkpoints can be considered effective in achieving the objec-
tive of Article 17 and ultimately the objective of the Protocol.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether countries implementing Article 17 
will empower checkpoints to track genetic resources from the stage of research 
to the stage of commercialization. The Protocol negotiators considered, and 
40 See this commentary on Article 3, section 3.
41 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(1). See this commentary on Article 6, section 3.
42 See section 3 below.
43 Nagoya Protocol Article 8.
44 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2). These questions are discussed in this commentary on 
Article 14, section 5.
45 Beginning of Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iv).
46 See this commentary on Article 1.
47 See this commentary on Article 30.
48 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(b) and this commentary on Article 6, section 5.2.
49 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(a)(iv).
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eventually decided against, a substantive obligation for Parties to ‘track’ 
genetic resources at all stages of the user chain through a range of specific 
measures, including a unique identifier for genetic resources, for gathering the 
information needed to establish whether a user is in compliance or not.50 In 
the absence of such a provision, there is no basis in the Protocol for setting up 
a multilateral framework supporting coordinated efforts to track the flow of 
genetic resources across jurisdictions.51 The Protocol, however, does not pre-
vent Parties to mandate their checkpoints to track genetic resources from the 
stage of research to the stage of commercialization through measures that do 
not require collaboration from other Parties, or possibly by joining efforts with 
other willing Parties through bilateral or regional agreements.52
3 The Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance
Article 17(2–4) concerns the internationally recognized certificate of com-
pliance as a tool to facilitate acceptance of evidence of compliance with the 
provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks in a transnational context.53 
Article 17(2) establishes that certificates are created by making available permits 
50 A proposal by the African Group, for example, would have obliged Parties to ‘facilitate 
an efficient, easy to use certification process through the use of new technology which 
may include: (i) Cost efficient publicly searchable certificate databases providing 
evidence of PIC and MAT, (ii) Recording of progressive compliance on such databases as 
conditions of PIC and MAT are met, (iii) Searchable patent application and registration 
databases, (iv) Integration of genomic and morphological taxonomy to create species 
certainty, (v) Low cost, portable, gene based bar-coding technology to create rapid attack 
taxonomy, (vi) Linking unique identifiers to gene based bar-coding.’ CBD Working Group 
on ABS, “Collation of operative text submitted,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/4, 28–29. See 
also draft article 13 in the Nagoya Draft, which was titled ‘MONITORING[, TRACKING] 
AND REPORTING THE [UTILIZATION] OF GENETIC RESOURCES [AND ASSOCIATED 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE]’ (brackets in the original). 
51 The technical challenges and opportunities related to monitoring and tracking the 
flow of genetic resources are succinctly described by George M. Garrity et al., “Studies 
on Monitoring and Tracking Genetic Resources” (2 March 2009) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/INF/2.
52 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
53 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(3). On possible WTO law implications of the internationally 
recognized certificate of compliance, see Tobin, Johnston and Barber, Options for 
Developing Measures, op. cit., 197–199.
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or their equivalent54 to the ABS Clearinghouse.55 The wording of Article 17(2) 
does not specify who has the responsibility to make available a domestic per-
mit to the international ABS Clearinghouse (as it is formulated in the passive 
form), although elsewhere in the Protocol this appears to be the responsibil-
ity of provider countries.56 This is compounded by the Protocol’s silence as 
to whether national competent authorities are the ones obliged to make the 
permits available to the ABS Clearinghouse.57 More importantly, Article 17(2) 
does not specify whether all permits (as it mentions ‘a permit’) should be made 
available, with a view to elevating them to the status of internationally recog-
nized certificate of compliance. This interpretative uncertainty also arises from 
a combined reading of the other Protocol provision requiring ‘notify[ing]’58 
the ABS Clearinghouse of the issuance of a permit (rather than ‘submitting’ 
the permit), and the fact that the explicit requirement to submit the permit 
to the ABS Clearinghouse is expressed in the passive form elsewhere in the 
Protocol.59 Because of these textual inconsistencies, some commentators 
have argued that the certificate is not mandatory.60 However, Parties would be 
well advised to clarify (either multilaterally through the Protocol’s governing 
body61 or unilaterally through their domestic ABS frameworks) whether there 
is a mandatory requirement for permits to be elevated to internationally rec-
ognized certificates of compliance, with a view to promoting legal certainty.62 
A mandatory certificate could in particular minimize room for uncertainty 
for user countries implementing their obligations to monitor and provide for 
compliance under the Protocol.
Article 17(3) clarifies that the legal effect of the certificate is to oblige Parties 
to consider it acceptable evidence under their national legal systems that the 
genetic resource covered has been accessed in accordance with PIC and that 
54 Issued under Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e). The meaning of the term ‘its equivalent’ is 
explained in this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
55 Nagoya Protocol Article 14.
56 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3) refers to ‘each Party requiring PIC’.
57 Nagoya Protocol Article 13(2).
58 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(e).
59 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2)(c).
60 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 37 (who 
refer to the ‘possibility to elevate a permit . . . to the status of an internationally recognized 
certificate of compliance’ – emphasis added). See also countries arguing for voluntary 
certification during the Protocol negotiations: Singh Nijar and Pei Fern, Nagoya ABS 
Protocol, op. cit., 279–350.
61 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a); see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
62 Nagoya Protocol 9th preambular paragraph.
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MAT were established according to another country’s domestic ABS frame-
work. Ultimately, therefore, the certificate may assist users in fending off alle-
gations of misappropriation.
Article 17(4) lists minimum information (of a procedural nature) that must 
be contained in the certificate.63 If a permit is made available to the ABS 
Clearinghouse without containing all the required information, it may arguably 
not be considered an internationally recognized certificate of compliance,64 
although it remains unclear who will verify that all required information has 
been submitted.65 The Protocol allows Parties to add to the list of mandatory 
information in their domestic ABS frameworks. Article 17(4) once again draws 
attention to issues of confidentiality, which however still need to be clarified 
under the Protocol.66
The ‘unique identifier of the certificate’ is intended to minimize efforts 
by users and public administrators carrying out computer-based searches of 
certificates;67 it would basically allow for searches based on a ‘registration 
number’ allocated to each certificate. It may be particularly useful to identify 
permits that have been modified or updated,68 as their successive iterations 
should have the same identifier in common. It should thus not be confused 
with the proposed unique identifier of genetic resources as part of a multilat-
eral tracking system that was not included in the Protocol.69 Parties could 
still decide to explore opportunities resulting from advances in identifying a 
63 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(4) also determines the information that needs to be made 
available on a permit to the ABS Clearinghouse. Contingent on the interpretation of 
Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2), this list will either result in a minimum harmonization 
of domestic permits and their equivalents, or it could be implemented by providing a 
common format for registering information on domestic permits or equivalents in the 
ABS Clearinghouse. See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
64 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 37.
65 See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
66 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(2). See this commentary on Article 14, section 5.
67 Greiber et al, Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 181. 
68 As discussed in this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
69 See section 2 above. Note that unique identifiers of living modified organisms are used 
to satisfy the documentation requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: the 
OECD Unique Identifiers of Transgenic Plants are alphanumeric codes given to each living 
modified organism approved for commercial use, a registry of which is maintained on 
the Biosafety Clearinghouse: “LMO Registry,” CBD, accessed 19 February 2014, <http://bch 
.cbd.int/database/lmo-registry>. This registry provides summary information on all living 
modified organisms registered in the Biosafety Clearinghouse including transformation 
events and genetic modifications, as well as links to all relevant decisions and risk 
assessment reports. 
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genetic resource70 to further develop the internationally recognized certificate 
of compliance, by including in the information contained in certificates avail-
able unique identifiers for genetic resources in the future.
On a final, substantive note, the purely procedural reference to the ‘confir-
mation that MAT were established’ in Article 17(4) confirms that the Protocol 
does not provide for any mechanism to check compliance vis-à-vis the content 
of MAT.71 This also means that the Protocol does not contain any international 
mechanism for assessing the fairness and equity of benefit-sharing require-
ments in specific ABS transactions.72 
70 Garrity et al., “Studies on Monitoring and Tracking”, op. cit., 29–85.
71 See also section 2 above.
72 See this commentary on Article 6, section 2 and conclusions to this commentary, section 
2, where the critical relevance of MAT for ensuring fairness and equity of benefit-sharing 
is discussed.
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Article 18. Compliance with Mutually Agreed Terms
1. In the implementation of Article 6, paragraph 3(g)(i) and Article 7, 
each Party shall encourage providers and users of genetic resources 
and/or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources to 
include provisions in mutually agreed terms to cover, where appropri-
ate, dispute resolution including:
(a) The jurisdiction to which they will subject any dispute resolution 
processes;
(b) The applicable law; and/or
(c) Options for alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation or 
arbitration.
2. Each Party shall ensure that an opportunity to seek recourse is avail-
able under their legal systems, consistent with applicable jurisdic-
tional requirements, in cases of disputes arising from mutually agreed 
terms.
3. Each Party shall take effective measures, as appropriate, regarding:
(a) Access to justice; and
(b) The utilization of mechanisms regarding recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.
4. The effectiveness of this article shall be reviewed by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol in 
accordance with Article 31 of this Protocol.
1 Overview
Specific conditions for the utilization of genetic resources1 or the utilization of 
traditional knowledge must be set out in MAT, which are normally contracts 
governed by private law.2 As already discussed,3 MAT are normally established 
upon access (and can possibly be (re)negotiated at a later stage)4 and must 
1 See this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
2 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, 
op. cit., 184.
3 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(1–2) and (5) and 6(3)(g). See this commentary on Article 5, 
section 5, and Article 6, section 7.
4 See Introduction to this commentary, Section 1.3 and fn. 81.
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primarily include conditions for benefit-sharing, as well as address dispute 
settlement, third-party use and change of intent. Against this background, 
Article 18 aims to create the legislative preconditions at the domestic level in 
order to address procedural challenges for individual providers and users that 
are located in different countries5 arising from situations of non-compliance 
with MAT – that is, violations of contractual obligations.6 This may be critical, 
for instance, for situations in which the user’s intent changes,7 particularly if 
the MAT allowed only non-commercial research.8 In these instances, the MAT 
may create a contractual obligation for users to re-negotiate MAT as soon as 
commercial research starts,9 in the absence of which the provider is entitled to 
obtain contractual penalties or damages.10
Article 18 addresses two issues related to compliance with MAT through 
three obligations. First, it complements Parties’ obligation to detail the mini-
mum content of MAT in domestic ABS frameworks,11 by establishing a quali-
fied obligation for Parties to ‘encourage’ (i.e., at least to remove barriers to, and/
or create incentives for)12 the inclusion in MAT of provisions on dispute resolu-
tion. Second, it aims to support users’ compliance with MAT by establishing an 
obligation for Parties to ‘ensure’ an opportunity to seek recourse for disputes 
on MAT; and a qualified obligation to take domestic measures on access to 
justice and on the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. The 
Protocol, however, does not provide any guidance on how national courts 
5 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 36. 
CBD Working Group on ABS, “Comparative study of the real and transactional costs 
involved in the process of access to justice across jurisdictions” (26 February 2009) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/4; “Analytical study on administrative and judicial 
remedies available in countries with users under their jurisdiction and in international 
agreements” (20 July 2007) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/INF/3; and “Analysis of 
claims of unauthorised access and misappropriation of genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge” (22 December 2005) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/4/INF/6.
6 The breach of MAT has been termed ‘misuse,’ in contrast to ‘misappropriation’ which 
generally refers to the appropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in 
violation of the applicable domestic requirements, i.e., generally without PIC and MAT. 
See Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 427–428; and fn. 14 in this 
commentary on Article 15.
7 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(g)(iv). See this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
8 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). See this commentary on Article 8, section 2.
9 That is, ‘research and development’ for the purposes of the Protocol definition of 
‘utilization’: see Article 2(c) and this commentary on Article 2, section 2.
10 Godt, “Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties,” op. cit., 423–424.
11 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g).
12 On the obligation to encourage, see this commentary on Article 9, section 1.
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should interpret ABS contracts,13 regarding for instance the interpretation of 
the contractual terms on benefit-sharing and the assessment as to whether 
they are fair and equitable pursuant to the Protocol’s objective. Article 18 also 
calls for a review of its effectiveness by the Protocol’s governing body, as part of 
its general assessment and review process.14
The following sections will discuss the three obligations enshrined in 
Article 18 in turn. The final section will explore the relevance of Article 18 for 
cases of misappropriation – that is, violation of domestic ABS frameworks 
(addressed in Articles 15–16).
2 Dispute Resolution Provisions in MAT
Article 18(1) aims to ‘promote best practice in drafting more easily enforce-
able ABS contracts.’15 It obliges each Party to encourage providers and users of 
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge to specifically address in MAT 
how to resolve disputes among them. The implementation of this provision 
is explicitly linked (and is, in effect, complementary to) Parties’ obligation to 
establish ‘clear [domestic] rules and procedures’ for requiring and establish-
ing MAT, including a clause on dispute settlement,16 and to take appropriate 
domestic measures to ensure that MAT have been established for access to tra-
ditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.17
Even where foreigners could enjoy equal access to domestic courts in a 
certain jurisdiction, there is broad understanding that further measures are 
needed for foreign users or providers wishing to bring legal action before a 
court of a State other than that in which they are based.18 This may be particu-
larly the case of providers that lack the resources and knowledge of the relevant 
legal system to bring a case, probably of a long duration, in another country, in 
order to obtain redress from a user that has allegedly violated the ABS contract. 
In order to cope with these obstacles, the Bonn Guidelines already elaborated 
on suggested elements for MAT, such as change of use, dispute settlement and 
choice of law, as well as permitted uses, IPRs, commitment to share monetary 
13 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 163.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 18(4). See this commentary on Article 31.
15 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 36.
16 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g)(i).
17 Nagoya Protocol Article 7.
18 Hiroji Isozaki, “Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States,” in Kamau and Winter, 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and the Law, op. cit., 442.
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and non-monetary benefits, and termination of the agreement.19 The aim was 
for detailed guidance to increase the chances for a court to come to an unam-
biguous decision thanks to the fact that the contract under dispute is suffi-
ciently clear and specific.20 In that regard, the Bonn Guidelines appear more 
detailed than the Nagoya Protocol. In addition, it should be borne in mind that 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law and the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law21 have been working on judicial cooperation among countries in 
facilitating the judicial process for foreign applicants,22 including towards the 
harmonization of legal systems on civil and commercial law.
Article 18(1) sets out three legal issues related to transboundary contractual 
dispute resolution. First, it underlines the importance for parties to MAT to 
identify the jurisdiction to which they will subject any dispute resolution pro-
cess (that is, MAT should explicitly clarify in which jurisdiction a MAT-related 
dispute will be brought).23 It has been noted that providers may prefer to 
bring an action for breach of MAT in the jurisdiction of the user, with a view 
to obtaining a judgment that can be directly enforced against the user in his/
her own jurisdiction.24 Absent such identification, legal uncertainty will arise 
as to whether a national court in a given country where legal action has been 
19 Bonn Guidelines, Appendix I.
20 Isozaki, “Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States,” op. cit., 442.
21 Ibid. See Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public 
Documents (The Hague, 5 October 1961, in force 24 January 1965) 20 ILM 1405; Convention 
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters (The Hague, 15 November 1965, in force 10 February 1969); Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (The Hague, 18 March 1970, 
in force 7 October 1972) 8 ILM 37; Convention on International Access to Justice (The 
Hague, 25 October 1980, in force 1 May 1988) 19 ILM 1505; Convention on Civil Procedure 
(The Hague, 1 March 1954, in force 12 April 1957); Convention on the Jurisdiction of the 
Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of Goods (The Hague, 15 April 1958, 
not yet in force); Convention on the Choice of Court (The Hague, 25 November 1965, 
not yet in force); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters (The Hague, 1 February 1971, in force 20 August 1977) 
5 ILM 636; Supplementary Protocol of to the Hague Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (The Hague, 
1 February 1971, in force 20 August 1979) 6 ILM 1083; Convention on the Choice of Court 
Agreements (The Hague, 30 June 2005, not yet in force). 
22 Isozaki, “Enforcement of ABS Agreements,” op. cit., 442.
23 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 430.
24 Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources, 
op. cit., 12.
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brought will deem to have competence to consider a dispute concerning MAT. 
Provided that the jurisdiction to which dispute resolution processes will be 
subjected is clarified in MAT, the decision on which court will have compe-
tence will be made on the basis of domestic norms applicable in the given 
country, unless an international or regional instrument for judicial coopera-
tion is applicable.25
Second, Article 18(1) underscores the importance for parties to MAT to 
identify in their contract the substantive law to be applied to resolve any dis-
pute among them. Absent such a clause, legal uncertainty will arise as the 
determination of the law that will govern the dispute, which would be left to 
the domestic court where legal action has been brought, on the basis of the 
domestic norms on private international law in its jurisdiction. The question of 
applicable law is particularly complex in the context of private-law contracts. 
The domestic court may have to make a choice, on the basis of private inter-
national law norms and taking into consideration the interest of the parties, 
between two different sets of law, such as for instance its own domestic law or 
the law of another country, or it may decide that different questions in a given 
case may be governed by different countries’ law.26
Third, Article 18(1) highlights the important possibility for parties to MAT to 
agree up-front to settle disputes through alternative dispute resolution mech-
anisms rather than domestic courts.27 This may be useful when such non- 
judicial means entail higher flexibility, simpler procedures and lower costs 
than judicial mechanism.28 The provision explicitly mentions mediation or 
arbitration, but does not exclude that parties to MAT may also agree to have 
recourse to other mechanisms, including community-based dispute resolu-
tion systems or an international institution that may facilitate the resolution 
of the dispute. With regard to the latter, it is noteworthy that during the nego-
tiations of the Protocol the creation of an international ombudsman had been 
proposed in relation to this provision.29 As discussed below in more detail,30 
this proposal has been revived in the context of negotiations on the Protocol’s 
25 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 185.
26 Godt, “Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties,” op. cit., 423.
27 See for instance Article 8 of the ITPGRFA SMTA which provides for the following steps on 
dispute resolution: amicable dispute settlement, mediation and arbitration.
28 Isozaki, “Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States,” op. cit., 446.
29 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point. See also Greiber 
et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 190–191; Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” 
op. cit., 433 and note 29; and CBD Working Group on ABS, “Collation of operative text 
submitted,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/5, 27–28.
30 See this commentary on Article 30, section 3.2.
288 Article 18
compliance procedures and mechanisms that are ongoing at the time of writ-
ing. With regard to the former, Parties’ obligation to encourage parties estab-
lishing MAT to include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as options 
should be interpreted and implemented taking in due consideration indig-
enous and local communities’ customary laws and procedures, when these 
communities are concerned by the ABS transaction.31
Finally, it has been noted that the Protocol glosses over the complexity of 
utilizing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms generally used in com-
mercial law disputes for the purposes of achieving fair and equitable benefit-
sharing, and that in that connection development of guidance by the Protocol’s 
governing body would be useful.32
3 Opportunity to Seek Recourse
Article 18(2) aims to ensure opportunities to seek recourse in any Party’s legal 
systems in case of cross-border dispute arising from MAT.33 This may be par-
ticularly complicated as domestic rules may vary on (and possibly prevent) 
standing for foreign government entities or for non-incorporated collective 
entities such as an indigenous or local community that is party to MAT.34
Language from the ITPGRFA35 was relied upon in the drafting of Article 
18(2), thereby obliging Parties to provide in their domestic legal systems for 
existing or new mechanism for parties to MAT to settle their contractual 
disputes. Article 18(2) arguably aims to ensure that some remedies against 
breaches of MAT will be made available in all jurisdictions independently of 
the nationality of the claimant,36 taking into account de facto barriers such as 
costs and differing requirements about the entitlement to bring legal actions 
before foreign courts.
31 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1): see this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
32 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 488. See this commentary on 
Article 26, section 2.
33 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 36.
34 Godt, “Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties,” op. cit., 422.
35 ITPGRFA Article 12(5), which reads: ‘Contracting Parties shall ensure that an opportunity 
to seek recourse is available, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, under 
their legal systems, in case of contractual disputes arising under such MTAs, recognizing 
that obligations arising under such MTAs rest exclusively with the parties to those MTAs’ 
(emphasis added). On the interpretation of this provision, see Moore and Tymowski, 
Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty, op. cit., 100–101.
36 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 186.
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The Protocol, however, does not provide guidance on how the courts 
should decide whether they have jurisdiction over MAT-related disputes.37 
The expression ‘consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements’ of the 
Party concerned has been interpreted as an acknowledgement or a safeguard 
clause that the availability of recourse to courts will depend on applicable 
rules on the choice of jurisdiction, as established in contracts and accepted 
by the named court, or in their absence by [the] private international law of 
the seized forum.’38 Fundamentally, Article 18(2) places a duty on Parties to 
provide to individual parties to MAT opportunities to seek recourse in other 
Parties and arguably to ensure that when such recourse is provided, the seized 
forum ‘should assert jurisdiction unless the complaint is apparently based on 
dubious grounds (e.g., where none of the parties to the MAT have real connec-
tion with the forum).’39
4 Access to Justice and Recognition of Foreign Judgments
Article 18(3) requires the development of domestic measures on access to jus-
tice and utilization of mechanisms of mutual recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments and arbitral awards,40 with a view to supporting providers 
that usually do not have easy access to courts in third countries.41
It has been noted that in the context of Article 18 the reference to ‘each 
Party’ indicates that the requirement targets the unilateral development of 
domestic measures, rather than the multilateral development of harmonized 
requirements.42 It may also serve to underline that both Parties that see them-
selves as mostly user countries or provider countries have to develop such 
domestic measures.
Article 18(3)(a) obliges Parties to take effective measures, as appropriate, 
regarding access to justice. While the term ‘access to justice’ is not defined in 
the Protocol, it has particular resonance in international environmental law. In 
the latter context, it is generally seen as a necessary tool for the enforcement 
of environmental law and as a means for reviewing the decisions, acts, and 
37 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 431.
38 Ibid., 432. See also Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 186.
39 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 432.
40 Glowka and Normand, “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” op. cit., 36.
41 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for drawing our attention to this point.
42 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 187.
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omissions of public authorities with regard to environmental matters.43 Access 
to justice is well-established in international human rights law44 in relation 
to the independence and impartiality of a court with a view to ensuring a fair 
trial, and ‘truly effective’ remedies in determining that a violation has occurred 
and in providing redress.45 It has thus been argued that human rights stan-
dards may be used as a yardstick to ensure that access to justice has been pro-
vided in a specific case under the Protocol.46
Under Article 18(3)(b), Parties have an obligation to adopt effective measures 
addressing the utilization of mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments and arbitral decisions. In other words, they are to sup-
port participation in existing mechanisms or establish new ones if they do not 
exist.47 Recognition of foreign judgments remains a complex matter,48 whereas 
the recognition of foreign arbitral awards may be considered ‘generally easier’ 
as a high number of countries are Parties to the 1958 New York Convention on 
43 See Rio Declaration Principle 10; and Guidelines for the development of national 
legislation on access to information, public participation and access to justice in 
environmental matters, adopted by UNEP Governing Council in decision SS.XI/5, 
part A, 26 February 2010, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.unep.org/civil-society/
Portals/24105/documents/Guidelines/GUIDELINES_TO_ACCESS_TO_ENV_INFO_2.
pdf>. See also Ebbesson, “Access to Information on Environmental Matters,” op. cit., 
particularly paragraphs 31–33, who concludes that ‘Despite the close link to the notions 
of access to information and public participation in decision-making on environmental 
matters, access to justice remains a less established concept than the latter two in 
international environmental law,’ emphasis added, paragraph 33.
44 E.g. Article 14 ICCPR; Francesco Francioni, ed. Access to Justice as a Human Right 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Louise Doswald-Beck, “Fair Trial, Right To, 
International Protection,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit.
45 Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, paragraph 184; Ebbesson, 
“Access to Information on Environmental Matters,” op. cit., paragraph 31.
46 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 72. It has also been 
noted that the use of this term in the Protocol was inspired by the Aarhus Convention 
(Koester, Nagoya Protocol on ABS, op. cit., section 5), which can in effect provide a 
standard for the interpretation and implementation of the Protocol in as far as Parties to 
that Convention are Parties to the Protocol (Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” 
op. cit., 432–233).
47 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 445.
48 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on compliance,” UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/7/3. For a discussion based on the case of Japan, see Isozaki, “Enforcement of 
ABS Agreements in User States,” op. cit., 443–444.
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the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.49 There is also 
the possibility for Parties to conclude an ex post arbitration arrangement.50
Article 18(3) does not specify which measures must be taken by Parties, but 
qualifies the obligation by reference to ‘as appropriate,’ thereby leaving flex-
ibility to Parties in its implementation. Parties can thus choose among various 
ways to facilitate access to courts or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
for foreign users or providers. Insofar as indigenous and local communities 
are parties to MAT, consideration must be given to their customary laws and 
procedures,51 in accordance with relevant international human rights norms 
and standards.52 In that regard, it has been recommended that States ensure 
the best means to attain access to justice in line with indigenous peoples’ self-
determination and related rights to participate in decision-making affecting 
them.53 States are also expected to work with indigenous peoples to address 
the underlying issues that prevent them from having access to justice on an 
equal basis with others, and facilitate their access to legal remedies including 
by supporting their capacity development in making use of legal systems.54
5 Jurisdiction and Access to Justice in Cases of Violation of Provider 
Country ABS Frameworks
It is noteworthy that the Protocol does not contain a provision on jurisdic-
tion and access to justice specifically devoted to compliance with the require-
ment for PIC and establishment of MAT,55 corresponding to Article 18 for the 
content of already established MAT. In other words, the Protocol does not 
49 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 444. 
50 Ibid.
51 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
52 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
53 Human Rights Council, “Expert Mechanism Advice No. 5 Access to justice in the 
promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples,” (2013), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/Session6/ 
A-HRC-EMRIP-2013-2_en.pdf>, Annex, paragraph 4.
54 Ibid., paragraphs 8 and 10.
55 Note that ‘With regard to illegal bioprospecting, both the applicability of the provider 
country’s law and the user country’s law can be argued. In essence, the law cannot be 
determined in the abstract in advance’: Godt, “Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties,” 
op. cit., 431 and previous discussion at 424–431. The author concludes that ‘it is possible 
to litigate a (meaningful) benefit-sharing claim for biopiracy in a user country’s court. 
Prospects for success are better with regard to immaterial property than to material 
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contain provisions on jurisdiction and access to justice in cases of violation 
of provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks under Articles 15–16.56 This 
may be explained by the fact that contractual arrangements can be more easily 
enforced in other jurisdictions thanks to the operation of private international 
law. Conversely legal recourse in user countries on the basis of an adminis-
trative decision embodying PIC (or lack thereof) may be difficult, as foreign 
courts may be hesitant to decide on the validity of foreign administrative deci-
sions because of different administrative systems and principles of interpreta-
tion of administrative decisions.57 These cases may rather be addressed under 
the Protocol’ compliance procedures and mechanisms.58
It has been argued, however, that the reference to ‘appropriate, effective and 
proportionate’ measures under Articles 15 and 16 may support an expansive 
systemic interpretation of Article 18, whereby the same jurisdictional prin-
ciples and access to justice standards that apply to contractual disputes aris-
ing from MAT under Article 18(2)–(3) should be applied, mutatis mutandis, to 
cases of misappropriation under Articles 15–16.59 Consequently, Parties would 
be expected to provide opportunities to seek recourse within their jurisdiction 
for foreigners alleging violations by users of domestic ABS measures or for for-
eigners alleging inaction by a competent national authority60 of a user country 
in enforcing domestic user-side measures.61 The same commentator has also 
argued that Parties’ duty to take measures to use mechanisms regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards may 
extend to cases of misappropriation.62
property. Against common wisdom, it is not the applicable law that forms an obstacle’ 
(ibid., 432).
56 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 432–434. See this commentary on 
Articles 15–16. 
57 Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya,” op. cit., 165, 172–172 and 174.
58 See this commentary on Article 30, section 3, and on Article 15, section 2.
59 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 435.
60 See this commentary on Article 13, section 3.
61 Chiarolla, “Role of Private International Law,” op. cit., 434–435.
62 Nagoya Protocol Articles 15(3) and 16(3). See Chiarolla, “Role of Private International 
Law,” op. cit., 444.
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Article 19. Model Contractual Clauses
1. Each Party shall encourage, as appropriate, the development, update 
and use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses for 
mutually agreed terms.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall periodically take stock of the use of sectoral and 
cross-sectoral model contractual clauses.
1 Overview
Article 19 identifies Parties’ responsibility to encourage the development and 
use of model clauses for MAT, namely the private ABS contract to be nego-
tiated between an individual provider and an individual user.1 As discussed 
above, the Protocol contains little guidance on the content of MAT,2 although 
this is the only tool that explicitly aims to operationalize the Protocol’s objec-
tive to achieve fairness and equity in sharing benefits3 and is expected to be 
enforceable across jurisdictions.4 Article 19, therefore, opens the door to the 
future development of further international guidance on the content of MAT 
by tapping into user-led practices and other ABS stakeholders’ experience in 
developing and operationalizing standard contractual clauses.5
The rationale of Article 19 is the need to create legally enforceable and 
inter-operable ABS contracts in different jurisdictions that may have different 
national ABS frameworks and whose national courts may have different stan-
dards in recognizing as valid and enforcing contracts.6 This was in fact one of 
the main concerns related to legal certainty7 that arose from the early imple-
mentation of ABS laws and motivated the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol. 
1 Generally on MAT, see this commentary on Article 5, section 5.
2 Nagoya Protocol Article 6.3(g) and this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
3 See this commentary on Article 1 and Conclusions to this commentary, section 2.
4 See this commentary on Article 18.
5 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 118.
6 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 490–494; and Tomme Young, 
“Applying Contract Law to ABS,” in Contracting for ABS: The Legal and Scientific Implications 
of Bioprospecting Contracts, ed. Shakeel Bhatti et al., (Gland: IUCN, 2009), 39.
7 Nagoya Protocol 9th preambular recital.
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The importance of standardized contractual clauses8 therefore lies in their 
potential contribution to the predictability and consistency of ABS transac-
tions, thereby reducing burdens and transaction costs in establishing MAT9 
and monitoring compliance.10 It should be stressed, however, that model con-
tractual clauses cannot replace the need for Parties to develop their national 
ABS frameworks supporting and regulating the negotiations of MAT.11
Notably, Article 19 emphasizes the importance of developing model con-
tractual clauses for specific sectors of ABS transactions, as well as cross-sectoral 
ones. This reflects the understanding that each sector is part of a unique 
research network or market, with distinct practices of accessing and using 
genetic resources and undertaking research and development.12 Article 19 
may thus possibly serve to further understand how the Protocol operates in 
different sectors. In addition, implementation of Article 19 may arguably also 
contribute to promoting best practices and building the capacity of concerned 
sectors in countries in which such sectors are less developed.13
The following sections will analyze the obligation of Parties, and the man-
date for the Protocol’s governing body contained in Article 19, in turn.
2 Obligation for Parties
Article 19(1) creates a best-endeavor obligation for all Parties to support the 
development, update and use of model contractual clauses for MAT. This 
8 See “Database of Model Contractual Clauses,” CBD, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.
cbd.int/abs/resources/contracts.shtml>; and WIPO online searchable database of bio-
diversity-related ABS agreements, with a particular emphasis on the intellectual prop-
erty aspects of such agreements: “Biodiversity-Related Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Agreements,” WIPO, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/con-
tracts/index.html>. 
9 See Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3)(g) and this commentary on Article 6, section 7.
10 See this commentary on Article 18.
11 We are grateful to Tomme Young for having drawn our attention to this point. The 
Protocol negotiators reflected this understanding when they placed draft operational text 
on model clauses in a section on tools to support compliance, rather than in a section on 
tools for enforcing compliance. See ENB 9/465, “Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the 
Working Group on ABS,” 6–7; and ENB, “Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the Working 
Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 9–15 
November 2009,” Vol. 9 No. 489, 18 November 2009, 7–9. 
12 CBD Secretariat, “Access and Benefit-sharing in Practice,” op. cit., 8.
13 Ibid. Note that the Protocol provision on capacity building explicitly points also to the 
needs of ABS ‘stakeholders’: Nagoya Protocol Article 22(5)(i) and this commentary on 
Article 22, section 4.
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obligation can be undertaken unilaterally by Parties establishing ‘default’ or 
‘standard’ MAT for specific categories of genetic resources under their jurisdic-
tion or for specific cases.14 Such default MAT would likely have to be accepted 
by a user upon applying for access to genetic resources and/or traditional 
knowledge, or could apply automatically unless different MAT are negotiated.15 
Parties could also implement this obligation collectively in the context of bilat-
eral or regional ABS frameworks,16 and at the multilateral level. One precedent 
of multilateral nature is the standard Material Transfer Agreement adopted by 
the ITPGRFA Governing Body for exchanges of material within its Multilateral 
System.17 In addition, States have initiated work on model clauses for other 
sectors of genetic resources for food and agriculture, which could include 
for instance animal genetic resources and microorganisms, under the FAO 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.18
It should be further noted that model contractual clauses are included 
among the information that can be voluntarily submitted by Parties to the ABS 
Clearinghouse.19 In addition, Article 19 should be read in conjunction with 
the obligation for Parties to endeavor to support, as appropriate, the devel-
opment by indigenous and local communities of model contractual clauses 
for benefit-sharing arising from the utilization of traditional knowledge asso-
ciated with genetic resources.20 Article 19 is further related to the obligation 
to encourage individual users and providers to include provisions in MAT 
on information-sharing and contractual reporting aimed at monitoring the 
14 See this commentary on Article 6, section 3.2.
15 See for instance the standard conditions that apply to bioprospecting activities with 
non-commercial purpose on Commonwealth territories in Australia: “Permits for Non-
Commercial Purposes,” Government of Australia, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.
environment.gov.au/node/14465>.
16 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
17 In practice, the SMTA of the ITPGRFA is also used for transactions of plant genetic 
resources outside the Treaty’s Multilateral System acquired before the Treaty’s entry 
into force, in particular between the international agricultural research centres of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. See this commentary on 
Article 4, fn. 99; and Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 
108–109.
18 The CGRFA, “Report of the fourteenth regular session,” paragraph 40 (viii), requested 
its Secretary to compile the information obtained by Parties for consideration by the 
Commission’s intergovernmental technical working groups, to enable the Commission 
to take a decision on the collection of model contractual clauses for subsectors of genetic 
resources other than plant genetic resources for food and agriculture at its fifteenth 
Regular Session.
19 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(3)(b). See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
20 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(c). See this commentary on Article 12.
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utilization of genetic resources once they have left the jurisdiction of the coun-
try providing PIC.21
3 Mandate for the Protocol’s Governing Body
Article 19(2) tasks the Protocol’s governing body to periodically ‘take stock’ 
of the use of standardized contractual clauses. At a minimum, in accordance 
with CBD practice, the governing body will likely invite Parties on a periodic 
basis to submit reports of sectoral reviews and examples of model contrac-
tual clauses, synthesize this information and make it available through the ABS 
Clearinghouse.22 The wording of Article 19(2) does not exclude the possibility23 
that the governing body could also endorse certain model contractual clauses, 
whether generally or as a ‘predetermination of enforceability’ that would 
enable Parties to ensure their automatic recognition in domestic courts.24 As 
endorsed by the Protocol’s governing body, certain model contractual clauses 
could come to represent ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the [P]arties regarding its interpretation.’25 
It remains to be seen, however, whether such an assessment would be con-
ducted by the Protocol’s governing body, could require the establishment of 
an ad hoc process given the high number of standard contractual clauses to be 
examined, or even be a function that might be subsumed under the Protocol’s 
compliance procedures and mechanisms.26
The Protocol, overall, seeks to tap into normative activities undertaken by 
various ABS stakeholders such as the research community, the private sector, 
indigenous peoples and local communities, and NGOs at the national (but also 
sub-national and transnational) levels as a bottom-up source of inspiration for 
multilateral discussions on ways to facilitate implementation of and compli-
ance with the Protocol.27
21 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(1)(b). See this commentary on Article 17. The availability of 
relevant model contractual clauses could also support the effective implementation of 
Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(3)(g), 7 and 18(1). 
22 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 194.
23 Although it does not mandate the Protocol’s governing body to do so. Compare Nagoya 
Protocol Article 20(2). See also this commentary on Article 20.
24 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 493. Such endorsement could 
be provided on the basis of Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(f).
25 VCLT, Article 31(3)(b).
26 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for a useful exchange of ideas on this point.
27 Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Introduction,” op. cit., 10.
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Article 20. Codes of Conduct, Guidelines and Best 
Practices and/or Standards
1. Each Party shall encourage, as appropriate, the development, update 
and use of voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines and best practices 
and/or standards in relation to access and benefit-sharing.
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall periodically take stock of the use of voluntary codes 
of conduct, guidelines and best practices and/or standards and con-
sider the adoption of specific codes of conduct, guidelines and best 
practices and/or standards.
1 Overview
ABS transactions involve a multitude of relationships between governmental, 
non-governmental and private-sector actors at different levels of governance 
and across jurisdictions. Albeit exemplary in the context of modern environ-
mental law,1 this multitude of relationships also points to the limitations of a 
purely inter-governmental approach to ABS regulation and to the relevance of 
more informal, complementary tools for shaping common expectations and 
behavior of all stakeholders involved in ABS transactions.
In this context, Article 20 calls attention to the role of voluntary instruments 
in the implementation of the Protocol. The terms ‘codes of conduct, guidelines 
and best practices and/or standards’ may include self-regulation instruments 
adopted by research entities/associations, funders, users’ groups, private enter-
prises and business associations, as well as good-practice advice elaborated 
by indigenous and local communities, NGOs, donors and others. These vol-
untary instruments will be particularly relevant for stakeholders interested in 
pioneering its implementation on the ground, including before the entry into 
force of the Protocol, and also to provide ideas for national ABS legislation and 
procedures. Several such voluntary instruments on ABS already exist.2
1 Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 515–516.
2 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 196 make reference to the International Plant 
Exchange Network’s codes of conduct: “The International Plant Exchange Network (IPEN): 
An Instrument of botanic gardens to fulfil the ABS Provisions,” University of Bonn, accessed
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After the development of domestic ABS frameworks, voluntary instruments 
may contribute to establish/maintain excellence in the conduct of institutions 
involved in ABS transactions, or serve to support compliance with national ABS 
frameworks, providing tools and guidelines to ensure respect of legally binding 
rules.3 They may also provide standards targeted to ABS in specific sectors.4 
Furthermore, voluntary instruments may be useful to address certain genetic 
resources that are outside the scope of the Protocol5 or to go otherwise beyond 
existing legal requirements.6 Best practice standards may also become relevant 
in ABS relationships between Parties and non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol.7
The following sections will analyze the obligation for Parties, and the man-
date for the Protocol’s governing body contained in Article 20, in turn.
2 Obligation for Parties
Article 20(1) creates, similarly to Article 19(1), a best-endeavor obligation for all 
Parties to support the development, update and use of voluntary ABS instru-
ments unilaterally or collectively (in the context of bilateral or regional ABS 
frameworks,8 and at the multilateral level).9 This obligation entails removing 
obstacles to the development of such voluntary instruments and arguably 
providing incentives in that regard. Parties may have recourse to awareness-
raising and capacity-building activities to this end.10 Adherence to voluntary 
instruments may be taken into account by Parties’ national authorities at the 
stage of authorizing access to genetic resources11 and possibly by indigenous 
and local communities authorizing access to traditional knowledge,12 particu-
 30 November 2013, <www.botgart.uni-bonn.de/ipen/criteria.html>; “ABS Management 
Tool,” International Institute for Sustainable Development and Swiss Government, 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.sib.admin.ch/en/nagoya-protocol/abs-management-
tool/index.html>; and the Ethical BioTrade standard, managed by the Union for Ethical 
BioTrade. As to the latter, see Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 373.
3 Ibid., 195.
4 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 119.
5 See this commentary on Article 3.
6 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 383.
7 See this commentary on Article 24.
8 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
9 See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
10 Nagoya Protocol Article 21(e). See this commentary on Articles 21–22.
11 See this commentary on Article 6, section 3.2.
12 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4, and Article 7.
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larly when these voluntary agreements constitute the basis for independent 
verification of compliance.13 Parties may also decide to submit information on 
voluntary instruments to the ABS Clearinghouse.14
In as far as voluntary instruments developed by users concern traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities,15 
Parties are to act under Article 20(1) with the effective participation of the 
communities concerned,16 taking into consideration their customary laws, pro-
tocols and procedures.17 And as part of the obligation to carry out awareness- 
raising activities, Parties are to promote voluntary instruments in consultation 
with these communities.18 From a provider community’s perspective, a com-
munity protocol,19 code of conduct or inter-community agreement (in case of 
shared traditional knowledge) could also serve as a voluntary instrument for 
the purposes of Article 20. In the case of long-standing ABS relationships, such 
voluntary instruments could also be developed in cooperation with private-
sector users.20
3 Mandate for the Protocol’s Governing Body
Like Article 19, the Protocol’s governing body is tasked with the periodic stock-
taking of voluntary initiatives. In line with CBD practice, the governing body 
will likely invite Parties on a periodic basis to submit reports of sectoral reviews 
and examples of voluntary instruments, synthesize this information and make 
it available through the ABS Clearinghouse.
As opposed to Article 19, the Protocol’s governing body is also explicitly 
tasked to consider the adoption of specific voluntary instruments. Adoption 
of these instruments by the Protocol’s governing body would increase their 
legitimacy21 due to the underlying intergovernmental consensus, in serving 
as official guidance for the interpretation and application of the Protocol. As 
endorsed by the Protocol’s governing body, voluntary instruments could thus 
13 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 384.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 14(3)(d). See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
15 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2), 6(2) and 7.
16 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No 169, Article 6(2); and fn. 54 in this 
commentary on Article 5.
17 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
18 Nagoya Protocol Article 21(e). 
19 See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.1.
20 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 384–385.
21 Oliva, “Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 385.
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come to represent ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the [P]arties regarding its interpretation.’22 It may 
also be possible for the governing body to recognize or endorse pre-existing 
and future domestic, transnational and multilateral ABS frameworks.23 That 
being said, the Protocol does not clarify whether such an assessment would 
be conducted by the Protocol’s governing body, could require the establish-
ment of an ad hoc process given the high number of standard contractual 
clauses to be examined, or even be a function that might be subsumed under 
the Protocol’s compliance procedures and mechanisms. It also remains to be 
seen whether the Protocol’s governing body would engage in ascertaining the 
compliance with the Protocol of voluntary instruments that have been inter-
governmentally approved in other fora,24 and what would be the fate of those 
instruments that are considered non-compliant.25
Overall, similarly to Article 19, this provision seeks to tap into normative 
activities undertaken by various ABS stakeholders such as indigenous and 
local communities, the research community, the private sector and NGOs at 
the national (but also sub-national and transnational) level(s) as a bottom-
up source of inspiration for discussions on ways to facilitate implementation 
of the Protocol at the multilateral level.26 In particular, voluntary instruments 
may arguably prove to be a useful basis to find agreement on difficult issues aris-
ing from the implementation of the Protocol, such as the distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial research,27 by taking into account actual 
experiences in scientific research collaborations, including those working in 
public domain-like conditions (i.e., without any ownership claims that would 
restrict access and use of the research results and basic research materials).28
22 VCLT, Article 31(3)(b).
23 Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen, “Analysis of the Relationship,” op. cit., 118.
24 This may be the case of intergovernmentally approved guidelines targeting non-State 
actors: see discussion in the context of the CGRFA in this commentary on Article 4, 
section 4.4. 
25 We are grateful to Geoff Burton for a useful exchange of ideas on this point.
26 Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Introduction,” op. cit., 10.
27 Pursuant to Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). See this commentary on Article 8, section 2.
28 Dedeurwaerdere et al., “Governing Global Scientific Research,” op. cit., 419–420. 
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Article 21. Awareness-Raising
Each Party shall take measures to raise awareness of the importance 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources, and related access and benefit-sharing issues. Such measures 
may include, inter alia:
(a) Promotion of this Protocol, including its objective;
(b) Organization of meetings of indigenous and local communities and 
relevant stakeholders;
(c) Establishment and maintenance of a help desk for indigenous and 
local communities and relevant stakeholders;
(d) Information dissemination through a national clearing-house;
(e) Promotion of voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines and best prac-
tices and/or standards in consultation with indigenous and local com-
munities and relevant stakeholders;
(f) Promotion of, as appropriate, domestic, regional and international 
exchanges of experience;
(g) Education and training of users and providers of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources about 
their access and benefit-sharing obligations;
(h) Involvement of indigenous and local communities and relevant stake-
holders in the implementation of this Protocol; and
(i) Awareness-raising of community protocols and procedures of indig-
enous and local communities.
1 Overview
Article 21 includes a clear and unconditional obligation for Parties to raise 
awareness about the Protocol and ABS issues, providing an indicative list of 
activities1 that can be undertaken to fulfill this obligation. The importance of 
awareness-raising in the ABS context and its contribution to the functioning 
of the Protocol should not be underestimated. ABS is still a little-known issue 
to the general public, as well as to the numerous government and stakeholder 
1 Tsioumani, “Access and Benefit Sharing: The Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 293.
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sectors that will be affected by the Protocol. Thus, the preamble indicates 
that Parties
recogniz[e] that public awareness of the economic value of ecosystems 
and biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of this economic value 
with the custodians of biodiversity are key incentives for the conserva-
tion of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components.2
Article 21 builds upon the obligations found in the CBD on communication, 
education and public awareness3 and exchange of information.4 In the light 
of the importance of awareness-raising activities for the effective implementa-
tion of the Protocol, the Intergovernmental Committee preparing the ground 
for the Protocol’s entry into force has already discussed the need to develop an 
awareness-raising strategy.5
As Article 21 does no raise particular interpretative difficulties, the following 
sections will first discuss the specific relevance of this provision for the imple-
mentation of the Protocol provisions related to indigenous and local commu-
nities, and then offer final observations on the linkages between Article 21 and 
other provisions of the Protocol.
2 Specific Relevance for Indigenous and Local Communities
It should be emphasized that the non-exhaustive list of awareness-raising 
activities pays particular attention to the implementation challenges raised 
2 Nagoya Protocol 6th preambular recital.
3 CBD Article 13. See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 68–70; and “Programme of Work for the Global Initiative 
on Communication, Education and Public Awareness (CEPA)” in CBD Decision 6/19, 
“Communication, education and public awareness” (22 May 2002) UN DOC UNEP/CBD/
COP/6/20, Annex.
4 CBD Article 17. See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 92–93; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 200.
5 ICNP Recommendation 1/3, “Measures to raise awareness of the importance of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge and access and benefit-sharing related issues” 
in “Report of the first meeting of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization” (21 July 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/8, Annex; 
and Recommendation 2/6, “Measures to raise awareness of the importance of the genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge, and related access and benefit-sharing 
issues” in ICNP, “Report of the second meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex.
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by the Protocol with regards to the role of indigenous and local communities. 
That is, several of the activities listed under Article 21 concern raising these 
communities’ awareness about their rights under the Protocol and their role in 
its implementation, and aim at addressing information asymmetries between 
users and community representatives negotiating MAT.6 Ultimately, Article 21 
may contribute to legal empowerment of indigenous and local communities,7 
by enhancing their ability to use legal tools to tackle power asymmetries and 
exercise greater control over decisions and processes that affect their lives 
and rights.8
In addition, several of the activities listed under Article 21 aim to raise the 
awareness of relevant government actors and other stakeholders as to their 
obligations vis-à-vis indigenous and local communities under the Protocol, 
such as through the organization of meetings of these communities and other 
stakeholders and the creation of a help desk. These awareness-raising activi-
ties can be part of the mechanisms required by the Nagoya Protocol to inform 
potential users of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
about their obligations.9 These activities may also contribute to Parties’ efforts 
in supporting indigenous and local communities’ development of community 
protocols, minimum requirements for MAT and model contractual clauses.10 
In all these cases, Parties are to act with the effective participation of the indig-
enous and local communities concerned,11 taking into consideration their 
customary laws, protocols and procedures12 and being mindful of relevant 
international human rights norms.13
3 Linkages with Other Provisions
Article 21 is linked explicitly and implicitly to other provisions in the Protocol. 
The inclusion among the list of awareness-raising activities of the promotion 
6 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 202.
7 Munyi and Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 234–235.
8 Lorenzo Cotula and Paul Mathieu, eds., Legal Empowerment in Practice, Using Legal Tools 
to Secure Land Rights in Africa (London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development, 2008).
9 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(2). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 201. See this 
commentary on Article 12, section 3.
10 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3). See this commentary on Article 12, section 4.
11 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2); and fn. 54 in this 
commentary on Article 5. 
12 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
13 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
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of the ‘objective’ of the Protocol implies the need to raise awareness about 
how ABS transactions contribute to fairness and equity between and within 
States,14 as well as to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.15
Article 21 is also linked to the promotion of voluntary instruments in consul-
tation with indigenous and local communities and relevant ABS stakeholders,16 
and its implementation will be influenced by the implementation of capacity- 
building activities.17 Finally, the ABS Clearinghouse can help in promoting 
domestic, regional and international exchanges of awareness-raising experi-
ences and in delivering education and training of users and providers.18
14 See this commentary on Article 1, sections 1–2.
15 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4; Article 5, section 4; Article 8, section 2; 
Article 9, section 2; Article 10, section 4; and Article 12, section 5.
16 See this commentary on Article 20.
17 See this commentary on Article 22.
18 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 472–473. See this commentary 
on Article 14, section 3.
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Article 22. Capacity
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the capacity-building, capacity develop-
ment and strengthening of human resources and institutional capaci-
ties to effectively implement this Protocol in developing country 
Parties, in particular the least developed countries and small island 
developing States among them, and Parties with economies in tran-
sition, including through existing global, regional, subregional and 
national institutions and organisations. In this context, Parties should 
facilitate the involvement of indigenous and local communities and 
relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organisations and 
the private sector.
2. The need of developing country Parties, in particular the least devel-
oped countries and small island developing States among them, and 
Parties with economies in transition for financial resources in accor-
dance with the relevant provisions of the Convention shall be taken 
fully into account for capacity-building and development to imple-
ment this Protocol.
3. As a basis for appropriate measures in relation to the implementa-
tion of this Protocol, developing country Parties, in particular the 
least developed countries and small island developing States among 
them, and Parties with economies in transition should identify their 
national capacity needs and priorities through national capacity self-
assessments. In doing so, such Parties should support the capacity 
needs and priorities of indigenous and local communities and rel-
evant stakeholders, as identified by them, emphasising the capacity 
needs and priorities of women.
4. In support of the implementation of this Protocol, capacity-building 
and development may address, inter alia, the following key areas:
(a) Capacity to implement, and to comply with the obligations of, 
this Protocol;
(b) Capacity to negotiate mutually agreed terms;
(c) Capacity to develop, implement and enforce domestic legisla-
tive, administrative or policy measures on access and benefit-
sharing; and
(d) Capacity of countries to develop their endogenous research 
capabilities to add value to their own genetic resources.
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5. Measures in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4 above may include, 
inter alia:
(a) Legal and institutional development;
(b) Promotion of equity and fairness in negotiations, such as train-
ing to negotiate mutually agreed terms;
(c) The monitoring and enforcement of compliance;
(d) Employment of best available communication tools and 
Internet-based systems for access and benefit-sharing activities;
(e) Development and use of valuation methods;
(f) Bioprospecting, associated research and taxonomic studies;
(g) Technology transfer, and infrastructure and technical capacity to 
make such technology transfer sustainable;
(h) Enhancement of the contribution of access and benefit-sharing 
activities to the conservation of biological diversity and the sus-
tainable use of its components;
(i) Special measures to increase the capacity of relevant stakehold-
ers in relation to access and benefit-sharing; and
(j) Special measures to increase the capacity of indigenous and 
local communities with emphasis on enhancing the capacity of 
women within those communities in relation to access to genetic 
resources and/or traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources.
6. Information on capacity-building and development initiatives at 
national, regional and international levels, undertaken in accordance 
with paragraphs 1 to 5 above, should be provided to the Access and 
Benefit-sharing clearing-house with a view to promoting synergy 
and coordination on capacity-building and development for access 
and benefit-sharing.
1 Overview
The length of this provision signals at the outset the paramount importance 
of capacity building for the successful implementation of the Protocol and 
for sensuring compliance with it. The Protocol addresses capacity building 
in detail, linking it to implementation and compliance, negotiation of MAT, 
development and enforcement of domestic ABS frameworks, and develop-
ment of endogenous research capabilities.1 The following sections will analyze 
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4).
307capacity
the obligation to cooperate in this context, the emphasis on country-driven 
capacity building, and provisions specifically targeting indigenous and local 
communities. The final section will offer an assessment of possible challenges 
in development cooperation for ABS capacity building.
2 The Obligation to Cooperate
Article 22 creates an unconditional obligation for all Parties to cooperate in 
building capacity2 for the implementation of the Protocol. The obligation is 
underpinned by concerns about optimal utilization of resources and avoid-
ance of duplicative activities. As per standard CBD terminology, the provision 
singles out two groups of countries that will benefit from capacity-building 
support: developing-country Parties, in particular the least developed coun-
tries and small island developing States among them, and Parties with econo-
mies in transition.3
Article 22, therefore, embodies an obligation of solidarity – that is, an inten-
sified form of international cooperation, whereby individual States are to take 
into consideration in their own policy the interests of other States and the com-
mon interests of the global community, and be ready to accept to bear certain 
costs and burdens of cooperation.4 This is based on the understanding that 
costs and burdens have been distributed fairly ‘in accordance with basic prin-
ciples of equity and social justice’ to address global challenges.5 Obligations 
of solidarity are to be fulfilled without expectations of reciprocity, and can be 
2 On the different meanings of the expressions ‘capacity-building,’ ‘capacity development’ 
and ‘strengthening of human resources and institutional capacities,’ see Greiber et al., 
Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 207–208, relying on: “UN Public Administration Glossary,” UN, 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.unpan.org>.
3 The first two paragraphs of Nagoya Protocol Article 22 are modelled after Biosafety Protocol 
Article 22.
4 Wolfrum, “Cooperation,” op. cit., paragraph 3.
5 UN General Assembly, “Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order” 
(8 February 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/151, paragraph 3(f), and “Promotion of a Democratic 
and Equitable International Order” (25 February 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/213, paragraph 
4(f), which (both) read: ‘Solidarity, as a fundamental value, by virtue of which global chal-
lenges must be managed in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly, in accordance 
with basic principles of equity and social justice, and ensures that those who suffer or benefit 
the least receive help from those who benefit the most.’ See also UN Millennium Declaration, 
paragraph 6; and Campanelli, “Solidarity,” op. cit., paragraph 17.
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considered inherent to specific areas of international law such as sustainable 
development and human rights.6
Article 22(1) can be interpreted as requiring Parties to enter into negotiations 
with a view to engaging in the coordinated or joint determination and alloca-
tion of capacity-building support. However, if agreement cannot be reached, 
the obligation does not impede Parties from making unilateral determinations, 
but in doing so they are expected to take in consideration other Parties’ initia-
tives and concerns.7 While Article 22 does not provide specific indications as 
to how such cooperation should be carried out, it suggests recourse to exist-
ing global, regional, subregional and national institutions and organizations. 
These institutions may include the Global Environment Facility (GEF),8 the 
ITPGRFA and the multi-donor ABS Capacity Development Initiative,9 as well 
as the CBD itself through its Action Plan on Capacity-building for Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing.10
In addition, Article 22 does not prevent cooperation among Parties to be 
carried out on an ad hoc basis, including through bilateral agreements (spe-
cifically related to ABS or having a broader scope).11 The usefulness and cost-
effectiveness of subregional and regional approaches to capacity-building and 
development, in particular where countries have similar biological resources 
and common capacity-building and development needs, have also been 
underscored in intergovernmental discussions preparing for the entry into 
force of the Protocol.12 Based on these intergovernmental discussions, it can 
also be expected that the Protocol’s governing body will facilitate coordina-
tion on capacity-building, through reporting, creating a specific coordination 
6 Ibid., paragraphs 5–6 and 9–10, and 16–20 specifically on sustainable development.
7 See discussion on the general duty of cooperation in this commentary on Article 11, 
section 2.
8 Note that the GEF is also the financial mechanism for the implementation of the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol: see this commentary on Article 25, section 2.
9 ICNP Recommendation 1/2, “Measures to assist in capacity-building, capacity 
development and strengthening of human resources and institutional capacities in 
developing countries and Parties with economies in transition” in ICNP, “Report of the 
first meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/8, Annex, 2nd preambular recital.
10 CBD Decision 7/19, “Access and benefit-sharing as related to genetic resources (Article 
15)” Annex (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21. See also “Database of ABS 
Capacity-Building Activities,” CBD, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/abs/
projects.shtml>; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 206–207.
11 See discussion of bilateral agreements in this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
12 ICNP Recommendation 1/2, 5th preambular recital.
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mechanism, and monitoring and reviewing of activities undertaken.13 This 
will build upon information (that ‘should’ be provided) on capacity-building 
activities to the ABS Clearinghouse.14 By storing and sharing information on 
capacity-building materials, the ABS Clearinghouse is itself expected to con-
tribute to capacity building.15
In cooperating on capacity building, Parties are to operate in the framework 
of relevant provisions of the CBD on technical cooperation and financial soli-
darity. Article 22(1) implicitly refers back to the CBD requirement for Parties to 
undertake technical and scientific cooperation, especially with respect to the 
development and strengthening of national capabilities in human resources 
development and institution building.16 According to Article 22(2), the finan-
cial needs of developing countries shall be taken into full account for capac-
ity building to implement the Protocol. Explicit reference, in that context, to 
‘accordance with relevant provisions of the Convention’ may thus be inter-
preted as a reference to CBD requirement for developed countries to provide 
‘new and additional financial resources’ to developing countries to enable 
them to meet the costs of implementing their obligations under the CBD.17 It 
may also refer to the CBD text on taking into account that the implementa-
tion by developing countries of their international obligations will depend 
on the degree to which developed country Parties provide financial resources 
to the former.18
13 ICNP Recommendation 1/2, paragraph 1 and Annex, where reference is made to a 
coordination mechanism and its possible elements, including the reporting of capacity-
building and development initiatives to the ABS Clearinghouse; and monitoring and 
review, including developing a set of indicators to facilitate the monitoring and review 
of the implementation of the strategic framework and to assess the impact of access and 
benefit-sharing capacity-building and development initiatives.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(6). See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
15 See this commentary on Article 14, section 3.
16 CBD Article 18. See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 94–95; and similarly to the corresponding text in the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 143.
17 CBD Article 20(2). See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 102–104.
18 CBD Article 20(4). See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 105. Similarly to the corresponding text in the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 144–
145. On the interpretation of CBD Article 20(4), see Melinda Chandler, “The Biodiversity 
Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer,” Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy 4 (1993): 141, 173–174, who sees it as 
a mere statement of fact; while Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the 
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3 Country-Driven Capacity-Building
Because of the Protocol’s built-in flexibility, capacity-building activities will 
vary greatly from one country to another. So intergovernmental discussions in 
preparation for the Protocol’s entry into force have tried to balance a bottom-
up approach to allow countries, as well as indigenous and local communities, 
to determine their own needs with an overarching global strategy to ensure 
optimal use of resources.19
Article 22 thus seems to recognize that no single model of capacity building 
for ABS will fit the situation of all countries, but that capacity-building initia-
tives should be tailored to fit the specific national context of the country whose 
capacity is being developed.20 Notably, Article 22(3) points to the desirability 
of demand-driven capacity-building cooperation. It recommends that benefi-
ciary countries identify their national capacity needs and priorities through 
national capacity self-assessments.
Article 22(4) then proceeds with an indicative list of key areas for capac-
ity building (development, implementation and enforcement of domestic ABS 
measures; compliance with the Protocol; negotiations of MAT; and develop-
ment of endogenous research capabilities to add value to one country’s own 
genetic resources).21 Furthermore, Article 22(5) includes an indicative list of 
activities,22 such as the enhancement of the contribution of ABS activities to 
the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components, 
which resonates with other provisions in the Protocol aimed at ensuring a 
holistic approach to the fulfillment of the three objectives of the CBD in the 
context of the Protocol.23 Reference is also made to technology transfer, which 
is specifically addressed elsewhere in the Protocol.24
Several of the key capacity-building areas and activities have to do with 
national law-making and implementation of the Protocol through legal means, 
Environment, op. cit., 633–634, emphasise that the effect of this provision is to subject 
developing countries’ compliance with international biodiversity policies to the extent 
that they receive funding under the Convention. 
19 ENB 9/551, “Summary of the First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Nagoya Protocol,” 12.
20 See similar comments in relation to the Biosafety Protocol in Mackenzie et al., Explanatory 
Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 143.
21 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4).
22 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(5).
23 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4; Article 5, section 6; Article 8, section 2; 
Article 9, section 2; Article 10, section 4; Article 12, section 5; and Article 21, section 3.
24 See this commentary on Article 23.
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including the need to ensure fairness in MAT, as well as to build institutional, 
scientific and other capacities to be able to fully and effectively apply and 
ensure compliance with domestic ABS frameworks.25
4 The Capacity of Indigenous and Local Communities and Other ABS 
Stakeholders
Article 22 makes several references (albeit of a recommendatory – rather 
than mandatory – character) to the capacity needs and priorities of indige-
nous and local communities, in recognition of their role in implementing the 
Protocol and their specific needs and rights. Thus, the provision recommends 
that Parties facilitate the involvement of these communities in cooperation 
on capacity-building26 and support the self-identification of capacity needs 
and priorities of these communities in the context of national capacity self- 
assessments. It highlights the need to pay specific attention to the capacity 
needs and priorities of women.27 Among specific measures for capacity build-
ing, reference is made to measures to increase the capacity of communities, 
particularly women, in relation to access28 to genetic resources and/or tra-
ditional knowledge.29 In this regard Article 22 is informed by and must be 
interpreted in conjunction with other specific obligations of Parties vis-à-vis 
indigenous and local communities in other provisions of the Protocol. In plan-
ning capacity-building activities, as far as these communities are concerned, 
Parties are to act with their effective participation,30 taking into consideration 
their customary laws, protocols and procedures31 and relevant international 
human rights norms.32
25 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(a–d). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 209.
26 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(1). 
27 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(3). On the relevance of a human rights approach to gender 
discrimination in the context of the Nagoya Protocol, see Introduction to this commentary, 
section 4.3.
28 Nagoya Protocol Articles 6(2) and 7. See this commentary on Article 6, section 3, and on 
Article 7.
29 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(j).
30 UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32(2); ILO Convention No. 169, Article 6(2); and fn. 54 in this 
commentary on Article 5. 
31 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
32 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.
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It should also be noted that most of the provisions in Article 22 referring to 
indigenous and local communities also aim to benefit other ABS stakeholders33 
such as NGOs and the private sector, in cooperation efforts and in the self-
assessment of capacity-building needs at the national level. Among the list of 
possible capacity-building measures, there is also explicit, although general, 
reference to increasing the capacity of relevant stakeholders in relation to 
ABS.34 This points to the underlying need for all ABS stakeholders to be well 
equipped to cooperate with one another in building effective and mutually 
beneficial ABS transactions.
The inputs of indigenous and local communities and other ABS stakehold-
ers will also be sought at the international level, in the context of the proposed 
development of a strategic capacity-building framework under the Nagoya 
Protocol.35
5 ABS-Related Development Cooperation
Overall, the proposed approach to ABS capacity-building cooperation – that is, 
country-driven, mindful of financial solidarity obligations under the CBD, and 
with the involvement of indigenous and local communities and other stake-
holders – is expected to be reflected not only in the activities of the GEF and 
other sources of multilateral assistance for capacity-building purposes, but 
also that of national bodies that engage in unilateral and bilateral develop-
ment assistance. This is particularly the case of those developed countries that 
are already providing or will provide development assistance with a view to 
facilitating implementation of the Protocol in developing countries.
Given the numerous legal complexities of the Protocol’s subject-matter 
that will have to be addressed in building domestic ABS frameworks, and the 
challenges that may arise in particular ABS transactions, effective realiza-
tion of capacity-building cooperation (or lack thereof) will be crucial for the 
Protocol’s implementation by developing countries. As observed in other mul-
tilateral environmental agreements, capacity-related issues are strongly linked 
with compliance, particularly in the face of ever-expanding obligations under 
33 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(1–2)
34 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(i).
35 ICNP Recommendation 1/2, paragraph 1 and Annex, which refers to possible sequence of 
actions for the implementation of the strategic framework, including a possible roadmap 
of activities to assist countries in defining their priorities and corresponding timelines.
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international environmental law.36 It remains to be seen whether and how 
this link will play out, including in the deliberations of the future compliance 
mechanism of the Protocol.37
Given the importance of capacity-building for ABS law-making and enforce-
ment at the national level, support by developed countries to the development 
of ABS laws in developing countries will occur not only in the interest of the 
international community in the effective implementation of the Protocol, 
but likely also in developed countries’ own interest (to ensure predictability 
and fairness for their users). It may be a challenge, in that context, to avoid 
exercising any undue influence or pressure on provider countries’ exercise of 
their national sovereignty over their genetic resources and on indigenous and 
local communities. The delicate, and in many respects still open-ended, bal-
ance of international obligations enshrined in the Nagoya Protocol may thus 
create also risks that capacity-building initiatives may unduly favor the inter-
ests of user countries, if provider countries find themselves dependent on user 
countries’ support. Another risk may arise from ready-made solutions offered 
through capacity-building activities that do not respond to the particular cir-
cumstances38 of Parties, who will be under pressure to build national capacity 
to implement and ensure compliance with the Protocol. Such pressure may be 
heightened for provider countries, due to the link established by the Protocol 
between the domestic ABS framework of provider countries and user coun-
tries’ international obligations on addressing compliance by their users.39
36 See Elisa Morgera et al., “Implementation Challenges and Compliance in MEA 
Negotiations,” in Chasek and Wagner The Roads from Rio, op. cit., 222.
37 See this commentary on Article 30.
38 Examination of the history of (the failure of) conventional development assistance 
in this regard is beyond the scope of this commentary. For a succinct account of the 
debate, see David Ellerman, “Autonomy in Education and Development,” Journal of 
International Cooperation in Education 7 (2004): 3, who notes ‘a real danger that a 
development intervention, instead of acting as a catalyst or midwife to empower change 
in an autonomy-respecting manner, will only short-circuit people’s learning activities and 
reinforce their feelings of impotence.’ Ibid., 13.
39 See this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1.
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Article 23. Technology Transfer, Collaboration and 
Cooperation
In accordance with Articles 15, 16, 18 and 19 of the Convention, the Parties 
shall collaborate and cooperate in technical and scientific research and 
development programmes, including biotechnological research activities, 
as a means to achieve the objective of this Protocol. The Parties undertake 
to promote and encourage access to technology by, and transfer of tech-
nology to, developing country Parties, in particular the least developed 
countries and small island developing States among them, and Parties with 
economies in transition, in order to enable the development and strength-
ening of a sound and viable technological and scientific base for the attain-
ment of the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol. Where possible 
and appropriate such collaborative activities shall take place in and with a 
Party or the Parties providing genetic resources that is the country or are the 
countries of origin of such resources or a Party or Parties that have acquired 
the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention.
1 Overview
Technology transfer is an essential form of benefit-sharing1 and a key means 
to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.2 It was 
part of the grand bargain struck in the negotiations of the CBD, and considered 
an essential counterpart to provisions related to access to genetic resources: 
access is to be balanced against greater availability of scientific and techno-
logical information and environmentally sound technology that make use of 
these resources.3 Technology transfer is thus seen as a means to acknowledge 
and reward the contribution of countries, as well as indigenous and local 
1 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 216.
2 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4. On the holistic interpretation of the three CBD 
objectives in the context of the Protocol, see also this Article 5, section 6; Article 8, section 2; 
Article 9, section 2; Article 10, section 4; Article 12, section 5; Article 21, section 3; and 
Article 22, section 3.
3 See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 84; and Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 215.
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communities, providing genetic resources and traditional knowledge to the 
development of related technologies.4
While technology transfer and scientific collaboration may take place in 
the context of specific ABS transactions, and be set out in MAT,5 the scope 
of Article 23 goes beyond bilateral ABS relationships. It includes any type of 
inter-governmental cooperation and collaboration such as joint research pro-
grammes that may involve ABS-related activities.
The main legal complexity related to Article 23, as anticipated in the open-
ing provision of the Protocol,6 concerns the limitation of State efforts in 
sharing technology that is in the hands of private actors, particularly when 
protected by IPRs. This is a complexity that is common to other MEAs.7 The 
following sections will thus analyse in the light of the reticence of the Protocol 
negotiators to address WTO law- and IPR-related matters8 the obligation to 
cooperate in the area of technology, and the obligation related to technology 
transfer, in turn.
2 Technology Collaboration and Cooperation
Article 23 establishes an obligation for Parties to collaborate and cooperate 
in technical and scientific research, and development programmes, including 
biotechnological research activities. The obligation is clear but quite open-
ended. It requires States to enter into negotiations without specifying the 
possible avenues for pursuing them – at the bilateral, regional or multilateral 
level. The obligation does not go as far as requiring States to reach agreement, 
so if agreement cannot be reached, they are not prevented from making uni-
lateral determinations about technical and scientific research. In doing so, 
4 Ibid., 216–7.
5 See generally this commentary on Article 5 section 5; and also on Article 6, section 7 and on 
Article 18.
6 See reference to ‘taking into account all rights . . . to technologies’ in Protocol Article 1. 
See this commentary on Article 1, section 2, fn. 8.
7 See for example Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 
op. cit., 134; and UNEP-UNCTAD, A Preliminary Analysis of MEA Experiences in Identifying and 
Facilitating the Transfer of Technology (Nairobi and Geneva: UNEP-UNCTAD, 2007), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.unep.ch/etb/areas/pdf/MEA%20Papers/MEA_EGS%20Paper.
pdf>. 
8 See generally Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit.
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however, Parties should take in consideration other Parties’ interests.9 Given 
the importance of technological cooperation for the successful implementa-
tion of the Protocol and the maintenance of mutual trust among its Parties, it 
can be anticipated that the Protocol’s governing body will provide a forum for 
facilitating such cooperation10 and will keep this matter under review.11
The obligation to cooperate is to be interpreted and applied ‘in accordance’ 
with a series of CBD provisions.12 First of all, the CBD spells out the content 
of the obligation to cooperate in technical and scientific matters, which 
implies the promotion of international technical and scientific cooperation 
through the development and implementation of supportive national poli-
cies, and paying special attention to the strengthening of national capabili-
ties through human resources development and institutional building.13 In 
addition, and very significantly for the Protocol provisions concerning indig-
enous and local communities, the obligation implies devising methods of 
cooperation for the development and use of indigenous and traditional tech-
nologies, including through training of personnel and exchange of experts.14 
Furthermore, the obligation implies the promotion of the establishment of 
joint research programmes and joint ventures for technology development.15 
These forms of international cooperation will likely involve bilateral coopera-
tion, particularly with developing countries, and capacity building.16
As a complement to international cooperation, Parties are to take a series 
of domestic measures to provide for the effective participation by provider 
9 For a general discussion on the duty to cooperate, see this commentary on Article 11, 
section 2.
10 See this commentary on Article 26.
11 See this commentary on Article 31.
12 Note that CBD Article 17 on the exchange of information from all publicly available sources, 
including the results of scientific research and traditional knowledge in combination 
with technologies using genetic resources, is not included in the CBD provisions referred 
to in this Article of the Protocol. This may arguably be explained by the desire of the 
drafters to avoid reference to repatriation of traditional knowledge (CBD Article 17(2)). 
The question of the applicability of the Nagoya Protocol to the repatriation of traditional 
knowledge, in effect, remains open at the time of writing: see ENB, “Summary of the 
Eighth Meeting of the Working Group on Article 8(j) and the seventeenth meeting of the 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: 7–18 October 2013”, Vol. 9 No. 611, 5–6. 
13 CBD Article 18(2).
14 CBD Article 18(4), emphasis added.
15 CBD Article 18(5).
16 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 93–94. See this commentary on Article 22.
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countries in biotechnological research, by promoting and advancing priority 
access to the results and benefits arising from modern biotechnologies to, and 
ensuring participation in biotechnological research by, Parties that provide the 
genetic resources for such research.17 It would thus be advisable to specify in 
ABS agreements that the start of biotechnological research on the provided 
genetic resources should be notified to the provider country so that the partici-
pation on biotechnological research can be arranged for.18
Article 23 concludes with a qualified obligation (‘Where possible and appro-
priate’) for Parties to engage in collaborative activities benefitting and taking 
place in Parties providing genetic resources, based on a pre-existing obligation 
under the CBD.19 It implicitly foresees that Parties will exercise due diligence in 
identifying whether the conditions exist for technology collaboration to take 
place in provider countries and that they will make reasonable efforts to estab-
lish these collaborations.
Overall, Article 23 allows for all types of technological collaboration 
amounting to fair and equitable benefit-sharing. These may include allocation 
of research funding, the sharing of research and development results, contri-
bution in scientific research and development programmes, and participation 
in product development.20 Such types of benefit-sharing may arguably cre-
ate ‘a flow of goods and knowledge that opens opportunities for learning and 
capacity-building in developing countries.’21
3 Technology Transfer
As technology is often in the hands of private individuals and companies, 
Article 23 includes a commitment,22 rather than an obligation, for Parties 
17 CBD Article 19(1–2).
18 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 96–97.
19 CBD Article 15(6) reads: ‘Each Contracting Party shall endeavor to develop and carry out 
scientific research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties 
with the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties,’ emphasis 
added. Compare with Nagoya Protocol wording ‘Where possible and appropriate such 
collaborative activities shall take place in and with a Party or the Parties providing genetic 
resources that is the country or are the countries of origin of such resources or a Party or 
Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention’.
20 Nagoya Protocol Annex, paragraphs 1(h), 2(a–c) and (m).
21 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 216.
22 Note the use of ‘undertake’ rather than ‘shall’.
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to promote and encourage (i.e., at least to remove barriers to, and/or create 
incentives for)23 access to, and transfer of technology24 to developing coun-
tries. This has the specific aim of enabling the development and strengthening 
of a sound and viable technological and scientific base for the attainment of 
the objectives of the CBD and Protocol.25 Where relevant technologies are in 
the hands of public entities,26 Parties have greater opportunity to provide tech-
nologies directly. The provision leaves it open to Parties to identify the specific 
means of implementation. These could include a domestic requirement to 
governmental agencies to transfer technology, the creation of economic incen-
tives to encourage private entities to transfer technologies, the establishment 
of national and regional technology clearinghouses, the purchase of IPRs on 
behalf of another Party, or the creation of a domestic obligation upon those 
using public funds to develop a particular technology and make it available 
for transfer.27
The wording of Article 23 is based in general terms on CBD Article 16 on 
access to and transfer of technology. While at first sight, it may appear that 
the Protocol uses weaker language than the CBD,28 it should be recalled that 
Article 23 recalls CBD Article 16 and other relevant provisions in this context.29 
Thus, the commitment to technology transfer under the Protocol cannot be 
interpreted and implemented so as to provide a lower standard than that 
23 On the obligation to encourage, see this commentary on Article 9, section 1.
24 On technology transfer, see Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 85; and UNEP-UNCTAD, Preliminary Analysis of 
MEA Experiences, op. cit.
25 This is yet another instance in which the Protocol pursues a holistic implementation of 
the three objectives of the CBD. See fn. 2 above.
26 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 84–85.
27 Ibid., 85 and 90.
28 CBD Article 16(1) reads ‘Each Contracting Party . . . undertakes . . . to provide and/or 
facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies’ (emphasis 
added); whereas the Protocol only refers to a commitment to ‘promote and encourage’ 
technology transfer. We are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this 
point.
29 This interpretation appears to offer the only justification for the crammed drafting of 
Article 23, as three different obligations are clustered in the same paragraph instead of 
being divided into three separate paragraphs. It can therefore be argued that the opening 
proviso ‘in accordance with Articles 15, 16, 18 and 19 of the Convention’ applies to the 
entirety of Article 23. This interpretation is also proposed by Greiber et al., Explanatory 
Guide, op. cit., 216. 
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established under the Convention. In addition, Protocol Parties as CBD Parties 
will continue to be bound by the CBD provisions in this regard.
Interpreted in the light of the relevant provisions of the CBD, Article 23 
requires Parties to adopt domestic measures that provide, or at least facilitate, 
access to technologies that make use of genetic resources, including biotech-
nologies, as well as technologies that are relevant for conservation and sus-
tainable use.30 This has to be arranged under fair and most favorable terms, 
including on concessional and preferential terms if mutually agreed, when 
developing countries are concerned.31 Both provider and receiver countries 
have an obligation to ensure that the transferred technology does not cause 
significant damage to the environment.32
Notably, the Protocol ‘buries’ a solitary reference to intellectual property in 
relation to technology transfer in its Annex among the possible monetary and 
non-monetary benefits.33 There, reference is made to transferring technologies 
under fair and most favorable terms, including on concessional and preferen-
tial terms where agreed.34 Such reference replicates wording common to other 
multilateral environmental agreements.35 As opposed to the Protocol, the 
CBD explicitly acknowledges that technology often is in private hands. It thus 
obliges Parties to take domestic measures targeting the private sector so as to 
facilitate access to, and joint development of, technology with governmental 
institutions and the private sector of developing countries.36 It also addresses 
explicitly the relevance of IPRs, by requiring that domestic legislation provide 
30 CBD Article 16(1). Note, however, that CBD Article 16 was one of the most controversial 
ones in the negotiations of the Convention and that ‘[c]ircular cross-referencing 
introduces decided ambiguity that opens the door to differing interpretations.’ 
See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 84.
31 CBD Article 16(2).
32 CBD Article 16(1). Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 85–6.
33 See this commentary on Article 5, section 6.
34 Nagoya Protocol Annex, paragraph 2(f).
35 CBD Article 16(2); UNFCCC Articles 4(1)(c) and (5); and Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989) 1522 
UNTS 28 (hereinafter, Montreal Protocol), Article 10(A). See also Glowka, Burhenne-
Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 86; and more 
generally: CBD, UNCTAD and WIPO Secretariats, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Technology Transfer in the Context of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2007, accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ttc/egttstc-02/other/egttstc-02-oth-
techstudy-en.pdf>.
36 CBD Article 16(4).
320 Article 23
access to technologies also when protected by IPRs, on the basis of MAT.37 It 
subjects access to such technology to terms that balance the need for transfer 
with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property.38 It fur-
ther calls for international cooperation to ensure that IPRs are supportive of 
the objectives of the Convention.39 These provisions are also applicable in the 
context of the Protocol’s implementation.
In implementing Article 23, Parties may find concrete guidance in the CBD 
work programme on technology transfer and scientific and technological 
cooperation, which was adopted by consensus.40 Accordingly, Parties should 
establish an enabling environment for technology transfer in providing and 
receiving countries by creating an institutional, administrative, legislative and 
policy structures for the private and public sector not only for the transfer 
of technology, but also for the adaptation of transferred technology. Parties 
are also to remove barriers to technology transfer that exist in their domes-
tic frameworks, and that are inconsistent with international law. In addi-
tion, Parties should conceive technology transfer not as a one-off, unilateral 
endeavor, but as part of an integrated, long-term scientific and technological 
cooperation effort, thereby creating the conditions for lasting participation by 
provider countries with a view to increasing their capacities and information 
base, as well as adding value at the local level.41
Overall, the commitment to technology transfer must be implemented in 
good faith to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing,42 as required to real-
ize the objective of the Protocol.43 Such commitment requires every reason-
able effort,44 even before knowing how the genetic resources will be used.45 
These efforts can be facilitated through information-sharing under the ABS 
37 CBD Article 16(3). 
38 The reference to ‘adequate and effective protection’ was meant to refer implicitly to 
protection under TRIPS: Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 86–87.
39 CBD Articles 16(4), 16(2) and 16(5).
40 “Programme of work on technology transfer and technological and scientific cooperation” 
in CBD Decision 7/29, “Transfer of technology and technology cooperation (Articles 16 to 
19)” (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, Annex. See Morgera and Tsioumani, 
“Evolution of Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 153.
41 CBD Decision 7/29, paragraph 2. See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 217.
42 CBD Article 15(7). Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 216.
43 See this commentary on Article 2, sections 1–2.
44 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 97.
45 Ibid., 83.
321technology transfer, collaboration and cooperation
Clearinghouse.46 They may also receive financial support, including by meet-
ing the agreed full incremental costs of establishing technological coop-
eration and ensuring technology transfer through the financial mechanism 
of the Protocol.47
46 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 216. See this commentary on Article 14, 
section 3. Compare CBD Article 18(3).
47 Note in fact that CBD Article 19 on technology transfer makes reference to the CBD 
provisions on financial solidarity (Articles 20–21). See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and 
Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 83 and 86. See also this 
commentary on Article 25, section 2.
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Article 24. Non-Parties
The Parties shall encourage non-Parties to adhere to this Protocol and to 
contribute appropriate information to the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House.
Article 24 is a short provision on how Parties to the Nagoya Protocol are to 
relate to non-Parties. As a general rule, treaties do not create obligations or 
rights for third Parties:1 that is, a treaty ‘cannot, by its own force, impose an 
obligation on a third State nor modify in any way the legal rights of a third 
State without its consent.’2 Nonetheless, a treaty may affect non-Parties. This 
provision, therefore, clarifies how non-Parties may be affected by the Protocol 
in their dealings with Parties.
Article 24 creates a two-fold obligation. First, it mandates Parties to encour-
age (i.e., at least to remove barriers to, and/or create incentives for)3 non-
Parties to comply with the Protocol on a voluntary basis, which may include 
encouragement to become Parties to the Protocol. In doing so, the Protocol 
leaves considerable flexibility as to the means to fulfill this provision. So, 
Parties may provide technical, financial or institutional support for adherence 
to the Protocol.4 Bilateral trade and cooperation agreements,5 or unilateral 
trade-incentive schemes could also include commitments to become Parties 
to the Protocol.6 Second, the provision mandates Parties to encourage non-
1 VCLT, Article 30. See also Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 14.
2 Ibid., 256.
3 On the obligation to encourage, see this commentary on Article 9, section 1.
4 For a comparable discussion in the context of the Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 157.
5 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
6 The EU, for instance, uses trade incentives to encourage other States become Parties to other 
multilateral environmental agreements in its bilateral trade and development agreements 
with third countries: see Gracia Marín Durán and Elisa Morgera, Environmental Integration in 
the EU’s External Relations: Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012); 
and Rok Žvelc, “Environmental Integration in EU Trade Policy: The Generalised System of 
Preferences, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments and Free Trade Agreements,” in The 
External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law Perspectives, 
ed. Elisa Morgera (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 174.
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Parties to provide information on a voluntary basis to the ABS Clearinghouse,7 
which aims to gather as much relevant information as possible on ABS to make 
it available to all Parties.8
Article 24 is partially modeled on the Biosafety Protocol,9 with a view to 
discouraging the development of conflicting national practices related to 
ABS and preventing non-Parties from developing a competitive trade advan-
tage by remaining outside the international ABS regime.10 As opposed to the 
Cartagena Protocol, however, the Nagoya Protocol does not specify the type of 
information that could be provided by non-Parties to the ABS Clearinghouse.11
Negotiators considered, and decided against, a proposal12 fully modeled 
after the Cartagena Protocol,13 to create an additional obligation for Parties 
to ensure that ABS activities and transactions related to genetic resources 
and derivatives with non-Parties be consistent with the Protocol and the 
Convention.14 Such a proposal would not have required ‘precise accordance’ 
with the Protocol’s detailed provisions.15 The proposal was in line with prac-
tice in other multilateral environmental agreements to create a strong incen-
tive for non-Parties to become Parties to a treaty.16 Negotiators eventually 
drew inspiration only from the ‘softest part’ of the corresponding provisions in 
the Cartagena Protocol, in line with a general approach to avoid any frictions 
7 See this commentary on Article 14, section 3.
8 Mackenzie et al.,  Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 157.
9 Biosafety Protocol Article 24(2).
10 Mackenzie et al.,  Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 157.
11 An earlier draft of this provision specified that such information would specifically 
concern activities and transactions regarding access and benefit-sharing related to 
genetic resources and derivatives within non-Parties’ jurisdiction: Montreal II Draft, draft 
article 18 ter (2).
12 As had been requested, for instance by the African Group. See ENB, “Summary of the 
Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: 22–28 March 2010,” Vol. 9 no. 503, 31 March 2010, 9.
13 Biosafety Protocol Article 24(1), which requires that import/export of living modified 
organisms between Parties and non-Parties be consistent with at least the objective of 
the Protocol.
14 Montreal II Draft, draft article 18 ter.
15 Along the lines of the interpretation of the corresponding provision in the Biosafety 
Protocol: see Mackenzie et al.,  Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 153.
16 Ibid., 154. The Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention prohibit trade with non-
Parties unless it is conducted according to specific conditions which ensure minimum 
standards equivalent to those established in the treaties, while CITES sets the conditions 
under which trade with non-Parties can be undertaken.
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between the Nagoya Protocol and WTO law.17 As a result, Article 24 has been 
considered a ‘very weak provision’ when compared to other multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements.18 This is particularly significant as the United States, 
who is not a Party to the CBD19 and therefore quite unlikely to become a Party 
to the Protocol, represents 40 percent of the global biotech sector20 and in 
addition has significant ex situ collections.21 In all events, free-riding by non-
Parties may be tackled by provider countries’ domestic ABS frameworks pro-
viding more favorable access conditions to users from Parties to the Protocol or 
countries that have put in place comparable measures.22
Finally, it should be recalled that CBD Parties that will not become Parties to 
the Protocol remain bound by relevant CBD requirements on ABS.23
17 Pavoni, “Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law,” op. cit., 190 and 196.
18 Ibid., 196.
19 As the Protocol can only be signed and ratified by CBD parties: see Nagoya Protocol 
Article 32, and this commentary on final clauses, section 2.
20 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 234.
21 See FAO, The Second Report on the State of the World Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, op. cit., chapter 3. 
22 As discussed in this commentary on Article 6, section 5.2.
23 Notably CBD Article 15. Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 124. For similar considerations in relation to the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al.,  Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 153.
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Article 25. Financial Mechanism and Resources
1. In considering financial resources for the implementation of this 
Protocol, the Parties shall take into account the provisions of Article 20 
of the Convention.
2. The financial mechanism of the Convention shall be the financial 
mechanism for this Protocol.
3. Regarding the capacity-building and development referred to in 
Article 22 of this Protocol, the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, in providing guidance with 
respect to the financial mechanism referred to in paragraph 2 above, 
for consideration by the Conference of the Parties, shall take into 
account the need of developing country Parties, in particular the least 
developed countries and small island developing States among them, 
and of Parties with economies in transition, for financial resources, as 
well as the capacity needs and priorities of indigenous and local com-
munities, including women within these communities.
4. In the context of paragraph 1 above, the Parties shall also take into 
account the needs of the developing country Parties, in particular the 
least developed countries and small island developing States among 
them, and of the Parties with economies in transition, in their efforts 
to identify and implement their capacity-building and development 
requirements for the purposes of the implementation of this Protocol.
5. The guidance to the financial mechanism of the Convention in rele-
vant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed 
before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
the provisions of this Article.
6. The developed country Parties may also provide, and the develop-
ing country Parties and the Parties with economies in transition avail 
themselves of, financial and other resources for the implementation of 
the provisions of this Protocol through bilateral, regional and multilat-
eral channels.
1 Overview
As foreshadowed in the opening provision of the Protocol, appropriate fund-
ing is essential to achieve the objective of the Protocol – ensuring fair and 
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equitable benefit-sharing, as well as contributing to biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use.1 Financial solidarity – as an international obligation of 
intensified cooperation without expectations of reciprocity2 – is also a neces-
sity in light of the fact that Parties with limited capabilities3 will be unable 
to comply with the obligations under the Protocol, particularly as they will 
face several complexities in developing domestic ABS frameworks.4 Limited 
implementation by developing countries will inevitably undermine the func-
tioning of the international regime, which is based on the interoperability of 
domestic ABS frameworks, to the detriment of the entire community of Parties 
to the Protocol.5 For these reasons, financial solidarity embodies one of the 
expressions of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.6 It 
thus serves as a ‘test for the seriousness of efforts and willingness to cooper-
ate’ of developed countries7 as an equitable contribution to a common task. In 
practice, however, the qualified and open-ended formulation of international 
obligations on financial solidarity (in the Nagoya Protocol, as well as in other 
multilateral environmental agreements) may lead Parties to avoid systematic 
scrutiny at the multilateral level of compliance with relevant obligations.8
1 See this commentary on Article 1.
2 Campanelli, “Solidarity,” op. cit., paragraph 17, and discussion of the obligation of solidarity 
in this commentary on Article 22, section 2.
3 This was clearly acknowledged in CBD Article 20(1), which reads: ‘Each Contracting Party 
undertakes to provide, in accordance with its capabilities, financial support and incentives 
in respect of those national activities which are intended to achieve the objectives of this 
Convention, in accordance with its national plans, priorities and programmes.’
4 As acknowledged in Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(c).
5 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 221.
6 Rio Declaration, Principles 6–7. See generally Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in 
International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). For a discussion on 
the status of this principle in international law compare Ellen Hey, “Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopaedia, op. cit., 444, who considers it a gen-
eral principle of international law; and Christopher D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 98 
(2004): 276, 300, who concludes that it is not ‘a customary principle of international law’.
7 Charlotte Streck, “Ensuring New Finance and Real Emission Reduction: A Critical Review of 
the Additionality Concept,” Carbon and Climate Law Review 2011 (2011): 158, 159–160 and 168, 
in the context of the international climate change regime.
8 Francesca Romanin Jacur, “Controlling and Assisting Compliance: Financial Aspects,” in Non-
Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Agreements, ed. Tullio Treves et al. (The Hague: Asser Press, 2009), 435. See this commentary 
on Article 30.
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Against this background, Article 25, which is modeled after the Biosafety 
Protocol,9 addresses two issues: the provision of financial assistance through a 
multilateral financial mechanism established under the CBD – that is, the GEF,10 
and the provision of financial assistance by developed countries through other 
bilateral, regional and multilateral channels.11 In both instances, developed 
countries are the donors, and developing countries and countries with econ-
omy in transition are the recipients of financial support.12 The following sec-
tions will discuss the role of the financial mechanism under the Protocol, and 
the role of other forms of financial solidarity, in turn.
2 Financial Mechanism
The international governance of the financial mechanism under the Nagoya 
Protocol includes a key role not only for the Protocol’s governing body,13 but 
also for the CBD COP. The Protocol’s governing body will provide guidance 
with respect to the financial mechanism as it relates to the Protocol, but such 
guidance will have to be considered by the CBD COP. In addition, future guid-
ance to be developed under the Protocol will have to take into account CBD 
COP guidance to the GEF adopted before the Protocol’s entry into force.14 As a 
9 Biosafety Protocol, Article 28.
10  Nagoya Protocol Article 25(2). See CBD Article 39; Nairobi Diplomatic Conference 
Resolution 1, “Interim financial arrangements” in “Nairobi Final Act of the conference 
for the adoption of the agreed text of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (1992), 
accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/handbook/cbd-hb-09-en.pdf>; CBD 
Decision 1/2, “Financial resources and mechanism” (28 February 1995) UN Doc UNEP/
CBD/COP/1/17, paragraph 2. For a discussion of the corresponding provision in the 
Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, 
op. cit., 175. See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 
82–83; and Charlotte Streck, “Financial Instruments and Cooperation in Implementing 
International Agreements for the Global Environment,” in Multilevel Governance of Global 
Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law, ed. Gerd Winter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 493.
11 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 173.
12 CBD Article 20(2). Only the category of ‘developed countries’ has been defined for the 
purposes of financial resources and mechanism in the context of the CBD – and, by 
implication, its protocols – through a list adopted by the CBD COP: CBD Decision 1/2, 
Annex II. See also Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 222; and Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 174.
13 See this commentary on Article 26.
14 CBD Article 25(5).
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result, the policy of the CBD COP with respect to the GEF in relation to the CBD 
and in relation to the new requirements of the Protocol will be inextricably 
linked.15 It should be recalled, in that regard, that the GEF Council is obliged to 
‘act in conformity’ with the policies, priorities and eligibility criteria decided 
by the CBD COP when acting as its financial mechanism.16 Consequently, the 
CBD COP is empowered to review the effectiveness of the GEF serving as the 
Convention’s financial mechanism,17 thereby having an opportunity to hold 
the GEF accountable in its observance of the guidance provided by CBD Parties.
Article 25 also makes a link to capacity-building needs by cross-reference 
to the relevant provision of the Protocol.18 This can be interpreted so that in 
providing guidance to the GEF, the CBD COP, on the recommendation of the 
Protocol’s governing body, will take account of the capacity-building needs 
identified in national capacity self-assessments by developing countries; and 
that in carrying out its role, the GEF will aim to meet the capacity-building needs 
so identified.19 This linkage with capacity-building is also noteworthy in recall-
ing that under the Protocol capacity needs include not only those of Parties, 
but also those of indigenous and local communities, including women within 
these communities,20 as identified in national capacity self-assessments.21
Intergovernmental discussions preparing for the entry into force of the 
Protocol have already identified areas where guidance to the GEF is needed. 
CBD Parties in particular recommended that financial assistance from the GEF 
be targeted to building Parties’ capacity to develop, implement and enforce 
domestic ABS measures;22 supporting the negotiations of equitable and fair 
15 As in the analogous provision of the Biosafety Protocol: Mackenzie et al., Explanatory 
Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 175–176. 
16 Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility as 
amended by Fourth Assembly of the GEF (24–28 May, 2010, effective 24 February 2011) 
33 ILM 1283, paragraphs 15 and 26. Nonetheless, the relationship between the CBD COP 
and the GEF may be more complex than may be suggested by this provision: see also CBD 
Decision 3/8, “Memorandum of understanding between the Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Council of the Global Environment 
Facility” (11 February 1997) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, Annex, paragraph 2.
17 CBD Article 21(3).
18 Nagoya Protocol Article 25(3–4). See this commentary on Article 22, sections 2–3.
19 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 175–176.
20 See Nagoya Protocol 11th preambular recital.
21 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(3). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 225. See also 
this commentary on Article 22, section 4.
22 Including through: identification of actors and legal and institutional expertise for the 
Protocol’s implementation; taking stock of domestic measures relevant to ABS in light of 
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MAT,23 including through enhanced understanding of business models and 
IPRs; and developing endogenous research capabilities in provider countries 
to add value to their own genetic resources and associated traditional knowl-
edge. This is to occur through, inter alia, technology transfer, bioprospecting 
and associated research and taxonomic studies, and the development and use 
of valuation methods.24 Furthermore, the GEF is mandated to finance projects 
that will assist in addressing the capacity needs and priorities of indigenous 
and local communities and relevant ABS stakeholders, such as through the 
development of community protocols, model contractual clauses and mini-
mum requirements for MAT to secure fair and equitable sharing of benefits.25
Even before the entry into force of the Protocol, CBD Parties have had an 
opportunity to hold the GEF accountable in supporting preliminary ABS activi-
ties aimed at speeding up ratification of the Protocol. This occurred in relation 
to the Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund26 – a multi-donor trust fund that 
started operations in May 2011, managed by the GEF and operated by the CBD 
Secretariat. The Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund supports not only sig-
natory countries and those in the process of signing the Nagoya Protocol to 
accelerate their ratification and implementation of the Protocol, but also the 
private sector in developing and implementing concrete ABS agreements, with 
a view to exploring the economic potential of ABS transactions and facilitating 
technology transfer.27 The latter was thus meant to achieve the aim of generat-
ing additional information to help understand future Parties’ capacities and 
the obligations of the Nagoya Protocol; establishing ways to address transboundary issues; 
and establishing institutional arrangements and administrative systems to provide access 
to genetic resources, ensure benefit-sharing, support compliance with PIC and MAT, 
and monitor the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, 
including support for the establishment of checkpoints. See ICNP Recommendation 2/1, 
“Elaboration of guidance for the financial mechanism,” Annex I, paragraph 1 in ICNP, 
“Report of the second meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex. See this commentary on 
Articles 11 and 13–18. Note, however, that Article 17 does not foresee monitoring of the 
utilization of traditional knowledge: on this point, see this commentary on Article 16, 
section 3.
23 See generally this commentary on Article 5 section 5; and also on Article 6, section 7 and 
on Article 18.
24 ICNP Recommendation 2/1, Annex II, paragraph 1(c).
25 See this commentary on Articles 12 and 19.
26 “GEF Establishes the Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund,” CBD (3 June 2011), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.cbd.int/doc/press/2011/pr-2011-06-03-GEF-ImpFund-en.pdf>.
27 Compare: “Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund,” World Bank, accessed 30 November 
2013, <http://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/index.php?type=fund&ft=npif>.
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needs in relation to effective ABS transactions.28 During intergovernmental 
discussions preparing for the entry into force of the Protocol, however, CBD 
Parties raised concerns about the use of the Fund to support the private sec-
tor’s engagement in ABS transactions, despite Parties’ prioritization of support 
to governments in ratifying and implementing the Protocol through the devel-
opment of national legislation and consultations with national stakeholders to 
that end. Financial support for private sector’s engagement in ABS transactions 
before the entry into force of the Protocol thus raised issues related to diverg-
ing priorities set under the GEF, on the one hand, and under the CBD and its 
Protocol, on the other.29 This discussion also showed the potential for vested 
interests in favoring ABS transactions while provider countries have not yet 
developed the necessary national ABS frameworks and guarantees for indig-
enous and local communities. The Intergovernmental Committee preparing 
for the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol therefore emphasized the need 
for the GEF to provide funding as a priority to law-making and related prepara-
tory activities at the national level.30
3 Other Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Channels for Financial 
Resources
In voluntarily providing financial resources through other channels, devel-
oped countries are to take into account the needs of developing countries, as 
28 See “Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund Brochure,” GEF, accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.thegef.org/gef/content/nagoya-protocol-implementation-fund-brochure>. See 
also Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 224.
29  Instrument for the Establishment of the GEF, paragraph 25(c)(i) reads: ‘decisions 
requiring a formal vote by the Council shall be taken by a double weighted majority; that 
is, an affirmative vote representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of 
Participants and a 60 percent majority of the total contributions.’ However, it has been 
argued that the GEF’s voting structure ‘does not preclude the possibility of conflict 
between the objectives of the Conventions, the implementing agencies, and the GEF in 
the context of particular decisions.’ See Jacob Werksman, “Consolidating Governance 
of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environment Facility,” Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 6 (1996): 27, 60, and discussion in Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 83.
30 ICNP Recommendation 2/1, Annex II, paragraph 3, integrated in COP Decision 
XI/5 (Financial mechanism). ENB 9/579, “Summary of the Second Meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 15. 
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identified in their capacity need self-assessments,31 and may choose between 
bilateral, regional and multilateral channels.32 It remains to be clarified, how-
ever, to what extent the relevant provisions of the CBD33 are to be ‘taken into 
account’ under these circumstances. It may be understood that the CBD pro-
visions on financial solidarity do not directly apply to the provision of finan-
cial resources under the Protocol, so arguably potential donor countries are 
not obliged to provide financial resources, but merely to consider the need for 
financial resources.34 It has also been suggested that not all provisions of CBD 
Article 20 are equally relevant for ABS, but they should be considered to the 
extent that they have a bearing on this issue.35
If bilateral financial assistance is provided in the context of bilateral agree-
ments, these are to be negotiated and implemented in ways that ensure the 
achievement of the objective of the Protocol.36 Even outside of these treaty-
based arrangements, however, unilateral and bilateral financial support for the 
development of domestic ABS frameworks in developing countries needs to be 
demand-driven and responsive to the particular needs and circumstances of 
the receiving country, to avoid allegations of undue interference with national 
sovereignty. Clearly financial support for these activities will occur not only 
in the interest of the international community in the effective implementa-
tion of the Protocol, but also in developed countries’ own interest (to ensure 
predictability and fairness for their users). The delicate, and in many respects 
still open-ended, balance of international obligations enshrined in the Nagoya 
Protocol may thus create a risk that unilateral and bilateral financial solidarity 
initiatives supporting the implementation of the Protocol may undermine the 
partnership between user and provider countries to be established under the 
Protocol. Such a risk may arise if undue influence is exercised or pressure is put 
on provider countries’ exercise of their national sovereignty over their genetic 
resources and on indigenous and local communities in that context.37
31 Nagoya Protocol Articles 25(4) and 22.
32 Nagoya Protocol Article 25(4).
33 Nagoya Protocol Article 25(1).
34 For an analogous interpretation of the corresponding provision under the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 175.
35 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 223, who do not, however, elaborate on which 
CBD provisions could be considered less or not relevant in the context of the Protocol.
36 See this commentary on Article 4, section 3.
37 The issue was preliminary discussed in Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of Community 
Interests?”, op. cit., 760–763.
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Intergovernmental discussions preparing for the entry into force of the 
Protocol have already identified the need to take a strategic approach to 
maximize opportunities for financial support as a complement to the GEF. 
A recommendation is thus made to integrate the provision of financial needs 
under the Protocol into the CBD Strategy for Resource Mobilization.38 In addi-
tion, Parties are encouraged (i.e., they are to remove barriers at least, and/or 
to create incentives)39 to direct domestic resources, including those gener-
ated through the successful implementation of ABS agreements, towards the 
implementation of the Protocol.40 Governments, organizations, the private 
sector and financial institutions are encouraged to provide financial resources, 
including through new and innovative financial mechanisms, for the imple-
mentation of the Protocol.41
38 CBD Decision 9/11 “Review of implementation of Articles 20 and 21.” The Strategy was 
adopted in 2008 to achieve multiple aims, including to improve the information base 
on funding needs, gaps, and priorities; strengthen national capacities for resource 
utilization; strengthen existing financial institutions; explore new and innovative 
financial mechanisms; to build capacity for resource mobilisation and promote South-
South cooperation as a complement to North-South cooperation; and enhance the global 
engagement for resource mobilisation.
39 On the obligation to encourage, see this commentary on Article 9, section 1.
40 ICNP Recommendation 2/2, “Guidance for resource mobilisation for the implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing” in ICNP, “Report of the second 
meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex, paragraph 3. COP Decision 11/5, “The financial 
mechanism” (5 December 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, paragraphs 21–23.
41 Ibid.
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Article 26. Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
1. The Conference of the Parties shall serve as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may 
participate as observers in the proceedings of any meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be 
taken only by those that are Parties to it.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference 
of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, 
not a Party to this Protocol, shall be substituted by a member to be 
elected by and from among the Parties to this Protocol.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of 
this Protocol and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions nec-
essary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the 
functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall:
(a) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the imple-
mentation of this Protocol;
(b) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the 
implementation of this Protocol;
(c) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and coopera-
tion of, and information provided by, competent international 
organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
bodies;
(d) Establish the form and the intervals for transmitting the infor-
mation to be submitted in accordance with Article 29 of this 
Protocol and consider such information as well as reports sub-
mitted by any subsidiary body;
(e) Consider and adopt, as required, amendments to this Protocol 
and its Annex, as well as any additional annexes to this Protocol, 
that are deemed necessary for the implementation of this 
Protocol; and
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(f) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the imple-
mentation of this Protocol.
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial 
rules of the Convention shall be applied, mutatis mutandis, under this 
Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol.
6. The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meet-
ing of the Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the Secretariat 
and held concurrently with the first meeting of the Conference of 
the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the entry into force of 
this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be 
held concurrently with ordinary meetings of the Conference of the 
Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
7. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times 
as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request 
of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being 
communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat, it is supported by at 
least one third of the Parties.
8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observ-
ers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented as observ-
ers at meetings of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol. Any body or agency, whether national or 
international, governmental or non-governmental, that is qualified in 
matters covered by this Protocol and that has informed the Secretariat 
of its wish to be represented at a meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an 
observer, may be so admitted, unless at least one third of the Parties 
present object. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the admis-
sion and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of pro-
cedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above.
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1 Overview
Article 26 establishes the Protocol’s governing body, in accordance with a well-
established practice under multilateral environmental agreements.1 The gov-
erning body (the Conference of the Parties to the CBD serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Protocol, or COP/MOP) is empowered to steer and super-
vise the entire process of implementation and further development of the 
Protocol. Both areas of work will be particularly critical as several provisions 
of the Protocol are open-ended or require further elaboration by Parties. This 
provision is also noteworthy for establishing institutional and procedural link-
ages between the Protocol and the CBD.
The following sections will discuss the basic rules for the functioning of the 
COP/MOP, and its relationship with the CBD COP.
2 The Functioning of the COP/MOP
The Protocol’s governing body comprises representatives of all States that are 
Party to the Protocol. It meets on a periodic basis. Article 26 thus details, in a 
self-explanatory manner, who is entitled to participate in the COP/MOP meet-
ings, its bureau, the COP/MOP functions, the rules of procedure, and meetings 
arrangements.2
With regards to the COP/MOP functions, Article 26(4) mirrors, as in the case 
of the Cartagena Protocol,3 the CBD provisions on the COP4 setting out the gen-
eral function of the COP/MOP. These functions notably include keeping under 
regular review the implementation of the Protocol and making the necessary 
decisions to promote its implementation. Furthermore, Article 26(4) lists spe-
cific functions of the COP/MOP. The broad framing of the provision and its 
last open-ended clause (‘exercise such other functions as may be required for 
the implementation of this Protocol’) allow for any function needed for the 
1 See for example Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 
86; and Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International 
Law,” The American Journal of International Law 94 (2000): 623.
2 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 179–184.
3 Ibid., 182.
4 CBD Article 23(4). See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 111–113.
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implementation of the Protocol to be carried out by the COP/MOP, even if not 
specifically listed.
This will be particularly useful as several issues under the Nagoya Protocol 
have not yet been fully resolved (for example, the determination of the need 
for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism,5 and 
the establishment of the compliance procedures and mechanisms).6 In addi-
tion, several other tasks are expressly mandated to the COP/MOP elsewhere in 
the Protocol (the assessment and review of the Protocol’s effectiveness,7 the 
stocktaking of model contractual clauses and voluntary instruments,8 etc.). 
In these and all other cases9 in which the COP/MOP will elaborate consensus 
guidance on the interpretation and application of the Protocol, it will have to 
be guided by the Protocol objective – achieving equity and fairness in benefit-
sharing among States and towards indigenous and local communities, with a 
view to contributing to conservation and sustainable use.10
According to Article 26, the CBD Rules of Procedure11 and Financial Rules12 
are applicable to the Protocol COP/MOP, with modifications if necessary to 
adapt them to the specificities of the Protocol, unless the COP/MOP by consen-
sus decides otherwise or if the Protocol itself establishes otherwise.13
As in the context of the CBD,14 non-Parties to the Protocol that are Parties to 
the CBD will be allowed to participate in the COP/MOP meetings as observers 
with the possibility to make interventions and submit proposals, but without 
5 See this commentary on Article 10.
6 See this commentary on Article 30.
7 See this commentary on Article 31.
8 See this commentary on Articles 19–20.
9 Several have been identified in this commentary, such as on Articles 2–6, 8–9, 11, 14 and 
16–18.
10 See this commentary on Article 1.
11 CBD Decision 1/6, “Financing of and budget for the Convention” (28 February 1995) 
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17, as amended by CBD Decision 3/1, “Pending issues arising 
from the work of the second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties” (11 February 1997) UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, Appendix – adopted under CBD Article 23. See also Glowka, 
Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 101.
12 “Rules of procedure for meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity” in CBD Decision 1/1, “Rules of procedure for the Conference of the 
Parties” (28 February 1995) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17, Annex, as amended by CBD 
Decision 5/20, “Operations of the Convention” (22 June 2000) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/
COP/5/23 (hereinafter, CBD Rules of Procedure).
13 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 183.
14 CBD Article 32(2). See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 124.
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the right to vote.15 As the CBD COP serves as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol, the bureau of the COP will serve as the bureau of the COP/MOP. The 
bureau performs functions supporting the meetings of the COP/MOP, such as 
providing guidance to the Secretariat for the preparation and conduct of meet-
ings; organizing the conduct of meetings; and chairing informal negotiations 
during meetings.16
Any governmental or non-governmental body – a term broadly interpreted 
under the CBD to include environment, consumer or development organiza-
tions, indigenous peoples’ groups, academic or research institutions, indus-
try associations or individual companies17 – may apply to the Secretariat for 
observer status. This is granted if the body in question is qualified in matters 
covered by the Protocol, and unless one-third of the Parties present at a par-
ticular meeting objects – that is, Parties attending that meeting and only with 
respect to the presence of a non-governmental body or agency at that meet-
ing. So the acceptance or rejection of a body or agency is only valid for that 
particular meeting.18
3 Relationship with the CBD COP
Article 26, similarly to the Biosafety Protocol,19 clarifies the relationship 
between the Protocol’s governing body and the CBD COP. Since the Protocol 
is a separate legal instrument, the functions of the COP/MOP differ to some 
extent from those of the CBD COP, and the membership of the two bodies is 
not necessarily the same. Not all Parties to the CBD (who are represented in the 
CBD COP) may decide to become Parties to the Protocol.20
15 Note that Rule 40 on voting in the CBD Rules of Procedure remains bracketed, so no 
voting takes place at CBD meetings. For a similar discussion in relation to the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 181.
16 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 230. For a similar discussion in relation to the 
Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, 
op. cit., 181.
17 Ibid.
18 The steps to apply for and attain observer status at meetings under the Convention are 
detailed in CBD Decision 9/29, “Operations of the Convention,” (9 October 2008) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29, paragraph 17. For a similar discussion in relation to the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 184.
19 Biosafety Protocol Article 29.
20 For a similar discussion in relation to the Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 180.
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There is, however a significant difference concerning the link between the 
CBD COP and the Protocol COP/MOP, when comparing the Cartagena and 
the Nagoya Protocols.21 The negotiators’ main concern was to ensure that the 
institutional structure of the Nagoya Protocol remains well linked to that of 
the CBD, as opposed to the case of the Biosafety Protocol, which has turned 
into quite a separate process from the CBD.22 The rationale lays in the recog-
nition that benefit-sharing is both the objective of the Protocol as well as the 
third objective of the CBD.23 In addition, several areas of work under the CBD 
would continue to be directly relevant for the effective implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol.24 The negotiators therefore discussed the possibility to follow 
the example of the Kyoto Protocol under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change,25 and provide for the Protocol governing body’s meetings to 
be held concurrently, rather than in conjunction, with the CBD COP.26 In other 
words, instead of being held back-to-back, as is the case for the CBD COP and 
the Biosafety COP/MOP, the meetings of the Nagoya Protocol’s governing body 
will be held simultaneously with those of the CBD COP.27 It can be expected 
that the agendas of the two meetings will be developed so to maximize syner-
gies and avoid repetitive discussion on closely related agenda items.
Nevertheless, the COP/MOP is a distinct and independent body from 
the CBD COP for all practical purposes, including guidance to the financial 
mechanism28 and in relation to the costs of Secretariat services to the extent 
that they cannot be split up between the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.29
21 Compare Biosafety Protocol Article 29(6). See also. Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, 
op. cit., 232–233.
22 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 36.
23 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.3.
24 For instance the work programmes on Article 8(j), protected areas, and communication, 
education and public awareness. 
25 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 
11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 148 (hereinafter, Kyoto Protocol).
26 ENB, “Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: 18–20 October 2010,” Vol. 9 No. 534, 18 October 2010, 4.
27 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 232.
28 See this commentary on Article 25, section 2.
29 See this commentary on Article 28.
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Article 27. Subsidiary Bodies
1. Any subsidiary body established by or under the Convention may 
serve this Protocol, including upon a decision of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Any 
such decision shall specify the tasks to be undertaken.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may par-
ticipate as observers in the proceedings of any meeting of any such 
subsidiary bodies. When a subsidiary body of the Convention serves as 
a subsidiary body to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall 
be taken only by Parties to this Protocol.
3. When a subsidiary body of the Convention exercises its functions with 
regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the bureau 
of that subsidiary body representing a Party to the Convention but, at 
that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be substituted by a mem-
ber to be elected by and from among the Parties to this Protocol.
Article 27 establishes the institutional and procedural linkages between the 
Protocol and the CBD. It addresses: the performance of functions by subsid-
iary bodies of the CBD in relation to the Protocol; which States are entitled 
to participate in the proceedings of subsidiary bodies performing functions 
in relation to the Protocol; and who is entitled to act as an officer (or ‘bureau 
member’) of such a subsidiary body.1
This provision is modeled after the Biosafety Protocol,2 with the only differ-
ence concerning the link between the CBD COP and the Protocol COP/MOP. 
Notably, the Nagoya Protocol foresees the possibility that CBD subsidiary bod-
ies will support the work of the Nagoya Protocol COP/MOP without the need 
for a decision to this end to be taken by the COP/MOP.3 Thus, CBD subsidiary 
bodies, such as the Working Group on Review of Implementation, the Working 
1 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 236–237. For a similar discussion in relation to the 
Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 
185–186.
2 Biosafety Protocol Article 30.
3 Note the word ‘including’ in Nagoya Protocol Article 27(1). The Biosafety Protocol, instead, 
requires such decision by its own COP/MOP.
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Group on Article 8(j) on traditional knowledge4 or the CBD Subsidiary Body 
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), could – upon a 
request by the CBD COP – address issues related to the implementation of the 
Protocol. In practice, however, it seems rather likely that specific instructions 
will be provided by the COP/MOP to that end. In this connection, it can be 
argued that if tasks related to the Nagoya Protocol would significantly add to 
the workload or costs of certain CBD subsidiary bodies, the CBD COP could 
exercise its right to ‘consider and take any additional action that may be 
required for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention’ to intervene 
in this event.5
Following the approach taken with regard to the COP/MOP, representatives 
of non-Parties to the Protocol could only participate as observers when a sub-
sidiary body of the CBD exercises functions in relation to the Protocol. Note 
also that the CBD Rules of Procedure apply, as appropriate, to its subsidiary 
bodies, and that when a CBD subsidiary body carries out functions under the 
Protocol, any member of the bureau who does not represent a Party to the 
Protocol must be replaced by a representative of a Party to the Protocol.6
4 In the context of which, in effect, consideration of guidelines on prior informed consent 
to, prevention of misappropriation of, and benefit-sharing from traditional knowledge 
are being considered with a view to contributing to the work of the Nagoya Protocol. See 
CBD Article 8(j) Working Group, “Report of the eighth meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/12/5, 
Annex, ‘Recommendation 8/4 on Tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best contribute to work under the 
Convention and to the Nagoya Protocol.
5 CBD Article 23(4)(i), on the basis of similar considerations made in relation to the Biosafety 
Protocol. See Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 185. 
See also Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, op. cit., 112.
6 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 237. For a similar discussion in relation to the 
Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, 
op. cit., 186.
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Article 28. Secretariat
1. The Secretariat established by Article 24 of the Convention shall serve 
as the secretariat to this Protocol.
2. Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the functions of the 
Secretariat shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol.
3. To the extent that they are distinct, the costs of the secretariat services 
for this Protocol shall be met by the Parties hereto. The Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, 
at its first meeting, decide on the necessary budgetary arrangements 
to this end.
Article 28, which mirrors the corresponding provision of the Biosafety 
Protocol,1 makes provision for the Secretariat of the Protocol, which is respon-
sible to administer the treaty and to act as day-to-day contact point for its 
Parties, international organizations and others. The Secretariat also prepares 
documentation for meetings of the governing and subsidiary bodies of the 
Protocol, and is in charge of organizing and servicing their meetings. It fur-
ther plays an important role in the functioning of the ABS Clearinghouse.2 
The Secretariat’s tasks will also likely include the preparation of reports on the 
execution of its functions under the Protocol for consideration by the COP/
MOP, and coordination with other relevant international bodies.3 Upon the 
Protocol’s entry into force, the COP/MOP will likely assign additional specific 
functions and tasks to the Secretariat.4
The CBD Secretariat will also perform the functions of the Secretarirat for 
the Protocol, as is customary in multilateral environmental agreements for 
cost-efficiency reasons. Thus, Article 28 also addresses the separation of costs 
incurred by the Secretariat for its services for the Protocol rather than for the 
1 Biosafety Protocol Article 31.
2 See this commentary on Article 14, section 3.
3 CBD Article 24. See Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, op. cit., 114. See also this commentary on Article 4.
4 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 239–240. For a similar discussion in relation to the 
Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 
187–188.
342 Article 28
CBD. As in the context of the Cartagena Protocol, this may have impacts on the 
ratification of the Protocol by developing countries: if developing countries are 
the first to ratify the Protocol,5 they will have to bear the costs incurred by the 
Secretariat in servicing the Protocol, which can constitute a significant finan-
cial burden for these countries.6
5 And indeed at the time of writing, only one developed country Party (Norway) has ratified 
the Protocol: see this commentary on Article 1, fn. 63.
6 For a similar discussion in relation to the Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 188. Note however that, 
notwithstanding ratification, all CBD Parties have obligations under the third objective of 
the Convention as operationalized in CBD Articles 1, 8(j), 15 and other related provisions.
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Article 29. Monitoring and Reporting
Each Party shall monitor the implementation of its obligations under this 
Protocol, and shall, at intervals and in the format to be determined by 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol, report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol on measures that it has taken to implement this 
Protocol.
1 Overview
Article 291 is a common provision in multilateral environmental agreements 
calling for Parties’ regular monitoring of implementation and reporting to the 
Protocol’s governing body. These obligations are critical for ensuring compli-
ance with the Protocol, assessing its actual operation on the ground, and may 
also facilitate cooperation and exchange of information among Parties and 
ABS stakeholders. The following section will discuss the functions of these 
obligations more in detail, and also explore links with other relevant provi-
sions of the Protocol.
2 Functions and Links
Article 29 is modeled after similar provisions in the CBD2 and the Biosafety 
Protocol.3 It imposes two mutually reinforcing obligations on Parties: to moni-
tor implementation of the Protocol, and to report on its implementation mea-
sures. Monitoring will provide information needed for the reporting. In turn, 
the requirement to provide reports may elicit feedback on the way monitoring 
has operated, and may be improved in the future.4 Monitoring is particularly 
significant as many of the obligations in the Protocol are not self-executing, 
1 This provision was not subject to negotiation and was first incorporated in the Cali Draft. 
2 CBD Article 26.
3 Biosafety Protocol Article 33.
4 Based on the commentary of the corresponding obligation under the Biosafety Protocol. See 
Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 191. See also Greiber 
et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 241–242.
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but rather explicitly require the adoption of domestic measures to enable 
implementation. This will imply that Parties have to ensure access to, or set 
up, reliable mechanisms of information gathering and data management at 
the national level.5
In practice, reports will be submitted through the Secretariat. The Protocol’s 
governing body will determine the intervals at which reports are to be submit-
ted (usually in time for every, or every second, meeting of the governing body) 
and provide guidance to Parties on the format and content of the reports to 
ensure that information is provided in a comparable format.6 This practice 
is in fact common to other multilateral environmental agreements, as their 
compliance procedures are essentially ‘informational.’7 On the one hand, it is 
expected that the reporting obligation exercises a positive influence on Parties 
having to assess the extent and impact of their implementation efforts and 
to justify them before the Secretariat, other Parties, international organiza-
tions and stakeholders to whom the report will be available.8 On the other 
hand, these reports provide opportunities for the Secretariat to evaluate prog-
ress in the implementation of the Protocol, and to other States or stakehold-
ers to scrutinize the practices of and exercise pressure on individual States.9 
National reports collectively may also feed into the review process foreseen 
under Protocol.10 Depending on the compliance procedures and mechanisms 
that will be agreed under the Protocol,11 national reports may further be taken 
into account by a future compliance committee.
Usually national reports indicate what kind of measures have been adopted 
by Parties towards implementing their obligations, in order to enable Parties 
individually and collectively to assess how effectively the treaty is operating. 
These reports may also allow NGOs and other interested stakeholders to moni-
tor progress at the country level. Reports can further serve to strengthen com-
munication and coordination among relevant national authorities responsible 
for the implementation of the Protocol, and foster scientific understanding 
and self-examination.12 In an ideal scenario, national reporting can, in addi-
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 238–243.
8 Alexandre C. Kiss and Dinah Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 84.
9 Ibid.
10 See this commentary on Article 31.
11 See this commentary on Article 30.
12 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 239; and Birnie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 239–243.
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tion, open the door to peer review, peer pressure and mutual learning. Scrutiny 
and exchange of lessons learnt can be undertaken by the focal points of other 
Parties and interested stakeholders on the basis of information provided 
through national reporting.13 In the context of the CBD, however, in view of 
the absence of a mechanism to systematically and effectively monitor imple-
mentation and compliance at the national level, the COP has not engaged in 
the review of individual national reports but, rather, limited itself to offering 
conclusions on the basis of the CBD Secretariat’s syntheses of these reports.14 
National reporting, however, may receive increased attention in the context of 
the Nagoya Protocol, given the link between the domestic ABS framework of 
provider countries and user countries’ international obligations on address-
ing compliance by their users.15 In that regard, it should be noted that Parties 
to the Cartagena Protocol have recently tasked the Biosafety Compliance 
Committee to systematically review Parties’ reports with a view to identifying 
general compliance challenges, and to engaging with Parties that still need to 
put in place their national biosafety framework.16
It should also briefly be recalled that ensuring timely and accurate national 
reporting is a challenge in many MEAs,17 although ‘misreporting is more dif-
ficult than it appears.’18 Non-compliance procedures can be employed, and are 
often employed by other MEAs, to put pressure on States that are late or defi-
cient in their reporting. In addition, the Protocol’s governing body may issue 
guidance to ensure sufficient quality and comparability of reporting, thereby 
making misreporting easier to detect.19
13 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 239; and Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 239–243.
14 This examination tends to focus on the mere submission of the report and on a 
quantitative analysis of legislative developments (for instance, the percentage of Parties 
with biodiversity-related legislation in place) rather than on a qualitative analysis of the 
content of the national reports, including the quality and comprehensiveness of national 
legislation and impacts of State measures on biodiversity and achievement of the CBD 
objectives. Involvement of subsidiary bodies under the CBD in the examination of reports 
has not yielded results in this direction either: see Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, 
Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 7.
15 See this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1.
16 See “Report of the Compliance Committee under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety” 
(12 June 2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/BS/CC/10/5.
17 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 243.
18 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 239.
19 Ibid.
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Article 30. Procedures and Mechanisms to Promote 
Compliance with this Protocol
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first meeting, consider and approve cooperative pro-
cedures and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the 
provisions of this Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance. These 
procedures and mechanisms shall include provisions to offer advice or 
assistance, where appropriate. They shall be separate from, and without 
prejudice to, the dispute settlement procedures and mechanisms under 
Article 27 of the Convention.
1 Overview
Article 301 is an enabling provision,2 which mandates the establishment of 
multilateral procedures and mechanisms for monitoring compliance and 
addressing instances of non-compliance with the Protocol. Similarly to the 
Biosafety Protocol,3 it provides a definite mandate to the Protocol’s governing 
body (‘consider and approve’) and a time frame4 (‘at its first meeting’).5
Article 30 indicates that the aim of the compliance procedures and mecha-
nisms will be two-fold: on the one hand, to promote compliance and, on the 
other hand, to address cases of non-compliance. It further provides some indi-
cation as to the nature of these procedures and mechanisms (‘cooperative and 
non-adversarial’) and the relevant powers, by pointing to the possibility to offer 
advice or assistance, and clearly distinguishing them from dispute settlement 
1 This provision was first incorporated in the Cali Draft. 
2 This is a common approach in other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol, Article 18; the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004) 2256 UNTS 119, Article 17; and ITPGRFA, 
Article 21. See also Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 244.
3 Biosafety Protocol Article 34. See Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena 
Protocol, op. cit., 193–196.
4 For similar considerations in the context of the Biosafety Protocol, see ibid., 194.
5 Which will be held concurrently with the first meeting of the CBD COP that is to con-
vene after the Protocol’s entry into force: Protocol Article 26(6). See this commentary on 
Article 26. 
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procedures.6 All other elements of the procedures and mechanisms, including 
their form, the full array of their powers, the determination of entities entitled 
to trigger consideration of cases of non-compliance and the nature of mea-
sures to address non-compliance will have to be defined in subsequent nego-
tiations and eventually be adopted by the Protocol’s governing body.
To a certain extent, the compliance procedures and mechanisms to be 
established under the Protocol will share features that have become common-
place across multilateral environmental agreements.7 On the other hand, some 
distinctive features of the Protocol will likely lead Parties to consider innova-
tive approaches to multilateral compliance procedures and mechanisms. The 
following sections will therefore discuss some of the likely common features 
of compliance procedures under the Nagoya Protocol and other MEAs, and 
then focus on likely distinctive features. The relation of Article 30 with other 
compliance-related provisions of the Protocol, and with international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, will be analyzed next.
2 Common Features
Compliance procedures, including the creation of a compliance committee, 
have become a common feature of MEAs – although negotiations for their 
establishment have proven quite arduous.8 Compliance procedures represent 
a response to general and individual issues related to compliance with inter-
national treaties, that are based on problem-solving through negotiation with 
6 The Nagoya Protocol does not contain a provision on dispute settlement, but CBD Article 27 
on dispute settlement is applicable in this context (pursuant CBD Article 27(5), which reads: 
‘The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol except as otherwise 
provided in the protocol concerned.’)
7 See for example: Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 
op. cit., 211–213 and 237–250; Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
eds., Ensuring Compliance With Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue Between 
Practitioners and Academia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006); Tullio Treves 
et al., eds., Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (The Hague: Asser Press, 2009); Ronald B. Mitchell, “Compliance 
Theory: Compliance, Effectiveness and Behaviour Change in International Environmental Law” 
in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 
op. cit., 893; and André Nollkaemper, “Compliance Control in International Environmental 
Law: Traversing the Limits of the National Legal Order,” Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 13 (2003): 165.
8 For a comparative discussion, see Morgera et al., “Implementation Challenges,” op. cit.
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a view to identifying a flexible and pragmatic multilateral solution to ques-
tions of interpretation of a treaty, as well as alleged breaches.9 The outcome of 
compliance procedures can be an authoritative determination of the correct 
interpretation of a treaty provision or a declaration of non-compliance by a 
certain Party. But it may also be (in addition or in alternative) a more prag-
matic proposal to manage non-compliance problems in order to achieve an 
‘acceptable level of compliance’ in the future, rather than establishing rights 
and duties under the treaty.10 In that connection, compliance mechanisms are 
more fundamentally geared towards promoting future compliance rather than 
punishing past non-compliance, with the ultimate aim of seeking to promote 
the effectiveness of the regime as a whole.11 To that end, the outcome of com-
pliance procedures may not be necessarily dictated by international law, but 
rather accommodate the interests of all Parties, thereby facilitating multilat-
eral solutions and restoring mutual trust.12 As a result, in different combina-
tions, compliance mechanisms generally mix a ‘managerial’ and ‘enforcement’ 
approach,13 encouraging Parties to engage in better planning of actions needed 
for ensuring compliance.14 Sanctions and disincentives are usually reserved 
only to tackle recalcitrant Parties.
It should also be noted that compliance mechanisms provide an opportu-
nity for the wider international community, beyond State Parties, to exercise 
multilateral pressure on non-compliant Parties. Thus, not only Parties but also 
observers, notably NGOs,15 can participate (in different ways and to different 
extents, depending on the specific procedures of the compliance mechanisms)16 
9 Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, “Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmen-
tal Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environ-
mental Agreements,” Journal of Environmental Law 24 (2012): 103; see also Birnie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 245–250.
10 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 251.
11 Ibid., 232–233.
12 Ibid., 226 and 251.
13 For this terminology, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” 
International Organization 47 (1993): 175; and Jutta Brunnée, “Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the Compliance Continuum,” in Winter, Multilevel Governance of Global 
Environmental Change, op. cit., 387.
14 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 235.
15 Alessandro Fodella, “Structural and Institutional Aspects of Non-Compliance 
Mechanisms,” in Treves et al., Non-Compliance Procedures, op. cit., 355; and Birnie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 244.
16 Veit Koester and Tomme Young, “Compliance with International Conventions: The Role 
of Public Involvement,” Environmental Policy and Law 37 (2007): 399.
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in negotiations for equitably balancing the interests of different Parties and for 
determining appropriate forms of assistance, taking into account experience 
and knowledge of different stakeholders involved in treaty implementation. It 
should be noted that compliance mechanisms have also raised concerns about 
the respect for the rule of law in MEAs. It has in fact been argued that compli-
ance with international obligations becomes ‘intensely negotiable,’ which pos-
sibly leads to a ‘relativization of international law’s normativity’ and conceals 
fundamental disagreement among relevant actors about the significance of 
international rules and their breach.17
The intergovernmental process preparing for the entry into force of the 
Protocol already engaged in the identification of useful elements of inspira-
tion from other compliance mechanisms under other MEAs.18 Useful elements 
could include the possibility for a future compliance committee19 to take facili-
tative measures in its own capacity,20 to address non-compliance also through 
17 Klabbers, “Compliance Procedures,” op. cit., 995.
18 The CBD Secretariat initially drew attention to the compliance mechanisms of the 
Biosafety Protocol and of the ITPGRFA in CBD Secretariat, “Cooperative procedures 
and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol and to address 
cases of non-compliance” (6 September 2011) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/6/Rev.1. But 
relevance of other experiences under other MEAs was later considered: ICNP, “Report of 
the Expert Meeting on Cooperative Procedures and Institutional Mechanisms to Promote 
Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing and to Address 
Cases of Non-Compliance” (1 March 2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12, paragraphs 47 
and 52.
19 While a decision has still be to taken on whether a compliance ‘committee’ will be 
established under the Nagoya Protocol, negotiating documents at the time of writing 
clearly point in that direction: ICNP Recommendation 2/7 “Cooperative procedures 
and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the protocol and to address 
cases of non-compliance”, Annex, paragraph B.1, in ICNP, ‘Report of the second meeting,” 
UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex.
20 ITPGRFA Article 21: ‘The Governing Body shall, at its first meeting, consider and 
approve cooperative and effective procedures and operational mechanisms to promote 
compliance with the provisions of this treaty and to address issues of non-compliance. 
These procedures and mechanisms shall include monitoring, and offering advice or 
assistance, including legal advice or legal assistance, when needed, in particular to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition.’ See ENB. “Summary 
of the Fourth Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture: 14–18 March 2011,” Vol. 9 No. 550, 21 March 2011; 
and Elsa Tsioumani, “ITPGRFA. Compliance Procedures and Operational Mechanisms,” 
Environmental Policy and Law 41 (2011): 74.
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punitive measures,21 to seek information through the Secretariat, to conduct 
visits to the territory of the Party under investigation if invited to do so,22 
and to consider reports of expert teams reviewing Parties’ national reports.23 
A notable potential source of inspiration would be the Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’), whose compliance mecha-
nism can be triggered24 by stakeholders25 and includes NGOs as members of 
21 This is the case of CITES, for instance, where powers were derived from a provision in CITES 
Article XI, enabling the COP to make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the 
Convention, coupled with majority-voting decision making. Compare CITES Resolution 
Conf. 14.3 “CITES Compliance Procedures,” CITES, accessed 30 November 2013, <www 
.cites.org/eng/res/all/14/E14-03C15.pdf>. See generally Rosalind Reeve, “Wildlife Trade, 
Sanctions and Compliance: Lessons from the CITES Regime,” International Affairs 82 
(2006): 881. See also Kyoto Protocol Articles 3(1), 5(1), 5(2) and 7(1); and Decision 27/
CMP.1 “Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol” 
(30 March 2006) UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, Annex, section XV. See Jacob 
Werksman, “Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a ‘Flexible’ 
Regime,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law 9 (1999): 48; and Meinhard Doelle, 
“Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate Change Regime,” in Hollo, Kulovesi and 
Mehling, Climate Change and the Law, op. cit., 165.
22 Montreal Protocol Article 8; and “Non-compliance Procedure” in “Report of the fourth 
meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol” (25 November 1992) UN Doc UNEP/
OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex IV, as amended by “Report of the tenth meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol” (3 December 1998) UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9, Annex II, paragraph 
7. See also Martti Koskenniemi, “Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on 
the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
3 (1993): 123; and Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 
op. cit., 353–354.
23  Kyoto Protocol Article 18; and Decision 27/CMP.1, Annex, section IV. See Cardesa-
Salzmann, “Constitutionalising Secondary Rules,” op. cit., 114; and Doelle, “Compliance 
and Enforcement,” op. cit., 167.
24 As proposed by Switzerland: ENB 9/551, “Summary of the First Meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 9.
25 This characteristic is also present in other UNECE instruments: Protocol on Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Kiev, 
21 May 2003, in force 8 October 2009) 2629 UNTS 119, Article 12 (which makes reference 
to ‘members of the public’) and Decision I/2, “Review of Compliance” (20–22 April 
2010) UN Doc ECE/MP.PRTR/2010/, paragraph 18; Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992, 
in force 6 October 1996) 1936 UNTS 269, and Decision VI/1, “Support to implementation 
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the compliance committee. Interestingly, however, these innovative character-
istics of the Aarhus Compliance Committee are balanced out by the fact that 
its decisions are subject to consensus approval by the Convention’s governing 
body – thereby implicitly giving a ‘veto power’ to the Party whose compliance 
issues are at stake.26 With regard to inspiration from other MEAs, a measure 
of caution has been called for by a commentator, who emphasizes the need 
for careful scrutiny of whether the characteristics of other compliance mech-
anisms may be effectively utilized to address ABS-related compliance issues 
that will likely involve requests for benefit-sharing in the context of commer-
cial relationships.27
At the time of writing it remains too early to determine which of these 
features will be included in the compliance procedures under the Nagoya 
Protocol.28 In the intergovernmental process preparing for the Protocol’s entry 
into force, it has also been noted that international treaties other than MEAs, 
such as human rights ones, may be taken into account in devising the compli-
ance mechanism for the Protocol.29 This may arguably serve to better address 
Parties’ lack of political will to comply with the Protocol, which appears to be 
addressed more often in the context of human rights bodies than in the con-
text of MEA compliance procedures, which rather tend to focus on capacity 
issues. Consideration of compliance mechanisms under international human 
and compliance” (28–30 November 2012) UNECE Doc ECE/MP.WAT/37/Add.2, Annex II; 
Protocol on Water and Health  to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (London, 17 June 1999, in force 
4 August 2005) 2331 UNTS 202 Article 15 and Decision I/2, “Review of compliance” 
(3 July 2007) UNECE Doc ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3, paragraph 16. See also Svitlana 
Kravchenko, “The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements,” Colorado Journal International Environmental Law and 
Policy 18 (2007): 1.
26 Veit Koester, “Aarhus Convention/MOP-4: The Compliance Mechanism – Outcomes and a 
Stocktaking,” Environmental Policy and Law 41 (2011): 196, 197–198.
27 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 489.
28 ICNP Recommendation 2/7, “Cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to 
promote compliance with the Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance” in ICNP, 
“Report of the second meeting,” UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6, Annex.
29 ICNP Recommendation 1/4 “Cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms 
to promote compliance with the Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance,” 
paragraph 1, in ICNP, “Report of the first meeting,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/8, Annex, where 
there is an open-ended reference to ‘taking into account the experience and lessons 
learned from other relevant multilateral agreements.’
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rights treaties may further provide options to factor in the specificities of the 
Nagoya Protocol with regard to indigenous and local communities.30
3 Distinctive Features
The unique obligations arising from the Protocol may lead Parties to explore 
innovative approaches to multilateral compliance procedures and mecha-
nisms. There are at least three aspects that may make the Protocol compliance 
mechanism quite distinctive from those under other MEAs:
a) the interaction between the bilateral obligations arising in the context of 
a specific relation between a provider and user country, on the one hand, 
and erga omnes partes obligations contained in the Protocol;31
b) compliance with the international obligations of State Parties vis-à-vis 
indigenous and local communities;
c) compliance involving relations between States and private entities.
These will be discussed in turn below. It should also be noted in passing 
that other elements under the Nagoya Protocol may require distinctive solu-
tions. This is the case of ensuring balanced representation among provider 
and user countries in a future compliance committee; addressing issues of 
confidentiality;32 and taking into account the specific needs of developing 
countries.33
30 ENB 9/551, “Summary of the First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Nagoya Protocol,” 10; and Morgera, “First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee 
for the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 190.
31 Note that this feature may not be unique to the Nagoya Protocol: it appears to distinguish 
also other ‘collective regimes’ that relate to resources that are to a great extent under State 
jurisdiction such as the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the 
ITPGRFA as MEAs that at the same time include generalized obligations for the ‘protection 
of components of global ecosystems’, thus enhancing ‘the application of principles and 
duties of general international law’ as well as bilateral and reciprocal international 
obligations as part of the economic instruments for their application: Cardesa-Salzmann, 
“Constitutionalising Secondary Rules,” op. cit., 109.
32 See this commentary on Article 14, section 5.
33 See this commentary on Articles 22–23 and 25.
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3.1 Compliance in Bilateral Relations between Provider and User 
Countries
Currently, there is no existing compliance mechanism under an MEA to address 
State compliance with obligations to ensure that users under its jurisdiction 
respect other countries’ national legislation.34 In addition, intergovernmental 
discussions preparing for the entry into force of the Protocol initially high-
lighted an underlying divergence of views among CBD parties in this regard, 
namely whether the Protocol’s compliance mechanisms will address Parties’ 
compliance with their obligations related to users’ compliance with domes-
tic ABS frameworks related to genetic resources35 and traditional knowledge,36 
and with MAT.37 As already discussed,38 unusually, the Protocol refers to ‘com-
pliance’ not only in the traditional sense under international environmental 
law of State Parties’ compliance with their international obligations, but also 
in the case of individual users’ compliance with applicable laws and MAT at the 
national level – where users will most likely be private individuals or entities.39 
This has led certain developed countries to argue that Protocol Articles 15–16 
and 18 were excluded from the purview of a future compliance mechanism, as 
these articles fundamentally relate to users’ compliance. The CBD Secretariat 
explicitly clarified that State Parties to the Protocol are bound by interna-
tional law to comply with all their obligations under the Protocol, including 
the international obligations concerning individual users’ compliance con-
tained in Protocol Articles 15–16 and 18, compliance with which could all be 
reviewed under the Protocol’s compliance mechanism to be established.40 
34 A comparison could nonetheless be drawn with the compliance procedures under CITES: 
we are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our attention to this point. For instance, 
the Management Authority of Japan is required to reconfirm directly to the Management 
Authority of the country of export, prior to the authorization of the import of the 
specimen, which export is prohibited under the law of that exporting country: Isozaki, 
“Enforcement of ABS Agreements,” op. cit., 440. 
35 See this commentary on Article 15.
36 See this commentary on Article 16.
37 See this commentary on Article 18.
38 See this commentary on Article 15, section 2.
39 See ENB 9/551, “Summary of the First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Nagoya Protocol,” 12. 
40 ICNP Recommendation 1/4, preambular recital (emphasis added). See also Egypt’s 
statements on behalf of the African Group on this matter in ICNP, “Report of the first 
meeting,” paragraph 151. Note also the statement made by the ICNP Co-Chair Casas during 
the meeting that ‘Parties to the Protocol are bound by international law to comply with all 
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These international obligations clearly relate both to domestic law-making 
action (or the enactment of other domestic –policy and administrative – mea-
sures) and international cooperation in transnational enforcement efforts. The 
latter seemed to be particularly important for provider countries, who may be 
able to use (or at least threaten to use) a Party-to-Party trigger under a future 
compliance mechanism to ensure that user countries cooperate in ensuring 
access to justice in cases of misappropriation.
Against this background, it can be expected that typical non-compliance 
instances that may be brought to the attention of a future compliance com-
mittee under the Protocol may include a Party claiming that another Party 
has failed to take domestic measures required for the implementation of the 
Protocol, thereby preventing persons or entities in the claiming Party from 
obtaining access or receiving benefits; or one Party alleging a breach of an 
inter-State ABS arrangement concluded with another Party.41 Other claims 
may also involve lack of international cooperation in addressing users’ alleged 
violations of domestic ABS frameworks.42
Due to the importance of compatible provider and user countries’ legislative 
activities on ABS for the full operationalization of the Protocol,43 it may also 
be suggested that the compliance mechanisms and procedures will be heavily 
involved in the advice and assessment of national ABS laws. To that extent, 
a comparison with the CITES compliance processes and the CITES National 
Legislation Project may be useful.44 The Project was established in 1992 in 
their obligations under the Protocol, and that these obligations include compliance with 
domestic legislation, as contained in Protocol Articles 15–16, as well as compliance with 
MAT, as contained in Protocol Article 18; and if a Party does not take these compliance-
related measures, this is considered non-compliance under the Protocol and will be 
reviewed under the compliance mechanism to be established:’ ENB 9/551, “Summary of 
the First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 8.
41 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 488. In the latter case, 
however, it could be possible for a bilateral ABS treaty to be in place, which may provide 
for dispute-settlement mechanisms: we are grateful to Tomme Young for drawing our 
attention to this point. On bilateral ABS treaties, see this commentary on Article 4, 
section 3.
42 Nagoya Protocol Article 15(3). See this commentary on Article 15.
43 See this commentary on Articles 4–5 and comments on the need for ‘inter-operability’ 
between domestic ABS frameworks in Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” 
op. cit., 488.
44 CITES Resolution Conf. 8.4 (Rev. COP15) “National Laws for implementation of the 
Convention,” CITES, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cites.org/eng/res/08/08-04R15.
php>. For a comparative discussion, see generally Morgera et al., “Implementation 
Challenges and Compliance in MEA Negotiations,” op. cit.
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the absence of an explicit basis in the Convention. The CITES Secretariat is 
enabled to determine whether Parties’ national legislation adequately imple-
ments the Convention, by categorizing each country’s legislation as meeting 
all, some, or none of the requirements for implementing CITES. The catego-
rization is based on a clear articulation of the minimum requirements set by 
CITES in terms of implementing the convention in national law. Countries in 
the lower category have to develop a ‘legislation plan’ establishing agreed steps 
and a timeframe for the adoption of national legislation. Failing to submit the 
Plan or to adopt adequate legislation by set deadlines may result in the recom-
mended suspension of commercial trade in all CITES species with the Party, 
although the Secretariat may withhold action if good legislative progress has 
been made by a Party.45 The system rests on the longstanding practice of the 
Standing Committee, which may recommend trade sanctions (suspension of 
wildlife trade) in cases where a country has not met its legislative obligations. 
In the framework of this multilateral process, national legislative sovereignty is 
closely monitored and significantly influenced by CITES bodies, on the basis of 
a comparative analysis of existing national laws and international guidelines, 
and a network of experts participating in relevant multilateral deliberations 
and field activities.46 This approach, however, would require a ‘cultural shift’ 
among Parties to the CBD, which have hitherto expressed opposition to any 
international monitoring or assessment of national legislation.47
3.2 Compliance vis-à-vis Indigenous and Local Communities
The Nagoya Protocol provisions on traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources held by indigenous and local communities48 significantly contribute 
to making States’ role ‘functional’ to the protection of the interests of these 
45 CITES Resolution Conf. 8.4 which instructs the Standing Committee to determine 
which Parties have not adopted appropriate measures for effective implementation of 
the Convention and to consider appropriate compliance measures, which may include 
recommendations to suspend trade, in accordance with CITES Resolution Conf. 14.3; 
directs the Secretariat to seek external funding to enable it to provide technical assistance 
to Parties in the development of their measures to implement the Convention; and invites 
all Parties, governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organisations, and 
other sources to provide financial and/or technical assistance for the development and 
effective implementation of such measures; and CITES Article XII. The authors are grateful 
to Soledad Aguilar for her contributions on CITES in Morgera et al., “Implementation 
Challenges,” op. cit.
46 Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests?,” op. cit., 756.
47 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 7.
48 See this commentary on Articles 5–7.
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communities located in their territories, as well as of these communities in 
other States.49 It remains to be seen how compliance with the Protocol’s obli-
gations related to indigenous and local communities will be monitored, par-
ticularly as currently, there is no existing mechanism under an MEA to address 
State compliance with obligations towards its indigenous and local communi-
ties. In addition or in alternative, a future compliance committee under the 
Protocol may have to assess compliance with, or at least consider the role of, 
indigenous and local communities’ laws, protocols and procedures50 in ensur-
ing compliance with the obligations of Parties vis-à-vis these communities. To 
some extent this task may be facilitated by the use of community protocols,51 
which may distil the relevant views, laws and procedures of these communi-
ties in relation to ABS. In that connection, States’ functional role may likely 
extend to support also the implementation and ensure the respect of com-
munity protocols, giving them legal effect in national legal system with a view 
to ensuring compliance by users and collaboration with user countries in that 
endeavor.52
Intergovernmental negotiations preparing for the Protocol’s entry into force 
provide some indications of the options that may be considered if Parties 
agree to adequately gear multilateral mechanisms and procedures to deal with 
compliance with the indigenous and local community-related obligations of 
Parties. One obvious possibility is that of triggering the compliance procedure 
with a submission from ‘a member of the public’ or more specifically by ‘indig-
enous and local communities,’ which has been discussed together with the 
proposal of conditioning such trigger to the ‘support of the Party in whose ter-
ritories the community is located.’53 This seems to demonstrate that while CBD 
49 This argument was first put forward in Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of 
Community Interests?,” op. cit., 745 and inspired by Ellen Hey, “Global Environmental 
Law and Global Institutions: A System Lacking ‘Good Process,’ ” in Cosmopolitanism in 
Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory, ed. Roland Pierik and 
Wouter Werner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45.
50 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.
51 Nagoya Protocol Articles 12 and 21. See previous discussions on community protocols in 
the context of this commentary on Article 12, section 2.1; as well as Jonas, Bavikatte and 
Shrumm, “Community Protocols and Access and Benefit-Sharing,” op. cit., 68; and Munyi 
and Jonas, “Implementing the Nagoya Protocol,” op. cit., 238–244.
52 Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests?,” op. cit., 762.
53 ICNP Recommendation 2/7, section D, paragraph (1)(d). The text appears in square 
brackets in the draft decision. It is noteworthy that an expert group on compliance that 
met earlier in 2012 had noted the possibility that a community trigger under the Protocol 
compliance mechanism be accompanied by a ‘number of qualifiers or conditions’: ICNP, 
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Parties display some openness to consider a stakeholder or community trigger, 
a significant degree of caution in that regard remains. It should also be noted 
that a trigger by any member of the public (rather than indigenous and local 
communities) would provide private-sector users and providers with access 
to the Protocol’s compliance mechanism, as well as environmental NGOs and 
other ABS stakeholders. Other options include the possibility for indigenous 
and local communities to submit information directly to a future compliance 
committee, which, combined with the possibility for the compliance commit-
tee to self-trigger, could provide an alternative to a community trigger. Another 
possibility is to allow representatives of indigenous and local communities to 
participate in a future compliance committee as members or as observers, 
and/or for the committee to directly consult with relevant communities in the 
course of its consideration of cases of non-compliance.54
An innovative idea that emerged during the Protocol negotiations, but that 
did not make it in the agreed text, was to establish an international ombud-
sperson to support developing countries and indigenous and local commu-
nities in identifying breaches of rights and to provide independent technical 
and legal support in ensuring the effective redress of such breaches.55 If estab-
lished, such an innovative feature in the MEA landscape56 would essentially 
constitute an international institution able to work on the ground directly with 
indigenous and local communities, while enabling these communities to have 
immediate access to an international avenue to address alleged disrespect of 
their rights protected under the Protocol.57 While the final text of the Protocol 
does not make reference to an international ombudsperson, there is nothing 
“Report of the Expert Meeting on Cooperative Procedures,” UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12, fns. 
21–22. 
54 ICNP Recommendation 2/7, Annex. See Morgera, “Second meeting of the ICNP,” op. cit., 
244.
55 See Montreal I Draft, draft article 14 bis. ENB 9/527, “Summary of the Resumed Ninth 
Meeting of the Working Group on ABS,” 11 and 15.
56 In the human rights context, an ombudsman is a national institution that contributes to 
the enjoyment and protection of human rights. In particular, ‘the traditional model of an 
ombudsman has been an independent institution that is established by and answerable 
to parliament, with the power to consider complaints and conduct investigations on its 
own initiative, and to make recommendations to government rather than to adopt biding 
decisions. (. . .) there are two main models of ombudsman (though some ombudsmen are 
hybrid between the two): the classical ombudsman and the human rights ombudsman:’ 
see Andrew Byrnes and Catherine Renshaw, “Within the State,” in Moeckli, Shah and 
Sivakumaran, International Human Rights Law, op. cit., 498, 514–5.
57 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 20.
358 Article 30
to prevent Parties from establishing such a body in the future through a deci-
sion by the Protocol’s governing body.58 And indeed the intergovernmental 
discussions preparing for the Protocol’s entry into force have witnessed the 
resurfacing of this idea. The Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya 
Protocol is thus considering at the time of writing whether an international 
ombudsman office could provide an intermediate layer in the multilateral 
compliance mechanisms and procedures where the Party concerned and its 
relevant communities could initially address implementation challenges with 
some international facilitation, but without the immediate involvement of a 
future compliance committee.59 The ombudsman could thus function as a 
mediator between governments and indigenous and local communities, and 
a filter to select well-founded community submissions for transmission to a 
future compliance committee.60 A comparable institution can be found in 
the context of the World Bank family: the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman 
(CAO) of the International Finance Corporation (IFC).61 The CAO is an inde-
pendent oversight authority that receives and addresses complaints from any 
person, group or community affected, or likely to be affected, by IFC-financed 
projects, and then reports directly to the President of the World Bank Group.62 
The Ombudsman’s modus operandi includes field visits to the site of contested 
projects and interviews with all parties involved: staff of the private company, 
58 Article 26(4)(a): see this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
59 ICNP Recommendation 2/7, Annex, F bis, which reads: ‘[The Committee shall establish 
the office of an ABS ombudsman to provide assistance to developing countries and 
indigenous and local communities to identify instances of non-compliance and make 
submissions to the Committee.]’ (brackets in the original). See also ENB 9/579, “Summary 
of the Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 12.
60 Morgera, “Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 245.
61 See “Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman” (CAO), CAO, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.
cao-ombudsman.org/>. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the ‘private 
arm’ of the World Bank: it provides financing to private operators active in developing 
countries: IFC Articles of Agreement (as amended through 27 June 2012), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1c95b500484cb68d9f3dbf5f4fc3
f18b/IFC_Articles_of_Agreement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>, Article 1. For a discussion, see 
Elisa Morgera, “Human Rights Dimensions of Corporate Environmental Accountability,” 
in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, ed. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 
Francesco Francioni and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 511.
62 CAO Terms of Reference, Operational Guidance and Operational Practice in “CAO 
Operational Guidelines,” CAO, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cao-ombudsman.org/
howwework/documents/CAOOperationalGuidelines2013_ENGLISH.pdf>.
359PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE
local authorities, affected communities representatives, other relevant local 
organizations and IFC staff. Complaints, reports of field missions and recom-
mendations are all published on the CAO website, together with updates on 
ongoing investigations.63 A similar body under the Nagoya Protocol, taking 
into consideration the specificities of ABS transactions, in particular regarding 
the central role of domestic ABS frameworks,64 could possibly address many 
concerns related to compliance on the ground, and facilitate relations between 
relevant ABS stakeholders.
It should also be added that in relation to the indigenous and local commu-
nity-related provisions of the Protocol, international human rights monitoring 
bodies may become involved in scrutinizing whether national-level implemen-
tation of the Nagoya Protocol complies with applicable international human 
rights instruments.65 To the extent that these other fora would work in a mutu-
ally supportive manner with the Protocol and its compliance mechanisms and 
procedures, this may provide an opportunity for cross-compliance.66
3.3 Compliance in State-Private Parties Relations
Parties will also need to discuss whether, to what extent and how the Protocol’s 
compliance mechanisms and procedures may address questions related to 
compliance in relationships between a State and private parties. If a stake-
holder trigger were to be created for the ABS compliance procedures, private 
users or providers such as a biotech multinational or a research centre could 
potentially bring claims before a future compliance mechanism for failures by 
Parties to create clear, predictable and effective domestic ABS frameworks.
Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that certain ABS arrangements, partic-
ularly in the context of bilateral or regional agreements, may be considered 
a form of ‘foreign direct investment’67 (given the extensive interpretation of 
this term under international investment law68 and its protection also under 
human rights instruments).69 As a result Protocol Parties could possibly find 
63 “Cases,” CAO, accessed 30 November 2013, <www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/>. 
64 See this commentary on Article 16, section 2.
65 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 79.
66 Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani, “Conclusions,” op. cit., 509.
67 See this commentary on Article 4, section 2.1.
68 Jan Wouters, Nicolas Hachez and Sanderijn Duquet, “International Investment Law: The 
Perpetual Search for Consensus,” in Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development: 
The Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements, ed. Olivier de Schutter, 
Johan F.M. Swinnen and Jan Wouters (New York: Routledge, 2013), 25. 
69 See for example Nicolas Klein, “Human Rights and International Investment Law: 
Investment Protection as Human Right,” Goettingen Journal of International Law 4 (2012): 
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themselves brought before investment dispute settlement mechanisms by pri-
vate ABS users,70 where human rights standards may be invoked by investors 
to challenge States’ fulfillment of their obligation to provide adequate access 
to justice to non-State parties.71 Such actions could arguably lead to differ-
ing interpretations of Protocol provisions by a future compliance committee 
under the Protocol on the one hand, and investment dispute bodies on the 
other hand, as the latter may have to balance the Protocol’s objective with 
those of international investment law.72
4 Links with Other Protocol Provisions
The Protocol’s compliance mechanism will interact with other international 
processes established under the Protocol. It will supplement the review 
of implementation by the Protocol’s governing body,73 which specifically 
includes review of the effectiveness of the Protocol’s provisions on compliance 
with MAT.74 A future compliance committee under the Protocol may also be 
allowed to take into account (upon request or of its own initiative) the reports 
submitted by Parties on their implementation of the Protocol.75
Potentially significant linkages may be established (or clarified) between 
the role of the compliance mechanisms and procedures, and the operation 
of the ABS Clearinghouse.76 Parties will have to input information on their 
179; Luke E. Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Mapping the Role 
of Human Rights Law within Investor-State Arbitration (Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 
2009); and Bruno Simma, “Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60 (2011): 573.
70 This may be particularly the case of ABS arrangements that provide benefit-sharing 
through the establishment of research facilities in the provider country: see this 
commentary on Article 5. We are grateful to Lorenzo Cotula for a useful exchange of ideas 
in this regard. 
71 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 72.
72 See for example Jorge E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the Environment in 
International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship,” British Yearbook of International Law 80 
(2010): 244.
73 See this commentary on Articles 26 and 31. For a similar question under the Biosafety 
Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 
193–196.
74 Nagoya Protocol Article 18(4). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 243 and this 
commentary on Article 18.
75 See this commentary on Article 29.
76 See this commentary on Article 14, section 4.
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national implementation measures (such as on domestic ABS frameworks) in 
the ABS Clearinghouse, and failure to do so may be considered a case of non-
compliance. Once the information is in the system, Parties may use the ABS 
Clearinghouse to monitor compliance by other Parties or perhaps even use 
that information as a defense against allegation of non-compliance against 
them. Crucially, once included in the ABS Clearinghouse, national permits will 
be elevated to internationally recognized certificates of compliance, which 
hold an important role in documenting users’ compliance with the bilateral 
ABS system set up by the Protocol.77
5 Dispute Settlement
Article 30 requires that the compliance procedures and mechanisms be ‘sepa-
rate from, and without prejudice to’ dispute settlement procedures. In accor-
dance with the Convention, Parties to the Protocol are required to address any 
dispute among them first of all by seeking solution by negotiation,78 and, fail-
ing that, by jointly seeking the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third 
party.79 Furthermore, when ratifying the Nagoya Protocol, a State may declare 
in writing that for a dispute that cannot be resolved through negotiation or 
mediation, the State may initiate an arbitration procedure and/or submit the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice.80 If the Parties to the dispute have 
not accepted the same or any procedure, the dispute will be submitted to con-
ciliation, unless the Parties agree otherwise.81
It should be finally noted that the Protocol’s compliance procedures and 
mechanisms might be used as an alternative to, or concurrently with, a dis-
pute settlement procedure. Parties may bring their concerns to the attention 
of a future compliance committee before resorting to international dispute 
settlement mechanisms in accordance with the CBD. In that case, the com-
pliance mechanism might help prevent disputes and thus minimize the need 
for dispute settlement, which in all events is an extremely unlikely option in 
77 Nagoya Protocol Article 17(2) and (3): see this commentary on Article 17, section 3. See 
Morgera, “First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,” 
op. cit., 190.
78 CBD Article 27(1).
79 CBD Article 27(2).
80 CBD Article 27(3).
81 CBD Article 27(4). See Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 249.
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international environmental law.82 On the other hand, it cannot be excluded 
that the same compliance issue may be considered at the same time by the 
Protocol’s compliance mechanism and by an international dispute resolution 
mechanism. In that case, it has been emphasized that the relationship between 
compliance mechanisms under MEAs and general international law’s enforce-
ment mechanisms is still undefined.83 Some commentators, however, have 
argued that the final decision of an international judicial organ would have to 
be considered ‘res iudicata’ by compliance committees. The latter could rather 
contribute through their own procedures to support the enforcement of the 
international court’s ruling.84
82 For similar reflections in the context of the Biosafety Protocol, see Mackenzie et al., 
Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 196. Recent practice under other 
MEAs also seems to indicate that Parties prefer to handle bilateral-type non-compliance 
instances through negotiations rather than through compliance mechanisms or formal 
dispute settlement procedures: Cardesa-Salzmann, “Constitutionalising Secondary 
Rules,” op. cit., 126–128.
83 Klabbers, “Compliance Procedures,” op. cit., 1005–1007.
84 Tullio Treves, “The Settlement of Disputes and Non-Compliance Procedures,” in Treves 
et al., Non-Compliance Procedures, op. cit., 499.
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Article 31. Assessment and Review
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall undertake, four years after the entry into force of this Protocol 
and thereafter at intervals determined by the Conference of the Parties serv-
ing as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of this Protocol.
1 Overview
As a specification to the general tasks of the Protocol’s governing body,1 
Article 312 requires the COP/MOP to undertake periodic assessments of the 
effectiveness of the Protocol. Article 31 thus provides an opportunity to identify 
the need for international guidance or adjustments that may be needed if the 
evaluation identifies specific areas in which the effectiveness of the Protocol 
can be improved.3 The specific mechanism and modalities for the assessment 
will have to be decided by the COP/MOP.4 The following section will discuss 
how the assessment and review process will likely function and its linkages 
with other provisions in the Protocol.
2 Functions and Links
Article 31 is modeled after the Cartagena Protocol,5 with the only difference 
that the first review is mandated after four years from entry into force and that 
following ones will be held at intervals to be determined by the COP/MOP. The 
Protocol’s assessment and review process can be interpreted as institutional 
supervision of the implementation of the Protocol, collective evaluation of 
1 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4). See this commentary on Article 26, section 2.
2 This provision that was not subject to negotiation: it was first incorporated in the Cali Draft, 
draft article 24. 
3 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 197.
4 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 251.
5 Biosafety Protocol Article 35, which reads: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall undertake, five years after the entry into force of 
this Protocol and at least every five years thereafter, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Protocol, including an assessment of its procedures and annexes.’
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its effectiveness, and as a complementary tool to the multilateral compliance 
mechanisms and procedures.6 As to the latter, the Protocol’s governing body 
is empowered to monitor implementation of the Protocol as a whole, whereas 
a future compliance committee will most likely focus on compliance by 
individual Parties7 in relation to specific circumstances. Thus, the COP/MOP 
under its review process will focus on the adequacy of the obligations under 
the Nagoya Protocol in its entirety, with a view to assessing their aggregate per-
formance in achieving the Protocol’s objectives,8 rather than the fulfillment 
of obligations by individual Parties. Nonetheless, the two processes will likely 
feed into each other: the results of the assessment and review processes may 
provide information relevant to the work of a future compliance committee, 
and the latter may also provide information that can contribute to assessment 
and review.9
As in the case of the Biosafety Protocol, the review process is ‘likely to be 
based in part on the information provided by Parties in their national reports 
on implementation of the Protocol as well as on other sources of information,’10 
so implementation of Article 31 will rely to a significant extent on compliance 
by Parties with their reporting obligations.11 It can also be expected that sub-
missions from ABS stakeholders,12 intergovernmental organizations,13 the CBD 
COP and its subsidiary bodies, notably the Working Group on Article 8(j), as 
well as reports by the Protocol Secretariat mandated to it on an ad hoc basis by 
the Protocol COP/MOP, will also contribute to the review.
Other provisions of the Protocol have expressly or implicitly made refer-
ence to this process. For instance, the review will particularly focus on the 
effectiveness of measures to ensure compliance with MAT.14 In addition, 
6 See this commentary on Article 30. This is based, by analogy, on the interpretation of 
Article 35 of the Biosafety Protocol put forward by Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to 
the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 197.
7 Although note that a future compliance committee under the Protocol may also address 
compliance issues involving private users and providers: see commentary on Article 30, 
section 3.3.
8 Bodansky, Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 239.
9 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 251.
10 Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 197.
11 See this commentary on Article 29.
12 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 251.
13 Particularly those involved in international processes that may be mutually supportive 
with the Protocol: see this commentary on Article 4.
14 Nagoya Protocol Article 18(4). See this commentary on Articles 5, section 5, 6, section 7 
and 18.
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CBD Parties have already indicated that the first review under the Protocol will 
assess the implementation of measures to ensure compliance with domestic 
ABS requirements related to traditional knowledge,15 in light of developments 
in other relevant international organizations, including WIPO.16
Given the many open-ended provisions of the Protocol, it has also been 
argued that the assessment and review process will serve to determine whether 
substantially divergent interpretation among its Parties hinders implementa-
tion, and fully assess the need for the Protocol’s governing body to provide 
authoritative interpretation, where needed.17 More generally, the assessment 
and review process will provide an opportunity for the Nagoya Protocol to 
evolve as a regime in light of lessons learnt in its implementation18 and sub-
sequent international developments, which is a common trait among MEAs.19
15 See this commentary on Article 16.
16 CBD Decision 10/1, paragraph 6. See also this commentary on Article 4, section 3.1.
17 Singh Nijar “An Asian Developing Country’s View,” op. cit., 249.
18 Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective,” op. cit., 495.
19 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, op. cit., 86–87; and 
Daniel Bodansky and Elliott Diringer, The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications 
for Climate Change (Arlington: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2010), accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/evolution-multilateral-regimes-
implications-climate-change.pdf>.
© Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani, and Matthias Buck, 2015.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 
Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License.
Final Clauses
ARTICLE 32. SIGNATURE
This Protocol shall be open for signature by Parties to the Convention at 
the United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 2 February 2011 to 
1 February 2012.
ARTICLE 33. ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of 
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession by States or regional economic integration organisations 
that are Parties to the Convention.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force for a State or regional economic 
integration organisation that ratifies, accepts or approves this Protocol 
or accedes thereto after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument as 
referred to in paragraph 1 above, on the ninetieth day after the date on 
which that State or regional economic integration organisation depos-
its its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or 
on the date on which the Convention enters into force for that State 
or regional economic integration organisation, whichever shall be the 
later.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument depos-
ited by a regional economic integration organisation shall not be 
counted as additional to those deposited by member States of such 
organisation.
ARTICLE 34. RESERVATIONS
No reservations may be made to this Protocol.
ARTICLE 35. WITHDRAWAL
1. At any time after two years from the date on which this Protocol 
has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this 
Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
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2. Any such withdrawal shall take place upon expiry of one year after the 
date of its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be 
specified in the notification of the withdrawal.
ARTICLE 36. AUTHENTIC TEXTS
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
1 Overview
Articles 32–36 are standard closing provisions of international (environmen-
tal) treaties.1 They were not subject to negotiation,2 and to a great extent rep-
licate the text of the Convention.3 As in any other international treaty, these 
provisions apply from the moment of the Protocol adoption, rather than its 
entry into force.4 The following sections will address any specific issues related 
to the Protocol that arise in the context of these provisions.
2 Signature and Entry into Force
At the time of writing, the Protocol attracted 92 Signatures,5 with many 
States and the European Union already taking legislative and other action to 
1 See generally on the signature, ratification and entry info force of treaties: Aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., chapters 7–9; on the final clauses of the Nagoya Protocol 
specifically, Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 253–264; and on the EU’s participation 
in multilateral environmental agreements, see Marín Durán and Morgera, Environmental 
Integration in the EU’s External Relations, op. cit., 17–24.
2 These Articles were first incorporated in the Cali Draft.
3 Nagoya Protocol Article 33 is modelled after Biosafety Protocol Article 37 (see comments 
by Mackenzie et al., Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol, op. cit., 201 on that provi-
sion) and corresponds to CBD Articles 38(2) and (4–5). Nagoya Protocol Article 34 reiterates 
CBD Article 38(1–2). Nagoya Protocol Article 35 replicates CBD Article 38(1)–(2); and Nagoya 
Protocol Article 36 mirrors exactly the text of CBD Article 42.
4 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., 162.
5 As mentioned above (this commentary on Article 1, fn. 63), at the time of writing the Protocol 
had 92 signatures and 26 ratifications.
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implement the Protocol.6 According to the law of treaties, after a government 
signs the Protocol, the State is obliged to refrain from acts that could defeat 
the object and purpose of the Protocol,7 unless the State manifests its inten-
tion not to become a Party to it.8 This implies that a State must avoid any act 
preventing it from being able to fully comply with the Protocol once it enters 
into force,9 or an act that would invalidate the basic purpose of the Protocol.10
Once the Protocol enters into force,11 its obligations may take effect at differ-
ent times for those States that will become Parties to it at a later stage. This may 
have particular relevance for provisions in the Protocol that refer to the ‘Party 
providing genetic resources’, rather than countries providing such resources.12 
In other words, if there are ABS transactions that involve Parties to the Protocol 
and CBD Parties that are not yet Parties to the Protocol, the latter will be only 
subject to the relevant CBD provisions.
3 Reservations
The Protocol includes an absolute prohibition for Parties to make reservations,13 
which can be explained by the desire to preserve the balance between the 
6 “Progress Report on the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization and Related Developments,” 
UNEP/CBD/COP/11/11 and ADD.1. 
7 See this commentary on Article 1.
8 VCLT Article 18, which reads: ‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged 
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until 
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a Party to the treaty; or (b) it has 
expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.’
9 It should be recalled that CBD Article 34 applies also to the ratification, acceptance 
and accession to CBD Protocols, including questions related to ‘Regional Economic 
Integration Organisations’ – an expression that applies to the European Union. 
10 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., 119.
11 As mentioned in this commentary on Article 1, fn. 63, at the time of writing the Protocol 
had 25 ratifications.
12 Similarly to CBD Article 15(3): see comments by Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, 
Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 127.
13 VCLT Article 19, which reads: ‘A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is prohibited by 
the treaty (. . .).’ See also VCLT Articles 20–23.
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various obligations created by the Protocol.14 This is in effect quite a common 
provision in other multilateral environmental agreements.15
While States are precluded from making a formal declaration that they do 
not consider themselves bound by some of the Protocol’s provisions,16 at the 
time they take the action needed to become a Party to the Protocol, the possi-
bility cannot be excluded that States may try to achieve the effect of a reserva-
tion through an interpretative declaration.17 The latter, although in principle 
it is not intended to have any legal effect in respect of the treaty at stake, may 
go beyond expressing the preference for an interpretation of the Protocol that 
is consistent with the domestic law of the State concerned, and rather aims at 
excluding or modifying the legal effect of certain provisions of the Protocol in 
their application to the State.18 At the time of writing, however, no declarations 
have been made on the Protocol. Pragmatically, it can be observed that the 
Protocol’s open-ended and heavily qualified language may already provide suf-
ficient flexibility to Parties, thereby lessening their desire to make declarations.19
4 Withdrawals
With regard to withdrawals20 from the Protocol, it should be noted that any 
Party to the Protocol that withdraws from the CBD will automatically withdraw 
from the Protocol too.21
14 Similarly to the CBD Article 37: see Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 124.
15 The prohibition of reservations is typical of treaties negotiated by consensus and as a 
package deal, and intends to express the Parties’ intention to create a single integral and 
interdependent treaty regime not open to contracting out: Boyle and Chinkin, Making of 
International Law, op. cit., 255.
16 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., chapter 8.
17 We are grateful to Riccardo Pavoni for drawing out attention to this point. If an 
interpretative declaration is genuine (i.e., it is not a ‘disguised reservation’), it can become 
an element in the interpretation of the Protocol, if no other Parties makes conflicting 
declarations or otherwise indicates disagreement: VCLT Article 31(2)(b) and Aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., 127–128.
18 Ibid., 126–131.
19 We are grateful to Riccardo Pavoni for drawing out attention to this point.
20 VCLT Article 54(a).
21 As a result of combined reading of CBD Articles 38(3) and 32.
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Withdrawals from multilateral environmental agreements have occurred in 
the recent past,22 so future research should consider the possible effects of a 
Party withdrawing from the Protocol on ABS arrangements concluded while 
the Protocol was in force for that Party.23
5 Official Languages
The Protocol was negotiated and adopted in the six official languages of the 
United Nations: all of its texts are equally authentic, thus they are presumed to 
have the same meaning.24 Of note are the corrections made to the French ver-
sion of the Protocol, which were announced by the CBD Secretariat on 27 June 
2011. As no objections were received, the French version of the original text of 
the Nagoya Protocol was amended accordingly.25
Any further cases of discrepancies between authentic language versions 
of the Protocol that may be identified in the future will be resolved either 
by interpretation, giving precedence – when the general rules of interpreta-
tion and supplementary means of interpretation fail – to the meaning which 
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
22 On 15 December 2011, the Government of Canada notified the UN Secretary-General 
that it had decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol with effect from 15 December 
2012: “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,” UN Treaty Collection, accessed 30 November 2013, <http://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&lang=en>. 
On 29 March 2013, Canada notified the UN Secretary-General its decision to withdraw 
from the UNCCD: “UN Convention to Combat Desertification Responds to Canada’s 
Withdrawal from Convention,” UN Convention to Combat Desertification, accessed 
30 November 2013, <www.unccd.int/en/media-center/MediaNews/Pages/highlightdetail 
.aspx?HighlightID=181> (not yet reported on the UNTS database).
23 On treaty withdrawal, see Duncan B. Hollis, The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 639–640; and James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 390–391.
24 VCLT Article 33(3).
25 CBD, Notification: Corrections du texte original de la version française du Protocole de 
Nagoya sur l’accès aux ressources génétiques et le partage des avantages (27 June 2011), 
accessed 30 October 2012, <www.cbd.int/doc/notifications/2011/ntf-2011-211-abs-fr.pdf> 
(only available in French).
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Protocol,26 or by amendment of one or more versions.27 In either case, 
Parties will likely engage in negotiations in the framework of the Protocol’s 
governing body.28
26 VCLT Article 33(4); Jonas and Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty,” op. cit., 574. 
See this commentary on Article 1.
27 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
op. cit., 129.
28 Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(a) and this commentary on Article 26, section 2. For 
an example of a possible discrepancy between the authentic language versions of the 
Protocol, see this commentary on Article 15, section 3.1, fn. 31.
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Conclusions
The objective of the Nagoya Protocol is realizing fairness and equity among 
States, as well as between governments and indigenous and local communi-
ties, through the sharing of monetary and non-monetary benefits arising from 
the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge.1 Facilitating access to 
genetic resources is a means to this end, although it is in fact a precondition 
for triggering benefit-sharing obligations and remains the dominant motiva-
tion for Parties that characterize themselves principally as user countries. The 
continued political tension between the two sides (access and benefit-sharing) 
of the transnational relation of exchange regulated by the Protocol explains its 
compromise language and its frequent interpretative ambiguities. This makes 
it less apparent how the Protocol intends to address the asymmetries among 
States, as well as between States and indigenous and local communities, that 
motivated its negotiations.2 This commentary has sought to identify textual, 
contextual and systemic interpretative questions and to suggest interpretative 
solutions that contribute to give coherent meaning and full effect to the whole 
text of the Protocol (effectiveness) and that avoid unfair advantages for certain 
Parties with a view to respecting the legitimate expectations of all Parties to 
the Protocol (good faith).3
On the basis of the detailed findings of the previous chapters, the conclu-
sions will reflect on four legal concepts that appear critical in the ongoing 
political and academic debate on the interpretation and operationalization of 
the Protocol: sustainable development, equity, due diligence and environmen-
tal rights.
1 Sustainable Development
More explicitly than many other multilateral environmental agreements, 
the Nagoya Protocol promises to contribute to sustainable development.4 
1 This is the Protocol’s essential goal ‘if a treaty could be boiled down to . . . [its] essence,’ 
which describes its ‘normative logic’ as basis for a ‘holistic mode of interpretation’: Jonas and 
Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty,” op. cit., 567 and 579. See this commentary on 
Article 1.
2 See Introduction to this commentary, section 1.
3 See Introduction to this commentary, section 5.
4 Dias, “Preface,” op. cit., 2.
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Its preamble makes reference to the potential of ABS transactions to contrib-
ute to scientific progress and innovation, poverty reduction, food security and 
public health, as well as the importance of technology transfer and coopera-
tion for adding value to genetic resources in developing countries and build-
ing their research capacities.5 Many of these elements are reflected in the 
operational provisions of the Protocol on special considerations, whereby 
Parties are to consider expeditious benefit-sharing towards those in ‘need,’ in 
particular developing countries, in the context of health-related emergencies. 
Regulatory space is also created in striking a balance between the Protocol’s 
bilateral ABS architecture and the continuation of exchanges of genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, with a view to contributing ultimately to 
food security.6 Concerns related to the social and economic pillars of sustain-
able development as articulated in treaties and instruments in other areas of 
international law (human rights, trade and investment, IPRs, oceans, as well as 
agriculture and health) are also addressed, in a much more open-ended and 
somewhat obscure way, in the Protocol provision on mutual supportiveness.7 
Furthermore, the Protocol key provision on benefit-sharing foresees contri-
butions to local economies, directing research towards health and food secu-
rity priority needs, and providing livelihoods security.8 Technology transfer 
is specifically seen as a means to acknowledge and reward the contribution 
of developing countries as well as of indigenous and local communities pro-
viding genetic resources and traditional knowledge9 as an essential form of 
benefit-sharing.10
With regard to the environmental pillar of sustainable development, the 
Protocol is expected to contribute not only to the conservation of biodiversity 
and the sustainable use of its components, but also to other global environ-
mental challenges such as climate change.11 As opposed to many other inter-
national environmental agreements, the Protocol is expected to contribute 
to environmental protection as an incentive-based system that innovatively 
structures international cooperation towards the contribution of genetic 
5 Nagoya Protocol 5th, 7th and 14th preambular recitals.
6 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(b–c) and this commentary on Article 8, sections 3–4.
7 See this commentary on Article 4.
8 Nagoya Protocol Annex, paragraphs 2(l–m) and (o). See this commentary on Article 5, 
section 6.
9 See this commentary on Article 23.
10 Greiber et al., Explanatory Guide, op. cit., 216.
11 Nagoya Protocol 14th preambular recital.
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variability to innovation.12 As such, the Nagoya Protocol may therefore pro-
vide a concrete case study for the ongoing debate on the green economy13 
and more generally on the use of an economic approach for more effective 
environmental mainstreaming, MEA implementation and involvement of the 
private sector.
Against this background, however, as discussed in more detail below, the 
Protocol does not focus solely on an economic approach for the benefit of 
environmental protection. It also presupposes a rights-based system, by man-
dating States to create the means to reward the stewards of biodiversity and 
holders of traditional knowledge – namely indigenous peoples and local com-
munities. In addition, it makes it part of its objective to realize the potential 
of ABS transactions to contribute to biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
use,14 and includes a series of operative provisions that explicitly aim to sup-
port a coherent interpretation of the three CBD objectives.15 Of these, some 
incorporate more clear-cut obligations, such as the requirement for Parties to 
create favorable conditions to promote and encourage research contributing 
to conservation and sustainable use,16 or the prohibition to restrict indigenous 
and local communities’ traditional use and exchanges of genetic resources that 
contribute to conservation and sustainable use.17 Other provisions, however, 
are more open-ended, notably the selection as a key non-monetary benefit of 
the sharing of research findings and the transfer of technology that contribute 
to conservation and sustainable use.18 Yet other provisions, notably the estab-
lishment of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, only embody an 
obligation for further negotiations.19
Overall, a complex and still uncertain picture emerges at this early stage 
as to how the Protocol will effectively function as an incentive-based frame-
12 See Introduction to this commentary, section 2.2.
13 Morgera and Savaresi, “A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on the Green Economy,” 
op. cit., 28, who conclude that while the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
did not unequivocally endorse a transition to the green economy, the understanding of the 
role of the green economy for accelerating and measuring progress towards sustainable 
development will likely become apparent in the area of international biodiversity law.
14 See this commentary on Article 1, section 4.
15 See this commentary on Article 5, section 6; Article 8, section 2; Article 9, section 2; 
Article 10, section 4; Article 12, section 5; Article 21, section 3; Article 22, section 3; and 
Article 23, section 3.
16 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a).
17 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(4).
18 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(f) and (k).
19 Nagoya Protocol Article 10.
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work for the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its compo-
nents. Empirical evidence on the contribution of ABS-based monetary benefits 
to environmental protection, food security and poverty eradication remains 
scarce.20 As multilateral deliberations focus on the implementation of the 
Protocol, national and community-level experiences multiply and the aca-
demic debate intensifies, it remains to be seen whether the linkage between 
ABS and sustainable development will become clearer, not only in policy and 
legal terms but also in terms of impact on the ground.
2 Equity
The Nagoya Protocol is basically premised on the international environmen-
tal law principle of intra-generational equity – equity among stakeholders of 
the same generation21 on the basis of self-determination, cultural diversity22 
and maintenance of ecological integrity.23 Intra-generational equity, however, 
remains quite novel and its status is still debatable in international law.24 In 
the specific context of ABS transactions, equity is expected to serve to strike 
a fair balance between the claims of a user country and of its individual users 
to carry out scientific research and protect biotechnological inventions, on the 
one hand, and the rights of provider countries and of their indigenous and 
local communities to obtain equitable rewards for the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge that they have conserved and that are indispensible to 
bio-based innovation, on the other hand.25 With a view to realizing equity in 
20 The same conclusion applies for the multilateral ABS framework developed under 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. See 
Moeller and Stannard, Identifying Benefit Flows, op. cit. See this commentary on Article 10, 
Section 3.
21 Rio Declaration, Principle 3 reads: ‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as 
to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations” (emphasis added).
22 Equity as ‘what is fair and reasonable in the administration of justice’ entails in 
international law reaching ‘a common sense of justice and fairness in a culturally and 
politically divided society as international society is today . . . reconciling, not only 
competing State interests, but also different ethical and cultural views of the peoples of 
the world’: Francesco Francioni, “Equity,” in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit., 
paragraphs 1 and 3.
23 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, “International Law and the Environment,” op. cit., 122.
24 Ibid., 123.
25 Francioni, “Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights,” op. cit., 20–21.
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this context, benefit-sharing is expected to reconcile competing interests and 
different (ethical, cultural and economic) views among States and stakehold-
ers as a tool for empowerment, participation and partnership.
Ultimately, the Nagoya Protocol operationalizes equity, in Prof. Francioni’s 
words, as an ‘unstructured source of principles which are assumed to inspire 
contractual arrangements.’26 Similarly to the Bonn Guidelines,27 the Nagoya 
Protocol limits itself to anchor fairness and equity to the establishment of 
MAT,28 without providing any substantive criteria in that regard either at the 
stage of the regulation of MAT negotiations in domestic ABS frameworks, 
their establishment or their enforcement through international coopera-
tion.29 There is therefore no explicit requirement or mechanism in the Nagoya 
Protocol focusing on the extent to which benefit-sharing is indeed fair and 
equitable in the context of specific ABS transactions.
Nothing of course prevents individual Parties from establishing some 
substantive rules on the content of MAT in their domestic ABS frameworks, 
as regards fair and equitable benefit-sharing. In addition, the Protocol does 
require Parties individually and collectively (through the Protocol’s governing 
body) to explore model contractual clauses30 and voluntary instruments,31 as 
well as awareness-raising32 and training activities,33 that may provide a bottom- 
up source of inspiration for fair and equitable benefit-sharing contracts.
That being said, the objective of the Protocol is unambiguous in requiring 
fairness and equity in benefit-sharing;34 as is the key provision on benefit- 
26 Francioni, “Equity,” op. cit., paragraph 25.
27 Bonn Guidelines, paragraphs 41 (which reads ‘Thus, guidelines should assist Parties 
and stakeholders in the development of mutually agreed terms to ensure the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits’) and 45 (which reads ‘Mutually agreed terms could cover 
the conditions, obligations, procedures, types, timing, distribution and mechanisms of 
benefits to be shared. These will vary depending on what is regarded as fair and equitable 
in light of the circumstances.’).
28 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1–2 and 5) and 10th preambular recital.
29 The Protocol provisions concerning MAT are invariably of a procedural character: see this 
commentary on Article 5, section 5; Article 6, section 7; Article 15, section 3.1; and Article 
18. Some reference to substantive guarantees only transpires in the Protocol provision 
on supporting indigenous and local communities in securing fairness and equity when 
negotiating MAT (Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(b)) and in more timid way on capacity 
building for developing countries (Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(b) and specific reference 
to equity in voluntary terms in Nagoya Protocol Article 22(5)(b)). 
30 Nagoya Protocol Article 19.
31 Nagoya Protocol Article 20.
32 Nagoya Protocol Article 21.
33 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(c) and 22(5)(b).
34 See this commentary on Article 1, sections 1–2.
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sharing.35 In addition, international human rights law also has a bearing on 
Parties’ obligations concerning equitable benefit-sharing arising from the 
use of genetic resources held by indigenous peoples and local communities 
and from the use of their traditional knowledge.36 It therefore remains to be 
seen in future practice in implementation and judicial pronouncements how 
Parties balance private parties’ contractual freedom with the need to achieve 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the light of the objective of the Protocol 
and international human rights law. The test will likely be framed in terms of 
due diligence.
3 Due Diligence
The Protocol contains a combination of bilateral and collective approaches 
to ABS. In other words, while it aims to regulate a relationship of exchange 
between States acting in specific circumstances as user and provider coun-
tries on the basis of reciprocity, it contains multilateral (erga omnes partes) 
obligations37 that aim to protect a collective interest of the international com-
munity. The bilateral system for access and benefit-sharing established by the 
Protocol, therefore, needs to be understood in the light of the conservation of 
biodiversity,38 which is a common concern of humankind,39 as well as general 
principles of equity and sustainable development. The bilateral obligations 
arising from the Protocol in the context of specific ABS transactions, therefore, 
are part of a system that is built upon inter-dependent, collective obligations 
triggering a sort of ‘global reciprocity’ so that implementation is conditional 
upon corresponding performance by all Parties.40
Against this background, it appears necessary to tease out the boundaries 
of due diligence under the Protocol, which is critical to the use of the ample 
margin of discretion left to Parties by the often open-ended formulation of the 
35 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1).
36 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 71–73.
37 Joost Pauwelyn, “A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations 
Bilateral or Collective in Nature?,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 907.
38 Nagoya Protocol Article 1.
39 CBD preamble. See discussion in Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the 
Environment, op. cit., 128–131; and more generally in Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, 
Common Heritage and Common Concern’ in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, op. cit., 550.
40 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “A General Stocktaking of the Connections Between the Multilateral 
Dimension of Obligations and Codification of the Law of Responsibility,” European 
Journal of International Law 13 (2002): 1053, 1071.
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obligations of means41 contained in the Protocol. Obligations of means42 have 
a continuing nature: a breach materializes from the moment the conduct of 
the State has been proven not to have been in conformity with the behavior 
required by the Protocol – that is, even before it is possible to assert that a cer-
tain result has not been achieved.43
Due diligence helps to better understand Parties’ obligations of means in 
developing their domestic ABS frameworks on benefit-sharing,44 access,45 and 
on ensuring individual users’ compliance.46 Domestic measures are to be all 
reasonably appropriate measures47 and embody Parties’ best possible efforts48 
to reach the objective of the Protocol (fair and equitable benefit-sharing among 
and within States and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity). 
Due diligence in the establishment of domestic ABS frameworks equally entails 
the establishment of administrative control systems to effectively monitor 
activities and the exercise of an appropriate level of vigilance in enforcement.49 
On both accounts, Parties are to exert appropriate and best possible efforts to 
ensure inter-operability of their domestic ABS frameworks with those of other 
Parties, as this is a pre-condition for the effective realization of the system put 
in place by the Protocol. In this connection, due diligence relies on the notion 
of good faith in expecting Parties to the Protocol to take into account the rea-
sonable expectations of the other members of the international community,50 
41 See ICJ, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judge-
ment (20 April 2010), (hereinafter, Pulp Mills), paragraph 187; ITLOS, Responsibilities 
and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Advisory 
Opinion (1 February 2011), paragraph 111.
42 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification 
of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility,” 
European Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 371, 378, where the author recalls 
that obligations of result involve in some measure a guarantee of the outcome, while 
obligations of means are in the nature of best efforts to do all in one’s power to achieve a 
result. 
43 Ibid., 382.
44 See this commentary on Article 5.
45 See this commentary on Articles 6–7.
46 See this commentary on Articles 15–16.
47 Pulp Mills, paragraph 197.
48 Sea Bed Advisory Opinion, paragraph 110.
49 Pulp Mills, paragraph 197; Sea Bed Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 115–116.
50 Markus Kotzur, “Good Faith”, in Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia, op. cit., para. 4.
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and protect the reasonable interests of other Parties51 in a predictable manner52 
in framing their domestic ABS frameworks with the ‘genuine intention to 
achieve a positive result.’53 This is of course particularly significant in assess-
ing Parties’ efforts in implementing the Protocol obligations on ensuring users’ 
respect for another country’s requirements for PIC and MAT, by relying on all 
tools provided to that end by the Protocol (at the international level, the ABS 
Clearinghouse and the internationally recognized certificate of compliance;54 
and at the national level, ‘effective’ checkpoints),55 as well as giving due con-
sideration to the expectations and reasonable requests from other Parties.56 
Equally, due diligence and good faith are essential criteria for assessing Parties’ 
efforts in engaging in international cooperation in addressing alleged cases of 
users’ non-compliance.57 Furthermore, due diligence and good faith may also 
be critical in the assessment of developed-country Parties’ implementation 
of their solidarity obligations in terms of funding,58 capacity-building,59 and 
technology transfer.60 In that context, because of the still open-ended balance 
of international obligations enshrined in the Nagoya Protocol, risks may arise 
that these initiatives may unduly favor the interests of user countries if pro-
vider countries find themselves dependent on user countries’ support or on 
ready-made solutions that may not respond to particular circumstances.
Due diligence also entails the exercise by States of effective administra-
tive control over private operators.61 Therefore States’ due diligence under the 
Protocol should be distinguished from users’ due diligence.62 The latter does 
51 Michael Virally, “Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law,” American Journal 
of International Law 77 (1983): 130.
52 Saul Litvinoff, “Good Faith,” Tulane Law Review 71 (1997): 1645, 1664.
53 ICJ, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United 
States of America), Judgment (12 October 1984), paragraph 87. 
54 See this commentary on Article 14, section 3 and Article 17, section 3.
55 See this commentary on Article 17, section 2.1.
56 See this commentary on Article 15, section 4.1; and Article 16, section 2.
57 See this commentary on Article 15, section 5; and Article 16, section 2.
58 Both through multilateral channels (in consideration of the double-weighted majority 
decision-making system in the GEF: see this commentary on Article 25, section 2) and 
through unilateral and bilateral channels (see this commentary on Article 25, section 3).
59 See this commentary on Article 22, section 5. 
60 See this commentary on Article 23.
61 Pulp Mills, paragraph 197; Sea Bed Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 115–116.
62 EU draft regulation, draft article 4(1), which reads: ‘Users shall exercise due diligence 
to ascertain that genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources used were accessed in accordance with applicable access and benefit-sharing 
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not exclude or diminish the international obligation of State Parties to imple-
ment the Protocol by appropriately regulating and effectively controlling the 
conduct of private users and providers in their jurisdiction.
That being said, private-sector due diligence presents interesting inter-
national law dimensions under the Protocol. First, corporate due diligence63 
can help companies respect responsible business conduct standards arising 
from the Nagoya Protocol,64 which may also have implications for interna-
tional investment disputes that could potentially arise in the context of the 
implementation of the Protocol.65 Second, corporate due diligence has been 
developed at the international level with regard to business entities’ respect for 
human rights,66 with specific implications for the understanding of users’ due 
diligence with respect to the community PIC requirement under the Protocol.67
All these considerations may help to address a fundamental legal question 
surrounding the international ABS regime. Since the entry into force of the 
legislation or regulatory requirements and that, where relevant, benefits are fairly and 
equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms.’
63 That is, the process through which enterprises ‘can identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts as an integral 
part of business decision-making and risk management systems’ (OECD Council, ‘OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises –: Update 2011 – Note by the Secretary-General” 
(3 May 2011) OECD doc C(2011)59), which not only concerns adverse impacts directly 
caused or contributed to by the enterprise but also those otherwise linked to their 
operations, products or services through a business relationship (OECD, Due Diligence 
Guide for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-risk 
Areas (Paris: OECD, 2013), accessed 30 October 2013, <www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
GuidanceEdition2.pdf>).
64 On the emergence of responsible business conduct standards arising from international 
law, see generally, Morgera, Corporate Accountability, op. cit.
65 See this commentary on Article 4, section 2.1.
66 In that context, due diligence is defined as the ‘process whereby companies not only 
ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm 
with a view to avoiding it’, based on reasonable expectations: Human Rights Council, 
“Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights” (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/
HRC/8/5, paragraphs 25 and 58. This has been further elaborated from the viewpoint 
of indigenous peoples’ human rights by: Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, James Anaya,” (19 July 2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37, section 3, which has also 
developed the environmental rights dimension of corporate due diligence: see Morgera, 
“Environmental Accountability of Multinational Corporations,” op. cit.
67 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2.2.
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Convention on Biological Diversity and particularly in the negotiation of the 
Nagoya Protocol, CBD Parties have expressed differing views on what CBD 
Article 15(7) and other provisions related to benefit-sharing entail. Parties that 
characterize themselves primarily as providers of genetic resources normally 
interpret it as an obligation of result.68 These Parties argue that obligations 
related to benefit-sharing, PIC and MAT69 are self-executing and user coun-
tries would need to require any proof of PIC and MAT for all transactions of 
genetic resources under their jurisdiction, even in the absence of domestic ABS 
frameworks in provider countries. Conversely, Parties characterizing them-
selves as predominantly user countries normally draw attention to the quali-
fiers in CBD Article 15(7)70 as an indication of an obligation of means that is 
not directly effective.71 These Parties also underline that more easily enforce-
able benefit-sharing obligations presuppose not only the existence of MAT but 
also of domestic legislation in provider countries spelling out procedures for 
the granting of PIC and establishment of MAT and for sharing benefits.72 The 
Nagoya Protocol does not necessarily resolve this fundamental divergence 
of views, although it clarifies that the absence of domestic ABS frameworks 
makes it virtually impossible for provider-country Parties to trigger user- 
country Parties’ compliance obligations.73 In view of its detailed provisions in 
that regard, the Protocol might engender a systematic multilateral process to 
identify and address when, why and to what extent Parties fail to implement 
their obligation to regulate ABS at the domestic level,74 which would certainly 
mark a stark contrast with existing practice under the CBD.75
68 This position is, for instance, supported by Tvedt and Young, Beyond Access, op. cit., 129.
69 CBD Articles 15(5) (requirement of PIC) and (4).
70 Namely, the wording ‘as appropriate’ and ‘with the aim of sharing.’
71 Note also that ‘. . . while Article 1 of the CBD states that its objective is the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of 
relevant technologies, it specifies that this must be done taking into account all rights 
over those resources and technologies. There is no provision of the CBD which requires 
that the conditions for the grant of a patent for biotechnological inventions should 
include the consideration of the interests of the country from which the genetic resource 
originates or the existence of measures for transferring technology’: European Court of 
Justice, Case C-377/98 Biotech Patents [2001] ECR I-7079, paragraph 66.
72 This position is, for instance, supported by Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, 
A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, op. cit., 82–83.
73 See this commentary on Article 6, section 3.1 and Article 15, section 3.1.
74 See this commentary on Article 6, section 3.1 and Article 30, section 3.1.
75 Morgera and Tsioumani, “Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” op. cit., 7. 
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4 Environmental Rights
Preliminary analyses of the Nagoya Protocol already indicated that the new 
treaty creates opportunities and risks for the realization of internationally rec-
ognized human rights of the public (in relation to access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice), and more notably the 
collective rights of indigenous peoples.76 The present analysis further suggests 
that, if interpreted and implemented in accordance with international human 
rights law, the Nagoya Protocol may represent a significant step forward in the 
debate on substantive environmental rights – a notion that remains very con-
troversial in international law.77
An argument can in fact be put forward that the Nagoya Protocol not only 
establishes an obligation for States to create the means to reward for their 
contribution to scientific progress for the benefit of the global community the 
indigenous and local communities responsible for the stewardship of genetic 
resources and for the development and protection of traditional knowledge 
associated with these resources. It is also implicitly underpinned by the recog-
nition (for the first time at the global level) of the substantive environmental 
rights of indigenous peoples and local communities to their genetic resources 
and to their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.78 Such 
recognition is based on established international human rights in their collec-
tive dimension to indigenous peoples’ self-determination, ownership and cul-
tural identity. It can further be argued that the Protocol points to an expansion 
of these rights to local communities,79 whose status in international human 
rights law remains underdeveloped.80
76 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., and Introduction to this 
commentary, section 4.
77 See Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment,” op. cit., 29–30 and other sources cited 
in this commentary on Article 5, fn. 36. The most cited example of an environmental 
treaty containing human rights is focused on procedural rights (the Aarhus Convention), 
whereas the only example of a treaty embodying a substantive environmental right is of a 
regional character (African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (27 June 1981, in force 
21 October 1986) 21 ILM 58, Article 24).
78 See this commentary on Article 5, sections 3–4; Article 6, section 4; and Article 7, 
section 2.
79 See Introduction to this commentary, section 4.2.
80 See generally Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in International Law, op. cit.
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To be sure, the Protocol is underpinned by a sophisticated elaboration of 
indigenous peoples and local communities’ procedural81 environmental rights 
in terms of benefit-sharing and community PIC.82 Notably, as opposed to the 
understanding that seems to emerge from relevant international human rights 
standards, benefit-sharing towards indigenous and local communities under 
the Protocol applies even in the absence of any restriction or deprivation of 
their right to use their genetic resources83 that may result from an ABS transac-
tion. In that regard as well as with regard to traditional knowledge, therefore, 
benefit-sharing under the Protocol does not simply aim at compensating indig-
enous and local communities. It also aims at empowering them to participate 
as equal partners in the utilization of their resources and knowledge.84 With 
regards to community PIC, while this is a well-established tool in international 
human rights, there are currently no international standards that can specifi-
cally fit with indigenous and local communities’ genetic resources and their 
traditional knowledge for research and development. Their specificities can-
not in effect be easily accommodated in the context of international guid-
ance on community PIC in case of proposed limitation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights to lands and natural resources (the classic case is relocation as a result 
of expropriation of indigenous peoples’ land) or expected negative impacts 
of extractive activities on indigenous peoples’ lands.85 The concept of com-
munity PIC under the Nagoya Protocol may rather serve as a procedural tool 
to empower indigenous and local communities to be actors in research and 
development efforts and results, as opposed to being recipients of (positive or 
negative) impacts of developments carried out by others.
81 PIC and benefit-sharing are seen as procedural safeguards for the realization of indigenous 
peoples’ substantive right to property, culture and non-discrimination, and their right 
to set and pursue their own priorities for development, including the development of 
natural resources, as part of their right to self-determination: “Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples’ rights” A/HRC/21/47, paragraphs 49–53.
82 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2; and Article 7, section 2.
83 Compare with the understanding of benefit-sharing as ‘compensation’ in Saramaka 
People v. Suriname 2008, paragraph 140.
84 The evolving legal notion of benefit-sharing under international law will be studied in 
depth by Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani, Annalisa Savaresi and Louisa Parks in the context 
of a 5-year research programme (2013–2018) funded by the European Research Council at 
the University of Edinburgh School of Law: <www.benelex.ed.ac.uk>.
85 See this commentary on Article 6, section 4.2
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These human rights-related developments embodied in the Nagoya 
Protocol are particularly noteworthy when one considers the reluctance by 
some CBD Parties to fully endorse in the Protocol the international human 
rights law language, particularly from UNDRIP.86 The recognition and pos-
sible justiciability of human rights entitlements under the Protocol, however, 
remains to be determined.87 This may depend on whether a national court 
or possibly an international judicial and quasi-judicial body is seized in this 
regard. If the question arises before a national court, the answer may depend 
on the constitutional order of different Parties to the Protocol and judicial cul-
tures vis-à-vis the potential direct or indirect effect88 of the Protocol provisions 
or the relevance of applicable international human rights law.89 It cannot be 
excluded, in addition, that indigenous and local communities may invoke rel-
evant Protocol provisions when having recourse to international human rights 
bodies.90 There are good indications that human rights monitoring bodies are 
inclined to investigate the respect of international human rights standards in 
the context of national measures implementing environmental treaties.91 In 
addition, it cannot be excluded that in the future Parties’ implementation of 
the community-related requirements under the Protocol may be the object of 
86 See introduction to this commentary, section 4.
87 But note that “justiciability is not the yardstick by which the status of a provision as a 
human right is to be judged. It is to be judged by reference to the authoritative nature 
of the sources that purport to identify it, by community expectation that an obligation 
exists”: Higgins, Problems and Process, op. cit., 102.
88 Ibid., 206–209; and generally André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International 
Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), especially chapters 6–7.
89 As a matter of human rights law, the right to a remedy under domestic law exists only 
insofar as it is explicitly provided for in the relevant human rights treaty, e.g. European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Strasbourg, 
4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222, Article 13; or upon the 
adoption of provisions to this effect in domestic law, as a result of States’ obligations to 
comply with a treaty, e.g. ICCPR, Article 2(3). We are grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for 
having drawn our attention to this point.
90 Recourse to international petition mechanisms is only available if the relevant State 
is Party to a human rights treaty that provides for such bodies. Frédéric Mégret, “The 
Nature of International Human Rights Obligations,” in Moeckli, Shah and Sivakumaran, 
International Human Rights Law, op. cit., 124, 148. For a list of UN human rights international 
complaint procedures, see: “Human Rights Bodies – Complaints Procedures,” UN Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed 30 October 2013, <www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx>.
91 Savaresi, “International Human Rights Law Implications,” op. cit., 72–73; and Annalisa 
Savaresi, “The Human Rights Dimension of REDD,” Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 21 (2012): 102, 107–108.
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scrutiny at the international level by a future compliance committee under the 
Protocol, particularly if indigenous and local communities have some form of 
access to the multilateral compliance mechanisms.92 It further remains to be 
seen whether such entitlements may have implications for the relations among 
State Parties to the Protocol: the right to invoke State responsibility assumes 
particular relevance for a breach of a treaty whereby States assume obligations 
to protect non-State entities.93 These may be considered erga omnes partes 
obligations that require States to prevent acts committed by private persons 
or entities that breach the principle of non-discrimination, by prohibiting and 
taking other appropriate measures to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by private persons or entities.94 That being said, however, few 
human rights bodies enabling State parties to complain about violations of 
human rights in other State Parties have received inter-State complaints.95
Overall, the findings related to the nature and extent of the environmen-
tal rights underpinning the Nagoya Protocol raise more questions than those 
that can be answered within the limits of the present enquiry. It is thus hoped 
that this commentary has laid the ground for a fertile academic debate in this 
regard.
5 Final Words of Caution
As interpretative difficulties are resolved, the Protocol could fuel novel and col-
laborative processes through which networks of public and private actors at 
international, regional, national and local levels would gradually work out the 
details of international and domestic ABS frameworks. In fact, a broad range of 
stakeholders at different levels will need to understand and contribute to the 
implementation of the Protocol: not only indigenous and local communities, 
but also the research community, the private sector, as well as intergovernmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations.96 Multi-level and multi-stakeholder 
92 See this commentary on Article 30, section 3.2.
93 Pauwelyn, “Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations,” op. cit., 915–922.
94 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31: Nature of the general legal 
obligations on State Parties to the Covenant” (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13, parapgraphs 2 and 8.
95 David Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 822; and in Mégret, “Nature of Obligations,” op. cit., 148. We are 
grateful to Annalisa Savaresi for drawing our attention to this point.
96 This broad approach to implementation is reflected in the provisions on capacity-building 
that explicitly address a very broad range of non-State actors: Nagoya Protocol Article 22.
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governance of ABS transactions is explicitly promoted by the Protocol not only 
by allowing for flexibility in implementation at the domestic level but also 
through provisions on model contractual clauses, codes of conduct, and com-
munity protocols.97 All these provisions could allow for legal experimentation 
from the bottom up and the top down in mutually reinforcing ways, with a 
view to making the open-ended provisions of the Protocol an opportunity for 
mutual learning among different ABS stakeholders.
Against this complex, future scenario, it should be finally cautioned that 
this commentary represents an early attempt to unravel the multifaceted and 
sometimes obscure innovations of the Nagoya Protocol. To that extent, many 
of the present findings can only be of a preliminary character.
97 See this commentary on Article 12, section 2.1 and Articles 19–20. 
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Appendix: Text of the Preamble of the Nagoya 
Protocol
(numbering suggested by authors)
The Parties to this Protocol,
1. Being Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, hereinafter referred to as 
“the Convention”,
2. Recalling that the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utili-
zation of genetic resources is one of three core objectives of the Convention, 
and recognizing that this Protocol pursues the implementation of this objective 
within the Convention,
3. Reaffirming the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources and 
according to the provisions of the Convention,
4. Recalling further Article 15 of the Convention,
5. Recognizing the important contribution to sustainable development made by 
technology transfer and cooperation to build research and innovation capaci-
ties for adding value to genetic resources in developing countries, in accordance 
with Articles 16 and 19 of the Convention,
6. Recognizing that public awareness of the economic value of ecosystems and 
biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of this economic value with the 
custodians of biodiversity are key incentives for the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components,
7. Acknowledging the potential role of access and benefit-sharing to contribute to 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, poverty eradication 
and environmental sustainability and thereby contributing to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals,
8. Acknowledging the linkage between access to genetic resources and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of such resources,
9. Recognizing the importance of providing legal certainty with respect to access 
to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
their utilization,
10. Further recognizing the importance of promoting equity and fairness in negotia-
tion of mutually agreed terms between providers and users of genetic resources,
11. Recognizing also the vital role that women play in access and benefit-sharing 
and affirming the need for the full participation of women at all levels of policy-
making and implementation for biodiversity conservation,
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12. Determined to further support the effective implementation of the access and 
benefit-sharing provisions of the Convention,
13. Recognizing that an innovative solution is required to address the fair and equi-
table sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in trans-
boundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior 
informed consent,
14. Recognizing the importance of genetic resources to food security, public health, 
biodiversity conservation, and the mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change,
15. Recognizing the special nature of agricultural biodiversity, its distinctive features 
and problems needing distinctive solutions,
16. Recognizing the interdependence of all countries with regard to genetic resources 
for food and agriculture as well as their special nature and importance for 
achieving food security worldwide and for sustainable development of agricul-
ture in the context of poverty alleviation and climate change and acknowledging 
the fundamental role of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture and the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture in this regard,
17. Mindful of the International Health Regulations (2005) of the World Health 
Organization and the importance of ensuring access to human pathogens for 
public health preparedness and response purposes,
18. Acknowledging ongoing work in other international forums relating to access 
and benefit-sharing,
19. Recalling the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-sharing established 
under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture developed in harmony with the Convention,
20. Recognizing that international instruments related to access and benefit-sharing 
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving the objectives of the 
Convention,
21. Recalling the relevance of Article 8(j) of the Convention as it relates to tradi-
tional knowledge associated with genetic resources and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
22. Noting the interrelationship between genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge, their inseparable nature for indigenous and local communities, the impor-
tance of the traditional knowledge for the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of its components, and for the sustainable livelihoods of 
these communities,
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23. Recognizing the diversity of circumstances in which traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is held or owned by indigenous and local 
communities,
24. Mindful that it is the right of indigenous and local communities to identify the 
rightful holders of their traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, 
within their communities,
25. Further recognizing the unique circumstances where traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is held in countries, which may be oral, docu-
mented or in other forms, reflecting a rich cultural heritage relevant for conser-
vation and sustainable use of biological diversity,
26. Noting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and
27. Affirming that nothing in this Protocol shall be construed as diminishing or 
extinguishing the existing rights of indigenous and local communities,
Have agreed as follows:
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